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PRELUDE ONE 
The thought of every age is reflected in its technique. The civil engineers of the 
ancient days were land surveyors, astronomers, and navigators; those of the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries were clockmakers and lens grinders. In ancient times, the 
craftsmen made their tools in the image of the heavens. A watch is nothing but a pocket 
orrery moving by necessity as do the celestial spheres; and if friction and the dissipation 
of energy play a role in it, they are effects to be overcome so that the resulting motion of 
the hands may be as periodic and regular as possible. The chief technical result of this 
engineering after the model of Huyghens and Newton was the age of navigation, in which 
it was possible, for the first time, to compute longitudes with a respectable precision, and 
to convert the commerce of the great oceans from a thing of chance and adventure to a 
regular understood business. It is the engineering of the mercantilists. 
 To the merchant succeeded the manufacturer, and to the chronometer, the steam 
engine. From the Newcomen engine almost to the present time, the central field of 
engineering has been the study of prime movers. Heat has been converted into usable 
energy of rotation and translation, and the physics of Newton has been supplemented by 
that of Rumford, Carnot, and Joule. Thermodynamics makes its appearance, a science in 
which time is eminently irreversible; and although the earlier stages of this science seem 
to represent a region of thought almost without contact with the Newtonian dynamics, the 
theory of the conservation of energy and the later statistical explanation of the Carnot 
principle or second law of thermodynamics or principle of the degeneration of energy – 
that principle that makes the maximum efficiency obtainable by a steam engine 
depending on the working temperatures of the boiler and the condenser – all of these 
have fused thermodynamics and the Newtonian dynamics into the statistical and the non-
statistical aspects of the same science. 
 If the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the later 
eighteenth century the age of steam engines, the present age is the age of communication 
and control.1 
                                                 
1
 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in The Animal and The Machine 2nd ed. 
(New York: The MIT Press, 1961), p. 38-9. 
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PRELUDE TWO 
To those who doubt whether there is progress in philosophy, it may be pointed out 
that in the three hundred years since Descartes died philosophical mankind has learned 
something. The word ‘Descartes’ is not equivalent to the word ‘modernity’, yet no other 
figure so symbolizes the spirit of modern thought: a broad departure from the Cartesian 
theses and assumptions implies an inner development of modern philosophy, a critique of 
modernity itself, and the readiness of this moment for a new stage of fundamental 
construction. 
There is a near consensus – as near as philosophers ever ought to achieve – over 
some of Descartes’ theses: for example that we can no longer accept neither the clean 
split between mind and body, which as a working hypothesis set laboratory science free 
for methodological cleanliness and a triumphant sweep of theory, nor the bisection of our 
physical experience into the sense-qualities, which are subjective, and the quantities, 
which are “out there” and “real”, nor the precise mathematical perfection of every 
detail of physical sequence, inside and outside of organic bodies. These items of 
conventional Cartesianism are not false – we still use them. It is simply that they are not 
“the truth” and that we cannot tell the truth now available to us in terms of space, time, 
masses, and laws of formula of Galileo or Newton, of Lavoisier or Laplace, of Helmholtz 
or Tyndall, or even of Clerk-Maxwell. We require new concepts for physics, but also for 
the world at large new categories.2 
                                                 
2
 William Ernest Hocking, „Foreword“ in Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process: Studies 
in Metaphysics and Religion (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 11. 
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PRELUDE THREE 
While it is the triumph of the analytical and conceptual model …the computer can also 
force us to transcend that model. Information itself is indeed analytical and conceptual, 
but information is the organizing principle of every biological process. Life, as modern 
biology teaches, is embodied in a “genetic code”, that is programmed information. 
Indeed, the sole definition of that mysterious reality “life” that does not invoke the 
supernatural is that it is matter organized by information. In a mechanical phenomenon 
the whole is equal to the sum of its parts and therefore capable of being understood by 
analysis. Biological phenomena are however “wholes.” They are different from the parts 
of their parts. Information is indeed conceptual but meaning is not…3 
                                                 
3
 Peter F. Drucker, The New Realities In Government and Politics in Economics and Business, in 
Society and World View (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1989), p. 262. 
 xii
INTRODUCTION 
The invention and the diffusion of electronic computers and related information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) are not just technical innovations. They bring 
cultural changes that affect not only the way people behave, but also the way people 
think. The subsequent structural and cultural implications make the “information 
revolution” a fertile ground for philosophical investigation by identifying constitutive 
elements of an emerging new conceptual framework or ongoing features of a change in 
paradigm. Change in paradigm does not only involve changing ways of creating, storing, 
sharing, articulating, and applying knowledge, but also creating new tools of reflection 
such as metaphor and images. In this context, some parallels can be noticed between 
interactive systems and knowing as a social practice, the integrating nature of computer 
systems and what is known as “systems thinking” or the puzzling concept of “intelligent 
technology” mainly represented by “artificial intelligence” and “virtual reality”. 
 
Since the electronic computer and computer-related ICTs (information and 
communication technologies) have multimedia features that integrate sound, image, and 
written text, it is possible to integrate patterns of human knowing that begin with 
different patterns of experiencing. Such patterns lead from experiencing to understanding, 
judging, and often to evaluating, deciding, and acting. Since knowledge is a factor of 
production and a criterion of social mobility, it shapes the management of natural and 
cultural resources in a way that philosophy ceases to be an armchair activity. The 
philosopher, in this new context, is not an abstract speculator, but an active member of 
the community. Hence, the philosopher of knowledge or the epistemologist participates 
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in the life of the community through teaching, social analysis, regular publications, and 
participation in debates of public interest. 
 
This makes the philosopher an information provider, processor, and evaluator. From 
different nodes of information networks the philosopher is at the heart of new canons of 
rationality and effectiveness that create new metaphors, such as networked organizations, 
interactive processes, and feedback loops. Hence, the definition of knowledge in terms of 
information needs to be investigated seriously in order to establish clear rapports between 
information, cultural beliefs, scientific knowledge, technological developments, and 
popular wisdom. All these are tools of decision making and problem solving, and the way 
they are articulated and applied influences the way people make responsible choices and 
carry on ethically acceptable actions. 
 
This thesis will attempt to articulate an information-based, dynamic and integrative 
model of epistemology. This model, on the one hand, intends to bring forward the notion 
of information as a paradigm of our time, and on the other hand, to show how this notion 
sets the ground for a dynamic and integrative epistemology that integrates contributions 
from many disciplines into the epistemological framework of the Canadian philosopher 
Bernard Lonergan. In the first chapter, with ample reference to Thomas Kuhn, the 
concept of paradigm change will be explained and then applied to the emergence of the 
scientific model and normative epistemology. It will be pointed out that modern science 
and normative epistemology have emerged as remedies to the arbitrariness of 
supernatural beliefs and the tyranny of authority in the description of reality and the 
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articulation of knowledge. The period of crisis that span from the late medieval age and 
the early modern times generated puzzles that challenged the medieval synthesis based on 
supernaturalism and scholasticism in an unprecedented way. Philosophers and scientists 
(called natural philosophers) would no longer rely on revelation, tradition, and religious 
authority in their description of reality and the articulation of knowledge. New paradigms 
were needed as the medieval synthesis was no longer able to contain various movements 
of contestation, such as the reformation and the emergence of an urban intellectual elite 
that separated knowledge roles appealing to reason, from clerical status or reference to 
supernatural entities, revelation, tradition, and (religious) authority. In this context, 
modern science and normative epistemology emerged as reason-based ways of describing 
reality and articulating knowledge. They benefited from new tools of observation, such as 
the telescope and the microscope. Moreover, new technologies such as printing put an 
end to the esoteric character of knowledge by making devotional books that were 
previously reserved to the clergy available to the laity. These social processes and 
movements of contestation created a situation where reason became the sole foundation 
of human knowledge through observation, reasoning, and experimenting. These new 
methods aimed at establishing “a” permanent foundation for a “new” knowledge based 
on rational principles and not on supernatural beliefs or coercion by political and 
religious authority. This new foundation was expected to be solid enough to lead to 
indubitable, infallible, and incorrigible knowledge. Certainty or “clear and distinct” ideas 
were ideals for any knowledge claim according to the Cartesian tradition. Normative 
epistemology, in this context, defined knowledge as true justified belief. This definition 
was linked with Plato’s distinction between knowledge (episteme) and opinion (doxa) or 
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the refutation of skepticism. Normative epistemology aimed at describing reality as it is 
(objectivity) and discarding the limitations associated with one’s spatial location, social 
status, moral values, and religious beliefs (universality). Furthermore, normative 
epistemology established a great mistrust of human senses by upholding that knowing is 
an activity of the mind. That is why the mechanical model with mathematics and logic as 
its systems of representation should be put in a historical perspective. Its claims to 
objectivity, universality, and truth are better understood when one has in mind its aim of 
providing remedies to the limits of the divine-organic model, which dominated 
scholasticism in the Middle Ages. The mechanical model, in the first instance, rejects 
metaphysical dualism, and establishes an order of causality that is embedded in the 
universe itself. In the second instance, the mechanical model postulates an isomorphism 
between the structure of the universe and the structure of the human mind. This approach 
implies the universality of reason against the privileged access to knowledge and truth of 
the authority of the church through its privileged access to “revealed” texts. The 
mechanical model, therefore, can be better understood as a response to scholasticism. Its 
rejection of a supernaturalism widely justifies its preference for empirical methods. 
Whereas the divine-organic model of the Middle Ages accepted revelation, tradition, and 
authority as suitable ways of accessing knowledge and truth, the mechanical model, 
replaces this trilogy by a different one: observation, reasoning, and experimenting. 
 
Changes in paradigms do not occur due to questions of fashion and personal taste, but to 
well entrenched conceptions of the universe. Paradigms determine what is acceptable and 
accepted as part of reality. The criteria used to define reality set the limits to what can be 
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included in an intelligible discourse. In other words, the criteria used to define reality also 
determine which systems of representation represent the best structure and behavior of 
the universe. Against the privileged access of the clergy through revelation, the 
mechanical model postulates an impersonal and timeless form of knowledge that does not 
depend on the qualities or the situation of the knower. In other words, universal and 
objective knowledge is necessary in the sense that it does not depend on any contingency. 
It differs from personal opinion, propaganda, or prejudice. As a specialized and 
systematized type of knowledge, objective and universal knowledge conflicts with other 
systems of explanation, such as myth and religion. In brief: 
(1) Objectivity calls for putting one’s idiosyncratic predilections and parochial 
preferences aside in forming one’s beliefs, evaluations, and choices. It is a 
matter of proceeding in line not with one’s inclinations, but with the dictates of 
impartial reason. 
(2) The universality of reason must be recognized: What is rational for one 
person to do, to believe, or to value will thereby also of necessity be equally 
rational for the rest of us who might find ourselves in the same circumstances. 
For rationality is inherently “objective”: It does not reconfigure itself to meet 
idiosyncratic predilections of particular individuals.1 
 
However, although modern science and normative epistemology have been great allies, 
standard epistemology textbooks present these disciplines as a-historical discourses that, 
in the name of objectivity and universality, attest to the rational development of a 
disembodied mind. The method of rational construction, which is often used, fails to link 
modern science and normative epistemology to the context of their emergence, depriving 
readers of their awareness of the puzzles that modern science and normative 
epistemology as emerging paradigms try to solve. This thesis attempts to overcome this 
shortcoming by establishing a parallelism between the movements of contestation and 
technological developments that have led to the decline of the medieval synthesis and the 
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development of modern science and normative epistemology as its alternatives. The 
disintermediation of knowledge brought by a decrease in reference to religious authority 
as a foundation of knowledge created a conflict between individual experience and 
institutionalized knowledge in a way that the option for the former by Descartes created a 
situation where knowing was presented as the activity of individual minds. This thesis 
argues that normative epistemology is mistaken by focusing on individual minds since it 
reduces human knowledge to univocal propositions that are formulated by the fixation of 
meaning and reference. It shows that the realm of human knowing is much broader than 
the propositional form that reduces knowing to knowing matters of fact, i.e. “knowing 
that”, although it can be shown that even if one upholds that knowing is “knowing that”, 
predication itself is paradigm-bound as paradigms determine what is included or 
excluded in the description of reality and the articulation of knowledge. This thesis, 
moreover, suggests a dynamic and integrative model of epistemology that defines 
knowledge not in its propositional form, but as a process of accumulating insights, which 
integrates emotional (pathos), intellectual (logos), evaluative (ethos), and pragmatic 
(praxis) dimensions. This model is based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan, who 
contends that human knowing involves four operations, namely experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and acting, and that the human mind acts at four levels of 
consciousness, i.e. the empirical, the intellectual, the reasonable, and the responsible 
level. Lonergan’s epistemology, in my view, provides a framework for an epistemology 
of successions that puts various rivaling schools of thought, such as empiricism, 
rationalism, critical theory, and pragmatism on one dynamically integrated continuum 
instead of considering them as unresolvable binary dichotomies that have led to the well 
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entrenched opposition of rationalism vs. empiricism, idealism vs. positivism, principles 
vs. facts, ideas (concepts) vs. objects, and theory vs. practice. 
 
Moreover, normative epistemology and modern science define reality – minds included –
according to a mechanical model. This mechanical model defines reality in terms of 
matter, motion, and universal mechanical laws. The mechanical paradigm, to use Kuhn’s 
terms, is a suitable alternative to the metaphysical dualism embedded in supernaturalism. 
By naturalizing or materializing substance, mechanical models focus on invariant aspects 
of reality that they consider as substances or universals. There is a well entrenched belief 
that universal laws are permanent and that they can be formulated into simple 
mathematical relations similar to Newton’s laws of motion, for instance. Mechanical 
models have become popular as many mechanical machines, such as the steam engine, 
have provided possibilities of generating motion from matter, unlike in previous periods 
where motion was associated with supernatural powers, such as the soul or anima in 
Latin (before the steam engine, only animated beings would move themselves or move 
others). However, mechanical models are limited as they can only handle simple, regular, 
and ordered processes as the latter operate according to linear patterns of causality, which 
are similar to mathematical operations and logical rules of inference. This assumed 
similarity is based on the widespread idea that the universe is a mechanical machine and 
that the mechanical laws of the universe are similar to the rules of logical inference. 
Mechanical models fail to handle complex and dynamically integrated systems and 
processes since the latter function in a way that the high level of interaction of their 
components does not allow the isolation of the parts and the formulation of the relations 
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between inputs and outputs into simple mathematical relations and rules of logical 
inference. Complex and dynamically integrated systems and processes function according 
to a cybernetic model where inputs and outputs influence each other by following 
differential rules that determine relations of control through information and feedback. 
These differential rules imply that cybernetic systems and processes are always in flux as 
they try to maintain their defining characteristics in certain thresholds as a way of 
avoiding destruction or transformation into something else and, at the same time, interact 
with their environment by following feedback processes that lead to the transformation of 
the systems and processes themselves or to the transformation of the environment by 
these systems and processes. 
 
The second chapter suggests a model of human knowing that is based on information and 
cybernetics. Unlike the mechanical model, which postulates a simple, regular, and 
ordered universe that is based on this model, a cybernetic-based model builds on the 
complexity and dynamism inherent in natural processes, and complements the limitations 
of the mechanical model. A cybernetic model defines reality not only in terms of matter 
and motion, but in terms of matter, motion, logic, and symbolism. A cybernetic model 
does not only look at matter in motion (the mechanical dimensions), but also at matter as 
it organizes itself into complex systems and processes (structure), as it changes its 
structural patterns over time (behavior), and at matter as it fulfils human purposes in 
terms of satisfying needs and maximizing capabilities (function/goal). A cybernetic 
model provides a better description of the process of human knowing as information 
processing since by defining information as negative entropy, i.e. a degree of 
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organization, Wiener implies that any organized system or process conveys an amount of 
information that is commensurate to its degree of organization. Therefore, totally 
disorganized and random processes are unintelligible as they do not convey any 
information. On the contrary, simple, regular, and ordered systems and processes such as 
those that naturally operate or are built according to mechanical models can be fully 
intelligible as their high level of organization leaves them with negligible levels of 
entropy or with no entropy at all in a way that they lend themselves to univocal 
predication and analytic methods providing the possibility of being understood with 
levels of certainty that approximate the Cartesian search for “clear and distinct” ideas or a 
level of accuracy similar to the one of mathematical operations and logical rules of 
inference. Opting for cybernetic models as an alternative to mechanical models implies 
an information-based model of reality based on Wiener’s definition of the measure of 
information as negative entropy and an information-based model of knowledge based on 
the intelligibility of the systems and processes under study, on the one hand, and the 
ability of the knower to process information by enriching the immediate data of 
experience with value and meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-
solving. This approach to knowledge is different from normative epistemology’s 
reduction of knowledge to its propositional form - a corollary of Descartes’ reduction of 
wisdom to certainty – since knowing, according to this model, leads to insights that can 
be theoretical or practical, individual or collective by following the integration of new 
data of immediate experience into an existing explanatory framework with the possibility 
of confirming the data or having the data disrupt the existing explanatory framework in a 
way that either the data itself or the explanatory framework is called into question. 
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A cybernetic model presents human knowing as a dynamic, integrative, cumulative, 
recurrent, and iterative process, unlike the Cartesian model, which reduces the whole 
process of knowing to its outcome, i.e. true justified beliefs or “clear and distinct” ideas. 
Understanding knowing as a multilevel and multi-operational process creates a possibility 
of understanding the link between Lonergan’s epistemology and an info-computationalist 
model as the various steps of the information process, i.e. enriching data with meaning 
and value and subjecting them to purposes of decision-making and problem-solving, 
imply shifting from one level of consciousness to another by giving a semantic dimension 
to immediate data of experience through understanding (generating meaning), i.e. shifting 
from the first level (empirical) of consciousness to the second (intellectual) level, and 
creating value by judging, choosing, deciding (the third “rational” level of consciousness 
according to Lonergan), and achieving goals by acting or voluntarily deciding not to act 
(the fourth “responsible” level of consciousness on Lonergan’s scale). Establishing a 
parallelism between Lonergan’s epistemology and an info-computationalist model of 
human knowing implies a dynamic and integrative model of epistemology that rejects the 
reduction of knowledge to its logico-deductive dimensions and calls for integrating 
scientific and common sense knowledge. These two forms of knowledge are different 
both in their scope and their telos since scientific knowledge is universal in scope and 
depends on universal laws of inference while common sense knowledge only applies to 
very contextualized problems and depends much more on individual judgment rather than 
on rules. Moreover, whereas Descartes presents a model of the philosopher in general and 
the epistemologist in particular as a solitary thinker conducting thought, this dynamic and 
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integrative model of epistemology acknowledges that some aspects of human knowing 
occur at the subconscious level as Polanyi has pointed out in the Tacit Dimension.2 
Furthermore, this model rejects Descartes’ idea of founding certainty or clear and distinct 
ideas on self-evident axioms that we intuit by pointing out that the context of discovery is 
preceded in Lonergan’s view by a tension of inquiry and that, according to the genetic 
epistemology of Jean Piaget, logico-deductive knowledge given its abstract nature occurs 
at a relatively high level of mental development. It builds on a certain amount of 
sensorimotor knowledge through the human ability to apprehend relations between 
objects through the mediation of representations of the characteristics of these objects. 
The second chapter, therefore, challenges a Platonic understanding of mathematics as 
having an existence of its own or as an intuitive approach that claims that basic axioms 
are self-evident and indicates that mathematics is a human enterprise that is built through 
the formalization of space by using metaphors, such as numbers as points on a line or 
numbers as sets. 
 
Defining knowing as information processing implies not only taking into account 
substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional dimensions, but also enriching data 
with value and meaning for the purpose of decision making and problem solving. This 
dynamic and integrative model of epistemology rejects the Cartesian strategy of cutting 
oneself off from objects and defines knowledge according to Lonergan’s concept of self-
appropriation. Self-appropriation implies that knowing is not an activity of a mind 
isolated or isolable from the body, but an activity of the whole organism in interaction 
with the environment. This idea of the whole organism interacting with the environment 
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in the way it was developed by Jean Piaget provides a biological foundation of 
knowledge instead of postulating a de facto opposition of the mind to the body or an a 
priori definition of the mind as non-physical, a vestige of the medieval supernatural soul, 
which is often presented as an ethereal reality that lacks physical extension. 
  
The third chapter builds on complexity as defined by a cybernetic model and shows that 
there are links between mechanical models and analytic methods. This linking of 
mechanical models and analytic methods implies that rejecting mechanical models calls 
for changing paradigms at the methodological level. This chapter contends, following 
von Bertalanffy3, that analytic methods not only apply to systems and processes of which 
parts can be clearly delineated due to their low levels of interaction, but also to systems 
and processes that follow linear patterns of causation. The only systems and processes 
that are analyzable are mechanical systems and processes as they fulfill the two criteria of 
analycity. Given the fact that mechanical models have negligible levels of entropy, they 
convey optimal levels of information and are the only ones that can generate knowledge 
at those levels of accuracy that Descartes suggested. Otherwise, highly complex systems 
and processes are not analyzable unless some of their characteristics are fixed or isolated 
from the systems and processes themselves. This need of fixing characteristics or 
isolating aspects under study involves translating these characteristics and aspects into a 
medium that lends itself to univocal predication, logical rules of inference, and 
mathematical operations. This strategy, often adopted in normative epistemology implies 
reducing knowledge to its logico-deductive dimensions, i.e. reducing wisdom to 
certainty, fixing meaning and reference, reducing knowing to thinking, and hermetically 
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isolating the mind from the body. However, a cybernetic model of reality involves 
defining reality as a complex process of information and control through feedback,4 and 
this process is not defined in terms of materialist and mechanistic dimensions, but it takes 
into account aspects of order and purpose as well. This approach looks at the issue of 
complexity from its substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional/teleological points 
of view.5 Acknowledging these patterns of complexity leads to a methodological strategy 
that apprehends reality in terms of dynamic and integrative processes, of which 
mechanical systems and processes are special cases. This methodological strategy that is 
called “systems thinking” avoids the simplicity involved in analysis, i.e. cutting systems 
and processes into pieces, since most systems and processes are not reducible to their 
components. Moreover, proponents of analytic models and methods uphold an anti-
metaphysicalism that reduces reality to invariant aspects that are considered as substances 
and universals and assumes that these universals are mathematical. However, a dynamic 
and integrative epistemology does not only look at matter at rest or in motion, but also at 
matter as it organizes itself into various patterns that convey information that is 
commensurate to their degree of organization. From this point of view one can analyze 
only systems and processes that are analyzable, i.e. systems and processes with parts that 
can easily be separated and reassembled given their low level of interaction and the linear 
pattern of their causal relations. Systems and processes that are inherently complex, 
dynamic, and integrative can only be understood by following a model that takes into 
account their substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional/teleological aspects. That 
is why the third chapter suggests a paradigm shift from the analysis/synthesis dichotomy 
to systems thinking. 
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By examining the notion of information from an interdisciplinary point of view, the 
fourth chapter brings us to the core. This assessment reaches a definition of information 
as patterns of (self-) organizing matter and energy, which confirms Wiener’s definition of 
information as “negative entropy”, i.e. negative disorder, i.e. a certain degree of order.6 
Limiting information to patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy only provides a 
static understanding of information that reduces information processes to the spatial 
arrangements of macromolecules, neurons and pulses, objects in the environment, and 
parts in artifacts, which determine the structure of the processors. Examining information 
from three facets, i.e. mapping, interpreting, and evaluating, shows that the notion of 
information embodies patterns of being, behaving, and becoming in a way that it 
constitutes a suitable foundation for a dynamic and integrative epistemology that takes 
into account structural, behavioral, and teleological/teleogenic processes. This model of 
epistemology challenges normative epistemology’s definition of knowledge in terms of 
(accurate) representation of reality and instead suggests a dynamic and integrative model 
of the process of human knowing as accumulating insights through information 
processing. This dynamic and integrative model of epistemology takes into account 
processes that occur at the macromolecular, neural, cultural, and technological levels, 
unlike normative epistemology, which confines the process of human knowing to 
individual human minds that are assumed to be hosted by individual human bodies in 
individual human beings. Even when the process of human knowing is considered as it 
occurs in individual human beings, dynamic and integrative epistemology takes into 
account the possible integration of formal scientific forms of knowing and their informal 
 xxvi
counterparts, and on the other hand, it does not exclude the rationality embodied in 
artifacts, such as special organizations designed in order to fulfill special goals. This 
rationality embedded in artifacts calls for an integration of individual human rationality 
with institutional rationality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MODERN SCIENCE AND THE HEGEMONY OF 
NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are intrinsic links between modern science and normative epistemology. Modern 
science as a conceptual framework rejects the metaphysical assumptions of the medieval 
synthesis i.e. supernaturalism. Supernaturalism can be defined as a conception of reality that 
refers to entities such as God, spirits, angels and so forth. Rejecting supernaturalism implies 
that both the description of reality and the articulation of knowledge have to remain within the 
boundaries of natural entities and processes. On the one hand, objects of knowledge are 
natural; while, on the other hand, the process of human knowing itself is also natural. 
Therefore, there is no need either in the description of reality or the articulation of knowledge 
to refer to supernatural entities or powers. From the point of view of modern science and 
normative epistemology, supernaturalism is based on arbitrary beliefs that cannot be proved 
either on an empirical or rational basis. The articulation of knowledge within the context of 
naturalism implies a crucial distinction. Theories of knowledge within the naturalist 
framework distinguish objects of knowledge from knowing subjects. Proponents of this 
distinction assume that objects of knowledge, on the one hand, are physical entities with 
material composition and spatial extension.  The knowledge subjects have of objects, on the 
other hand, is not physical but mental. Most of the time, objects of knowledge and their 
“mental” representations are distinguished using the spatial metaphors of “external” objects 
and “internal” mental representations. Distinguishing objects of knowledge from the 
knowledge knowing subjects have of them set the stage for normative epistemology.  
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Normative epistemology as an academic discipline aims at studying the nature, the possibility, 
the conditions and the limits of human knowledge. Normative epistemology finds in modern 
science a great ally for two reasons. First, modern science is considered as a better (some 
many even say the best) form of explanation as compared to mythical narrative or religious 
belief for instance. Secondly, both normative epistemology and modern science reject 
supernaturalism because the latter cannot be proved on empirical and rational grounds. 
However, justifying a theory on empirical and rational grounds is itself an epistemological 
position. Normative epistemology and modern science share naturalism both as a 
metaphysical assumption and an epistemological position. In both normative epistemology 
and modern science there is a direct inference from metaphysical naturalism to 
epistemological naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism therefore, restricts reality within the 
realm of natural phenomena, and the process of human knowing is one of them. Therefore, 
normative epistemology as a naturalist theory of human knowing cannot found human 
knowing on revelation, tradition or religious authority as it was done during the middle ages. 
Instead, the process of human knowing, in addition to being a natural process is a rational 
process that relies only on human reason. Reason is conceived as a human natural ability to 
know and the process of human knowing is a rational process that leads to what Pandit calls 
“our subjective knowledge.”1 Subjective knowledge refers to the process of knowing as it 
occurs “within” one individual knower. 
 
However, subjective knowledge fails to overcome the arbitrariness and the tyranny embedded 
in founding knowledge on supernatural beliefs or religious, political and moral authority. It 
simply replaces the arbitrariness of the supernatural beliefs by the arbitrariness of the knower 
individual experiences and the tyranny of authority by the tyranny of the subject. That is why 
modern science and normative epistemology, in addition to upholding that the process of 
human knowing is (or has to be) natural and rational require that genuine processes of human 
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knowing lead to objective knowledge. Human knowledge, therefore, cannot be based on the 
personal idiosyncrasies, the moral values, the cultural background, the social class, the 
expectations, the opinion or the location of the knower. Human knowing has to be an object-
oriented process that overcomes arbitrariness and tyranny by describing the world “as it is”. 
For normative epistemology, human knowing, as a natural and rational process, has either 
inevitably to generate objective knowledge or it is not a process of knowing at all. Objective 
knowledge, in the context of modern science and normative epistemology, is not based on 
supernatural beliefs since the latter would imply arbitrariness; or reliance to religious, moral 
and political authority. The latter would imply founding knowledge and truth on tyranny 
rather than on reality. The search for objective knowledge discards practices such as 
divination and establishes a scientific method that comprises observation, reasoning and 
experimenting. In other words, the only authority acceptable in the context of modern science 
and normative epistemology is the authority of reason and nature. Arbitrariness and tyranny 
as foundations of knowledge and truth are to be avoided through empirical proof and rational 
persuasion. 
 
As disciplines based on natural, rational and objective processes of human knowing, modern 
science and normative epistemology share: (1) a conception of the universe as a natural 
autonomous and automatic system that needs no explanation or justification outside itself; (2) 
a theory of knowledge as a natural and rational process that leads to accurate representations 
of reality as a way of generating objective knowledge. Moreover, in addition to their 
commitment to naturalism, rationality, and objectivity, modern science and normative 
epistemology avoid parochialism in the process of knowing. In addition to being natural (as 
opposed to supernatural), rational, and objective, the type of knowledge that modern science 
and normative epistemology seek is (3) universal. According to Prigogine and Stengers, 
modern science and normative epistemology seek “a form of deductive knowledge that 
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contained a degree of certainty unaffected by convictions, expectations, or passions”.2 In the 
technical jargon of philosophy, the type of knowledge has been called Objective Knowledge3. 
In other words, the scientific view of reality in Nagel’s words, “The View from Nowhere”4. It 
ignores the peculiarities of the knower be they religious beliefs, moral values, social class, 
cultural background, or personal interest. The context where the process of knowing occurs is 
irrelevant because objective knowledge is also meant to be universal. In other words, it 
transcends the particularities of time and space and is accessible to anyone who is capable of 
following rigorously some detailed method of investigation. Moreover, the degree of certainty 
that it leads to is so high that it does not depend on any contingency. This degree of certainty 
matches the Cartesian requirement that knowledge must be indubitable, infallible and 
incorrigible.5 Universal and objective knowledge is necessary in the sense that it does not 
depend on any contingency. It differs from personal opinion, propaganda, or prejudice. As a 
specialized and systematized type of knowledge, objective and universal knowledge conflicts 
with other systems of explanation such as myth and religion. In brief, 
(1) Objectivity calls for putting one’s idiosyncratic predilections and parochial 
preferences aside in forming one’s beliefs, evaluations, and choices. It is a matter of 
proceeding in line not with one’s inclinations but with the dictates of impartial 
reason. 
(2) The universality of reason must be recognized: What it is rational for one 
person to do, to believe, or to value will thereby also of necessity be equally rational  
for the rest of us who might find ourselves in the same circumstances. For 
rationality is inherently “objective”: It does not reconfigure itself to meet 
idiosyncratic predilections of particular individuals.6 
 
However, in its task of articulating genuine knowledge through describing the world “as it is,” 
normative epistemology is confronted with different contentions on what the world “really” 
is. This implies diversity in philosophical conceptions of “the” world (if one assumes that 
there is only one), reality and being. World, reality and being are very important philosophical 
notions because the position one holds on these notions determine not only one’s philosophy 
but also one’s behaviour. This chapter aims at assessing the emergence of normative 
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epistemology within the framework of modern science. Although Thomas Kuhn has restricted 
the concept of paradigm shift within science, this chapter argues that a scientific approach to 
the world, reality and knowledge is itself a paradigm i.e. “universally recognized 
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners”.7 The particularity of the scientific paradigm can be understood either by 
comparing epistemological practices and theories of the scientific period with their pre-
scientific counterparts or by observing knowledge theories and practices in societies where 
modern science is of recent import. For the case at hand, this chapter attempts to link modern 
science and normative epistemology by referring to aspects of their historical context. It does 
not base normative epistemology on the opposition of knowledge (episteme) to “mere” 
opinion (doxa), as it is the case in standard epistemology textbooks because knowledge and 
opinion are not mutually exclusive. Some opinions such as those based on careful inquiry by 
experts indeed constitute knowledge. This chapter attempts a different point of view that 
upholds that modern science and normative epistemology are responses to a series of issues 
and conflicts pertaining to the nature of the world, reality, and knowledge in a context of 
social and intellectual upheavals that upset the medieval synthesis. Moreover, in the context 
of modern naturalism, the role of normative epistemology is not to refute scepticism. Modern 
scepticism is part of the paradigmatic framework in which normative epistemology emerged. 
It is an invitation for proof because the paradigm shifts introduced by modern science and 
normative epistemology call for a “new” foundation of knowledge that eliminates reliance to 
arbitrary religious beliefs and coercion by political or religious authority.  
 
B. MODERN SCIENCE AND NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
1. Modern Science and Paradigm Change 
Epistemology has intrinsic links with metaphysics because aiming at describing the world as 
“it is” implies that one knows what and how “the” world “is.” Otherwise a comparison 
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between the object of inquiry and the results of inquiry would be impossible. One would 
never be able to know whether one’s inquiry has been successful or not. Moreover, 
epistemology is not made of abstract theories but of practices as well. Modern science, as a 
paradigm explains, for instance, why a modern normative epistemologist would seek 
knowledge in a library, an academic journal, or a laboratory, instead of consulting the Oracle 
of Delphi. Theories of knowledge depend on what is included or excluded in the definition of 
reality or the knowable and the practices that are believed to lead to knowledge are influenced 
by one’s metaphysical assumptions. In other words, there is an intrinsic link between 
metaphysical assumptions and epistemological positions because both are subject to changing 
paradigms.8 For instance, the medieval synthesis founded knowledge on supernaturalism and 
found revelation, tradition and authority as adequate ways of accessing knowledge and truth. 
Even in texts where the natural law is mentioned such as in the philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas for instance, natural law is believed to be inscribed by God in the universe or human 
consciousness through the act of creation. This way of looking at reality is different from 
modern naturalism that rejects supernaturalism and attempt to establish new foundation for 
natural processes of human knowing in a natural world.  
 
Standard epistemology textbooks often suggest that normative epistemology as a discipline 
emerges from the opposition of knowledge (episteme) to mere opinion (doxa). This distinction 
that some authors retraces as far as to Plato indicates that opinions are deficient. More is 
needed for them to reach the status of knowledge. However, this distinction misses the fact 
that knowledge and opinion are not mutually exclusive. Some opinions indeed – such as those 
held by experts after careful inquiry – constitute knowledge. Therefore, the aim of an 
epistemological study such as this one is not to examine means of upgrading opinions to make 
them knowledge but examining how normative epistemology as a particular conception of 
knowledge and its criteria of validity emerged in a context of social and intellectual upheaval. 
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This study will not also attempt to refute scepticism. Scepticism has been challenged on the 
ground that the sceptics give up their position as they carry on their living endeavours basing 
their decisions to beliefs and assumptions that they consider as true. This study will attempt to 
examine a possibility of looking at normative epistemology as an academic discipline that 
emerged in a context where philosophical debates were dominated by a series of contentious 
issues pertaining to the definition and description of reality and the articulation of knowledge 
and truth. The distinction between episteme and doxa is an important retrospect because it 
shows that epistemological questions that are as old as philosophy itself can still emerge at 
various periods of human history. This retrospect shows that although epistemological 
concerns are universal in scope (i.e. transcending historical periods and places) the way they 
are formulated and resolved depend on changing paradigms. For instance, contemporary 
normative epistemologists who operate in the context of modern science are unlikely to resort 
to practices such as Platonic contemplation or Socratic practice of consulting the Oracle at 
Delphi because there are institutions such as universities and research centres where 
professional philosophizing takes place. Moreover, differences in practices of philosophical 
enquiries, despite similarities in concerns, point to the fact that although some philosophical 
debates that are still going on may be very old, there have always been changing paradigms 
both in the description of reality and the articulation of knowledge. 
 
The notion of paradigm change in science was introduced and popularized by Thomas Kuhn 
in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.9 According to Kuhn, paradigms are “universally 
recognized achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a 
community of practitioners”.10 Kuhn distinguishes in science three phrases in the evolution of 
a scientific paradigm. There is a pre-scientific era which lacks a central paradigm. During the 
pre-scientific period disparate practices and beliefs form the body of knowledge with no 
apparent way of organizing them in a systematic way. The vocabulary used to describe 
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knowledge theories and practices in the pre-scientific period is also disparate because it lacks 
the rigors of scientific definition and the univocal nature of scientific terms. The pre-scientific 
period is followed by a period of normal science. Normal science is the most productive 
period in the evolution of a paradigm. Not only the paradigm solves the puzzles it was 
intended to solve but its domain of application extends much beyond the original interests of 
the inventors of a paradigm. Moreover, normal science unifies the field of knowledge by 
bringing forwards a paradigm that is applicable across disciplines. Kuhn chooses a good 
example of paradigm change. He illustrates his view of a paradigm shift with the replacement 
of the belief in the presence phlogiston in combustible elements to the belief that oxygen is 
the key element in this phenomenon of combustion.11 Not only this belief explains the original 
phenomenon of fire i.e. oxygen as an energy-generating substance but the application of this 
discovery goes beyond its original domain of application. The combustion of oxygen as a 
source of energy explains also, for instance, the phenomenon of metabolism within animals. 
In a layman’s language metabolism can be explained as a phenomenon of generating energy 
in an animal’s body by burning foods with the oxygen an animal breathes. The period of 
normal science is succeeded by a period crisis where an accumulation of anomalous results 
leads to the questioning of the paradigm itself instead of attributing anomalous results to the 
mistakes of the researcher. Crisis within a dominant paradigm is, therefore, an opportunity for 
discovery rather than an obstacle. It points to the fact that the existing paradigm, although 
successful on a variety of issues and in various areas still has some “empirical residue”. This 
empirical residue indicates that the dominant paradigm has not yet reached the status of a 
unified scientific theory and that additional modes of explanation are necessary. 
 
Although Kuhn’s theory has been very popular and generated a fertile debate among both 
philosophers and scientists, Kuhn does not seem to recognize that modern science itself is a 
paradigm. Modern science emerged at a period of crisis. Kuhn’s domain of inquiry is 
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scientific theory themselves, but, in my view, Kuhn’s method and assumptions can be applied 
to the overall domain of knowledge. The scientific paradigm has solved a lot of puzzles and a 
possible extension of the domain of application of Kuhn’s theory of paradigm change implies 
looking at science in its context of emergence and at the ways paradigms have been changing 
not only within modern science itself but also in overall theories of knowledge. While Kuhn 
focused on changing paradigm within modern science, there is a possibility of examining 
changing paradigms in epistemology. This approach is different from a rational reconstruction 
of a universalistic (a-historical) epistemological theory that puts side by side Platonic 
questions and Cartesian responses forgetting that the role of paradigms is indeed puzzle 
solving, as Kuhn pointed out. Epistemology, as a discipline that has been evolving throughout 
history implies not starting the debate with a Platonic distinction between knowledge 
(episteme) and opinion (doxa). This distinction may be appealing in our context where 
pluralism of opinion is part of our culture and where we have sophisticated technologies to 
pin down errors of perception and reasoning. However, normative epistemology can be 
understood as a puzzle solving intellectual tool that emerged in the context of modern science 
with the aim of solving existing puzzles. Both normative epistemology and modern science 
solve puzzles by approaching issues of reality, knowledge and truth in a way that avoids the 
arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs and the tyranny of authority.  
 
2. Modern Science and the Decline of the Medieval Synthesis 
The particularity of a scientific approach – despite its universal horizon - can be better 
understood when scientific approaches are compared to knowledge practices and assumptions 
of pre-scientific periods or to knowledge practices and assumptions in societies where 
scientific culture is of recent import. There are, in fact, intrinsic links between metaphysical 
assumptions and epistemological positions. Metaphysical assumptions define reality i.e. the 
known or at least the knowable while epistemological position establish theories of 
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knowledge which are relationship between the knowable (reality) and process of human 
knowing. Most of the time, processes of human knowing are characterized as internal 
processes “within” the knower. Although this spatial metaphor of “external” objects and 
“internal” knowledge processes is detrimental, Aaron points out that: 
there is a strong assumption that anyone who sets out to give an account of human 
knowledge must do so in terms of either rationalism or empiricism. In addition these 
theories tend to be linked with metaphysical theories, rationalism with idealism and 
empiricism with positivism. So the philosopher is faced with two alternatives and two 
only; he has to choose between rationalism, and the metaphysic that goes along with it, 
and empiricism, and its accompanying metaphysic.12 
 
Aaron contention is a fair assessment of contemporary normative epistemology. By pointing 
to the intrinsic links between metaphysical assumptions and epistemological positions, Aaron 
shows that what is involved in the definition and description of reality gets also involved in 
the articulation of knowledge. Therefore, normative epistemology should be understood in the 
context of modern science because as rejections of supernaturalism, normative epistemology 
and modern science lend each other tools. In addition to their rejection of supernaturalism, 
one salient feature of supernaturalism and scholasticism that modern science and normative 
epistemology oppose is the presentation of knowledge as something hidden. This approach 
that locates knowledge in an atmosphere of mystery is rooted in an older philosophical debate 
that opposes reality to appearance. Epistemology as philosophy of knowledge should, of 
course, tackle knowledge of reality (and not just knowledge of appearances) but the concept 
of reality itself remains problematic. It is subject to changing paradigms. For instance, 
referring to the metaphysical dualism that dominated scholasticism, Cornwell pointed out that, 
during the middle ages: 
Philosophy … treated ideas as if they had the same sort of reality as a child’s coloured 
building blocks. It was held that there was a real distinction between a thing’s substance 
and its observable appearances – shape, size, texture; that a thing’s essence could be 
distinguished from its existence; that ideas like justice, beauty, truth, had a sort of 
separate existence in a universalized world of pure forms, independent of individual 
minds and actual objects and actions. It was thus easy, without the aid of sense 
experience, that a supernatural realm, far more important and durable, lay beyond the 
veil of appearance.13 
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The metaphysics of supernaturalism is dualistic. By assuming the existence of two worlds, 
one supernatural and another natural, supernaturalism locates reality in the supernatural world 
and the natural world is reduced to mere appearance. The epistemological implication of 
supernaturalism is that knowing implies accessing a hidden reality. Accessing this hidden 
reality is possible either through this reality manifesting - i.e. revealing - itself or through 
some intermediaries that can act as bridges (pontiffs) between the natural realm of appearance 
and the supernatural realm of reality. This need for mediation explains why in the pre-
scientific period revelation and the mediation of religious authority were accepted means of 
accessing knowledge and truth. Supernaturalism’s belief in a universe that is ultimately 
grounded in God’s act of creation creates a situation where knowing to universe implies often 
referring to its origin. Moreover, this understanding of the universe with referring to its origin 
i.e. God’s creation makes clerical status not only a religious function but also a knowledge 
function. In fact, in the context of the late medieval thought McGrath pointed to “the apparent 
inability to distinguish catholic dogma from theological opinion”.14 This coupling of religious 
and knowledge functions as mediation to the supernatural creates a situation where the body 
of knowledge does not make a difference between theological debates and cosmological 
theories. At this stage, the disciplinary distinctions and autonomy that modern scientific 
disciplines currently enjoy are not clearly delineated and the separation of the sacred and the 
secular which is a normal feature of modern culture is not yet established. 
 
In the context of the late medieval age, the role of epistemology can be defined as an attempt 
to assess how supernatural reality reveals itself in natural appearance. Even in context where 
concepts such as “natural law” are used (by Thomas Aquinas, for instance) medieval 
naturalism is different from the modern naturalism that opposes supernaturalism. Medieval 
naturalism upholds that natural laws are inscribed in nature by God through the act of 
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creation. The perfection of these laws as manifested by order, simplicity and regularity in the 
universe is a manifestation of God’s own perfection. From the point of view of medieval 
naturalism, regular and ordered processes such the regular succession of day and night, the 
regularity of seasons, the harmony and rhythm of the heartbeat and so forth are considered as 
manifestations of God’s perfection. Modern naturalism, on the other hand, rejects altogether 
supernatural beliefs. Moreover, it assumes that the universe is an autonomous and automatic 
system. Therefore, laws of the universe, according to modern naturalism, are not 
manifestation of God’s perfection, but “universal” laws. Modern naturalism, therefore, aims at 
explaining natural phenomena in the universe by referring to universal laws and not the will 
of a divinity or special people who are believed to access of hidden realm of supernatural 
reality. 
 
Supernaturalism, therefore, can be rejected on empirical and rational grounds, but its 
epistemological consequences i.e. founding knowledge on revelation, religious authority and 
tradition did not pave the way to scientific methods smoothly. The crisis that generated 
modern science and normative epistemology was first and most of all a crisis of authority. 
This aspect is most of the time overlooked by the supports of a a-historical universalistic 
approach to epistemology that attempts a rational reconstruction of the epistemological 
enterprise as a series of arguments and counterarguments. McGrath pointed out that: 
the later medieval period may be regarded as characterized by a two-fold crisis of 
authority. First, a lack of clarity concerning the nature, location and exercise of 
theological authority at a time of rapid intellectual development led to considerable 
diversification of theological opinions, and confusion concerning the status of these 
opinions.15 
 
This doctrinal diversity and confusion explains Descartes’ search for new and ultimate 
foundations. Descartes looked for foundations because he was standing at on a shaky ground. 
For more than ten centuries, scholasticism had played the role of normal science. It had 
generated fruitful philosophical debates based on crucial philosophical distinctions such as 
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substance vs. form, knowledge vs. opinion, actuality vs. potency, substance vs. accidents, 
essence vs. existence, faith vs. reason, reality vs. appearance, eternity vs. time, and the soul 
vs. the body. This dualistic pattern still prevails in contemporary philosophical debates where 
distinctions such as rationalism vs. empiricism, idealism vs. positivism, principles vs. facts, 
ideas (concepts) vs. objects, theory vs. practice, regularly occur. The shaking of the 
supernatural assumptions that supported scholasticism left Descartes in doubt. Minds of 
philosophers and scientists were left to wary as clerical status as a knowledge function was 
challenged by the rise of an urban professional groups and the influence of lay theologians.16 
Erasmus, for instance, played a great knowledge role without coupling it with clerical status.17 
Moreover, the maze of mystery that surrounded knowledge functions was dissipated. On the 
one hand, “the introduction of printing was at least a catalyst, and also an agent, of intellectual 
and social change.”18 Printing made available to the laity the bible and devotional books that 
were previously restricted to the clergy. Among professional groups and lay theologians, 
“there was a new interest in studying both scripture and the fathers directly, rather than 
through a ‘filter’ of glosses and commentaries”.19 Therefore, the main contribution of the 
reformation to the emergence of modern science and normative epistemology is a certain 
disintermediation of knowledge. This disintermediation implied reliance on one’s rational 
abilities rather than on interpretation by religious authority. Moreover, this disintermediation 
of knowledge created conditions for the replacement of religious authority as a source of 
knowledge by personal experimentation. It is worthy noting that in the late middle age and 
early modern times, religious and knowledge functions were still entangled. Personal 
experimentation was encouraged by people of various abodes independently of the position 
they held on questions of knowledge and truth. Martin Luther, for instance, encouraged 
personal experimentation by urging his followers to read the scriptures themselves instead of 
relying to the interpretation by religious authority. Ignatius Loyola, on the other hand, tried to 
get the best of both personal experimentation and authority by subjecting his followers, the 
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Jesuits, to lifelong lengthy periods of study and yet imposing them under oath strict obedience 
to the leaders of the Jesuit order. 
 
Disintermediation of knowledge created a conflict between individual knowledge and 
institutionalized knowledge. On the one hand, individuals who claimed to be enlightened by 
reason moved from place to place challenging established beliefs and practices.20 On the other 
hand, some strong institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church were willing to defend 
“the” truth by all means including violence. This period of crisis was propitious to the 
emergence of a new paradigm. On the one hand, it layed naked the tyranny of authority in the 
articulation of knowledge and truth, and, on the other hand, it denounced the arbitrariness of 
supernatural beliefs That is why, the foundation of normative epistemology in modern science 
should not be understood as emanating from the distinction between knowledge (episteme) 
and opinion (doxa) or as a refutation of skepticism. Modern skepticism by questioning the 
reliability of senses or by pointing to the risk of an infinite regress in our reasoning processes 
is part and parcel of the modern paradigm that bases knowledge on proof. Skepticism and 
normative epistemology are two sides of the same coin. Proof according to modern science 
and normative epistemology is limited to empirical evidence and rational persuasion. The 
reference to the Greek origins of both the distinction between episteme and doxa and 
skepticism is a strategy of rejecting supernaturalism and scholasticism by rediscovering the 
greatness of antiquity. This is a type of renaissance in philosophy as it had occurred in arts 
from the 14th century. These distinctions, as reclaimed by normative epistemology are 
additional exigencies for a theory of knowledge that bases itself not on the arbitrariness of 
supernatural beliefs or on the tyranny of the coercion by authority. Instead, human knowledge 
should be based on proof and rational persuasion which can be provided by observation, 
reasoning and experimenting. 
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3. Modern Science, Empiricism and Logocentrism 
The modern predilection for empirical methods can be explained by the rejection of 
supernaturalism, on the one hand, and the belief in one’s capacity to know (without the 
intermediation of authority). Empiricism is based on the restriction of reality to what can be 
observed. Since supernatural entities cannot be observed they are not part of reality from an 
empirical point of view. Empirical methods restrict themselves to the “what” questions. 
Empirical methods, in other words, replace revelation, tradition and authority with 
observation as a reliable method to find knowledge and to access truth. It is worthy noting the 
in the early modern times, techniques and instruments of observation such as the microscope 
and the telescope expanded incredibly the dimensions of the universe. These techniques of 
observation allowed philosophers to deal with the dimensions of the universe at infinitesimal 
levels including the infinitely big (the universe itself) and the infinitely small world of 
particles. Empirical methods and techniques of observations reinforced naturalism as a 
philosophy of the universe. Cosmologists such as Galileo and Copernicus spread theories of 
the universe that challenged the religion-based beliefs and assumptions. 
 
Empirical methods are the reflection of the assumption that reality is immediately available to 
human experience. Therefore, there is not need for the intermediation of revelation, tradition 
and authority. Empirical methods replace revelation, tradition and authority by observation. 
Different instruments of observation such as the telescope or the microscope only introduce 
changes in magnitude. They do not add or subtract anything from the objects and processes 
being observed. Instead, they assist human abilities because of our limited visual abilities and 
short memory. In addition to instruments that extend our abilities, we have designed other 
instruments that represent intangible processes and elements into media that make them 
directly observable. For instance, the thermometer assists in observing the increase or the 
decrease of temperature on a longitudinal scale. By using the movement of mercury in a tube 
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as a way of measuring the increase or the decrease of heat or cold, head and cold have been 
translated into a spatial medium that lends itself to graphic representation as part of a one 
dimension strait line.  
 
However, empirical methods were confronted with one serious challenge: the fallibility of our 
senses. Among early modern scientists and philosophers, no one challenged observation as a 
foundation of knowledge. However, what remained puzzling was the question of the 
reliability of human senses and instruments of observation. Not only instruments of 
observation could be defect but also human senses were fallible. It is Descartes who 
systematized doubt about the reliability of our senses. Descartes challenged the reliability of 
human senses basing himself on simple observations such as objects changing shape and size 
when observed from varying distances or a straight stick looking bend in water. Descartes’ 
skepticism about the reliability of human senses had a great impact on the epistemological 
status of sensations. Descartes’ problem was not whether observation is a genuine method for 
accessing knowledge and truth; but how to establish a new foundation of knowledge and truth 
given the dismay of the medieval synthesis and the decline of power of the Church. For 
Descartes, therefore, sensations would not constitute that foundation because our senses were 
unreliable and could not dissipate doubt. What puzzled Descartes was how to overcome doubt 
and establish “clear and distinct” ideas despite the fact that our senses are not always reliable. 
Moreover, Descartes was aware that our reasoning may end in an infinite regress and we 
could even be deceived by an evil genius. Descartes introduced in addition to observation, a 
set of rules for conducting thought. For Descartes, one would reach knowledge by conducting 
thought methodically. In addition to following the Cartesian method one then would reach 
knowledge i.e. “clear and distinct ideas” through meditation.  
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Descartes proposals are rarely examined against the background of supernaturalism and 
scholasticism. In standard epistemology textbooks, the problem of knowledge is presented 
either as a search for knowledge (episteme) and not just opinion (doxa) or epistemology is 
presented as having the sole role of refuting skepticism. However, Descartes is answering 
concrete challenges raised by concrete people. The Cartesian paradigm, like any other 
paradigm, attempts to solve puzzles. Descartes, who was previously trained in scholasticism is 
faced with the decline of what he perceived as a foundation and is looking for new 
foundations. However, like the scholastics Descartes maintains a strong metaphysical dualism 
that makes him believe in the existence of two substances one material, and another “thinking 
substance” that is mental. At the same time, Descartes, as a mathematician, is aware of the 
mathematical developments of his time. In this context, Descartes is at a crossroads because 
he sets questions in scholastic terms (metaphysical dualism that implies two substances) and 
at the same time he seeks solutions that lead to the accuracy and certainty of mathematical 
science. That is why Descartes, as the father of modern rationalism (some may say the father 
of modern philosophy) managed to shift the foundation of knowledge from a cosmological- 
theological ground of the nature of reality itself (ontology) to the relationship between 
material objects and their mental representations (epistemology). Descartes, therefore, founds 
normative epistemology by (1) promoting personal experimentation through one’s “privileged 
access” of the contents of one’s consciousness; (2) discrediting the epistemological status of 
sensations given the unreliability of our senses and instead defining knowledge in terms of 
certainty or clear and distinct ideas; (3) supporting a method of conducting thought that is 
similar to mathematical demonstration where complex statements are inferred from simple 
ones following infallible rules of inference. 
 
Descartes, therefore, by privileging individual experience over the tyranny of authority and 
the arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs, portrays the philosopher in general and the 
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epistemologist in particular as a solitary thinker. This approach has been singled out by Dancy 
and Sosa. They note in the introduction to their A Companion to Epistemology21 that: 
the jacket illustration is symptomatic of our general approach. Here we have the solitary 
thinker working in private. Isn’t he a wonderful example of the CARTERSIAN 
approach to epistemology which is so characteristic of the Anglo-American analytic 
tradition, and which is so vehemently rejected on the Continent?22 
 
In other words, solipsism is a major characteristic of the way normative epistemology is 
portrayed in the Cartesian tradition. One is assumed to have a transparent mind and a 
privileged access to the contents of one’s consciousness. This approach maintains that 
knowledge is hidden not in the supernatural realm but in individuals’ minds. There is a spatial 
metaphor that considers the human mind and consciousness as an inner arena, a place to be 
filled with representations be they sensations or ideas. However, Dancy and Sosa immediately 
refute the idea of the knower as a solitary thinker. They put forwards two arguments against 
solipsism. In their view:  
There are two points to be against it. First, the attempt to escape from the clutches of the 
Cartesian paradigm is as common within the analytic tradition as it is outside. Second, 
our solitary thinker is not as solitary as all that. He is reading a book, which could be 
taken to show that he is not relying entirely on his own resources, as the Cartesian mind 
is supposed to do23 
 
Therefore, Descartes definition of knowledge as “clear and distinct” ideas is very restrictive. 
It creates a type of armchair epistemology of a solitary thinker who scrutinizes his own 
thoughts as a way of looking for the ones that are beyond doubt. This approach can lead to a 
tyranny of the subject that is similar to the tyranny of authority in the pre-scientific age. 
Another salient aspect of normative epistemology is that Descartes reduces human knowing to 
its mental dimensions i.e. thinking or perceiving. As Dancy and Sosa point out once more, 
“the picture exemplifies a conception of knowledge as something to be gained by rational 
enquiry and perception rather than by practical life and action.”24 They add that: 
This ‘logocentrism’ may be a more insidious feature of the Cartesian approach, and 
certainly the emphasis on practice and action is distinctive of continental epistemology 
… as is emphasis on social considerations.25 
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Logocentrism is an important feature of both modern science and normative epistemology as 
they both look for laws. Modern science searches for laws of nature while normative 
epistemology looks for the laws that that regulate the relationships between material objects 
and their mental representations. There is an assumed isomorphism between the laws of 
nature and the laws of the mind, and this isomorphism determines the relationships between 
material objects and their “mental” representations. However, although logocentrism, though 
its derivative “logics”, is intrinsically associated with human rationality, it is worthy noting 
that the logos in the original Greek context is first and most of all a principle of unity of 
reality. As such it is a principle of creation but also a principle of intelligibility. Some biblical 
narratives repeat this idea but interpreting God’s act of creation as putting order in chaos. The 
principle of the logos wrongly translated in Latin as ratio and later on in the first chapter of 
John’s gospel as verbum by Saint-Jerome, associates the ontological category of the unity of 
reality (logos) with the epistemological category of intelligibility (ratio) and later on with 
language (verbum). This trilogy implies an often assumed association of intelligibility, 
rationality and language. This outright association of the unity of reality and its intelligibility 
with language can be challenged by looking at the main tasks of modern science. Despite the 
dominance of logocentrism both in modern science and normative epistemology, it is worth 
noting that the search for laws is only one task of modern science among three. As Armstrong 
has noted, “[n]atural science traditionally concerns itself with at least three tasks.”26 
According to Armstrong: 
The first task is to discover the geography and history of the universe, taking 
‘geography’ to cover all space and ‘history’ to cover all time, including future time. 
Astronomy is beginning to give us a picture of how the universe as a whole is laid out in 
space and time. Some other natural sciences give us an overview of more restricted 
spatio-temporal areas.27 
 
The first task of modern science, according to Armstrong, is mainly descriptive or narrative. 
This task that was traditionally devoted to metaphysics has been overtaken by modern 
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science. Modern science, therefore, provides normative epistemology with better (or the 
“best”) descriptions of the universe. For instance, rejection of the metaphysical dualism that 
opposed the supernatural to the natural led to the belief that there is only one natural universe. 
This eliminates from epistemology any reference to supernatural entities because they are not 
part of reality from a modern scientific point of view. In other words, supernatural entities do 
not belong to the realm of the known or the knowable and, therefore, normative epistemology 
would be making a mistake by referring to them. The second task of modern science is 
complementary to the first. It is: 
To discover what sorts of things and what sorts of property there are in the universe and 
how they are constituted, with particular emphasis upon the sorts of thing and sorts of 
property in terms of which other things are explained. (These explainers may or may be 
not be ultimate explainers.)28 
 
From this point of view, modern science has been dominated by a theory that I shall call 
materialist-atomism. This is a belief that ultimate reality is constituted by small material 
particles i.e. the atoms. Material-atomism coupled with the description of the “geography” 
and the “history” of the universe in terms of Newton’s laws of motion and Darwin’s theory of 
evolution has created the dominance of mechanical and evolutionist models. Mechanics as an 
overall theory of the universe implies defining reality in terms of matter in motion. Mechanics 
implies, for instance, defining heat as molecular motion.29 The mechanical model has been so 
dominant that it was applied far beyond its original discovery in physics. For instance, many 
biological processes were understood as material particles in motion creating a possibility of 
reducing biology to physical chemistry. Even contemporary studies in neuroscience and 
cognitive science understand their task as “mechanizing the mind.”30 Although the 
evolutionary model was first applied in biology and not in physics, it can be considered as a 
mechanical theory if one reverts to Aristotle definition of motion not only as change in spatio-
temporal location but also as any change such as the growth of an organism as Kuhn pointed 
out. 31 What is interesting from the point of view of modern science and normative 
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epistemology is that both the mechanical and the evolutionary models provides a definition of 
reality and natural processes that does not refer to supernatural beliefs. Moreover, these 
models, in their description of reality, do not refer to abstract entities such as Aristotle’s belief 
that reality consists of being in the process of fulfilling their purposes. 
  
The third task of modern science, which is the most evoked in philosophy of science, is: 
to state the laws which the things in space and time obey. Or, putting it in the terms used 
in describing the second task, the third task is to state the laws which link sort of thing 
with sort of thing, and property with property.32 
 
Therefore, modern science combines the threefold task of providing a cosmology i.e. a model 
of the universe, a metaphysic (materialist-atomism for the case at hand) and an epistemology 
understood not only in terms of knowing objects and their properties but also in terms of 
knowing the relationships between these properties. In addition to being naturalistic, modern 
science is materialist, mechanistic and deterministic. It upholds that reality is ultimately 
constituted by material particles. This view turns any metaphysic of substance into 
materialism. This view was reinforced by the attempt to identify and describe in fine details 
all the material elements in the universe. Modern scientists have managed to achieve this task 
by establishing the periodical table of elements. However, material atoms, as identified by 
modern chemistry do not tell the whole story of the universe. They tell quite a lot about the 
structure of the universe i.e. the “geography” in Armstrong’s words, but there is also the 
functioning of the universe. It is at this level of function that mechanical models originally 
borrowed from physics has been a dominant suggestion. The factors that contributed to the 
dominance of the mechanical model are not easy to identify but its definition of reality in 
terms of matter and motion was as outright rejection of supernaturalism on the one hand, and 
on the other, its attempt to provide evidence based on the rigor of mathematical proof was an 
unprecedented remedy to the tyranny of authority. No wonder that modern science and 
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normative epistemology have inherited from Newton the belief that any motion can be 
measured. Not only one can reduce all natural processes and human behaviour to material 
particles in motion, but also if one broadens the concept of motion to change and biological 
growth as Aristotle did, there is a way of integrating mechanical and evolutionary models. 
This implies, on the one hand, that all natural processes can be described as physical 
processes, because “geographically” much of the universe functions following Newton’s 
mechanical laws; and, on the other hand, since “historically” evolutionary processes can be 
reduced to mechanical processes by broadening the concept of motion to the way Aristotle 
(the father of biology) used it, biological processes can be reduced to physical processes. 
Following these two possibilities of reduction, physicalism imposes itself as a foundational 
theory. Therefore, modern science by modelling itself on Newton’s mechanics is 
deterministic. Its functioning implies establishing invariant relationships between the 
properties of material objects and these invariant relationships are natural laws. They regulate 
the universe without the intervention of the will of a divinity or a homonculus. Normative 
epistemology, through its finding a great ally in modern science, shares with the latter its third 
task i.e. knowing not only the properties of things but also the relationships between these 
properties. 
 
4. Normative Epistemology and Logico-Deductive Processes 
Normative epistemology becomes relevant from the point of view of a third level of 
abstraction that is different from the first level where properties of material objects are 
represented, and the second level where meaningful representations are understood. The task 
of normative epistemology, therefore, is not making representations and understanding them, 
but, evaluating the accuracy of representation (how genuine is the relationship of properties of 
material objects and their representations) and assessing the meaningfulness of meaningful 
representations. Normative epistemology, therefore, has a semantic function. This conception 
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of normative epistemology, therefore, makes epistemology a meta-cognitive enterprise that 
implies not knowing the objects themselves and their properties (this is the role of cognitive 
science) but knowing the laws of the mind that are involved in the process of knowing itself. 
The assumption behind this conception of normative epistemology is the possibility of 
understanding relationships between properties of material objects through understanding the 
relationships between the representations of these properties. At a purely epistemological 
level, it does not matter whether these representations are sensations or ideas because actually 
the nature of mental representations is still controversial both in philosophy of mind and in 
epistemology. However, despite the fact that epistemologists and philosophers of mind still 
agree on the nature of mental representations, mathematical models, for instance, provide a 
possibility of operating at a level of abstraction that rivals the one sought by epistemologists 
who locate the laws of the mind at the highest possible level of abstraction. The conception of 
normative epistemology as a meta-cognitive process leads to a highly abstract view of 
normative epistemology that locates epistemic structures much beyond the realms accessible 
by perception and rational inquiry. Some philosophers such as Pandit hold such a very highly 
abstract view of epistemology. For Pandit, in addition to “world1: of physical 
things/processes”33 and “world2: of minds/mental states of consciousness, belief, etc.”34 there 
is “world3: of epistemic structures [i.e.] linguistically neutral structures as abstract as 
propositions and theories (and problems)”35 
 
This abstract view of epistemology obscures the paradigmatic nature of metaphysical 
assumptions and epistemological positions. This abstract view turns epistemology into an 
impersonal and a-historical discourse in the name of objectivity and universality. This 
approach ends up with a type of objectivity without objects and a universality without a 
universe. This view implicitly assumes that abstraction generates necessity, or at least that it 
expresses it! Epistemology elevated to this highly abstract level aims at proving the veracity 
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of statements or propositions and the validity of logical inferences by (1) restricting 
knowledge statements to univocal propositions, and (2) restricting rules of inference to logical 
and mathematical laws that are (wrongly) assumed to be isomorphic to necessary laws of the 
mind. The assumption that logical and mathematical rules of inference are replications of a 
necessity that embedded both in the universe and in the human mind is based on wrong 
assumptions about both mathematics and the mind. Wrong assumptions about mathematics 
include the belief that, “[m]athematics is abstract and disembodied – yet it is real;”36 This 
assumption postulates the existence of a separate world of mathematics that is different from 
realm of naturalism, materialism, mechanics and deterministic universal laws. This 
assumption that has generated enthusiasm among mathematicians who have tackled 
philosophical issues like Penrose, implies that epistemological structures, defined at the 
highest level of abstraction are similar to mathematical structures. This would imply that 
human knowledge displays the same necessary laws as those found in logical rules of 
inference and mathematical operations. This conception, that one can call Platonic or realism 
implies that there is a mathematical world of necessity of which real human mental processes 
are only an approximation. In other words, Platonists and realists contend that: 
Mathematics has an objective existence, providing structure to this universe and any 
other possible universe, independent of and transcending the existence of human beings 
or any other beings.37 
 
The view that postulates an independent existence of mathematics implies that mathematics is 
not a creation of the human mind or human culture. Rather, the realists or Platonists uphold 
that mathematics is embedded in the universe and what the human mind does is just to 
discover it or to approximate it at its best. This belief that mathematics is somewhere awaiting 
to be discovered is based on a top-down approach that implies that “human mathematics is 
just a part of abstract, transcendental mathematics.”38 Therefore, mathematics like Platonic 
forms has an independent existence that can only be approximated by humans. Using Platonic 
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vocabulary the realists or Platonists assume that human mathematics is a shadow of 
transcendental mathematics. This idea of an independent existence is reinforced by the view 
that mathematics is embedded in the fabric of the universe. According to this view: 
Mathematics is part of the physical universe and provides a rational structure to it. 
There are Fibonacci series in flowers, logarithmic spirals in snails, fractals in mountain 
ranges, parabolas in home runs, and  in the spherical shape of stars and planets and 
bubbles.39 
 
Mathematics, according to this view, not only has an independent existence but also it is 
embedded in both the order of the universe and the order of the human mind. According to 
this belief, “mathematics even characterizes logic, and hence structures reason itself – any 
form of reason by any form of being”40 This expansion of mathematical principles to the order 
of the human mind is explained somehow by the association of the unity and the intelligibility 
of the universe with language. The logos, ratio and verbum trilogy constitute the fabric of 
human rationality in a way that, “[t]o learn mathematics is therefore to learn the language of 
nature, a mode of thought that would have to be shared by any highly intelligent beings 
anywhere in the universe.”41 This leads to the conclusion that, [b]ecause mathematics is 
disembodied and reason is a form of mathematical logic, reason itself is disembodied. Hence, 
machines can, in principle think.”42  
 
These misunderstandings, although they are rarely challenged, have not been proved on 
empirical and rational ground. First and most of all, mathematics do not express some form of 
necessity and universality that are found “out there.” Mathematics operates perfectly in very 
restricted areas of similar kinds. In other words, although necessary laws can be found in 
logical rules of inference and mathematical operations, this necessity is embedded in 
mathematics itself as a medium and not in the order of things themselves. One cannot make a 
mathematical model of anything without imposing constraints to natural processes and 
systems. One such of constraint is fixing reference in a way that matters of fact can be 
 26 
expressed in univocal propositional statements. Fixing reference implies fixing meaning and 
fixing meaning leaves no place for individual value judgements. Assuming that numbers have 
necessary relations between themselves is based on a Platonic understanding of mathematics 
as constituting a world of universals and necessary rules of inference that the real world can 
only approximate. This top-down approach to mathematics and human rationality implies that 
reality goes from abstraction to realisation, a replication or rather a vestige of the Aristotelian 
view that essence precedes existence. The implication of this relation between abstraction and 
realisation is that the imperfections and imprecise aspects of the real world are imperfect 
representations of a mathematical world of clear and distinct ideas (univocal propositional 
statements) and necessary rules of inference. However, early mathematical experience, such 
as in elementary school is a bottom-up process. Children learn to count using concrete objects 
such as balls, oranges and their own fingers before they delve into abstract calculation. It is 
only when the mind has reached sufficient levels of development that a person can perform 
abstract calculations. Early mathematical experience brings the challenge of abstracting 
numbers from the maze of complex reality. The difficulty of abstracting and operating 
following the necessary laws of mathematics cannot be assumed to be natural to the human 
mind. This capacity is actually very low among students and adults with limited mathematical 
talent or in people with no or very low level of academic training. Mathematics is a medium 
with its assumptions and rules and like any other medium it has to be learned. If really 
mathematics were embedded in the order to the universe and in the structure of the mind, 
then, mathematics would have been very easy to learn. However, experience in schools and 
universities show that mathematics is not always an easy subject to learn. 
 
In fact, mathematics is part of what Piaget calls logico-mathematical knowledge.43 According 
to Piaget: 
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From the types of acquired cognitive behaviour and especially from the higher forms of 
intelligence, two aspects should be defined – essentially different from each other in the 
part taken in the elaboration by the actions of the subject or the organism, on one hand, 
and by the objects themselves or their environment, on the other. These aspects of 
knowledge the logico-mathematical and the exogenetic (empirical apprenticeship and 
experimental behaviour)44 
 
Piaget’s differentiation of logico-mathematical knowledge and exogenetic knowledge points 
to the fact that all knowledge is not mathematical although mathematics is often elevated to a 
very high level of abstraction that associates it with universality and necessity. In fact: 
Logico-mathematical structures, which imply, ipso facto, a preponderant share of 
activity and organization which are internal (if not entirely endogenetic …) can be seen 
(although constantly fused with exterior data from which they can only be distinguished 
on the higher levels of thought) at all stages of acquired behaviour or even of perception 
– perhaps even of certain instincts. For instance, Gestalt perceptives consist of 
geometrization; the practical intelligence of chimpanzees dominates the detour 
problems, which imply the intervention of a “group of displacements”; the sensorimotor 
schemata follow their own logical pattern; and so on.45 
 
Logico-mathematical knowledge, therefore, is not the whole of human knowledge. There is 
also exogenetic knowledge that is based on empirical apprenticeship and experimental 
behaviour. In other words, logico-mathematical knowledge is not the only type of knowledge 
that humans are capable of. In addition to logico-mathematical knowledge, Piaget mentions 
sensorimotor knowledge which he divides in two phases one pre-operative and another 
operative. Logico-mathematical knowledge, therefore, occurs at a relatively high level of 
mental development. It builds on a great deal of pre-operative and operative sensorimotor 
knowledge. The conceptualization of space and the perception of objects in space play a great 
role in the development of logico-mathematical knowledge. What is interesting, from Piaget’s 
point of view, is that the acquisition of logico-mathematical knowledge does not suppress 
sensorimotor knowledge. On the contrary it builds on it through a process of organizing the 
immediate data of experience. In real processes of human knowing there is hardly a separation 
between the two forms of knowledge because these forms dynamically integrate themselves 
as the human organism apprehends its environment. Even when one is performing functions 
that would appeal to logico-mathematical knowledge such as mathematical calculations and 
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logical inferences, there is constantly an appeal to sensorimotor knowledge. Sensorimotor 
knowledge is not imperfect knowledge of which logico-mathematical knowledge is an 
essence or a perfect model. Sensorimotor knowledge is an altogether different form of 
knowledge. The differentiation between the two forms of knowledge depends of their degree 
of mediation of immediate data of experience. Sensorimotor knowledge is mainly associated 
with perception of material objects and leads to representations. Its mode of apprehending the 
world is empirical. Logico-mathematical knowledge, on the other hand, deals with universal 
aspects of descriptions and relations and applies rules of inference that are (assumed to be) 
universal and to express the universality and the necessity embedded in the order of the 
universe and in the human mind. Most of the time, sensorimotor knowledge is excluded by 
normative epistemologists from the realm of knowledge on the ground that its perceptual 
nature relegates it to the realm of irrationality. However, this view has been challenged by 
neurophysiologists, cognitive scientists and experimental psychologists who have provided 
evidence for the plurality of human knowledge from their respective disciplines. For 
neurophysiologists, the polymorph nature of human knowledge is embedded in the 
topography of the human brain. The two brain hemispheres play different functions in 
cognitive and behavioral processes. Detailed neurophysiologic research has been undertaken 
to identify how these different hemispheres control various biological and behavioural 
functions. One of the theories brought forward is to the distribution of the analytic and 
synthetic modes of apprehending reality following cerebral hemispheres. According to Harris: 
the left hemisphere operates in a more logical, analytical, computerlike fashion, 
analyzing stimulus information input sequentially and abstracting the relevant details, 
to which it attaches verbal labels; the right hemisphere is primarily a synthesizer, more 
concerned with the overall stimulus configuration, and organizes and processes 
information in terms of gestalts, or wholes.46 
 
Moreover, experimental psychologists have reinforced this view by putting forwards theories 
of multiple-intelligence. Howard Gardner, for instance, shows that human intelligence is 
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linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, and naturalist. His view is corroborated by Bernard Lonergan’s contention that 
human knowing includes various operations such as experiencing, understanding, judging, 
choosing, deciding and acting47 because the human mind operates at four levels of 
consciousness namely the empirical, the intellectual, the rational and responsible. 48 
Lonegan’s four levels of consciousness point to the fact the reducing human knowing to 
logico-mathematical knowledge implies reducing the whole process of human knowing to the 
second level of consciousness i.e. the intellectual level. However, a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology would imply that normative epistemology through reducing the whole of human 
knowing to logico-mathematical knowledge remains incomplete. 
 
Moreover, people can actually supplement limited ability for abstraction by using external 
aids that appeal to their sensorimotor knowledge as they solve logico-mathematical problems. 
Therefore, counting on one’s fingers or performing an addition by putting successively many 
objects in a box, or simply writing numbers on a paper attest to the fact that numbers are not 
ontologically abstract entities. They are a normative medium that can allow the understanding 
of relationships between properties of material objects by understanding relationships 
between representations of these objects. This medium operates properly only in a restricted 
world of similar kinds that implies fixing reference and meaning, and hence, eliminating 
value. This process of fixing meaning and eliminating value is achieved through fixing 
reference and the subtle way it is done in real mathematical operations is not mentioning 
reference at all and implicitly assuming that 2 + 3 = 5 regardless of what real objects 2, 3, and 
5 refer to. In brief, as Lakoff and Nunez have pointed out: 
Symbolic logic is not the basis of all rationality, and it is not absolutely true. It is a 
beautiful metaphorical system, which has some rather bizarre metaphors. It is useful for 
certain purposes but quite inadequate for characterizing anything like the full range of 
mechanisms of human reason.49 
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This contention by Lakoff and Nunez seems radical and rebellious since logical inference and 
mathematics have penetrated our culture to the extent that very few philosophers and 
scientists can dare to challenge the validity of the systems of mathematics and mathematical 
logic. Challenging these systems does not imply denigrating their achievements which are 
unprecedented in various areas of modern science and technology. It is acknowledging that 
sometimes mathematics has been elevated beyond its power and abilities. Moreover, given the 
metaphysical dualism entrenched in modern philosophy despite its rejection of 
supernaturalism there is still some contempt for human natural abilities other than reason. The 
natural human realm was considered as an imperfect copy of the supernatural divine realm in 
the middle ages. Likewise, the search for certainty and precision in modern science led to the 
postulation of the existence of transcendental mathematics of which the imperfections of our 
measurement and calculations is a copy. However, as Lakoff and Nunez have noted: 
Human beings can have no access to a transcendent Platonic mathematics, if it exists. A 
belief in Platonic mathematics is therefore a matter of faith, much like religious faith. 
There can be no scientific evidence for and against the existence of a Platonic 
mathematics.50 
 
Therefore, there is no mathematics other than human mathematics. The postulation of a 
Platonic mathematic is based on a belief in transcendence that is associated with religion. Its 
corollaries are an idea of a perfect heaven as opposed to an imperfect earth or an idea of a 
perfect God as opposed to imperfect human beings. This transcendental dualism manifests 
itself in other philosophical categories such as the opposition of essence to existence or 
substance to accidents. The same transcendental dualism manifests itself in some opposition 
of the mental to the physical in philosophy of mind. These oppositions imply defining the 
mental in terms of lack of spatial extension unlike the physical that can be defined by spatial 
and temporal characteristics. However, the rejection of supernaturalism itself would have led 
to a form of naturalism devoid of transcendental dualism. Transcendence should be limited to 
the way humans are able to transcend their limitations in space and time. For instance, 
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through signs and symbols that are at the origin of purposeful and meaningful communicative 
processes, humans transcend their temporal and spatial boundaries and reach out to other 
persons humans on the one hand; and, on the other hand, humans create techniques and 
technologies that allow the person to dig into the abyss of history and collective memory and 
at the same time to face challenges and seize opportunities of the present and to make plans 
for the future. Many of our contemporaries are not aware that usual practices such as 
preparing budgets, making timetables, booking appointments with other people are 
expressions of this self-transcendence because they are ways of handling the future while we 
are still in the present. The same applies to practices such as keeping records and archives that 
are ways of handling the past while our lives move forwards in the future. Therefore, there is 
no need to associate transcendentalism with supernaturalism or the existence of a Platonic 
world that humans are trying to duplicate. There are creation of humans such as technologies 
and signs and symbols that allow humans to transcend their limitations both in time and 
space. In other words, there are no transcendental mathematics because: 
The only mathematics that human beings know or can know is, therefore, a [human] 
mind-based mathematics, limited and structured by human brains and minds. The only 
scientific account of the nature of mathematics is therefore an account, via cognitive 
science, of human mind-based mathematics. Mathematical ideas analysis provides such 
an account.51 
 
Therefore, admitting that there is no transcendental Platonic mathematics as Penrose would 
postulate or mathematical principles embedded in the order of the universe and in the human 
mind gives some credit to Cartestian intuitionism. Assailed by doubts Descartes sought new 
foundations. However, Cartesian foundations did not become famous because they were new 
but because they are (at least according to Descartes himself) absolute. Descartes’ programme 
consisted therefore in replacing doubt by certainty. Therefore, Descartes attempt to establish 
absolute foundations for human knowledge came with costs: (1) Descartes reduced 
philosophy’s traditional vocation i.e. love of wisdom to certainty; (2) he popularized a 
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mechanistic model of mental processes by claiming that as complex natural processes can be 
explained by the behaviour of atoms, complex mental processes and human knowledge itself 
can be explained as combinations of self-evident axiomatic propositions that the human mind 
intuit; and (3) Descartes sought objectivity not in the objects themselves but through an 
introspective process of accessing contents of his own consciousness. Therefore, Pundit is 
right in characterizing the type of individually-based type of knowledge that dominated the 
Cartesian tradition as “our subjective knowledge.”52 It would sound anathema to describe the 
father of modern philosophy as one who bases objectivity on a subjective process but that is 
what Cartesian Meditations are about. Descartes reduces knowledge to certainty by defining 
knowledge in terms of “clear and distinct ideas.” The Cartesian influence on normative 
epistemology is unprecedented since the search for clear and distinct ideas lead normative 
epistemology to defining knowledge as true-justified-beliefs, with the condition that these 
beliefs have to be infaillible, indubitable, incorrigible. 
 
C. CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITS OF NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
1. Knowledge as true-justified belief 
a) Normative Epistemology and the Gettier Problem 
The emergence of normative epistemology within the context of modern science aimed at 
founding human knowledge on scientific principles against the background of the 
arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs and the tyranny of authority. Therefore normative 
epistemology is not founded on the distinction between knowledge (episteme) and (mere) 
opinion (doxa) because episteme and doxa are not always in opposition. In many instances, 
some opinions constitute real knowledge. It is a truism that the metaphysic of modern science 
and normative epistemology is naturalism since the two reject supernaturalism as a point of 
departure. However, the form of naturalism that modern science and normative epistemology 
uphold is materialism given the success of materialist-atomism in physical chemistry. 
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Moreover, normative epistemology as a philosophy of human knowledge aims at establishing 
the principles that regulate the representation of the material physical objects into mental 
forms such as sensations and ideas. These principles are expected to share the objectivity and 
the universality of the principles that modern science finds in the universe. Therefore, while 
modern science provides normative epistemology with better (or the best) descriptions of the 
universe and has proved to be a good system of explanation, normative epistemology goes 
beyond the descriptive, predictive and prescriptive roles of modern science. Normative 
epistemology operates at the meta-disciplinary level as it assesses the nature, the possibility, 
the conditions and the limits of human knowledge. As Crumley noted: 
Epistemology is a normative discipline. Unlike psychology or sociology, which merely 
describes and explains how we acquire our beliefs, epistemology attempts to identify 
the principles for evaluation of our beliefs. The evaluative or normative task of 
epistemology is perhaps its most characteristic feature.53 
 
In the attempt to identify the principles that found human knowledge, epistemology not only 
redefines itself as modern science provides tools for describing reality and articulating 
knowledge but despite the diversity of metaphysical assumptions (idealism vs. positivism for 
instance) and diversity of epistemological positions (rationalism vs. empiricism, for example) 
there four salient features of normative in its actual state as an academic discipline. These 
characteristics include: defining knowledge as true justified belief; as a corollary of reducing 
knowing to logico-deductive processes in addition to assuming that that knowing is an activity 
of the mind. However, these characteristics can be challenged in various ways following 
Putnam’s advice to take into account the “division of linguistic labour” and “paradigms that 
are supplied by our environment”54 
 
Beliefs have been defined as “representations of the world around us”.55 This definition 
implies that “they are mental states – states of mind – with particular contents or 
information.”56 However, it is worth noting that the context in which modern science and 
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normative epistemology emerged had made beliefs a contentious issue. The tyranny of 
authority that finally brought scholasticism into disrepute had made beliefs a contentious issue 
and sometimes a matter of life and death as religious wars were waged all over Europe. 
Moreover, new techniques of inquiry had challenged in an unprecedented way the 
arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs. In addition to the decline of the medieval synthesis as 
represented by scholasticism, doctrinal diversity within the Roman Catholic Church created a 
lot of “empirical residue” that called for paradigm changes. Modern science and normative 
epistemology aimed, in this period of crisis, to safeguard knowledge and truth from the 
arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs and the tyranny of authority. The tyranny of authority was 
real because some institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church were read to defend “the 
truth” using all means including violence. Therefore, modern science and normative 
epistemology are better understood as paradigms that aim at solving puzzles generated by the 
decline of scholasticism rather than as impersonal a-historical discourses that portray the 
necessity and the universality embedded in the order of the universe and the functioning of the 
human mind. 
 
The conflicts of the early modern times, although they may today be classified as religious in 
their nature had important epistemological implications. Not only the medieval times did not 
have the disciplinary differentiation that characterizes our time but also religious disputes had 
cosmological, metaphysical, and ethical tenets that questioned the status of God in the 
universe and human destiny. Moreover, there was a confusion of roles as religious and 
knowledge functions were not separated. In the dominantly agriculturalist and rural societies 
of the late middle ages, the clergy cumulated both religious and knowledge roles. Actually the 
clergy somehow monopolized education given the fact that most people were not only 
illiterate but they could not speak Latin which was the medium of knowledge transmission at 
that time. Therefore, challenging cosmological beliefs and assumptions was not only an 
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intellectual endeavor (an academic exercise) but it implied heads on collusion with the 
political and religious establishment. Therefore, normative epistemology in this context 
emerged as a foundational discipline i.e. its aim was not only reaching accurate description, 
making reliable predictions and useful prescriptions as modern science does, but establishing 
criteria for confirming or invalidating these descriptions, predictions and prescriptions. 
 
Defining knowledge as true-justified-belief is known in epistemology as the Gettier 
problem.57 Gettier delineates outright the aim of normative epistemology i.e. “to state 
necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition.”58 Gettier 
formulates the epistemological problem following a definition that many contemporary 
philosophers trace from Plato. Schematically the Gettier problem implies three conditions for 
given proposition to count as knowledge: 
(a) S knows that P IFF  (i) P is true, 
(ii) S believes that P, and 
(iii) S is justified in believing that P.59 
 
Gettier looks at two alternative formulations of the epistemological problem by Chisholm and 
Ayer. For Chisholm: 
(b) S knows that P IFF  (i) S accepts P, 
(ii) S has adequate evidence for P, 
and 
(iii) P is true.60 
And for Ayer 
 (c) S knows that P IFF  (i) P is true, 
(ii) S is sure that P is true, and 
(iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true.61 
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Without delving into a detailed analysis of the Gettier problem, these three alternative 
formulations show that knowledge of a proposition depends on three criteria: (1) an epistemic 
criterion i.e. the proposition P itself being true, (2) a subjective criterion i.e. the subject S, 
“believing“, “accepting“ or “being sure“ that P is true and (3) a justification criterion i.e. S 
“being justified”, “having adequate evidence” or “having the right”. In addition to the fact that 
Gettier has pointed out that a person can be justified to hold a proposition as true owing to 
other elements of the situation that S does not know, this formulation and the criteria it 
establishes have many shortcomings. Moreover, when the belief that a person holds to be true 
is based on the testimony of another person who is deliberately lying, one remains justified to 
hold a belief as true but that belief does not constitute knowledge. My own view is that the 
traditional formulation of the epistemological problem fails to account for real processes of 
human knowing because it reduces knowing to “knowing that” i.e. knowing matters of fact. 
However, real processes of human knowing involve other aspects such as knowing how, 
knowing why, and knowing when and where.  In other words, normative epistemology, 
reduces human knowing to following rules (such as the ones prescribes by Descartes in his 
Discourse on Method) but as Alasdair MacIntyre has noted: “[o]bjective rationality is 
therefore to be found not in rule-following, but rule-transcending, in knowing how and when 
to put rules and principles to work and when not.”62  
 
b)  The Justification Requirement 
Looking at the justification criterion itself, it remains ambiguous. “Being justified”, “having 
the right”, and “having sufficient evidence” are not synonymous. According to Gettier “ 
(a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for 
the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) 
and (c) fail if ‘has adequate evidence for' or ' has the right to be sure that ' is substituted 
for ' is justified in believing that ' throughout. 
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What should be questioned is not only the nature of epistemic justification itself but also the 
project of normative epistemology i.e. searching for necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the truth of propositions. Not only all matters of fact cannot be reduced to univocal 
propositions, but also, our assumption that in the process of eliminating the tyranny of 
authority and the arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs in both the description of reality and the 
articulation of knowledge should be characterized. The disintermediation of knowledge 
achieved through the elimination of the mediation by religious authority in the description of 
reality and the articulation of knowledge is really a point progress for both modern science 
and normative epistemology. However, it does not achieve direct knowledge. In other words, 
the form of disintermediation that modern science and normative epistemology brought seems 
rather to require other forms of mediation or justification. As Alston has noted: 
Where what justifies a belief includes the believer’s having certain other justified 
beliefs, so related to the first belief as to embody reasons or grounds for it, we may 
speak of indirectly (mediatly) justified belief.  And, where what justifies a belief does 
not constitute any such as constituent, we may speak of directly (immediately) justified 
belief. Correspondingly, a case of knowledge in which the justification requirement is 
satisfied by indirect (mediate) justification will be called indirect (mediate) knowledge; 
and a case in which the justification requirement is satisfied by direct (immediate) 
justification will be called direct (immediate) knowledge.63 
 
The distinction between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge implies that in some cases 
not only knowledge or true belief has to be justified but also justification itself has to be 
justified ad infinitum. This can lead to an infinite regress because the doctrine that defines 
knowledge a true justified belief implies that: 
Our justified beliefs form a structure, in that some beliefs (the foundations) are justified 
by something other than their relation to other justified beliefs; beliefs that are justified 
by their relation to other beliefs all depend for their justification on the foundations.64 
 
This doctrine called foundationalism is based on a certain conception of reality and 
knowledge that is Aristotelian. This model was borrowed from cosmology. It is a vestige of, 
as Carruthers has pointed out, 
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one form of the medieval-Aristotelian conception of science. It was believed that the 
various natural sciences form deductive systems (Somewhat like geometry), the axioms 
of which are self evidently true as well as innately known.65 
 
  
As an ideal, the Cartesian search for “new” and permanent foundations of knowledge is 
fascinating. No one would like to found anything on the shaky grounds of ignorance and 
doubt. However, Cartesian foundations remain themselves unfounded. In a scientific context, 
where techniques such as observation, reasoning and experimenting in contradistinction to 
revelation, tradition and reliance to authority are believed to lead to knowledge, it is 
paradoxical that the founder of modern rationalism himself bases his system of belief on 
intuition. Despite tremendous progress in both epistemology and philosophy of mind, 
intuition remains the most obscure concept in modern philosophy. On the one hand, it seems 
that intuition is handed to us by fundamental axiomatic propositions because the latter are 
self-evident! And on the other hand, intuition looks like a superior quality of humans that 
allow them to grasp basic concepts and axioms effortlessly. It is not clear whether intuition is 
based on the nature of propositional knowledge itself or whether it is based on the nature of 
the human mind itself. Despite this confusion, many scholars still uphold that intuition is real. 
For Simon, for instance, intuition: 
is an observable fact that people reach solutions to problems suddenly. They then have 
an “aha!” experience of varying degrees of intensity. There is no doubt of the 
genuineness of the phenomenon. Moreover, the problem solutions people reach when 
they have these experiences, when they make intuitive judgments, are frequently 
correct.66 
 
However, that spontaneous act of understanding that emerges naturally and spontaneously 
seems to be much more of a myth rather than reality. This is so because it is not easy to 
determine in fine detail what factors enter what we should call the context of discovery. Many 
scientists and philosophers of genius have attempted to describe how they reached some great 
ideas – Descartes did it at length in his Meditations – but some scientists and philosophers of 
great reputation puzzled by the way they arrived at solutions to difficult scientific and 
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philosophical problems outside their professional settings while attending to non-professional 
aspects of their lives. This phenomenon, that I shall call the triple B (Bus, Bed, Bath) i.e. the 
possibility of reaching great scientific and philosophical insights when one is travelling, 
sleeping or bathing points to a great weakness of Descartes’ theory. By reducing knowledge 
to “clear and distinct” ideas, Descartes reduces human mental processes to those that humans 
are aware of. However, recent discoveries in cognitive science and experimental psychology 
have pointed out that there is a great part of our mental process that we are not aware. Clearly 
and distinctly structured thoughts as Descartes wishes are rather an exception to the rule. 
According to Lakoff and Nunez, there are three contribution of cognitive sciences to our 
understanding of mathematics (and of mental processes in general: (1) the embodiment of the 
mind, (2) the cognitive unconscious, and (3) metaphorical thought. Concerning the second 
contribution of cognitive science, Lakoff and Nunez point to the fact that: 
Most of thought is unconscious – not repressed in the Freudian sense but inaccessible to 
direct conscious inspection. We cannot look directly at our conceptual systems and at 
our low-level thought processes. This includes most mathematical thought.67 
 
This aspect of human mental processes calls into question Descartes prescription of a method 
of conducting thought. This aspect not only undermines the possibility of monitoring one’s 
thought step by step as Descartes but it has been documented by people from various 
disciplines and areas of academic interest. Penrose expresses this aspect, for instance, when 
he talks of the “non verbally of thought” and “the non-algorithmic nature of mathematical 
insight”. Michael Polanyi focuses on this aspect in a whole book entitled for the purpose The 
Tacit Dimension.68 
 
From another perspective, this aspect corresponds to what Rosalind Shaw calls, after 
Mudimbe69, “implicit patterns of knowledge”.70The latter are found “in symbolic action rather 
than in authorized written texts”71 They escape not only codification but also formalization 
and systematization. According to Eboussi-Boulaga, 
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They emerge from the habitus, the practical mastering of the symbolical significance of 
social relations. At every moment, they are capable of improvizations ordered in facts of 
perceptions, of representations, of appreciations and actions, in accordance with the 
context, the situation and the configuration of relations, and the balance of power.72 
 
Insight is linked with other aspects that manifest the creative aspects of human knowing. 
These aspects defy the criteria of demarcation embedded in the realist and idealist traditions. 
They indicate that the idealist cannot clearly state which idea led to a particular insight. 
Similarly, the realist cannot sometimes express how a particular experience yields special 
meaning. Lonergan shows that despite the fact that insight occurs suddenly, it is preceded by 
the tension of inquiry. He describes the context of discovery as a context of tension where a 
problem seems to exhaust the resources of an existing context of description and definition or 
a paradigm as Kuhn would have said and indicated that understanding or insight: 
(1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, 
(2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly; 
(3) is a function not of outer circumstances but of internal conditions, 
(4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract, and 
(5) passes through the actual texture of one’s mind.73 
 
This description of the context of discovery by Lonergan indicates that intuition is not an 
unfounded foundation as Descartes would make us believe. In addition to being a response to 
a tension of inquiry, intuition includes both implicit and explicit processes. Intuition is not 
based on the transparency of a mind that carefully monitors its processes but on previous 
experience and skill and on the tension embedded in the desire to know. Intuition as an 
unfounded foundation constitutes a sort of absolute beginning similar to Aristotle’s 
unmovable mover but Descartes search for an absolute beginning of human knowledge into 
self-evident axioms that we intuit is misleading. Descartes himself stated philosophizing in 
adult age and after training had equipped him with a great deal of sensorimotor and logico-
mathematical knowledge. He did not state with self-evident axioms or propositions but with 
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doubting the system of scholasticism in which he had been originally trained and trying to 
find solutions in intellectual tools that his academic milieu offered especially mathematics and 
Newton’s physics. It is worthy noting that in early modern time the distinction between 
science and philosophy that some of our contemporaries uphold was not that well delineated 
since what we call science now was called natural philosophy. 
 
However, there are increasing challenges to the Cartesian reduction of knowledge to “clear 
and distinct” ideas that can be expressed in terms of univocal propositions. Moreover, the 
formulation of knowledge in terms of a-historical rational discourse that is founded on self-
evident axioms and basic proposition that the human mind intuit led to an infinite regress as 
not only the beliefs on which other beliefs are founded have to be justified but also 
justification itself has to be justified. Moreover, the top-down approach to problems of 
knowledge that assume that knowing processes are deductive systems that are best 
exemplified by mathematical operations and logical inference excludes other aspects of 
human knowing such what Piaget calls sensorimotor knowledge or common sense 
knowledge. In fact, contemporary philosophers such as Hilary Putnam have called into 
question theories that are based on the Aristotelian model. According to Putnam: 
traditional accounts of meaning and reference fail in two different ways. On the one 
hand, they neglect the division of linguistic labor. On the other hand, they neglect the 
way in which the paradigms that are supplied by our environment contribute to the 
fixing of reference.74 
 
Therefore, from the point of view of the division of the linguistic labour, a complete 
epistemology should not restrict human knowing to its logico-mathematiacal aspects. This 
approach leads to an emaciated highly abstract form of knowledge that is most of the time 
expressed in formal languages since they are the only ones which lend themselves to the 
fixation of meaning and reference into univocal propositions and follow invariable rules of 
inference. Most proponents of normative epistemology associate mathematical operations and 
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logical inferences with immutable laws embedded in the order of the universe and the human 
mind. Therefore, there is, first, a need to recognize that science is a coded, specialised, 
formalized and systematized form of knowledge. Therefore, epistemology should take into 
account non-scientific aspects of processes of human knowing. Lonergan, for instance, calls 
for an integration of scientific and common sense knowledge not by putting them into a 
hierarchy or replacing one by the other. What is needed is to recognize the specificity of each 
form of knowledge and carefully control whether one from is not encroaching on the realms 
of the other. According to Lonergan, while “common sense is concerned with things as 
related to us, science is concerned with things as related among themselves.”75 Therefore, 
common sense, “never aspires to universally valid knowledge and it never attempts 
exhaustive communication.”76 Moreover, “it [common sense] has no use for a technical 
language and no tendency towards a formal mode of speech”.77 Moreover, common sense 
“has no theoretical inclinations”.78 In other words, science is a coded (use of technical 
language), formalized (fixing meaning and reference as a way of reaching unambiguous and 
univocal definitions), systematized (need for coherence of insights) and controlled (need of 
institutional, collegial validation, or at least peer review) type of knowledge. Science is in 
principle universal and objective while common sense knowledge deals mainly with highly 
context dependent problems. Science appeals to universal principles of rationality common 
sense appeals mainly to individual judgement and decision. Minsky has corroborated this 
view when he notes that: 
Common sense is not a simple thing. Instead, it is an immense society of hard-earned 
practical ideas – of multitudes of life-learned rules and exceptions, dispositions and 
tendencies, balances and checks.79 
 
Therefore, if epistemology is to be complete, there is a need to overcome the neglect of the 
linguistic labor by dynamically integrating various form of human knowledge and not 
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restricting the whole of human knowledge to logico-mathematical knowledge. As Lonergan 
has noted: 
The occurrence of insight is not restricted to the minds of mathematicians, when doing 
mathematics, and to the mind of physicists, when engaged in that department of science. 
On the contrary, one meets intelligence in every work of life. There are intelligent 
farmers and craftsmen, intelligent employers and workers, intelligent technicians and 
mechanics, intelligent doctors and lawyers, intelligent politicians and diplomats. There 
is intelligence in commerce and industry, in finance and taxation, in journalism and 
public relations. There is intelligence in the home and in friendship, in conversation and 
in sport, in the arts and in entertainment. In every case, the man or woman of 
intelligence is marked by greater readiness in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing 
the issue, in grasping the implications, in acquiring know-how.80 
 
Moreover, following Putnam’s suggestion, it is also important to take into account paradigms 
“that are supplied by our environment.”81 As normative epistemology found in modern 
science a great ally in eliminating the tyranny of authority and the arbitrariness of 
supernatural beliefs in both the description of reality and the articulation knowledge our 
environment supplies academically interesting paradigms such as the concept of information. 
Therefore, instead of reducing the scientific contribution to epistemology to 19th century 
physics, epistemology can be enriched by integrating in its areas of interests areas from other 
disciplines such as neurophysiology and cognitive science. These disciplines assist in 
overcoming some limits embedded in the Cartesian paradigm but also in solving puzzles 
associated with reducing reality to material, mechanistic and deterministic processes and 
taking into account the dynamic and integrative processes through which humans interact 
with their human and non-human environments. Therefore, instead of reducing knowledge to 
univocal propositions that lend themselves to invariant rules of logical inference there is a 
possibility of enriching the traditional view of knowledge as true-justified-beliefs by noting 
that processes of human knowing are not passive processes of a solitary thinker who is filling 
one’s mind with representations no matter how accurate they are. In addition to being 
observers of reality, humans also act on reality. Therefore, epistemology should defines itself 
as a study of the nature, the possibility, the conditions, and the limit of human knowledge. 
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c) Truth and Differentiation in Levels of Consciousness 
To count as knowledge beliefs have to be not only justified but also true. Truth remains a 
puzzle because it does not lend itself to the paradigms used to define reality. It is not a 
material substance or a mental representation but a relationship between the two. This elusive 
nature of truth has prompted some theorists to give to truth an absolute value. They actually 
talk of “The” truth rather than simply “truth.” However, this absolutist notion of truth cannot 
be understood unless it is put in relation to other philosophical notions that define its contexts 
and determine its content. This absolutist conception of truth, according to Putnam is tributary 
to some metaphysical realism that upholds: 
the ideas that truth is a matter of Correspondence and that it exhibit Independence (of 
what humans do or could find out), Bivalence, and Uniqueness (there cannot be more 
than one complete and true description of Reality;82 
 
These assumptions imply that “to solve philosophical problems is to construct a better 
scientific picture of the world.”83 However, this would amount to an inversion of roles. While 
traditionally, at least in the Aristotelian tradition, philosophy was considered as the foundation 
of all the sciences, in the modern context, philosophy is striving to be scientific. That is why 
normative epistemology should be understood as an attempt to elaborate a theory of 
knowledge that is modeled to modern science especially physics. This modeling of normative 
epistemology on modern physics is sometimes done in a way that does not takes into account 
internal dynamics the scientific enterprise itself and its various disciplines. This absolutist 
approach to truth “retains the ancient principle that Being is prior to Knowledge.”84 It implies 
that “all the philosopher has to do, in essence, is be a good “futurist” – anticipate for us how 
science will solve our philosophical problems.”85 In practice, “science should be understood 
without philosophic reinterpretation.”86 
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However, this is a conception of philosophy that makes philosophy bite its own tail. It is a 
way of philosophizing that destroys philosophy itself by replacing it by modern science or by 
setting its targets into absolutist terms that reduce philosophizing to searching for certainty 
instead of maintaining the complexity and the dynamism embedded in loving wisdom. Real 
people involved in real processes of knowing are not looking for absolute truth or clear and 
distinct ideas that will wipe away their doubts once for all. They are involved into a process of 
inquiry that leads to accurate or non-accurate representations of the immediate data of 
experience but even when these representations are true-justified-beliefs or “clear and 
distinct” idea they are not sufficient to constitute a complete process of human knowing. In 
addition to representing the world, human knowing has a universal horizon that implies a 
process of integration and discrimination that classifies similar kinds as universals and 
separate them with elements from instances that do not fulfill the criteria of demarcation. This 
process of classification implies that in addition to representing the immediate data of 
experience (no matter whether the representations are accurate or not), human knowing 
implies making sense of these representations. In other words, these representations are 
compared and contrasted with pre-existing explanatory schemes that are acquired through 
early childhood learning for general knowledge and through training and life experience by 
domain specific knowledge. Therefore, understanding the immediate data of experience is a 
process of meaning creation that is both integrative and discriminatory. It takes data that fit is 
one explanatory scheme as true while it rejects those that do not fit in the explanatory scheme. 
However, data that does not fit in one explanatory scheme is not wasted because it prompts 
further inquiry and learning in way that leads to the questioning of the data themselves or 
sometimes in a dramatic way to the questioning of the explanatory scheme itself. 
 
Therefore, empirical processes abide to correspondence theories of truth as they believe that, 
according to Crumley, “a sentence or proposition is true if it matches or corresponds to certain 
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features of the world”.87 However, a real knower’s objects of predications are not only 
material objects or features of the world. Sometimes, a real knower is involved in abstract 
reasoning and subject to logico-deductive processes as one does mathematical operations or is 
involved with univocal propositions and logical inferences. These processes lend themselves 
easily to coherence theories of truth because the knower is not longer interested in achieving 
accurate representations of material objects but in making sense of these representations 
themselves. This predicating on representations and not on features of the world creates a 
situation of abstraction where meaning and reference are fixed as a way of generating 
univocal propositions that are considered as embodiments of universality and truth. This 
process of abstraction is based on a metaphysical assumption that there are universals that are 
present in each instance but that cannot be isolated except by eliminating their changing 
aspects that are relegated to the level of appearance or accidents as contrasted to reality 
defined in terms of substance or essence. This essentialist metaphysical position implies that 
defining reality in terms of  complexity and dynamism is going astray and missing the way to 
substance, essence and necessary truth.  
 
This approach reduces the process of knowing to its outcome i.e. knowledge as contrasted 
with opinion and defined in terms of “clear and distinct” ideas or justified-true-belief. 
Moreover, it takes the various operations involved in the process of human knowing as one 
and the same thing.  However, one can agree that empirical processes that may led to accurate 
representation of the world for some of its features are different for the intellectual processes 
that predicate not on material objects but in the presentations themselves as a way of fitting or 
excluding these representations into existing explanatory schemes. While empirical processes 
achieve representations, intellectual processes achieve meaning. Their role consists in 
understanding the immediate data of experience. Empirical and rational processes are most of 
the time put in opposition as different and opposing schools of thought. However, Lonergan 
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indicates that focusing on the outcome of the process of knowing i.e. knowledge instead of the 
process itself leads to a situation where the various operations involved in the process of 
knowing are taken as wholes when they are only parts of one multidimensional, dynamic, 
integrative, iterative and cumulative process. Lonergan calls these dimensions levels of 
consciousness because when humans are involved in the process of human knowing they are 
not limited to achieving accurate or non-accurate representations or making sense of these 
representations. They are not passive contemplators of the world but they are involved in 
processes of generating resources that allow them to led a meaningful lives by satisfying their 
needs and maximizing their abilities. That is why the process of human knowing cannot be 
limited its empirical and intellectual dimensions because not only accurate or non-accurate 
representations are generated and understanding achieved through making sense of these 
representation, but also these representations themselves and the meaning generated by 
comparing and contrasting them with existing explanatory schemes are compared and 
contrasted with real situations as a way of determining the importance of these representations 
and their meaning and the way they can be aligned to purposes such as satisfying one’s needs 
and maximizing one’s capabilities. This process of comparing and contrasting representations 
and their meaning with concrete situation in an evaluative process that discriminate between 
important representations and meanings and those that are just accessory. This evaluative 
process is most of the time eliminated form the process of human knowing by normative 
epistemologists following the traditional contrasting of empiricism with rationalism, 
positivism with idealism, objects with ideas (concepts), facts and principles, practice and 
theory. This evaluative process can be elusive because it vacillates between the universal 
horizon of the terms at the right side of these binary opposites and the concrete, particular 
dimensions of their counterparts on the left side. This evaluative dimension does not led to the 
generation of accurate or non-accurate representation or the generation of meaning, it is not a 
process of experiencing or understanding but a process of judging that implies comparing real 
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situation with principles and values that are idealizations based on either past experiences or 
expectations of the future. This evaluative process that is not necessarily to be associated adds 
to the process of knowing a dimension of value that eliminates from the processes of knowing 
representations and meanings that are not valuable. In other words, as the process of human 
knowing takes place, only representations that are meaningful and valuable constitute 
knowledge because as the knower is not a passive spectator of the world but an active 
generator of meaning and value, the knower uses meaningful and valuable representations as 
inputs into processes of decision-making and problem-solving. This means that meaningful 
and valuable representations emanating from comparing immediate data of experience with 
pre-existing explanatory schemes or with concrete situations are used to create desired 
situations as the knower strives to lead a meaningful life through satisfying needs and 
maximizing capabilities. 
 
In addition to the evaluative process that is part and parcel of the process of human knowing 
alongside empirical processes that aim at achieving representations and intellectual processes 
that aim at achieving meaning, there is a pragmatic dimensions that aims at achieving 
concrete goals. In other world in addition to representational (empirical, perceptual), semantic 
(meaning), evaluative (value) dimensions of human knowing there is a teleological dimension 
that implies a pragmatic dimension of human knowing. All in all, the human mind operates at 
four levels of consciousness that aim at achieving representations, meaning, value and goals 
in a dynamic and integrative way. Therefore, truth should not be always defined in terms of a 
relationship between material objects and mental representations but it can also be a 
relationship between mental (or other) representations themselves as they are compared and 
contrasted with existing explanatory schemes in the process of meaning generation. 
Moreover, truth is not a fixed entity associated with immutable substance or eternal forms but 
a process that occurs either through achieving accurate representations of the world or its 
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features (correspondence theory), or through reaching through deductive processes 
proposition that fit in already existing coherent systems of logically proven propositions 
(coherence theory). The two approaches to truth are not contradictory. They are different 
because they are not dealing with the same level of predication. Correspondence theories deal 
with empirical processes that aim at achieving accurate representations of the world or its 
features while coherence theories deal with these representations themselves as their accuracy 
(from previous empirical inquiries) is taken for granted and their truth depends on their fitting 
in an existing systems of true propositions and logically valid inferences. There is actually 
even a third theory of truth that is based in the process of using meaningful and valuable 
representations as inputs into the processes of decision-making and problem-solving. This 
theory, or the pragmatic theory implies that “a belief [or an idea] is true if it works or has 
certain kinds of consequences; the belief is cognitively useful”.88 This theory is different from 
the previous ones because as the correspondence theory is concerned with sense data i.e. the 
mental picturing or representing the material and the coherence theory with how propositions 
yields properties that make fit together in one system of true propositions, the pragmatic 
theory reverses these perspectives by creating a situation where truth is not an intrinsic quality 
of sense data or proposition but a quality to achieved through acting on real objects in the real 
world. This theory, called also verificationnism, would imply that there are not sense data or 
propositions that are intrinsically true. All of them have to be verified by their practicality. 
While correspondence theories would favor observation as a way of accessing knowledge and 
truth, coherences theory favor reasoning (logico-deductive methods) while pragmatic theories 
would favor experimental methods. The multiplicity of theories of truth calls for the natural 
questions of knowing whether there is one or many truth (s). The response can be found in the 
rejection of the outlook that upholds that: 
Independence, Uniqueness, Bivalence, and Correspondence are regulative ideas that the 
final scientific image is expected to live up to, as well as metaphysical assumptions that 
 50 
guarantee that such as final scientific resolution of all philosophical problems must be 
possible.89 
 
This rejection leads to a much more modest approach whose aim would be “to find a picture 
that enables us to make sense of the phenomena from within our world and practice rather 
than to seek a God’s-Eye view”90 This modest approach would start by acknowledging that 
the first experience of the world that we have as humans is not the one of univocal and 
universal proposition or self-evident axioms but: 
We are “thrown” into the world as beings who understand and interpret – so if we are to 
understand what it is to be human beings, we must seek to understand understanding 
itself, in its rich, full and complex dimensions. Furthermore, understanding is not one 
type of activity, to be contrasted with other human activities. … Understanding is 
universal and may properly be said to underlie and pervade all activities.91 
 
Paraphrasing Gadamer, Bernstein notes that “understanding is misconceived when it is 
thought of as an activity of a subject; it is a “happening,” an “event,” a pathos.”92 Therefore, 
paraphrasing the existentialists who uphold that we are “thrown” into existence, one can 
contend from an epistemological point of view that we are thrown into experience and that 
our first experience as human infants is a world where everything holds together. The world 
we experience as infants is a unified world and the challenge of intellectual growth and 
learning is our ability to separate the different pieces of the puzzle. In other words, reflection 
on the world and our knowledge of it is an ad hoc activity that appeals to our ability to 
apprehend the logical aspects of the universe. The word logic here is used in a broad sense 
linked with the Greek logos which is a principle of unity and intelligibility of reality that 
appeals to logico-mathematical processes in our minds. Therefore, the assumption by 
normative epistemologists that performing logico-mathematical inferences and operations is 
innate is erroneous. The performance of logico-mathematical inferences and operations is 
acquires as through training and life experience as one learns to untangle to puzzles of life 
experiences and to order then into a logical narrative or a series of equations or logical 
formulas. 
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In addition to neglecting changing paradigms, normative epistemology assumes a certain 
isomorphism between these universal laws embedded in the order of things and the laws of 
the mind because both types of laws are believed not only to be necessary but to be the object 
of mental representations. However, the error that normative epistemology makes is to 
consider all mental processes as one and the same thing. There is no differentiation of what 
we predicate on and what our aims in predicating are. As Putnam has pointed out, “Analytic 
philosophers have a preference for material objects and sense data.”93 Although this approach 
can be successful when one upholds an empirical approach, modern rationalism, for instance, 
claims do deal with concepts and not with sense data. Moreover, critical theory claims to 
tackle evaluative aspects and pragmatism claims to achieve concrete goals in the real world. 
The differences in approach from these four dominant schools show that actually all mental 
processes are not one and the same thing. There are empirical processes that deal with 
material objects and sense data in order to achieve representations. Empirical processes are 
not the only ones that takes place in the human mind. The logico-positivists were aware of 
these facts when they associated logic and positivism as way of getting the best from both 
logico-deductive forms of knowledge and empirical processes. However,  logico-positivism 
itself as a concept is an oxymoron because the type forms of knowledge (logico-deductive and 
empirical/positive) that they are attempting to bring together show a dilemma of choice 
between the perfection of rationality associated with unambiguous formal systems of 
predication and inference such as mathematics and logics and the predilection for empirical 
methods a way of countering supernaturalism and psychologism. 
 
However, taking into account of the paradigmatic nature of predication, one can acknowledge 
that empirical and logico-deductive approaches to knowledge are not antagonistic and much 
less contradictory. They are different levels of one multifarious process. When we are 
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knowing we are not always doing one and the same thing. There are times where we are 
interested in acquiring sense data of material objects and this can be achieved through 
empirical processes that lead to representations. However, when logico-deductive knowledge 
is at stake, we have a universal horizon of meaning that aims at understanding the principles 
underlying empirical processes. The telos of logico-deductive knowledge is understanding 
while its achievement is meaning. Logico-deductive processes are intrinsically analytic. In 
addition to empirical processes and logico-deductive processes there are also evaluative 
processes where humans compare ends and means, principles and facts, theories and 
practices, rules and their application, ideas and objects, laws and procedures, ideals and 
experiences. This evaluative dimension is most of the time excluded from normative 
epistemology because the latter in search of universalistic discourses and a universal language 
sacrifices value by fixing meaning and reference. This implies that fixing meaning and 
reference eliminates value because the attribution of meaning in a potentially polysemic 
context implies not only interpretive acts but also evaluative processes. The attribution of 
meaning through evaluative processes determines which aspects of a material object is 
meaningful and valuable in a given context and which ones are not. It determines for instance 
whether a stone is a sitting place, a construction material, a weapon (in the case of an attack 
by a wild animal, for instance), a tourist attraction to be photographed, or a monument that 
will serve as an external human memory. This evaluative dimension of human knowing has 
been excluded from normative epistemology because of the association of value with 
morality, a dimension of human beings that has been considered by many modern 
philosophers as as arbitrary as supernatural beliefs. However, this evaluative dimension is at 
the basis of our abilities for criticism and choice and assists in determining our actions as we 
much means to ends. This evaluative dimension both precedes and succeeds our actions 
because it assists in choosing the best means to achieve our goals but also to assess whether 
our goals have been achieved using principles and values that are idealizations of real 
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situations as yardsticks. In other words, reducing to the processes of human knowing to 
empirical and logico-deductive processes excludes evaluative and pragmatic processes. While 
empirical processes achieve representations and logico-deductive processes meaning, 
evaluative processes create value through a differential process of comparing ideals and 
realities while pragmatic processes achieve real goals in the real world. 
 
Therefore, knowing involves many integrated and recurrent steps. In fact, different theories of 
knowledge such as empiricism, rationalism, naïve and representative realism and the different 
types of idealism have the mistake of taking themselves as wholes, whereas they are different 
and complementary parts of one process. From this point of view, it becomes clear that 
various theories and positions on the origin and the nature of truth and knowledge are not 
contradictory. Their claim to be absolutely true, total and definitive is rooted in a 
discriminatory either/or pattern of truth and falsity that deprives the intermediate position of 
incompleteness and limited truth. In fact, between truth and falsity there is a continuum of 
doubts, incomplete meanings and unfinished inquiries. The ignorance of this fact makes the 
dualisms identified above seem unresolvable. 
 
However, following Lonergan’s theory of levels of consciousness, it becomes clear that 
Hume’s empiricism made the mistake of limiting the whole of knowledge to the empirical 
level. Similarly, Cartesian rationalism made a similar mistake by limiting knowledge to the 
intellectual level. The empirical view was echoed later by the early Wittgenstein’s picture 
theory of language and led to a correspondence theory of truth. On the other hand, rationalism 
limited knowledge to the point of view of science, i.e. the abstract and general (or universal) 
level and led to a coherence theory of truth. Kant’s attempt to reconcile empiricism and 
rationalism through the distinction of things as they are in time and space (the empirical level) 
and the categories of understanding in which those objects fit (the intellectual level) did not 
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overcome the original dualism. Instead, it shifted it to the metaphysical real through the 
distinction between the phenomenological and the noumenal dimensions of reality. Hence, the 
phenomenal could be empirically apprehended and the noumenal could not be the object of 
empirical investigation. In brief, according to Lonergan, knowing is a dynamic and iterative 
process that integrates recurrent operations leading to the accumulation of insights. In other 
world, logico-positivism (although in practice there have been more logic than positivism and 
empiricism) reduces the process of human knowing to two types of operations when there are 
four. According to Bernard Lonergan, the process of human knowing includes four basic 
operations i.e experiencing, understanding, judging and acting. In Lonergan’s own words: 
To apply these operations as intentional to the operations as conscious is a fourfold 
matter of (1) experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) 
understanding the unity an relations of one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, 
judging, deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood 
experiencing, understanding, judging, and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the 
norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of  one’s experienced, understood, 
affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding.94 
 
In fact, a throughout study of the nature of representation and epistemic justification shows 
that knowing is not just stocking accurate representations “in” the mind be they sensations or 
ideas.  This spatial metaphor of the mind is linked to Cartesian reduction of knowledge to 
certainty (clear and distinct ideas) abandoning the traditional vocation of philosophy as love 
of wisdom. According to Rorty: 
The Cartesian change from mind-as-reason to mind as inner arena [consciousness] was 
not the triumph of the prideful individual subject freed from scholastic shackles so 
much as the triumph of the quest for certainty over the search for wisdom. 95 
 
However, returning to the traditional understanding of philosophy as love of wisdom shows 
that instead of a selective theory of knowledge that reduces wisdom to certainty and 
knowledge to univocal propositions that lend themselves easily to formalization and logical 
inference, there is a need to comprehend human knowing in its dynamism and complexity. 
This would imply a dynamic and integrative epistemology that  not only takes into account of 
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the “division of linguistic labor” as manifested by the interdisciplinary nature of the problems 
of human knowledge and the dynamic and integrative nature of human rationality. This idea 
of a dynamic and integrative human rationality is based on the fact that reason is not as 
autonomous as Descartes Meditations would make us believe. In real processes of human 
knowing, if we agree with Aristotle that the human person is a rational animal, the human 
person is not rational only intellectually but also physically, emotionally, morally and 
practically. Therefore, an integrative theory of rationality must include empirical, rational, 
critical, pragmatic dimensions of human knowing. This multifaceted nature of human 
rationality implies that, as Polanyi reminds us, knowing enhances the exercise of skills, the 
practice of connoisseurship, and commitment. It is commitment that gives personal 
knowledge a universal intent. In Polanyi’s words: 
The arts of doing and knowing, the valuation and the understanding of meanings, are 
thus seen to be only different aspects of the act of extending our person into the 
subsidiary awareness of particulars which compose a whole. The inherent structure of 
this fundamental act of personal knowing makes us both necessarily participate in its 
shaping and knowledge its results with universal intent. This is the prototype of 
intellectual commitment96 
 
Looking at the justification requirement one is puzzled by the permanent search for an 
absolute beginning, an unfounded foundation. Hence, one theory of justification that is called 
foundationalism implies that “knowledge constitutes a structure the foundations of which 
support all the rest but themselves need no support.”97 In other words, “the mode of support 
involved is justification, and what get supported is belief.”98 Foundationalism would imply for 
the case at hand that human knowledge is founded on fundamental propositions and axioms 
that we intuit. However, as shown in the previous section, intuition is not as unfounded as 
such. It is the result of the tension of inquiry and this tension of inquiry creates the context to 
spontaneous acts of discovery because some of the processes of inquiry are relegated to the 
subconscious level as we proceed with various cores of life. In other words, we are not 
inquiring only when we are aware that we are inquiring. Intuition actually is itself a 
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dimension of rationality that can be assimilated to the trained observation that gives advantage 
of accuracy and speed to the expert over the novice. The expert not only can easily conduct 
processes of inquiry on subconscious levels but the expert can easily grab implicit patterns 
and meanings.  
 
2. Beliefs and the Paradigmatic Nature of Predication 
Even if we concede that human knowing implies knowing matters of fact i.e. “knowing that” 
it remains puzzling whether all matters of fact can be formulated into univocal propositions as 
proponents of the traditional formulation of the epistemological problem would want. In 
addition to reducing the whole of human knowing to propositional knowledge which lends 
itself easily to mathematical operations and logical inference, this traditional formulation 
ignores paradigmatic dimensions of the description of reality and the formulation of 
knowledge. It takes for granted the question of meaning and reference by assuming that all 
matters of facts can be reduced to univocal propositions that can translated into languages. 
This attempt of transforming human knowledge and human language into propositional 
statements that would lend themselves to the rigor of mathematical operations and logical 
inference was an attempt to introduce atomism and reductionism into epistemology by 
believing that as physical chemistry had found “fundamental” particles, it was also possible to 
find fundamental propositions and axioms. The first attempt to match every word with an 
object was attempted by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and likewise many epistemologists 
believed that in the “language of thought” it is possible to attach an idea to every object or a 
proposition to every matter of fact. However, Hilary Putnam, after rejecting his previous 
views on knowledge and representation contends that: 
To interpret a language, one must, in general, have some idea of the theories and 
inference patterns which are common in the community that speaks that language. No 
one could determine what “spin” refers to in quantum mechanics, for example, without 
learning quantum mechanics, or what “negative charge” refers to without learning a 
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certain amount of electrical theory, or what “inner product” refers to without learning a 
certain amount of mathematics.99 
 
Therefore, even at the basic level of predication i.e. defining matters of fact following the 
propositional formulation of S is P there is a lot of background knowledge involved. Some of 
this background knowledge is acquired through experience and early education, but in some 
areas one has to go through specialist training. That is why there are differences across 
languages and cultures both in defining reality and articulating knowledge. Avoiding these 
differences implies imposing constraints to natural processes as a way of translating them into 
a universal language. Putnam again points out that: 
The predicate calculus if often treated by philosophers as a universal language; but to 
put beliefs expressed in a natural language into the predicate calculus format, one must 
interpret them – that is, one must deal with the very problem we wish to solve. A theory 
of interpretation which works only after the beliefs to be interpreted have been 
translated into some “regimented notation” begs the question.100 
 
The problem of considering the predicate calculus as a universal language misses the fact that 
predicate calculus eliminates value by fixing meaning and reference. Working univocal 
symbols where each symbol has an invariant meaning and following necessary laws of 
inference, implies that one is dealing with the medium itself and not the objects it refers to. 
Actually, predicate calculus is very restrictive because it includes in the definition of a symbol 
or an object only one aspect that is considered as inalterable to changes in time or spatial 
location. As a medium, predicate calculus like mathematical operations works only in 
restricted domains of similar kinds. That is why after the interpretive process that lead to the 
fixation of meaning and reference as a way of translating matters of fact into a universal 
language, symbols and rules of inferences are considered as not having any reference at all. 
However, 
The predicate calculus format itself has problems. What should the variables range 
over? Analytic philosophers have a preference for material objects and sense data; but 
there is no guarantee that every human language and sublanguage, including the 
specialized sublanguages of various professions (psychoanalysis, theology, sociology, 
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cognitive science, mathematics …), will employ these standard ontologies. In fact, we 
know that that the sublanguages just mentioned, at least, do not.101 
 
Therefore, at the basic level of predication as we attempt to define reality or matters of fact 
following the propositional format of S is P, we are confronted with the problem of finding a 
universal language without simplifying complex systems and processes. Because, universal 
language is only possible when we find a permanent dimension of reality on which our 
predications refer to. Plato thought that permanence and necessity are embedded in universal 
and non-material forms while Aristotle was of the view that universals are embedded in 
substance and not in accidents. These metaphysical assumptions influence the modern 
attempts of finding permanent foundations of knowledge. But even in modern science the 
level of predication remains controversial because despite the modeling of many modern 
sciences on physics, physics itself as a scientific discipline is not homogenous. For instance, 
Space-time points are another choice popular with philosophers; but to tell whether 
someone is quantifying over points in Newtonian space, or in space-time, or in Hilbert 
space, or in the space of supergravitational theory … one has to interpret his or her 
discourse.102 
 
In other words, predication itself is an interpretive act. It is not a neutral ground or a medium 
that defines the world as it is. What can or cannot be included in the predicate depends on 
metaphysical assumptions i.e. theories or beliefs defining what can be included in reality or 
not. For instance, in the European middle age, sneezing was believed to be a religiously 
beneficial act that would take out an evil spirit from a person. However, in the context of 
modern science as influenced by mechanics, sneezing is interpreted as a purely mechanical 
process that can be analyzed in terms of the movement of air from the lungs through the nose. 
Air itself has not been understood as a material “substance” in the history of European 
philosophy. The Greek concept of pneuma (air) has a lot of religious and supernatural 
connotation. A Christian appropriation of the concept of pneuma associates the spirit with air 
not in the act of creation where the demiurge creates life by inspiring air into matter but also 
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in the act of dying interpreted with loosing one capacity to breath. These supernatural 
interpretations of air involve also contexts where the spirit is represented as thunder in 
religious texts or where and bad winds on the sea associated with the evil spirit. These beliefs 
can appear laughable in the context of modern since, but they point to the fact that the 
definition of reality and the articulation of knowledge are essentially paradigmatic. Therefore, 
a Newtonian modern meteorologist who defines reality in terms of material particles in 
motion would have a different view of a storm from a Jew of biblical time such as the fisher 
Peter. While the modern meteorologist is equipped with knowledge and instruments that 
allow him to measure and even predict storms in a reasonable way, Hebrews of the biblical 
times would not hesitate to throw Jonas in the sea on the ground that his behavior called for 
God’s retribution and the ship was about to sink. Although, these examples are remote from 
modern science and normative epistemology, they point to the fact that metaphysical 
assumptions and epistemological positions are paradigm-dependent and the dominant 
paradigm influences human action in various ways. The paradigmatic nature of predication 
implies that: 
no human society is unsurpassable.  For any human society, there is a possible other 
society that is more sophisticated, which has modes of conceptualizing and describing 
things which members of the first society cannot understand without years of 
specialized study. What is often said is true, that all human languages are 
intertranslable.; but that does not mean that one can translate a current book in 
philosophy or a paper in clinical psychology or a lecture on quantum mechanics into the 
language of a primitive tribe without first coining a host of new technical terms in that 
language. It does not mean that we could tell any “smart” native what the book in 
philosophy or the paper in clinical psychology or the lecture on quantum mechanics 
“says” and have him understand (without years of study). Often enough we cannot even 
tell members of our linguistic community what these discourses “say” so that they will 
understand them well enough to explain them to others.103 
 
Therefore, the predicate calculus is not the universal language it claims to be but a medium 
that attempts to produce a form of knowledge based on modern physics belief in universal 
laws that can be formulated into simple mathematical relations. In fact, models of the universe 
influence conceptual frameworks and actions in a way that both the definition of reality and 
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the articulation of knowledge are paradigm bound. Although physicalism as a form of 
materialism has dominated normative epistemology and modern science, it is worth noting 
that even within physicalism paradigms are not homogenous. Moreover, as humans made 
tools that assisted them is coping with reality they embedded in these tools beliefs about the 
universe and the possibilities if offers. This realization shows that Descartes belief in innate 
ideas and Kant’s postulation of an a priori knowledge are questionable. Models of the 
universe provide models of social life and human action in a way that not only modes of 
thought but also patterns of action have been changing with changing paradigms. This creates 
a great risk of confusion as concepts used at different historical periods or in different 
societies can yield different meanings. This is a blow to normative epistemology’s attempt to 
achieve universality by fixing meaning and reference. According to changes in paradigms one 
can note that scientists and philosophers have been shifting focus. For instance, although 
modern mechanics would agree with Newton’s definition of reality in terms of material 
particles in motion, the concept of motion itself as it is used in Newtonianism is different from 
its Aristolelian use. Kuhn discovered this possible difference in reference and meaning as he 
found: 
rudiments of an alternative way of reading the texts with which I had been struggling. 
For the first time I gave due weight to the fact that Aristotle’s subject was change-of-
quality in general, including both the fall of a stone and the growth of a child to 
adulthood. In his physics, the subject that was to become mechanics was at best a still-
not-quite isolable special case. More consequential to my recognition that the permanent 
ingredients of Aristotle’s universe, its ontologically primary and indestructible 
elements, were not material bodies but rather qualities which, when imposed on some 
portion of omnipresent neutral matter, constituted an individual material body or 
substance.104 
 
Therefore it is not easy to grab the full meaning of a proposition when one is not acquainted 
with the paradigm in which the proposition is uttered. The search for a universal language and 
permanent foundations itself is a paradigmatic change that aimed at eliminating the tyranny of 
authority and the arbitrariness of supernatural beliefs in both the definition of reality and the 
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articulation of knowledge. However, this project is itself confronted to changing paradigms 
because even within the realm of physics concepts and paradigms are not homogenous. 
Moreover, in practice, the way physics is conceived and practices is also subject to changing 
paradigms as overall models of the universe influence human action and social life. Wiener 
points to this fact when he notes that: 
The thought of every age is reflected in its technique. The civil engineers of ancient 
days were land surveyors, astronomers and navigators; those of the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries were clockmakers and grinders of lenses. As in ancient times, 
the craftsmen made their tools in the image of the heavens. A watch is nothing but a 
pocket orrery, moving by necessity as do the celestial spheres; and if friction and the 
dissipation of energy play a role in it, they are effects to be overcome, so that the 
resulting motion of the hands may be as periodic and regular as possible. The chief 
technical result of this engineering after the model of Huyghens and Newton was the 
age of navigation, in which for the first time it was possible to compute longitudes with 
a respectable precision, and to convert the commerce of the great oceans from a thing of 
chance and adventure to a regular understood business. It is the engineering of the 
mercantilists. .105 
 
Wiener continuous his exemplification of how paradigms have been changing within the area 
of physics and engineering by noting that: 
To the merchant succeeded the manufacturer, and to the chronometer, the steam engine. 
From the Newcomen engine almost to the present time, the central field of engineering 
has been the study of prime movers. Heat has been converted into usable energy of 
rotation and translation, and the physics of Newton has been supplemented by that of 
Rumford, Carnot, and Joule. Thermodynamics makes its appearance, a science in which 
time is eminently irreversible; and although the earlier stages of this science seem to 
represent a region of thought almost without contact with the Newtonian dynamics, the 
theory of the conservation of energy and the later statistical explanation of the Carnot 
principle or second law of thermodynamics or principle of the degeneration of energy – 
that principle that makes the maximum efficiency obtainable by a steam engine depend 
on the working temperatures of the boiler and the condenser – all these have fused 
thermodynamics and the Newtonian dynamics into the statistical and the non-statistical 
aspects of the same science.106 
 
As a conclusion Wiener sets as a contemporary challenge the fact that: “[i]f the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the later eighteenth century the age of 
steam engines, the present age is the age of communication and control.”107 However, before I 
delve into a detailed description of an epistemology based on communication and control, it is 
worth noting that like Putnam: 
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I am not thinking of the possibility that quantum mechanics may be best understood in 
terms of non-standard logic (although that illustrates the point in a different way), but of 
the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics in its standard (“Copenhagen”) 
presentation. Copenhagen theorists claim that quantum mechanics does not treat the 
world as consisting of objects and observer-independent properties, but rather treats it as 
consisting of two realms: a realm of “measuring apparatus,” described by one ontology 
and one theory (classical physics), and a realm of “statistical states,” described by 
vectors in Hilbert space and projection operators on Hilbert space.108 
 
The problem is that: “[t]he “cut” between these two realms is not fixed, but is itself observer-
dependent – something the predicate calculus format has no way of representing.”109 
Therefore, predication calculus fails to achieve its mandate i.e. providing a universal language 
through which material objects are described “as they are” because what is included in reality 
or excluded is paradigm dependent. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, instead of defining human knowledge through opposing knowledge (episteme) and 
opinion (doxa) in addition to reducing wisdom to certainty and knowing the logico-deductive 
processes there is a possibility of respecting “the division of linguistic labor”110 and taking 
into account the “paradigms supplied by our environment” through the introduction of a 
dynamic and integrative model of epistemology based on the notion of information. This 
model is not a theory “in the sense that the scientific realist hopes that it will be possible to 
construct a theory of intentionality,” but “a picture that enables us to make some sort of sense 
of a variety of different phenomena”. Dynamic and integrative epistemology is not strictly 
speaking an epistemological position. It does not stand aside empiricism or rationalism for 
instance, either as their equal or their substitute. Dynamic and integrative epistemology 
suggests a series of paradigm shifts that allows the construction of a model of epistemology 
that takes into account various operations involved in the process of human knowing as it 
takes place at different levels of consciousness within an equally dynamic and integrative 
conceptual framework based on the notion of information.  This conceptual framework 
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upholds cybernetics as a metaphysical alternative to mechanics and suggests that the process 
of knowing in its dynamism should be viewed as information processing in contradistinction 
to representation which is an intrinsically static view. Moreover, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology suggests that instead of reducing matter of facts to univocal propositional 
statements through fixing meaning and reference, the complexity of the real should be 
handled as it is using complex methods such as “system thinking” in contradistinction to the 
simple, regular, and ordered patterns involved in the analysis/synthesis dichotomy. As a 
corollary to extending the process of human knowing beyond logico-deductive processes, 
dynamic and integrative epistemology suggests that philosophy should not restrict itself to 
handling concepts. As a way of becoming again the “love of wisdom” and not just a search 
for certainty, philosophy should complement its speculative tasks with practical issues 
pertaining to decision-making and problem-solving. Dynamic and integrative epistemology, 
therefore, is not a replication of computer algorithms by the human mind, but a philosophical 
framework based on a dynamic and integrative model of human rationality that acknowledges 
that at individual level the process of human knowing is multidimensional but also that 
sometimes individual rationality needs to be supported by institutional rationality.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FROM REPRESENTATION TO INFORMATION PROCESSING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Normative epistemology has been challenged from two main perspectives. On the one hand, 
its dissociation of physical and mental processes has been challenged by studies in 
neurophysiology. These studies have in various ways associated processes that lead to 
sensations and ideas with physiological processes in the human brain. On the other hand, 
scientific psychology, in describing in detail phenomena such as sensation and perception, has 
proved that the knower is not a passive spectator, but an active participant in the process of 
human knowing. Moreover, in contradistinction to normative epistemology’s reduction of 
knowing to thinking, recent theories such as emotional intelligence, virtue epistemology, and 
social epistemology point to a need to integrate affective, ethical, and social dimensions of the 
human person in the process of knowing. However, this task may remain an uphill climb if 
one does not first question the metaphysical assumptions that have given rise to normative 
epistemology. This chapter will first question mechanical models of the universe. It will 
suggest, at the metaphysical level, a shift from mechanical models, i.e. understanding reality 
in terms of matter, motion, and immutable mechanical laws, to cybernetic models, i.e. 
understanding reality in terms of information, control, and feedback. This paradigm change is 
based on the parallelism between mechanical models of the universe, modern science, and 
normative epistemology, and analytic methods. Mechanical models not only assume that 
reality is constituted by material particles in motion (atoms), but also that the motion of these 
particles follow immutable universal mechanical laws that are embedded in the universe itself 
and that are manifested in the universe’s simple, orderly, and regular aspects. However, this 
description of the universe is more and more challenged and complexity is more and more 
perceived as an important aspect of natural systems and processes. If the complexity of the 
real is taken into account, the mechanical models’ portrayal of a universe that is simple, 
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ordered, and regular seems to be more ideal than reality. As an alternative to mechanical 
models, a cybernetic model will be assessed not only because cybernetics is an information-
based model that is part of the “paradigms supplied by our environment”1, but also as it 
follows the inventor of the concept’s contention that “[t]he thought of every age is reflected in 
its technique”2 and our age is “the age of communication and control”3. In other words, the 
development and diffusion of electronic computers, related information, and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can inspire a new model of reality (cybernetics) that is different from the 
one modelled on mechanics. The invention of the steam engine and other material sources of 
energy and motion (water or wind) moved us from an era of animation, where motion and 
action were described in terms of a spiritual power, the soul, or “anima” in Latin, to an era of 
automation where motion and action are described in terms of material bodies self-moving 
through the effects of energy (a derivative of matter and motion). Likewise, we can postulate 
that the computer revolution introduced the era of programming and cybernetics where 
motion and action can be understood in terms of information, control, and feedback. In other 
words, our metaphysical outlook is shifting from mechanics (matter + motion) to cybernetics 
(matter + motion + logic + symbolism) or from energy to information as a defining 
characteristic of reality. 
 
A cybernetic model of reality is itself an information-based metaphysical position, but also an 
important background for an info-computational model of knowledge. A cybernetic model of 
reality provides the necessary metaphysical assumptions for a paradigm shift from conceiving 
knowing as representing (a static model) to conceiving knowing as information processing, 
i.e. a dynamic and integrative model that implies processes of information, control, and 
feedback as the knower enriches the immediate data of experience with meaning and value for 
the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving. Instead of reducing rationality to the 
principles of logic and mathematics, which are based on mechanical assumptions such as the 
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continuity of substance, the permanence of reality, and the actuality of only regular and linear 
efficient causality, a cybernetic model completes its two predecessors, namely mechanical and 
electromagnetic models. An electromagnetic model accepts discontinuity (such as the 
succession of discrete signals in digital systems) and alternation (such as the regular 
succession of charges of opposite signs in alternating current) as being part of reality. 
However, electromagnetic models can still be reduced to mechanical models on the grounds 
that electricity can be defined as motion of electrons or ions. Therefore, a cybernetic model 
implies that reality should not be defined exclusively in terms of substances (that imply 
permanence), but also in terms of dynamic patterns and relations. A cybernetic model does 
not reject mechanical and electromagnetic models. It completes them by elevating to the 
metaphysical level logical and symbolic aspects that are generated by our relations to the 
universe. Therefore, in addition to the natural laws that physics has identified in the universe, 
one should include within the scope of reality artificial laws that humans have made for their 
interaction with nature and between themselves. The most popular of these artificial laws for 
our time are computer programs or software. In other words, a cybernetic model of the 
universe recognises the existence of both a material and mechanical component (hardware) 
and a logical and symbolic component (software) of reality. After this metaphysical ground 
clearing, this chapter will introduce a dynamic and integrative model of human knowing that 
is based on the concept of information and is meant to complete normative epistemology. This 
model associates the concept of information with the degree of order, i.e. the negative 
entropy, as, according to a cybernetic model of reality, any organized system or process 
conveys a certain amount of information. The definition of information as negative entropy by 
Norbert Wiener4, the founder of cybernetics, implies that a totally disorganized system or 
process yields the highest levels of entropy (disorder) and conveys the lowest amount of 
information. Conveying the lowest amount of information or no information at all makes 
these systems and processes unintelligible and meaningless. At the other end of the 
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continuum, a system or a process that is organized by following simple, ordered, and regular 
patterns (mechanical systems and processes, for instance) conveys the highest levels of 
information due to its minimal or non-existent degree of entropy. These systems and 
processes are fully intelligible because they operate by following linear patterns of causality 
and they lend themselves to analytical methods and univocal representations. They can be 
assessed with high levels of accuracy in a way that fulfills Descartes’ dream of “clear and 
distinct” ideas since their simplicity, regularity, and orderliness implies possibilities of fixing 
reference, meaning, and rules of transformation. Between these two extremes, there are 
systems and processes that are more or less intelligible according to their degree of 
organization, i.e. the amount of information they convey or in Wiener’s terms their “negative 
entropy”5. An info-computationalist model of human knowing, therefore, defines knowledge 
not as true justified belief. It does not aim at infallible, indubitable, incorrigible knowledge, 
but assesses real processes of knowing as they occur in concrete human beings in concrete 
situations. Instead of looking for perfect knowledge with the highest levels of accuracy, an 
info-computationalist model of human knowing defines knowing as accumulating insights 
through information processing. Information processing implies enriching immediate data of 
experience with meaning and value for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving. 
Insight, therefore, is not restricted to principles of logical inference or mathematical 
operations. It has experiential, intellectual, evaluative, and pragmatic dimensions. In other 
words, accumulating insights through information processing is, in Lonergan’s terms, a 
fourfold process of experiencing, understanding, judging (evaluating, choosing, deciding), 
and acting.6 These operations attest to the fact that knowing is not a single level activity, i.e. 
the accumulation of sensations by empirical means or of ideas by intellectual means, but 
human knowing is a multilevel activity because, in Lonergan’ terms, the human mind operates 
at four levels of consciousness, namely the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the 
responsible.7 Each level of consciousness contributes to the overall outcome of the process of 
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human knowing by achieving representations at the empirical level, meaning at the 
intellectual level, value at the rational (evaluative) level, and goals at the responsible 
(practical) level. In other words, the process of human knowing as the accumulation of 
insights through information processing has representational, semantic, evaluative, and 
pragmatic aspects that are linked with the fact that information processing implies enriching 
immediate data of experience with value and meaning for the purpose of decision-making and 
problem-solving. 
 
B. FROM MECHANICS TO CYBERNETICS 
1. Mechanics: Matter, Motion, Automation, and Instrumental Rationality 
What Newton called “rational mechanics” and Leibniz “dynamics” is different from the 
branch of physics that contemporary scientists call “mechanics”. In some contemporary 
physics textbooks, mechanics is presented as a series of equations that are assumed to be self-
evident to the teachers and students of that discipline.8 This approach to mechanics follows 
idealizations of bodies as mass points in order to facilitate mathematical calculations.9 In 
other physics texts, first, principles are formulated by the physicist in general statements given 
their assumed universality, and then, graphic representations and mathematical formulations 
follow.10 However, for the philosopher in general and the epistemologist in particular, 
mechanics in its original sense is a body of theories and practices that are linked to materialist, 
mechanical, and deterministic models of the universe. These models present the universe as 
constituted of material bodies in motion. Hence, scientists, as natural philosophers, have not 
only devoted time and energy to the study of matter and motion, but have also limited their 
study to aspects of reality that fit into these models. These aspects match criteria such as 
order, simplicity, and regularity. In contradistinction to the divine-organic model that 
mechanics replaced, the mechanical model does not assume the superposition of a natural and 
a supernatural order. For the mechanical model, the universe is an autonomous and automatic 
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system that does not require any explanation and justification outside itself. Therefore, one 
does not need revelation, tradition, or the mediation of religious authority to access 
knowledge and truth. The “universal” laws that regulate the universe are accessible to 
immediate human experience and they can be formulated in simple mathematical relations. 
The social, technological, intellectual context of early modernity gave to the scientists, who 
were also called natural philosophers, a new subject matter and new methods. In an 
unpublished preface to his Principia, Newton explains the subject matter of mechanics as 
follows: 
The aim of the Book of Principles was not to give detailed explanations of the 
mathematical methods, nor to provide exhaustive solutions to all difficulties therein 
relating to magnitudes, motions, and forces, but to deal only with those things which 
relate to natural philosophy and especially to the motions of the heavens [...].11 
 
In other words, mechanics was the study of matter, motion, and the cause of motion, i.e. force. 
Although mechanics has been now reduced to a branch of physics that studies the 
mathematical characteristics of bodies in motion, mechanics in its original sense was a 
general understanding of the world: a cosmology. Mechanics was a theory of the universe that 
meant to be a foundation of a natural philosophy. The idea of a natural philosophy itself has 
emerged as an opposition to scholasticism that includes the supernatural in its philosophical 
framework. Natural philosophy, therefore, can be defined as a conceptual framework that 
eliminates any role played by supernatural powers, such as God, angels, and so forth. In 
contradistinction to the scholastic divine-organic order, which assumes that reality as an 
unchanging substance is hidden beyond the veil of appearance that is essentially accidental 
and transient, mechanics upholds that reality, knowledge, and truth are accessible by natural 
processes. For this reason, mechanics, as natural philosophy, does not rely on revelation, 
tradition, and religious authority as methods of accessing knowledge and truth. Instead, it 
relies on observation, reasoning, and experimenting.  
 
 73 
Natural philosophy upholds that as an automatic and autonomous system, the universe is 
regulated solely by universal laws. These laws are universal in the sense that they are 
embedded in the universe itself. They are custodians of the simplicity, order, and regularity 
that mechanical models of the universe display. By following these patterns, one can explain 
various natural phenomena, such as the regularity of the seasons, the succession of day and 
night, and the periodical occurrence of phenomena, such as eclipses. Therefore, universal 
laws are not only descriptive, but also predictive. They allow the description of natural 
phenomena in naturalistic terms, but also make possible the anticipation of the final 
conditions of a natural process when one knows the initial conditions and the rules of 
transformation. The predictive dimension of natural laws sets the boundaries between natural 
phenomena and claims to supernatural phenomena in some religious contexts. For instance, 
when a person claims to have contacts with supernatural beings, such as God, spirits, the 
devil, Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and so forth, scientific examinations check whether there is 
anything in the physiological functioning or the behavior of the “visionaries” that natural laws 
of biological and psychological sciences cannot explain. The predictive role of natural laws is 
much more evident when these laws are applied to various technological processes. At the end 
of a process they indicate that “something” went wrong as the outcome of the process is 
different to what following natural laws would imply. 
 
The mechanical model of the universe has served as an inspiration to scientists and engineers. 
They have carefully studied matter and motion, and, managed to embed the mechanical laws 
in a huge variety of machines. Therefore, one can agree with Wiener that “[t]he thought of 
every age is reflected in its technique”12 In the beginning, machines like clocks assisted in the 
navigation and measurement of time, and later the invention of the steam engine led to the 
Industrial Revolution. As Weizenbaum states: 
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The word “machine” calls up images of complex and yet somehow regular motion. The 
back-and-forward movement of the needle of a sewing machine, so analogous to both 
the hustle of the gyrating, thrusting connecting rods that drive the locomotive’s wheels 
and the tremor of the pulsating escapement mechanism of the most delicate watch, such 
images almost sum up what we mean by “machine”. Almost. Sufficiently so that we 
need ask no further what a machine is. Regularity, complexity, motion, power.13 
 
The machine that is often associated with the Industrial Revolution is the steam engine. 
Before the invention of the steam engine motion, in fact, had always been linked to 
supernatural powers, especially the soul. The invention of the steam engine provided a 
material source for motion. Hence, it was not just a technical achievement, but a revolution in 
metaphysics as well. It brought a change in the understanding of reality. During the era that 
preceded the steam engine, only animated beings (animals and human beings that were 
believed to have a soul – anima in Latin) were believed to be capable of generating motion. 
Even at the level of the planets, before Newton, Galileo, and Copernicus came up with their 
theories, planets had been believed to have a life of their own and to be able to influence 
human destiny in many respects. However, the generation of motion from material substances 
such as water and steam was proof to the possibility of a system of explanation that would 
explain motion and force in naturalistic terms according to a mechanical model by which 
everything could be expressed mathematically and represented geometrically in terms of 
matter (mass) and motion (force and velocity). In other words, the replacement of 
supernaturalism by mechanical models moved humanity from an era of animation, in which 
motion and action were described in terms of a spiritual power, the soul or “anima” in Latin, 
to an era of automation, in which motion and action are described in terms of material bodies 
self-moving through the transformation of energy. With mass defined as quantity of matter 
and motion as change in spatial position over time, the modern physicists created a new 
system of explanation that led to the naturalization of force. Within this change of framework, 
a philosophical revolution took place: philosophers and scientists moved from supernatural 
animation (relying on supernatural powers, such as the soul, which generate and explain 
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motion) to automation (relying on material and mechanical forces, which need no explanation 
and justification outside themselves). 
 
An important notion that has emerged with the definition of reality in terms of matter and 
motion is the concept of energy. Energy as a derivative of matter and motion became a 
driving force of the modern/industrial society. Daniel Bell, in his seminal book The Coming of 
the Post-Industrial Society14 describes in great detail changes that have led to the 
modern/industrial society. According to Bell, whereas the main mode of production in the 
pre-industrial society was extractive and mainly focused on the primary economic sector, i.e. 
agriculture, mining, fishing, timber, oil, and gas, the industrial society mainly produced by 
means of fabrication, which was focused on the secondary economic sector, i.e. goods 
producing, manufacturing, and heavy construction. In other words, extractive modes of 
production consisted in supporting nature and getting the best of natural processes while 
fabrication implied the domination of nature by human labor. However, as we look at the 
modern/industrial society as a weltanschauung where energy, a derivative of matter and 
motion, is a driving force, Bell shows that the pre-industrial society mainly relied on natural 
powers, such as wind, water, draft, animal and human muscle. The industrial society, on the 
other hand, used created energy, such as oil, gas, or nuclear power.15 
 
From a social point of view, in the pre-industrial society the artisan, the manual worker, and 
the farmer occupied the center stage at least in Europe. In the Middle Ages, the feudal system 
was well entrenched and land tenure was a major source and sign of wealth. The industrial 
society, on the other hand, was dominated by the engineer and the semi-skilled worker. This 
situation has changed radically since the post-industrial society is dominated by scientists and 
experts holding technical and professional positions. Peter Drucker notes that the “knowledge 
worker”, an expert, is replacing the semi-skilled worker of the massive production of the 
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industrial society. The semi-skilled worker is, in fact, the fruit of Cartesianism, i.e. the habit to 
“break apart problems, to fragment the world”16. The semi-skilled worker was precious in the 
industrial society because, at that time, the industrialist “analyzed tasks and broke them down 
into individual, unskilled tasks that could be learned quickly”17.  
 
Last but not least, the modern/industrial society, as the fruit of defining reality according to a 
mechanical model, brought a new “state of mind.” In Bell’s view, the pre-industrial society 
was past-oriented; its axial principle is traditionalism. In practice, it tended to transmit 
tradition from one generation to another and it played games against the natural course of 
events through practices such as divination. The industrial society experimented, and the 
findings from experiments were incorporated into existing bodies of knowledge through ad-
hoc adaptiveness. It created technology, and yet, struggled to put into places political 
structures, social systems, and cultural patterns that limit its excesses and abuses. Through 
invention and regulation, the industrial society played a game against fabricated nature, and 
its axial principle is productivity.18 That is why the modern/industrial society witnessed the 
emergence of a wide range of artifacts. Herbert A. Simon claims that artifacts attest a 
paradigm shift from the traditional vocation of science, i.e. exploring the secrets of nature, to 
acting on nature. Simon’s merit is in distinguishing natural things from artificial things 
without opposing them. He ascertains that nature is the preferred domain of science while the 
artificial is the realm of engineering. Moreover, Simon notes that while the method of science 
is analytical, the method of engineering is synthetic. For Simon:  
The thesis is that certain phenomena are “artificial” in a very specific sense: they are as 
they are only because of a system’s being molded, by goals or purposes, to the 
environment in which it lives. If natural phenomena have an air of “necessity” about 
them in their subservience to natural law, artificial phenomena have an air of 
“contingency” in their malleability by environment.19 
 
Artifacts, in addition to being distinguished by contingency, have four main characteristics. 
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1. Artificial things are synthetized (though not always or usually with forethought) by 
human beings. 
2. Artificial things may imitate the appearance of natural things while lacking, in one 
or many respects, the reality of the latter. 
3. Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions, goals, and adaptation. 
4. Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they are being designed, in 
terms of imperatives as well as descriptives.20 
 
In modern times, where a materialistic, mechanistic, and deterministic outlook based on the 
success of classic physics dominated, reality was identified with immutable and universal 
laws of nature. The same laws were believed to apply simple, regular, and ordered patterns, 
which are similar to invariable patterns in the movements of planets and particles, to human 
behavior and social interaction. These patterns themselves became the focus of scientific 
inquiry and philosophic reflection in a way that natural processes and systems were more and 
more studied from the point of view of their spatial and temporal characteristics. There was a 
shift from metaphysical or ontological themes related to ‘principles and first causes’ to the 
study of observable physical characteristics. According to J. Christiaan Boudri, with the 
development of modern science the study of matter has shifted from inquiring about its nature 
to inquiring about its structure.21 
 
The focus on observable physical characteristics has reinforced a mechanical approach to 
people and societies. Both individuals and societies have been believed to be characterized by 
order, regularity, and predictability. Science, through the identification of the regular patterns 
of natural phenomena and human behavior, has been able to design means of controlling the 
course of nature and human interaction. This control was to be achieved through the 
establishment of simple relationships between cause and effect, means and ends, inputs and 
outputs. This way of reasoning has been called “instrumental rationality”. According to the 
principle of instrumental rationality, “if you intend that a situation, X, occurs and you believe, 
in agreement with your evidence, that another situation, Y, is the most effective means to X, 
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then you rationally should have Y occur”22. Therefore, there is a possibility of establishing a 
parallelism between mechanical models and instrumental rationality because the two 
approaches are based on assumptions of simplicity, order, and regularity. Mechanical models 
assume that natural processes in the universe are simple, ordered, and regular, and hence, 
follow linear patterns of causality while the principle of instrumental rationality also follows 
linear patterns of causality with the assumption that, as in natural processes, complex systems 
and processes in the universe can be explained in terms of simple atoms, complex knowledge 
patterns can also be explained in terms of simple axioms or simple univocal propositions. 
 
2. Platonic and Neo-Aristotelian Alternatives to the Mechanical Model 
a) Platonic Reactions 
Paradoxically, mechanical models have prevailed even among those who have found them 
unsatisfying. Many philosophers writing about science or philosophy of science have reduced 
the scientific understanding of reality to mechanical models. They call their position 
“materialism”, physicalism, and sometimes simply naturalism. This reduction is based on the 
belief in the explanatory adequacy of physics. According to Lewis, the explanatory adequacy 
of physics would imply: 
The plausible hypothesis that there is some unified body of scientific theories, of the 
sort we now accept, which together provide a true and exhaustive account of all 
physical phenomena (i.e. all phenomena describable in physical terms). They are unified 
in the sense that they are cumulative: the theory governing any physical phenomenon is 
explained by theories governing phenomena out of which that phenomenon is composed 
and by the way it is composed out of them. The same is true of the latter phenomena, 
and so down to the fundamental particles or fields governed by a few simple laws, more 
or less as conceived in the present-day theoretical physics.23 
 
The explanatory adequacy of physics leads inevitably to a materialist theory of the mind. The 
background of this theory is the elimination of any reference to supernatural entities or vital 
powers from the modern mode of explanation. The natural universe as a physical universe 
only operates through physical processes. Even phenomena that do not belong to the 
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discipline of physics can still be explained in terms of physical entities and processes. 
According to Armstrong: 
It is now very probable, even if not certain, that life is a purely physico-chemical 
phenomenon. We do not need to postulate ‘vegetative souls’ or ‘vital entelechies’ to 
explain life. […] More and more psychologists and neurophysiologists explicitly or 
implicitly accept the view that, so far as mental processes are concerned, that there is no 
need to postulate anything but purely physical processes in man’s central nervous 
system. If we take the word ‘mind’ to mean ‘that in which mental processes occur’ or 
‘that which has mental states’, then we can put this view briefly and not too 
misleadingly as: the mind is nothing but the brain. If scientific progress sustains this 
view, it seems that man is nothing but a material object having none but physical 
properties.24 
 
Opponents to the mechanical model  adopt a strategy of separating material objects from their 
representations. They uphold a metaphysical dualism different from the medieval one. 
Wheareas the medieval dualism opposed the natural to the supernatural, opponents of the 
mechanical model oppose the material to the mental. Modern science, based on the 
mechanical model easily rejects supernaturalism on empirical grounds. The scientific position 
is that, since supernatural entities can be observed, logically deduced, or experimented on, 
either they do not exist, or at least they are subject to methodological doubt. Systematic 
Platonic and neo-Aristotelian responses to the mechanical model adopt different strategies. 
Instead of defining reality in terms of substance and accidents (since the existence of 
metaphysical essences, which acquires the existence of individual kinds, would be difficult to 
prove scientifically), one strategy is reducing the substance/accidents dichotomy to the 
material/form dichotomy. This strategy allows the elimination of supernatural entities, but 
maintains that not all is matter or that matter is not everything. It opposes individual objects, 
which are material, to their representations, which are mental or formal. Therefore, material 
objects and processes can be confined within the boundaries of the mechanical model while 
their representations cannot. The proponents of this strategy attribute an independent 
existence to representation systems. Roger Penrose, for instance, has set this question clearly: 
“How “real” are the objects of the mathematician’s world?”25 He notes that: 
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From one point of view it seems that there can be nothing real about them at all. 
Mathematical objects are just concepts; they are mental idealizations that 
mathematicians make, often stimulated by appearance and seeming order of aspects of 
the world about us, but mental idealizations nevertheless. Can they be other than mere 
arbitrary constructions of the human mind? At the same time there often does appear to 
be some profound reality about these mathematical concepts, going quite beyond the 
mental deliberations of any particular mathematician. It is as though human thought is, 
instead, being guided towards some external truth – a truth which has reality of its own, 
and which is revealed only partially to any one of us.26 
 
The positions that Penrose brings out, highlight two dominant views both in the philosophy of 
science and the philosophy of mind: the formalists and the realists. Penrose is a realist. He is 
faced with the question of whether mathematics is invention or discovery.27 He elaborates his 
position as follows: 
When mathematicians come upon their results, are they just producing elaborate mental 
constructions which have no actual reality, but whose elegance is sufficient simply to 
fool even the inventors into believing that these mere mental constructions are ‘real’? 
Or are mathematicians really uncovering truths which are, in fact, already “there” - 
truths whose existence is quite independent of the mathematicians activities? I think 
that, by now, it must be quite clear to the reader that I am adherent to the second, rather 
than the first view, at least with regard to such structures such as complex numbers and 
the Mandelbrot set.28 
 
Despite the unquestioned dominance of the mathematical model, people still disagree over the 
reasons for its triumph. There are two dominant positions. One position, represented by 
Penrose for instance, attributes an independent existence to representational systems. This 
position, called realism, implies that representation systems, such as mathematics, are not 
products of the human mind. They are embedded in the order of things, and what the human 
mind does, is simply to discover them. Realism, therefore, attributes a metaphysical character 
to mathematics. In Penrose’s view, mathematics exemplifies the coherent, conceptual 
representation of reality that science seeks. In his own words: 
 
The appropriateness of the real number system is not often questioned, in fact. This 
confidence - perhaps misplaced - must rest (although this fact is not often recognized) on 
the logical elegance, consistency and mathematical power of the real number system, 
together with a belief in the profound mathematical harmony of nature.29 
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The usefulness of mathematics seems to be embedded in its quality as a reasoning tool. 
However, throughout the history of philosophy, mathematics has often been understood from 
a metaphysical point of view. The Greek mathematician and philosopher Pythagoras was the 
first one to postulate that number is the underlying principle of reality. The importance of 
mathematics has emerged again with the search for a universal language. This search was 
based on the belief in a natural harmony embedded in the system of the universe and a unique 
descent of humankind. Those who believed in a unique descent of humankind mixed the 
biblical narrative of Adam and Eve with pseudo-scientific speculations. They literally 
searched for an Adamic language that could be understood by all people. Other thinkers 
postulate that that kind of language must be constructed artificially. As Donald Rutherford has 
noted: 
Most early proponents of artificial language schemes stressed the practical value of their 
inventions as instruments of communication. Their works were primarily attempts to 
devise systems of writing, modelled variously on Chinese characters, cryptographic codes 
or shorthand notation, where synonymous words in different languages would be 
represented by a common sign.30 
 
For most modern scientists and philosophers universal language was neither to be 
reconstructed nor to be invented. It was inscribed in nature. According to Pythagoras’s 
intuition, mathematics was what Heinz Pagels calls “The Building Code of the Demiurge”31. 
 
The other strategy consists in upholding the principles of the mechanical model, but 
restricting the model’s domain of applicability. According to this strategy, the mechanical 
model is a wonderful tool for describing natural processes, but it is inadequate as far as human 
behavior is concerned. Human behavioral processes are considered as acts of will that involve 
non-mechanical aspects such as volition and intentionality. Whereas mechanical processes are 
mainly autonomic, human behavioral processes are relational, and hence intentional. This 
strategy suggests that the mechanical model should only be applied to material processes as 
opposed to mental or spiritual processes. However, the concept of the mental or the spiritual 
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remains ambiguous. It is often wrapped into veils of metaphors borrowed from physical 
processes. For instance, the Greek concept of pneuma (air) has been associated with non-
material processes for a long time. Biblical narratives indicate that the act of creation consists 
in infusing air into inanimate matter. This creates confusion between non-material processes 
and breathing. However, according to the mechanical model, breathing is a physical process 
because, on the one hand, air is constituted by material particles, and on the other hand, the 
laws regulating the motion of air in the human body are mechanical laws. There is, therefore, 
nothing non-physical in the process of breathing. The metaphor of air as a non-physical 
process is so well entrenched that even modern medicine techniques of reanimation (giving 
back the anima, the soul) consist of infusing air in someone’s lungs to allow the patient to 
breath properly. The mechanical model does not add any supernatural dimension to air. The 
laws of thermodynamics are natural laws like the laws of motion. 
 
The mechanical model, therefore, accounts for material bodies in motion, but has the function 
of naturalizing some processes and aspects that were previously considered as supernatural. 
Actually, breathing is not the only metaphor used to describe non-material processes. John 
Locke, for instance, borrowed from painting when he thought of the mind as a “tabula rasa”. 
In our photography-dominated culture, we believe that we have mental “pictures” of material 
objects while those familiar with information and communication technologies, such as 
Churchland, uphold computational models. This view that attributes independent existence to 
systems of representation is called realism. It is opposed to formalism that upholds that 
systems of representations are constructions of the human mind. According to this distinction, 
Penrose can be classified as a realist while Dretske, for instance, is a formalist. 
 
What these two alternatives to the mechanical model have in common is their essentialist 
position. They reject the mechanical position that the universe is one and that other aspects 
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such as motion, duration, and modality are dimensions of the physical universe. This 
difference in the description of reality implies that the concepts of naturalism, physicalism, 
and materialism are not univocal. It is easy to reject supernaturalism, but it is not clear by 
what it can be replaced. The neo-Platonist and neo-Aristotelian alternatives to the mechanical 
model are metaphysically dualistic. However, the type of dualism they bring about is not the 
opposition of the natural to the supernatural, but the material to the mental. There are two 
dominant positions on this issue. Realism contends that representation systems have an 
existence of their own. They are independent of the objects they represent. Formalism, on the 
other hand, upholds that representation systems are mental constructions. They are abstracted 
from characteristics of the objects they represent. Ernst Cassirer notes: 
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity advances. 
Instead of dealing with things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with 
himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical 
symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the 
interposition of [an] artificial medium.32 
 
 
b) Neo-Aristotelian Reactions 
Whereas the mechanical model has been efficient in tackling the impasses of scholasticism, it 
also has its own impasses. One of its criticisms is that it cannot account for religious beliefs. 
Authors, like Charles Hartshorne, who have tried to salvage religious beliefs in the context of 
fast scientific and technological development, have adopted the strategy of separating the 
domain of science from the domain of philosophy. According to Hartshorne, for instance: 
The scientist asks, what ideas will fit and explain the facts? The philosopher asks, what 
ideas will explain the ideas that fit the facts, and in addition, will explain the ideas 
which do not fit the facts? The philosopher is seeking principles so general, so basic, 
that they are no longer special cases to be explained by more general principles, but are 
themselves the most general of ideas, true not only of the actual world but of any 
conceivable one. Since there is nothing beyond them, nothing more fundamental, those 
ideas must, taken together be self-explanatory.33 
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This understanding of philosophy and its role by Hartshorne is in accord with the tenets of 
scholasticism. It defines philosophy in an Aristotelian way as “the knowledge of first causes 
and first principles”. It makes philosophy a second order activity. The type of principles it 
seeks are so encompassing that, in the end, they are ultimate. According to Hartshorne: 
They form a system which sets forth the ultimate what? How? And Why? (in whatever 
sense there be such ultimates). Because this system (if only we can find it) is completely 
general, it can deal with values as well as facts, with God as well as man, with the 
everlasting as well as the temporary, with the possible as well as the actual.34 
 
For him: 
 
The philosophical system would not be a complete version of science, for it can contain 
only general principles, not specific facts. Thus philosophy does not compete with 
science. Nor can science take the place of philosophy, as can be seen from this alone, 
that scientific knowledge by itself gives no satisfaction to the man who reflects 
intelligently upon death.35 
 
In other words, for Hartshorne science and philosophy are different both in their purposes and 
in their methods. Despite the popularity and the widespread use of science in human affairs, 
science does not occupy the whole terrain. There are aspects of human existence that cannot 
be handled scientifically. Those aspects pertain not only to issues of religious beliefs and 
morality, but also to an understanding of reality as a whole. Hartshorne further articulates the 
role of science and, at the same time, questions it as follows: 
Science explains facts by such ideas as “matter”, “law”, and “experience” or 
“observation”. But are these ideas as used by the scientists, fully generalized, or are they 
special cases? Is all reality matter in motion, or can there be “immaterial” spirits? Can 
there be lawless matter or experience; what are the most general relations between 
matter, experience, and law? These are some of the questions that a scientist would 
hardly wish to consider, but which philosophy takes as its own.36 
 
Secondly, the authors who try to salvage religious beliefs adopt a radical anti-Cartesianism. In 
an ambiguous characterization of science in his foreword to Hartshorne’s Reality as Social 
Process, William Ernest Hocking points out that: 
One feature, however, of Cartesian thinking we are not discarding, and I am not sure it 
isn’t the chief mark of the modern era. I venture to say we shall never discard it. It is the 
inseparability of science and philosophy, of physics and metaphysics. Every future 
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philosophic era will be, like our era, for better or worse, “scientific” in the sense that 
whatever science reveals belongs integrally to the philosophical world picture. But the 
era now opening has the specific task of putting science at its place.37 
 
Hocking characterizes his and Hartshorne’s thought as follows: 
This implies that science is not the whole of truth or scientific method the whole of 
human thinking. As laboring to weld together the sciences with philosophy, our 
pragmatists, naturalists, realists and positivists have labored well. But to put science into 
its place requires a pou sto beyond science: that is the task of metaphysics. The era on 
which we are entering is marked by nothing so much as by a revival of metaphysical 
courage – the will not only to describe but to understand.38 
 
The book Hocking is introducing characterizes itself by a struggle to build an alternative 
metaphysical model that would replace the materialist, mechanistic, and deterministic model 
of Newton’s physics. This new type of metaphysics would then support religious belief and a 
conceptualization of God in categories that appeal to the modern intellectual mind. Right from 
the beginning Hartshorne points out a categorical confusion that expresses itself in radical 
antinomies. In his view: 
Nearly all the questions that are important for our time are begged or confused by such 
crude or equivocal alternatives as – fascism versus communism (or even, capitalism 
versus socialism), naturalism versus supernaturalism, idealism versus realism. If we 
have made basic advances in intellectual method, and I think we have, in the last 
century or so, this should affect not merely our answers but our questions, to such an 
extent that the old dichotomies should be viewed with suspicion.39 
 
Hartshorne’s rejection of a conceptual framework that locks philosophical discourse into 
irreconcilable dichotomies and hermetically closed schools of thought may be historically 
important. Although his motives for questioning Cartesianism develop within a religious 
perspective, the new philosophical categories he is looking for would overcome the 
denounced dichotomies just as they would fit well with religious belief. They are a way of 
siding with metaphysics as opposed to mere physics, an affirmation of some reality beyond 
what physics considers. Hence, Hartshorne calls for a separation between philosophy and 
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science, claiming that these activities have different modes of questioning and that the 
principles they seek are at different levels of generality. 
 
Hartshorne’s questioning of the vocation and the role of science is legitimate; although by 
opposing matter to mind, nature to “supernature”, science to philosophy, he is still partially 
bound by the dichotomies of the Cartesian system that he sensed to transcend. He can be 
credited for pointing out the ambiguities linked with radical dichotomous oppositions and 
hermetically closed schools of thought. Hartshorne’s situation where he struggles to transcend 
a system of categories and, at the same time, falls into its tangles is symptomatic of an age 
where a conceptual framework can no longer accommodate the available elements of human 
experience and another more comprehensive conceptual framework has not yet been crafted 
or well articulated. This declining conceptual framework seems to create unsolvable problems 
and irreconcilable ways of thinking. Nevertheless, Hartshorne, in consistency with his search 
for a fully generalized system of ideas, describes the philosophical landscape that has been 
generated by the scientific challenge to scholasticism: 
It [philosophy] seeks a set of ideas of which any scientific or common-sense notions, 
true or false, can be viewed as special cases. For example, materialism is the philosophy 
which regards “matter in motion” as the general principle, and experience, mind, 
purpose, as special cases. Idealism, on the other hand, makes mind the general principle, 
and matter the special case. Similarly, the philosophical doctrine of determinism views 
law or causal order as completely universal, and treats freedom as the special case 
where the laws happen to govern motives and acts of will; whereas libertarianism makes 
freedom the rule, and treats law as the special case where freedom is slight, resulting in 
approximate or statistical uniformities.40 
 
Hartshorne then claims that a “higher synthesis” is taking place in philosophy, and asserts that 
“[p]erhaps all reality is both physical and psychical, and perhaps everywhere there is law and 
freedom. In that case, the extremes of doctrine might cease to exist as extremes”41. Hartshorne 
tries to overcome the shortcomings of the conceptual frameworks he criticizes by introducing 
another paradigm, namely the “social”. In his view: 
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There is a conception in which motion and mind, law and freedom are inextricably 
blended. It is the conception of the “social”, or rather it is what this conception becomes 
when fully generalized.42 
 
He introduces this concept by describing various aspects of social processes and interactions. 
For him: 
Critics of the social philosophy who complain that we cannot detect definite social 
character in all portions of nature are missing the point, which is that an idea actually 
known to be true in some cases, but not even potentially known to be false in any 
conceivable case, is for all purposes an ultimate idea.43 
 
However, Hartshorne falls short in his description of his new paradigm. He begins with the 
attempt to give a social account of scientific theories, such as atomism and the fact that 
“living matter” is multi-celled. However, his use of political metaphors, such as his 
contrasting of “monarchical” and “democratic” societies, seems farfetched. They can only be 
accepted, in my view, as analogies and not as accurate descriptions, and perhaps that is how 
they were intended. In addition to this contrast, Hartshorne upholds the existence of a certain 
hierarchy in nature. This hierarchy allows him to establish the supremacy of God by claiming 
that “[d]emocratic cooperation is possible only within an all-inclusive monarchy”44. In 
addition to the idea of a hierarchy, Hartshorne attempts to transcend mechanics with his claim 
that reality is governed by aesthetic principles. These aesthetic principles are an expression of 
his concept of harmony. His approach now introduces the concept of value to the description 
of reality, unlike the predominance of mathematical representation in mechanics that was 
mainly concerned with facts. For Hartshorne: 
If experience is the source of meanings, then the basic traits of experience must 
somehow correspond to the basic possible meanings, and these to the basic structure of 
any world that can be meant. Now all experience is concerned with value.45 
 
Hence, for him, aesthetic experience is the foundation of all abstract descriptions of reality. In 
his own terms: 
Aesthetic experience is intuitive, concrete; aesthetics is the science of the laws of direct 
awareness or intuition as such. But all abstract knowledge presupposes intuitive 
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awareness. Hence, aesthetics establishes data that all abstract knowledge must take into 
account if its basis in immediacy is to be understood. And unless this basis is 
understood, we cannot know what the abstractness of the knowledge consists in, what it 
is of concrete reality that? is omitted.46 
 
In other words, the diversity of positions in philosophy is based on the harmony in nature, a 
complementary uniting of opposites, which introduces the aesthetic value of contrast both to 
nature and its description. Hence, Hartshorne defines harmony as: 
a kind of relation between things such that though they are felt to be different from each 
other, they are yet felt to be not merely different. Otherness is not the only relation 
between them. In fact, it seems that the very opposite of otherness is also involved.47 
 
3. An Electromagnetic Model: Taking into Account Discontinuities and Alternatives 
Hartshorne tries to illustrate his “social model of the universe” and its harmonious patterns 
where difference and opposition should be understood as manifestations of the aesthetic value 
of contrast. For example, he finds that: 
there are only two ways of failing to achieve harmony – by too little contrast 
(“insipidity,” “monotony”), and too little similarity (“discord,” “incoherence,” and 
“chaos”).48 
 
Moreover: 
The importance of contrast is not confined to art. All through life run the great contrasts 
of man and woman, child and adult, joy and sorrow, lively and calm temperaments or 
moods etc.49 
 
Hartshorne’s concept of contrast that generates harmonies finds echoes in Heraclitus’ doctrine 
of the “uniting of opposites” and recently in Chinese Confucianism, where the contrast 
between the masculine principle of Yang and the female principle of Yin creates harmony in 
the universe. Applied to science, this concept brings useful insights into the paradigm shifts 
that have been taking place within science itself. First, Hartshorne affirms that “[c]ontrast is 
not found only throughout life but throughout nature as disclosed by science”50. He illustrates 
his view by the fact that: 
There is the shift of the electron between energy levels. This shift is sharp, and has a 
fixed minimal value which measures the least unit of radiant energy emitted by the 
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electron, e.g. a photon of light. The electron does not relieve the monotony of its 
existence, we might say, merely by shifting its path a little, but rather by shifting it 
enough to achieve a deep contrast between its two successive states.51 
 
Another phenomenon that illustrates contrast in nature is the wave pattern: 
 
Again, nature avoids monotony by flowing in waves. A calm lake surface is not so far 
lacking in contrast, but when the wind ruffles this surface, sharply contrasting planes are 
introduced. We know now that nature carries all her fundamental operations, not in the 
manner of an unruffled stream, or an arrow cleaving the air without deviation from its 
almost rigid trajectory, but in the manner of a stream simultaneously flowing and 
ruffling in waves. The wave pattern, which is a simple scheme of repetitive contrast, is 
all pervasive in nature.  
 
Even matter at particle level is not as compact as the common sense view makes us believe. In 
fact, regarding “this wave pattern or ‘wave-pocket, waves are, it seems, collected in pellets. 
Matter is both continuous and discontinuous, a vital harmony, apparently, of those two 
contrasting aspects. This unity in duality is called in physics ‘complementarity’.”52 
  
After noting that there are other contrasts in nature, such as the contrast between “living 
matter” and “dead matter” and between “efficient” and “final causes”, Hartshorne notes that: 
It is interesting to note that, beginning with Heraclitus twenty-five centuries ago, a 
number of philosophers have held that the world is a “unity of opposites”. But opposite 
does not mean simply unlike, but rather: emphatically unlike and - in some respect – 
emphatically alike. For instance, particles and waves are alike in that both involve sharp 
contrast; the particle with its surrounding “empty” space, and the waves in their 
divergent planes.53 
 
Hence: 
To decide whether the world as disclosed by the new physics is really beautiful apart 
from man, it would be necessary to discuss the question with reference to the categories 
of quality and meaning as well as the category of harmony, which is here alone for 
consideration. But in as far as the new physics pictures nature as a system of 
complementarities or vital harmonies, it is immeasurably more satisfying esthetically 
than the old physics, which was full of monotonous continuities, and of unlikeness not 
unified by equally pronounced likeness, while it was poor in strong and well-unified 
contrasts.54 
 
In my view, Hartshorne’s insights, although they have the main purpose of creating a 
conceptual framework that supports religious belief, are useful for other philosophers. They 
dismantle a conceptual framework that is based on assumptions that have been challenged too 
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little and that have largely been taken for granted. The most important of these assumptions 
are exaggerations of a continuity of substance and of a permanence of reality. These 
assumptions are at the origin of rejecting change as part of reality in previously dominant 
metaphysical schools. That is why pre-Socratic philosophers looked for a permanent element 
of reality (that was believed to be material) and science looks for immutable universal laws, 
relegating change to the realm of appearance. In contrast, Hartshorne’s principle of harmony 
points to the fact that some aspects of reality are not explained by the continuity of their 
permanent features, but by the succession of opposing aspects in a regular pattern. This 
characteristic, for instance, differentiates digital communication systems, which function by 
transmitting discrete signals at regular intervals, and analog communication systems, which 
transmit continuous signals. Therefore, instead of reducing reality to permanent and 
continuous features, there is a possibility of shifting from a “metaphysics of substance” 
(understood as a permanent and continuous substratum) to a “metaphysics of relation and 
process”. Hartshorne is not the one to suggest an elevation of change and process to the 
metaphysical level.  
 
Mechanical models were not limited to the study of the movement of planets. Modern 
chemistry tried to study the structure of matter at the microscopic level, i.e. the atomic level. 
Rutherford established the similarity between the structure of atoms and the solar system. 
Despite the success of mechanics, Newton himself remained puzzled by another phenomenon: 
electricity and magnetism. He contends that: 
He who investigates the laws and effects of electric forces with the same success and 
certainty will promote philosophy [i.e., natural philosophy] even if perhaps he does not 
know the cause of these forces. First, the phenomena should be observed, then their 
proximate causes – and afterwards the causes of the causes – should be investigated, 
and finally it will be possible to come down from the causes of causes (established by 
phenomena) to their effects, by arguing a priori.55 
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Although electricity and magnetism have not attracted special attention from philosophers, 
these phenomena created a new metaphysical puzzle. Not only was reality made of material 
particles in motion, but also these particles were charged with electric power. The motion of a 
charged particle created magnetic fields. These phenomena introduced, in addition to 
mechanics, a new field in physics: electromagnetism. According to Frederic E. Brasch: 
various other physical concepts of the nature of force at attraction and inertia were 
developed by William Gilbert (1544-1603). He assumed that motion and attraction were 
due to magnetic-electrical phenomena.56 
 
An electromagnetic model, although it was not considered as a revolution in itself, brought a 
new understanding of matter. It somehow complemented Newton’s mechanical understanding 
of reality in terms of “matter in motion”. The charged particle did not only explain the 
puzzling phenomenon of action at distance, but also brought a new understanding of 
phenomena such as light and heat. Charged particles could not only attract or repel each other, 
but moving these particles could create electromagnetic fields. An electromagnetic model 
created a redefinition of the notion of force no longer only in terms of matter and motion, but 
in terms of electric charges, electromagnetic fields and new phenomena such as radiation. 
Although electromagnetic phenomena have been widely used in engineering and in the 
manufacturing of various tools in modern society, they have received relatively little attention 
from philosophy. 
 
4. Cybernetics: Complexity, Dynamism, Control, and Integration 
An electromagnetic model has, to the best of my knowledge, never been proposed as a 
weltanschauung very explicitly before. The revolutionary character of its development has 
remained unnoticed by philosophers to the extent that even some contemporary philosophers 
continue to think in terms of objects (material bodies) and ideas (their representation). One 
possible explanation of this neglect is that electromagnetism can be integrated into mechanics 
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by arguing that electricity can be defined as motion of electrons or ions. However, there is an 
emerging paradigm shift, to which various academic disciplines have pointed. For instance, 
Prigogine and Stengers have pointed out that “today interest is shifting from substance to 
relation, to communication, to time”57. At the same time, Drucker has postulated a 
multidimensional change characterized by The New Realities in Government and Politics, in 
Economics and Business, in Society and World View.58 Another voice that has begged for a 
paradigm change is Richard Bernstein, who has called for a New Constellation.59 However, it 
is Henry C. Mishkoff who has given the concept of cybernetics its status as a new 
weltanschauung in the tribute of his book on artificial intelligence. According to Mishkoff: 
Norbert Wiener is best known for developing a new approach to understanding the 
workings of the universe. Since the time of Newton, scientists have concentrated on an 
energy model, explaining events and processes in terms of the transfer of energy. 
Wiener suggested a model that has proven to be extremely valuable in understanding 
computers as well as people – he suggested that the transfer of information rather than 
energy is the best way to model different kinds of scientific phenomena. Cybernetics 
was the name Wiener used both to describe his informational approach and to entitle his 
1948 book on the subject.60 
 
The concept of cybernetics may be new, but the phenomenon it describes is not. Before 
Wiener, Whitehead stressed “organism”, Hartshorne “social”, and Progogine and Stengers 
stressed both “relation” and “process”. These are implicit ways, in my view, of expressing the 
complexity and dynamism that are at the heart of the cybernetic model. Cybernetics has not 
been accepted immediately in the scientific community. In the beginning, it has been 
considered as belonging to the esoteric jargon of highly skilled mathematicians given its 
origins at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.61 As K. M. Syre warns us, the concept of 
cybernetics has come a long way. Before its general acceptance, it had competing or 
substituting concepts that, instead of overcrowding it, revealed its intrinsic link with 
information science and its richness. In his 1967 article “Philosophy and Cybernetics”, Syre 
notes that: 
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The term ‘cybernetics’ has not been universally accepted by mathematicians and 
engineers in this country, who often prefer to speak instead of information theory or of 
the theory of feedback and control. The use of the term here does not reflect a decision 
one way or another regarding those issues which incline many specialists from adopting 
‘cybernetics’ as a technical term.62 
 
The concept of cybernetics, like any other encompassing concept, refers to such wide and 
different areas of reality that it is not easy to define. For example, its mechanical counterpart 
defines reality as “matter in motion” and hence, insists on the transmission of energy. We can 
also describe how mechanical principles apply to machinery, in body functions, such as the 
understanding of speech as the movement of the tongue in the mouth, dying as the 
impossibility of motions including the motion of blood in vessels, the motion of air in the 
lungs, or economics as the motion of goods and services between sellers and buyers (the 
notion of “financial flow” attests to this). The same wide areas of application are available for 
the concept of cybernetics. According to the inventor of the concept himself: 
Since the end of World War II, I have been working on the many ramifications of the 
theory of messages. Besides the electrical engineering theory of transmission of 
messages, there is a larger field which includes not only the study of language but the 
study of messages as a means of controlling machinery and society, the development of 
computing machines and other such automata, certain reflections upon psychology and 
the nervous system, and a tentative theory of scientific method. This larger theory is a 
probabilistic theory … Until recently, there was no existing word for this complex of 
ideas, and in order to embrace the whole field by a single term, I felt constrained to 
invent one. Hence “Cybernetics”, which I derived from the Greek word kubernetes, for 
“steersman”, the same Greek word from which we eventually derive our word 
“governor”.63 
 
Hence, from the subtitle of the book where the founder of cybernetics has systematically 
exposed this concept, we can define cybernetics as the science of “control and 
communication, in the machine and the animal”64. The encompassing character of the concept 
of cybernetics creates a situation where, as Syre warns us, “there is no recognized philosophic 
theory or school that could properly be termed cybernetics”65. The reason for this is that 
“cybernetics stands to the real machine – electronic, mechanical, neural, or economic – much 
as geometry stands to a real object in our terrestrial space”66. In other words, cybernetics is 
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not a form of description or a separate theory, but a framework through which the functioning 
of both natural and artificial machines can be understood. According to Ashby: 
it (cybernetics) treats, not things, but ways of behaving. It does not ask “what is this 
thing” but “what does it do?” Thus it is very interested in such a statement as “this 
variable is undergoing simple harmonic oscillation”, and is much less concerned with 
whether the variable is the position of a point on a wheel, or a potential in an electric 
circuit. It is thus essentially functional and behaviouristic.67 
 
This clarification by Ashby confirms Neville Moray’s definition of cybernetics as the study of 
the behavior of systems of all kinds. It is the science of “input” and “output”.68 This shift 
introduces a double dynamism. On the one hand, it requires us to study and understand not the 
invariant characteristics associated with structure, but the variable ones that are associated 
with behavior. Therefore, while modern science has shifted our focus from the study of nature 
(ontology) to the study of structure, cybernetics invites us to shift from the study of structure 
to the study of behavior, and behavior implies change or difference. For this reason Ashby 
points out that: 
the most fundamental concept in cybernetics is that of “difference”, either that two 
things are recognizably different or that one thing has changed with time … All the 
changes that may occur with time are naturally included, for when plants grow and 
planets age and machines move, some change from one state to another is implicit. So 
our first task will be to develop this concept of “change”, not only making it more 
precise but making it richer, converting it to a form that experience has shown to be 
necessary if significant developments are to be made.69 
 
On the other hand, change effected at one end of the behaving system is transmitted to other 
parts of the system or to its environment. Therefore, change does not occur merely within the 
system, but the system is both an object and an agent of change. In other words, cybernetics is 
not only interested in the way both internal and external factors change a given system, but 
also in how this system transmits the change to its environment. This double dynamism points 
to another aspect of cybernetics, namely the study of “input” and “output”.70 Not only is the 
system acted upon by its environment, but it also acts itself on its environment. This capacity 
to be acted on or to receive inputs and the capacity to generate an output create a situation 
where the system loses its invariant character and is subject to complex processes of change 
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that are triggered by both internal and external factors. Hence, “a system is a set of attributes 
and the history of the changes of that set of attributes”71. 
 
Being a set of attributes and the history of that set of attributes, any system basically 
presupposes some complexity. This complexity is brought by the fact that, on the one hand, in 
order to make a system one must bring several entities or attributes together, and on the other 
hand, not only these entities, but also their various relations are subject to change over time. 
Hence, adopting cybernetics as a weltanschauung implies what Nicholas Rescher calls “the 
complexity of the real”72. Acknowledging the complexity of the real invites our proceeding in 
a way opposed to that of traditional metaphysics and philosophy of science, which attempted 
to understand reality by reducing it to its fundamental constituents. Hence, both traditional 
metaphysics and the philosophy of science subscribed implicitly to the simplicity of the 
principles underlying reality, whether they were considered as simple particles (atoms or 
monads), elements (water, fire) or principles (change, permanence, contrast, or the 
indeterminate). The complexity of the real then requires the acknowledgement that the world 
is complex at the various levels of our understanding both in its constituents and in its 
processes. The number of chemical elements that modern chemistry has identified and 
presented in the periodical table, for instance, attests to this fact. Moreover, advances in 
science have proved that both non-living and living beings are complex both at the atomic and 
the genetic levels although these levels used to be considered as fundamental keys to the of 
understanding reality. 
 
The complexity of the real becomes more evident with the various patterns of organization 
and interaction of elements and entities that can be aggregated to form complex beings or are 
involved in various relations, be they spatio-temporal, exchanges of various forms of energy, 
or various possibilities of transformation given both external and internal factors.The degree 
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of complexity can be so high to the extent that some philosophers and scientists have started 
to question the ideas of simplicity, order, and regularity, which found modern physics. There 
is increasing literature that claims that reality, at least in some of its aspects, is chaotic. This 
chaotic aspect has been studied to the extent that some scientists have attempted to find its 
mathematical formulation especially by pushing the variables of functions, which are 
otherwise simple when their computation is kept in ‘normal’ limits, beyond certain limits. The 
distinction Alvin Toffler makes when he assesses Progogine and Stengers’ ways of thinking is 
worth noting. In their view: 
Summed and amplified, they hold that while some parts of the universe may operate 
like machines, these are closed systems, at best form only a small part of the physical 
universe. Most phenomena of interest to us are, in fact, open systems, exchanging 
energy or matter [one may add information] with their environment. Surely biological 
and social systems are open, which means that the attempt to understand them in 
mechanistic terms is doomed to failure. 
This suggests, moreover, that most of reality instead of being orderly, stable, and 
equilibrial, is seething and bubbling with change, disorder, process.73 
 
The link between cybernetics and the info-computational model of knowledge, which we are 
developing in this thesi is based on the possibility that if we consider reality as behaving 
systems, we can acknowledge the basic principle of reality as information. At this level, the 
notion of information can be defined by opposing it to its contrary, namely entropy. 
According to Wiener, the founder of cybernetics: 
The notion of the amount of information attaches itself very naturally to a classical 
notion in statistical mechanics: that of entropy. Just as the amount of information in a 
system is a measure of its degree of organization, so is the entropy of a system is a 
measure of its degree of disorganization; and the one is simply the opposite of the 
other.74 
 
One implication of this description of information is that the absence of information would 
lead to infinite entropy and hence, to total chaos and meaninglessness. Thus, simple, regular, 
and orderly systems like those based on mechanics can be understood as having a bigger 
“amount of information” than their complex, irregular, and somehow chaotic counterparts. 
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This notion of information leads to “a statistical theory of the amount of information, in which 
the unit amount of information was transmitted as a single decision between equally probable 
alternatives”75. Associated with this concept of information is the notion of message. Wiener, 
narrating how he has managed to identify cybernetics as a new model of reality, notes that: 
the problems of control engineering and of communication engineering were 
inseparable, and that they centered not around the technique of electrical engineering 
but around the much more fundamental notion of the message, whether this should be 
transmitted by electrical, mechanical, or nervous means. The message is a discrete or 
continuous sequence of measurable events distributed in time – precisely what is called 
time series in statistical mechanics.76 
 
The notion of information understood as negative entropy introduces an understanding of 
reality not only as complex, but also dynamic. Many systems, be they natural or artificial, are 
embedded in these two principles that determine their “degree of organization”. However, 
systems remain organized as long as their complexity and their dynamism are limited. The 
limiting factor is a certain feedback that does not allow certain parameters of the system to go 
beyond certain limits without destroying the system itself. According to Syre, for instance: 
A star at midlife is balanced thermally by negative feedback between forces of gravity 
and of radiation. On earth, life is an energy exchange between environment and 
organism, regulated by processes of negative feedback. With respect to reproductive 
groups, these processes are known as natural selection. In the individual organism they 
are known as learning, and in the organism’s nervous system as perception and 
consciousness. 77 
In other words: 
Feedback is basic to all life processes. But feedback is a form of information exchange. 
The fundamental category of life is information, in the technical sense of 
communication theory. The task of this book is to exhibit man in his organic and mental 
functions as a natural outcome of these informational processes.78 
 
Although Wiener had applied the notion of feedback to mechanical systems he realized that 
this notion has wide areas of application both in human action and in social organization. In 
his view, “an extremely important factor in voluntary action is what the control engineers 
term feedback”79 given the fact that: 
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when we desire a motion to follow a given pattern the difference between this pattern 
and the actually performed motion is used as input to cause the part regulated to move 
in such a way as to bring its motion closer to that given pattern.80 
  
Wiener himself observed the phenomenon of feedback in the nervous system during an 
experiment he performed on a cat81 and found other examples as well, such as the thermostat, 
which regulates the temperature in a house82, the governor of a steam engine83, the way we 
drive a car on an icy road, animal and human reflex action84, and the recognition of patterns 
by human senses, such as vision.85 Concerning the way we drive a car on an icy road, for 
instance, Wiener notes that: 
Our entire conduct depends on knowledge of the slipperiness of the road surface, that is, 
on a knowledge of the performance of the system car-road. If we wait to find this by the 
ordinary performance of the system, we shall discover ourselves in a skid before we 
know it. We thus give to the steering wheel a succession of small, fast impulses, not 
enough to throw the car into a major skid but quite enough to report to our kinesthetic 
sense whether the car is in danger of skidding, and we regulate our method of steering 
accordingly.86 
 
He generalizes this process as follows: 
 
This method of control, which we may call control by informative feedback, is not 
difficult to schematize into a mechanical form and may well be worth while employing 
in practice. We have a compensator to our effector, and this compensator has a 
characteristic which may be varied from outside. We superimpose on the incoming 
message a weak high-frequency input and take off the output of the effector a partial 
output of the same high frequency, separated from the rest of the output by an 
appropriate filter. We explore the amplitude-phase relations of the high-frequency 
output to the input in order to obtain the performance characteristics of the effector. On 
the basis of this, we modify in the appropriate sense the characteristics of the 
compensator.87 
 
The generalization of the information model of reality as embedded in cybernetics is not far 
fetched. Cybernetics not only has found a wide audience in various academic disciplines, but 
its applications have also been wide-ranging. The theory of cybernetics has been accepted in 
disciplines such as systems sciences, control sciences, information sciences, psychology, 
linguistics, and biology. As a new paradigm, cybernetics has been applied in biology, 
psychology and education, social sciences, health care, management and organization, 
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engineering, linguistics, artificial intelligence, global planning, and the forecasting of the 
future.88 In the ongoing studies of human brains motivated both by the application of theories 
of measurement of intelligence at the workplace and research in artificial intelligence, 
Wiener, J. P. Schade and other collaborators have studied in detail the “cybernetics of the 
nervous system”89 while Vladimir H. Brix has elevated this concept to a “metaphysical” level 
by contending that “all is cybernetics”90. Wiener has also generalized this notion beyond his 
original area of academic interest, namely from mathematics and engineering to the social 
sciences. According to Wiener: 
It is certainly true that the social system is an organization like the individual, that it is 
bound together by a system of communication, and that it has a dynamics in which 
circular processes of a feedback nature play an important part. This is true, both in the 
general fields of anthropology and sociology and in the more specific field of 
economics; and in the very important work … of von Neumann and Morgenstern the 
theory of games enters into this range of ideas.91 
 
 
C. KNOWING AS INFORMATION PROCESSING 
1. Knowledge as a Factor of Information 
In the tradition dominated by normative epistemology, both epistemologists and philosophers 
of science have, at least implicitly, assumed an invariant element. For the philosopher of 
science, this invariant element is the universal laws embedded in the order of things and can 
be identified by science and then represented mathematically through formulations and 
relations that are universally (always and everywhere) valid. For the epistemologist, this 
invariant element is the human mind, which, by following proper methods, can access truth 
and is then capable of formulating knowledge as opposed to mere opinion. The first 
assumption is implicit in the increasing mathematization of every discipline that claims the 
status of science. As Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh remind us: 
Mathematization is upheld as the only way for a field of study to attain the rank of a 
science. Mathematization means formalization, casting the field of study into axiomatic 
mode and thereby, it is supposed, purging it of the taint of rhetoric, of the lawyery tricks 
used by those who are unable to let the facts and logic speak for themselves.92 
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In other instances, this search for an invariant element is manifested in the control of elements 
that are not examined according to the principle of caeteris paribus (or all other things kept 
equal). The second principle is found in texts by authors who oppose some aspects of 
normative epistemology, but who are not radical enough to question its foundations or to 
provide alternatives. They remain entrapped by the search for a fixed frame of reference 
which they do not find in the order of things, but in the knower. This is also the case for 
Pandit, for example, who assumes that the knowing subject is the fixed frame of reference. In 
Pandit’s words: 
Thus in the subjective context, I took ‘I know that p’ as (expressing) a K-claim in its 
own right as much as “S knows that q’; each invariably involving the presumption of 
the knowing subject as a fixed frame of reference.93 
 
The informational model of epistemology is a logical consequence of the cybernetic model 
that we have introduced previously as its metaphysical ground. This approach recognizes a 
double dynamism that occurs both in the knower and in the object of knowledge. Its basis is 
the acknowledgement of the complexity and the dynamism of both the knower (the subject) 
and the known (the object). Hence, the information model of knowledge recognizes that both 
the knower and the object known are “behaving systems” and then shifts from the study of 
knowledge understood as an end product to the study of the process of knowing understood as 
an activity of the knower. Philosophers of knowledge now investigate what is human knowing 
in this context of dynamism and complexity, and what is the role of an information-based 
framework in this process. From the definition of “the amount of information” as an 
organizing principle by Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, and its unit of measurement as 
what is transmitted as a single decision between equally probable alternatives94, we are 
introduced to a metaphysics of alternatives where the invariant element assumed by normative 
epistemology is replaced by a probabilistic element. This probabilistic element creates a 
situation where the process of knowing does not aim at certainty, but at wisdom according to 
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the etymological definition of philosophy as “the love of wisdom”. Although the links 
between this shift from an invariant to a probabilistic element may not be directly evident, this 
element creates a situation where the knower is not a passive contemplator of reality, but an 
active participant in the creation of value and meaning. Hence, the metaphysics of 
alternatives, which is postulated at the elementary level of the measurement of the amount of 
information, can be elevated to the cognitive level by considering the knower not only as an 
information processor, but also an information provider, and an information evaluator. Hence, 
whereas normative epistemology aims at establishing “clear and distinct” representations of 
objects in terms of sensations (empiricism) or ideas (rationalism), the information model of 
knowledge aims at capturing the dynamism embedded both in the knower and in the object of 
knowledge and ordering them into a valuable and meaningful process. Therefore, instead of 
defining knowledge as true justified beliefs or the acquisition of accurate representations that 
lead to certainty, we can define knowledge as a factor of information. According to Peter 
Drucker: 
Knowledge is information that changes something or somebody – either by becoming 
grounds for action, or by making an individual (or an institution) capable of different 
and more effective actions.95 
 
This definition remains unclear as, in the common parlance, the concept of information is 
often overclouded or even replaced by another related concept, namely the concept of data. 
However, Robert Schultheis and Mary Sumner have pointed out: 
data and information differ. Data are the individual elements of a transaction, such as 
item number, item quality, and price on a sales order transaction. Information, on the 
other hand, is data with meaning for decision-making.96 
 
In other words, from a cognitive point of view, information is data enriched with value and 
meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving. This definition of 
knowledge then transcends the model suggested by normative epistemology that reduces 
knowing to perceiving or thinking, which is only accessing data. It acknowledges that the 
 102 
knower receives a wide variety of data with different senses, but the process of knowing does 
not take place unless these data is processed. Processing, then, is enriching data with value 
and meaning and organizing it according to purposes. Hence, in addition to accessing data 
through immediate experience, by understanding data the knower enriches it with meaning 
and by judging data the knower enriches it with value. By experiencing data, the knower 
codes it in various forms of representations and patterns, but this does not yet make data 
meaningful. Meaning is created when new data is integrated into an already existing 
conceptual framework that links the new data with past experiences, challenges, and 
opportunities of the present and expectations of the future. Only when accessing and 
understanding data leads to what Lonergan calls insight, then meaning is created. According 
to Lonergan: 
By insight…is meant not any act of attention or advertence or memory but the 
supervening act of understanding. It is not any recondite intuition but the familiar event 
that occurs easily and frequently in the moderately intelligent, rarely and with difficulty 
only in the very stupid. In itself it is so simple and obvious that it seems to merit the 
little attention that commonly it receives. At the same time, its function in cognitional 
activity is so central that to grasp it in its conditions, its workings, and its results, is to 
confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human 
opinion.97 
 
In other words, according to the analogy of the detective with which the preface to Insight 
begins, insight does not solve problems through “the mere apprehension of any clue”98 or “the 
mere memory of all”, but through “a quite distinct activity of organizing intelligence that 
places the full set of clues in a unique explanatory perspective”99. 
 
However, the process of human knowing does not limit itself to enriching data with meaning. 
This process leads to a second stage where the knower enriches data with value. It is at this 
stage that the knower distinguishes between what is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is 
important and what is trivial. At this stage, the knower uses both implicit and explicit 
principles and values as yardsticks to select what is meaningful and to notice what may 
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require inquiry. Hence, the process of knowing is intrinsically selective as not all the data that 
presents itself to the knower is meaningful or valuable.  
 
2. Knowing as a Dynamic and Integrative Process 
Lonergan is of the view that the human mind acts at four differentiated, but integrated levels 
of consciousness. The idea of knowing as thinking defended by normative epistemology 
reduces the whole process of knowing to its second level, that of understanding. This 
polymorphic character of human knowing, according to Lonergan, is linked to the very nature 
of human consciousness. Whereas normative epistemology has presented consciousness as a 
“container” and knowledge as “contents of consciousness”, Lonergan presents consciousness 
as a multidimensional and a multilevel activity. According to Lonergan: 
Different levels of consciousness and intentionality have to be distinguished. In our 
dream states consciousness and intentionality commonly are fragmentary and 
incoherent. When we awake, they take on a different hue to expand on four successive, 
related, but qualitatively different levels. There is the empirical level on which we 
sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we 
inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the 
presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the rational level on which 
we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or 
probability, of a statement. There is the responsible level on which we are concerned 
with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses 
of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.100 
 
In brief, our information-based model of human knowing can be summarized as follows: 
 
Operation/ 
Activity 
Greek 
Equivalent 
Level of 
Consciousness 
Achievement Proponent School of 
Thought 
Method 
Experiencing Pathos Empirical Representations 
(data) 
Empiricism Phenomenology 
Understanding Logos Intellectual Meaning Rationalism Analytic 
Judging 
Evaluating 
Ethos Rational Value Critical Realism Critical 
Deciding 
Acting 
Praxis Responsible Purpose Pragmatism Experimental 
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According to the informational model, knowledge is oriented towards action. Therefore, this 
model corrects the modern reduction of knowledge to thought and rationality to intellectual 
activity. It calls for the recognition that knowing is multifaceted and occurs at different levels 
of consciousness. Hugo Meynell points out rightly that: 
[n]ow empiricism and materialism both presuppose, in their different ways, that it is 
only experience, and not the whole process of experience, understanding, and judgment, 
which actually puts us in touch with the real world; real knowledge of the real world, 
for these philosophies, is fundamentally a matter of taking a look at what is open for 
inspection rather than inquiring intelligently and reflecting reasonably.101 
 
Meynell’s remark brings to our attention the central Lonerganian idea that knowing is not a 
single and separate event, but an integrative and iterative process of experiencing, 
understanding, judging [and I will add acting].102 This implies that knowing cannot be 
reduced to a simple, static, invariable, or universal relation between the knower and the 
known. It is a complex process that integrates operations such as seeing, hearing, touching, 
smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, 
marshalling and weighing evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, 
writing [and reading].103 The appreciation of this complexity corroborates the previous view 
that knowing is essentially an activity of the knower and that the knower is not a tabula rasa, 
but a creator of meaning given the knower’s situation as an embodiment of past memories, 
challenges, and opportunities in the present and expectations of the future (both real and 
imaginary or illusory). Moreover, the knower is not isolated, but is involved in intricate and 
complex networks of relationships, which not only define the knower as a person, but also 
provide a substratum for the knower’s activity through the creation of different systems of 
valuation where an economy of meanings occurs. In this respect knowing is contextual and 
intersubjective. 
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The recognition that knowing is not a single-level activity is full of consequences. It 
demonstrates that different epistemological schools, such as empiricism and rationalism, are 
not to be opposed since they focus on two different stages on one continuum. Whereas 
empiricism reduces knowing to experiencing, rationalism makes the same mistake by 
reducing knowing to its intellectual dimension, namely understanding. It becomes clear that 
various theories and positions that have been opposed make the mistake of considering 
themselves as wholes, whereas they are different and complementary parts of one process. 
Their claim to be absolutely true, total, and definitive is rooted in a discriminatory either/or 
pattern of truth and falsity, which deprives the intermediate positions of incomplete truth. This 
leads consciously or unconsciously to the ignorance or the neglect of the fact that there is a 
continuum of doubts, incomplete meanings, and unfinished inquiries between truth and 
falsity. 
 
The same reduction is found in various schools that have dominated contemporary philosophy 
– namely phenomenology, analytic philosophy, critical theory, and pragmatism. The remedy 
to this neglect or ignorance is the recognition that knowing is a multidimensional activity that 
occurs at different levels of consciousness.These four operations show that the great limitation 
of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, critical theory, and pragmatism is that they consider 
themselves as wholes although they are parts of one, but multifaceted process. All these 
philosophic disciplines reduce knowing to a single-level activity, which creates a fragmented 
philosophical landscape with irreconcilable dualisms. For instance, phenomenology reduces 
knowing to experiencing and discards important intellectual activities, such as abstraction, 
calculation, classification, and formalization; analytic philosophy reduces knowing to 
understanding and creates a contempt for some important sources of immediate data, such as 
senses and emotions, while it marginalizes ethical principles and aesthetic values as 
epistemologically unworthy since they do not meet the canons of rationality established by 
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modern science. Critical theory reduces knowing to judging according to one of society’s 
definitions of the good life. It reintroduces ethical concerns, as for instance, conforming of the 
individual to social norms and institutions. However, it does not leave enough room for the 
possibility of social change based on a redefinition of what good life is by rebels who are 
capable of turning the existing social order upside down, reformers who call for timed and 
progressive change, and charismatic leaders who create new ideals and draw society to a new 
way of understanding itself. Moreover, critical theory does not account for mutual 
communication of information between societies through different patterns of exchange 
including material goods, artefacts, movements of people, and different processes of cultural 
influence. Pragmatism, by reducing knowing to acting, creates a sort of social engineering 
that may reduce persons to entities that are malleable and that can be moulded in one’s 
understanding of what an ideal human community is thought to be. In this way, pragmatism 
does not account for aspects that are recognized as uniquely human, such as freedom and 
autonomy. Not only can people act on the world, but the world also acts on them. There is a 
process of mutual influence in a give and take fashion that amounts to a two-way information 
cycle. Understanding knowing as a fourfold process that integrates experiencing, 
understanding, judging, and acting puts the four schools together and calls for a dynamic and 
integrative theory of human knowing that emphasizes different levels of consciousness and 
that bridges the opposition bred by the search for fixity and its concomitant discontent. This 
search for a permanent foundation of what is valid and valuable knowledge has been 
conceptualized by Bernstein as objectivism. This school of thought seems to proclaim, in an 
apodictic fashion, the impossibility of knowledge and value outside its own horizon. As 
Bernstein notes, objectivism involves: 
an underlying belief that in the final analysis the only viable alternatives open to us are 
either some form of objectivism, foundationalism, ultimate grounding of knowledge, 
science, philosophy, and language, or that we are ineluctably led to relativism, 
skepticism, historicism, and nihilism.104 
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The information model of knowledge can be an antidote to the fragmentation of the 
philosophical landscape by acknowledging that human knowing is a multilevel process and by 
highlighting each operation at its proper place in the whole process. This new synthesis of 
knowledge demands an integration of the conceptual and the analytical model that dominated 
classical science with an experiential and synthetic model. In my view, this model based on 
information will lead to a more complete and comprehensive understanding of reality, which 
integrates elements of our experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. On the one 
hand, this model of the process of knowing integrates various forms of knowledge, namely 
emotional, intellectual, ethical, and practical or behavioral knowledge; and on the other hand, 
it overcomes some deep embedded dichotomies linked with the opposition of operations and 
framework. This model, instead of opposing reason to emotion, ideas to sensations, theory to 
practice, and perception to thought, can locate these activities on one continuum. In other 
words, instead of being an epistemology of oppositions, the information-based model of 
knowing creates an epistemology of successions. 
 
The information-based model of human knowing that we are suggesting implies then that 
knowing is polymorphic.105 This acknowledgement is an antidote to a certain reductionism 
that limits human rationality to its intellectual dimension, thus reducing knowing to thinking. 
Knowing has experiential, intellectual, judgmental, and pragmatic dimensions. In fact, even 
scientists do not always appeal to scientific principles when they do not practise their 
profession. Lonergan is right to point out that “[t]he occurrence of insight is not restricted to 
the minds of mathematicians, when doing mathematics, and to the minds of physicists, when 
engaged in that department of science”106. The reason for this is that since scientists carry on 
the cores of daily life, they appeal to a level of consciousness that is different from the 
intellectual level, which is essentially logico-deductive.107 In fact, Lonergan points out again 
that “one meets intelligence in every walk of life” and various professions such as farming, 
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technical work and mechanics, medicine and law practice, politics and diplomacy are not 
devoid of insight merely because they are not mathematical and logico-deductive.108 
Professions that are remote from physics (which is presented as “the” model of modern 
science), appeal to a great degree of intelligence. As there is insight in mathematics and 
physics, there is also insight in industry and commerce, finance and taxation, journalism and 
public relations. This is the case even in the sphere of private life, the home and friendship, 
conversation and sports, arts and entertainment. One may wonder, for instance, whether living 
together with a person of the opposite sex (a woman in my case), scoring a goal, or raising 
children requires less intelligence than solving equations and making logical inferences. For 
Lonergan, “[i]n every case, the man or woman of intelligence is marked by greater readiness 
in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing the issue, in grasping implications, in acquiring 
know-how”109. 
 
Thinking is only one aspect of the process of human knowing. It has to be complemented by 
other human operations, such as making accurate observations when perceiving objects or 
events, integrating new data in a pre-existing conceptual scheme, making inferences, and 
establishing meaningful and valuable connections within and between wide and various sets 
of data, making reasonable decisions, and carrying on effective actions. The information-
based model of human knowing requires a dynamic and integrative model of rationality. This 
idea of a dynamic and integrative model of rationality is based not only on the fact that 
knowing is polymorphic and that the process of knowing is multidimensional, but also on the 
fact that reason is not as autonomous as normative epistemology postulates. In a real process 
of knowing, objectivity and universality can be hindered by both internal and external 
elements. If the human person is a rational animal, he or she is not rational only intellectually, 
but also physically, emotionally, morally, and practically. Therefore, a dynamic and 
integrative model of rationality gives credit to various theories of multiple intelligence and 
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must at least include the visual, the auditory, the gustatory, the olfactory, and the tactile 
aspects, as well as the kinesthetic, the interactive, the rational, and the artistic aspects. A 
multifaceted model of rationality implies that the idea of knowing as an activity of the mind 
as propagated by normative epistemology should be replaced by a more encompassing idea of 
knowing as an activity of the whole organism.  
 
3. Knowing as an Activity of the Knower 
The scientific model of knowing requires objectivity. Therefore, the knower and his or her 
context must be detached from the process of knowing. Knowledge must occur on a neutral 
ground. However, the appreciation of the complexity identified in the previous subsection 
shows that knowing is an activity of the knower. The knower cannot be detached as he or she 
is not a tabula rasa. The knower is an embodiment of past memories, challenges, and 
opportunities in the present and expectations of the future (both real and imaginary or 
illusory). Moreover, the knower is involved in intricate and complex networks of 
relationships. These relationships not only define him or her as a person, but also provide a 
substratum for his or her knowing activity. As a member of a human community, the knower 
is committed to various systems of values and meanings. These systems constitute a 
conceptual framework where an economy of meanings constitutes the lieu where the 
production, the supply, and the demand of knowledge occur. In this respect, knowing is 
contextual and intersubjective. 
 
Therefore, the idea that knowledge is “the possession of accurate representations of an 
object”110 is too limited. This view is based on a particular understanding of philosophy that 
emerged in the seventeenth century, according to which “[p]hilosophy should provide a 
permanent matrix of categories into which every possible empirical discovery and cultural 
development can be fitted”111. This search for a permanent matrix was emphasized by the 
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scientific quest for objectivity and universality. Therefore, it relegated the role of the knower 
to the periphery. The historicity of this approach needs to be acknowledged. As Rorty notes 
again: 
To think of knowledge which presents a “problem” and about which we ought to have a 
“theory”, is a product of viewing knowledge as assemblage of representations [...] as a 
product of the seventeenth century.112 
 
This approach to philosophy in general and epistemology in particular has created difficult 
problems, such as the problem of other minds, and the problem of the existence of the 
external world. Moreover, the idea of knowing as having representations has reduced 
knowledge to factual knowledge. In the long run, it created the image that intellectual 
knowledge is more perfect than common sense and feeling. Later, the belief in the autonomy 
of reason made abstraction a criterion of purity and perfection of knowledge. This reductionist 
approach was based on the belief that knowledge can be a simple, static, invariable, or 
universal relation between consciousness and reality. In fact: 
The notion of knowledge as the assemblage of representations is optional [...] it may be 
replaced by a pragmatist conception of knowledge which eliminates the Greek contrast 
between contemplation and action, between representing the world and coping with 
it.113 
 
Therefore, Lonergan’s identification of different levels of consciousness posits an active and 
dynamic subject. This subject integrates the external data brought by his or her empirical 
capacities into the inner dimensions of his or her inquiring, understanding, abstracting, and 
generalizing capacities. Michael Polanyi has corroborated this view when he notes that: 
Knowing is an active comprehension of things known, an action that requires skills. 
Skilful knowing and doing is achieved by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or 
tools, to the shaping of a skilful achievement whether practical or theoretical.114 
 
In other words, knowing is not done by brains in a vat, as Putnam hypothetically assumes. It 
is done by a dynamic subject endowed with judgement capabilities, not in a passive 
contemplation of truth, but in an active search for
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complex realities where the knower struggles to lead a meaningful life by satisfying a wide 
range of needs (both material and non material) against the background of moral values and 
changing patterns of culture, economics, society, politics, and religion. In brief, Lonergan’s 
dynamic and integrative theory of knowing not only takes into account the changes that occur 
in the known, but also those that occur in the knower. In Lonergan’s words: 
The operations then not only intend objects. There is to them a further psychological 
dimension. They occur consciously and by them the operating subject is conscious. Just 
as operations by their intentionality make objects present to the subject, so also by 
consciousness they make the operating subject present to himself.115 
 
This double presence is an additional feature of Lonergan’s understanding of knowledge as 
self-appropriation through the active self-affirmation of the knower, which is, in fact, a 
prerequisite condition for “the possibility of judgements of facts”116. 
 
4. Knowing as Self-Appropriation 
The scientific model, in search of objectivity and universality, excludes the knower. 
Knowledge is meant to be universal, impersonal, and absolute. This approach ignores that 
knowing does not only change the known, but also the knower. The knower, in fact, is 
capable of learning and creativity. In other words, the knower is not a tabula rasa, as Locke 
has assumed. Moreover, there is no detached universality awaiting to be unveiled. The kind of 
universality the inquiring subject can attain is a generalization of particulars. This cannot be 
done through repeated similar experiments looking for elements of invariance that can be 
established into universal laws, but through an accumulation of insights. This accumulation of 
insights is achieved through a dynamic, integrative, and recurrent process of experiencing, 
understanding, and judging. This pattern overcomes the dualisms that have plagued the 
various attempts to establish a definite, permanent, and universal relationship between the 
knower and the known. 
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In fact, knowing is not merely apprehending the way things relate to one another. It is 
inquiring the way they relate to us. This raises a need to understand the difference between 
“nominal definitions”117 and “explanatory definitions”118. Whereas nominal definitions 
“merely tell us about the correct usage of names”119, explanatory definitions “include 
something further that, were it not in the definition, would have to be added as a postulate”120. 
These views should not be opposed or contrasted in antagonistic fashion, for they are not 
fundamentally different, but rather attest to the fact that “knowing is not a single-level 
activity”121. According to Flanagan: 
[It] involves three different but functionally related sets of activities. This discovery not 
only explains why knowing ourselves as knowers is so difficult to achieve, but it also 
suggests why so many different accounts of knowing can be interpreted as part of a 
developing, dialectical process leading to the goal of knowing our own knowing. Once 
this goal is achieved we proceed to identify the different forms and objectives of 
specialized patterns of knowing and to integrate them into a search of a unifying 
objective.122 
 
Hence, every knower is the fruit of a creative integration of his or her external environment 
and an inner disposition to know. Therefore, Lonergan’s approach constitutes a change in 
paradigm from “classical to historical consciousness”123. This creative integration of the 
external environment and the knower’s internal disposition is reflected both in the elements of 
insight and in the understanding of knowledge as self-appropriation. 
 
In other words, knowing is not just establishing a simple relation between an abstract and 
isolated knower and an atomistic and static object. Knowing cannot be compared to a simple 
pattern such as the early Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language since knowledge 
understood as self-appropriation leads inevitably to: 
The effort to give an account of the invariant dynamic structure of conscious 
intentionality with immanent criteria of objectivity, truth, reality, and value. But, still 
more importantly, it is taking reflective possession of oneself as constituted 
fundamentally by operative, preconceptual, prelinguistic criteria of knowledge, 
objectivity, truth, reality and value.124 
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In other words: 
Self-appropriation is radically different from the Cartesian strategy of cutting oneself 
off from external objects in order to find oneself in the internal remainder. Self-
appropriation is not disengagement from the world of subjects but development of an 
understanding of oneself in the widest possible range of cognitive and moral 
engagements. The criteria immanent in interior operations cannot be discovered unless 
the interior operations occur. Accordingly, Lonergan deliberately provides opportunities 
in Insight for his readers to catch themselves in the act of performing cognitional 
operations – experience themselves questioning, imagining, having insights, reflecting 
on the correctness of their insights, and making judgements.125 
 
The demands for objectivity and universality embedded in the project of normative 
epistemology require a hypostatized knower. This knower is the contemplator of “pure forms” 
and merely uses one faculty, “pure reason”. However, the double dynamism found in the 
cybernetic model of reality and in the information-based model of human knowing that we are 
advocating postulates a more modest idea of the knower. The knower, like any ordinary 
person, is not a passive spectator of an unfolding reality, which meets his or her rationality to 
reveal its true nature. The role of the knower then is not merely to observe the universe, to 
understand the intricacies of the laws of its workings, and to formulate them in necessary 
propositions. The knower is, like any other human being, confronted with a wide range of 
data, with both its clarity and ambiguities in a world where the knower struggles to satisfy his 
or her needs and to maximize his or her capabilities. In other words, the knower is an 
“incarnate subject”. In Lonergan’s words: 
That dimension is the constitutive role of meaning in human living. It is the fact that 
acts of meaning inform human living, that such acts proceed from a free and responsible 
subject incarnate, that meanings differ from nation to nation, from culture to culture, 
and that, over time, they develop and go astray. Besides the meanings by which man 
apprehends nature and the meanings by which he transforms it, there are the meanings 
by which he thinks out the possibilities of his own living and makes his choice among 
them. In this realm of freedom and creativity, of solidarity and responsibility, of 
dazzling achievement and pitiable madness, there ever occurs man’s making of man.126 
 
The informational model, by bringing back the knower to the center of the knowing 
processes, recognizes that knowing is a multifaceted activity. By inquiring intelligently and 
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reflecting reasonably, the knower is paradoxically involved in processes of integration and 
discrimination that identify similarities and differences and establish criteria not only for 
truth, but also for valid and valuable knowledge. This permanent tension requires vigilance, 
but also integration. The attempt to reduce knowing to a single level leads to a conflict 
between different binary opposites, such as objects and ideas, practice and theory, the 
particular and the universal, the concrete and the abstract, facts and principles, rules and 
values, the accidental and the essential, the dynamic and the static, the contingent and the 
necessary, the emotional and the intellectual, the analytic and the synthetic, the real and the 
ideal, and the perceptual and the conceptual. These oppositions are due to the fact that various 
schools of thought consider themselves as wholes while they are only parts of one, but 
multifaceted process. For instance, whereas empiricism reduces knowing to experience, 
rationalism, in its crude version, reduces knowing to thought. The explicit idea that 
knowledge is aimed at action reintroduces the concept of finality or final cause or purpose 
into epistemology. This is a challenge to normative epistemology’s predilection for 
knowledge for its own sake and also to the idea that knowledge is value-free. 
 
Hence, the information-based model of human knowing, instead of isolating the knower, 
makes the knower the center of the epistemological process. There cannot be any process of 
information processing without an information processor. Likewise, there cannot be any 
process of knowing without a knower. Therefore, the process we have defined above only 
takes place if we acknowledge that knowing is, first and most of all, an activity of the knower. 
This appreciation of intentionality that was, at least, present in Aquinas, in some Neo-
Scholastic thinkers, such as Joseph Maréchal, who influenced Lonergan and Karl Rahner, and 
in some pragmatists, process thinkers, and phenomenologists, brings together not only the 
complexity of the knower and the complexity of the object of knowledge, but also the 
complexity of the process of knowing itself. Therefore, in order to bring together these multi-
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level complexities, epistemology should not start by investigating the representation of 
objects in the mind, but the subject-centered process that leads to self-appropriation. In 
Lonergan’s words: 
The beginning, then, not only is self-knowledge and self-appropriation but also a 
criterion for the real. If to convince oneself that knowing is understanding, one 
ascertains that knowing mathematics is understanding and knowing science is 
understanding and the knowledge of common sense is understanding, one ends up not 
only with a detailed account of understanding but also with a plan of what there is to be 
known. The many sciences lose their isolation from one another; the chasm between 
science and common sense is bridged; the structure of the universe proportionate to 
man’s intellect is revealed; and as that revealed structure provides an object for a 
metaphysics, so the initial self-criticism provides a method for explaining how 
metaphysical and anti-metaphysical affirmations arise, for selecting those that are 
correct, and for eliminating those that patently spring from a lack of accurate self-
knowledge. Further, as a metaphysics is derived from the known structure of one’s 
knowing, so an ethics results from knowledge of the compound structure of one’s 
knowing and doing: and as the metaphysics, so too the ethics prolongs the initial self-
criticism into an explanation of the origin of ethical positions and into a criterion for 
passing judgment on each of them.127 
 
5. The Role of Information 
a) Information as an Inviting Final Cause: the Role of Purpose, Value, and Meaning 
The limitations the scientific model faces when it is applied to human affairs are similar to 
those it faces when applied to natural phenomena. As Prigogine and Stengers have noted: 
Today we are beginning to see more clearly the limits of Newtonian rationality. A more 
consistent conception of science and of nature seems to be emerging. This new 
conception paves the way for a new unity of knowledge and culture.128 
 
In fact, the application of the scientific method to human affairs is based on an important 
misgiving. Human interaction and social organizations cannot be reduced to materialist 
entities that interact mechanically. In addition to being systems and structures, they are 
embodiments of meaning and value. This dimension is manifested in the ability to create and 
communicate signs and symbols. Therefore, various areas of human interactions and different 
social organizations are not just material and mechanical systems. They integrate material and 
mechanical aspects with logical and symbolic aspects. If we call information the meaning 
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and the value, then human interaction and social organization are not only mechanical 
processes, but also flows of information. This informational aspect of human knowing is not a 
random process, but it is purposeful. In this respect, information is an inviting final cause. 
Efficient causality as emphasized by the scientific model confines us to the question of how to 
attain truth. It excludes purpose and makes the question of why we aspire to attain truth 
irrelevant. 
 
b) Information as a Meaningful Interaction with a Context 
With the flow of information within and outside systems, the ordered and simple universe of 
classical science is more and more challenged. We are more and more aware that science is a 
specialized type of knowledge that cannot embody the whole of knowledge. The special 
conditions in which it occurs are different from the ordinary conditions of daily life. 
Moreover, the scientific dream of an objective and universal knowledge is increasingly 
challenged. Both the knower and the context play an active role in the process of knowing. 
Rescher recognizes that: 
objectivity will have to take context into account, seeing that different individuals and 
groups confront very different objective situations. Rationality is universal, but it is 
circumstantially universal - and objectivity with it.129 
 
The recognition of the importance of the context and the knower challenges the scientific 
predilection for abstraction. As I noted earlier, abstraction distorts reality. This view is 
emphasized by Prigogine and Stengers, when they point out that: 
The progress of science has often been described in terms of rupture, as a shift from 
concrete experience towards a level of abstraction that is increasingly difficult to grasp. 
We believe that this kind of interpretation is only a reflection, at the epistemological 
level, of the historical situation in which classical science found itself, a consequence of 
its inability to include in its theoretical frame vast areas of the relationship between man 
and his environment.130 
 
Among these “vast areas of the relationship between man and his environment” is the 
informational component of reality. We live in a world where natural phenomena, human 
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behavior, organizational styles, cultural values, social structures, various living and non-living 
organisms can be considered as huge information processors. The universe, for instance, can 
be portrayed as a huge analog (not digital) computer while the human person can be more and 
more perceived as “being digital”131. 
 
c) Information as a Meaningful Interaction with Others 
The kind of objectivity and universality that the scientific model stipulates violently relegates 
some aspects of human experience to the periphery of knowledge. For instance, that kind of 
objectivity and universality excludes elements of culture, context, value, and meaning. 
However: 
By admitting only a subjective meaning for a set of experiences men believe to be 
significant, science runs the risk of transforming these into the realm of the irrational, 
bestowing upon them formidable power.132 
 
In fact, in both human interaction and social organization non-intellectual elements sometimes 
play a great role. In fact, the influences that stratify and structure society are not a stable 
equilibrium because the development of social order is not a linear process. As Lonergan has 
noted, “in the dialectic of community there is the operation not only of practical common 
sense but also of human inter-subjectivity”133. However, the structured narratives of the 
origins and the development of a given social order create the impression that “the course of 
social change [is]… a succession of insights, courses of action, changed situations, and fresh 
insights”134. The construction of these narratives misses the fact that “truly practical insights 
have to be divided into operative and inoperative”135 ones. In fact, “the operative insights 
alone go into effect, for they alone either meet with no group resistance or else find favour 
with groups powerful enough to overcome what resistance there is”136. Therefore: 
[t]he social order that has been realized does not correspond to any coherently 
developed set of ideas. It represents the fraction of practical ideas that were made 
operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants of once excellent 
schemes that issued from the mill of compromise, the otiose structures that equip groups 
for their offensive and defensive activities137. 
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Having these facts in mind, it becomes clear that a mathematical model of a social order is 
implausible. It is impossible to be established with simple rules of efficient causality and 
formal systems of explanation as some aspects of human interaction cannot be quantified or 
formalized. Moreover, social causality is so complex that, in my view, it cannot be reduced to 
simple mathematical relations or physical laws. Therefore, a study of human affairs that yields 
to the characteristics of Newton’s physics or Darwin’s evolution is limited. In fact, that kind 
of study would be inaccurate if elements of value and meaning are not taken into account. 
 
d) Information as a Dynamic and Irregular Process 
The world displays elements of instability and randomness that make the Cartesian search for 
“a permanent foundation for the sciences”138 fruitless. The new understanding of reality 
identified above and the new types of knowledge it requires are at the heart of the paradigm 
shift we are investigating. Although Pagels’ penchant for Darwinism is obvious, he seems to 
share Drucker’s view that we are experiencing a “shifting knowledge base”139. Other 
philosophers, such as Gaston Bachelard, talk of the rise of a “non-Cartesian epistemology”140, 
while Weizenbaum reacts against “the imperialism of instrumental reason”141. These views 
highlight an epistemological shift that will not only change our patterns of thought, but also 
our worldview. This worldview will lay new foundations for knowledge, value, and meaning 
through an integration of materialistic, mechanistic, logical, and symbolic aspects of reality. 
 
Drucker suggests a shift from “analysis” to “perception”. Although this suggestion is, in my 
view, limited, it unveils the limits of Cartesianism, Newtoniasm, and Darwinism. As an 
overall worldview, Drucker suggests the incorporation of the informational aspect in reality 
through the replacement of a Newtonian physical model by a biological model. In his own 
words: 
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While it is the triumph of the analytical and conceptual model […] the computer also 
forces us to transcend that model. “Information” itself is indeed analytical and 
conceptual. But information is the organizing principle of every biological process. Life, 
modern biology teaches, is embodied in a “genetic code” that is, in programmed 
information. Indeed, the sole definition of that mysterious reality “life” that does not 
invoke the supernatural is that it is matter organized by information. And biological 
process is not analytical. In a mechanical phenomenon the whole is equal to the sum of 
its parts and therefore capable of being understood by analysis. Biological phenomena 
are however “wholes.” They are different from the parts of their parts. Information is 
indeed conceptual but meaning is not [...].142 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Normative epistemology is based on the modeling of philosophy on modern science. 
Therefore, normative epistemology and modern science share a certain search for truth and 
knowledge as expressed by “clear and distinct” ideas. However, this program, which is based 
on Cartesian rationalism and influenced analytic philosophy in a great way, falls short of 
accounting for the whole process of human knowing as it reduces knowing to merely one of 
its aspects, i.e. thinking. This problem is not solely epistemological, but metaphysical as well. 
It involves a certain conception of reality in terms of substance or universals, which imply 
necessity and permanence. This metaphysical model is assumed to be expressible into simple 
mathematical relations or rules of logical inference and conforms to the mechanical model, 
which defines reality in terms of matter, motion, and mechanical laws. However, this view of 
reality is mistaken since it reduces reality and natural laws to their invariant aspects. There is 
a possibility of formulating a modest dynamic and integrative epistemology, which is based 
on how real processes of knowing occur instead of setting an agenda of disambiguation and 
certainty that reduces knowledge to univocal propositions and knowing matters of fact. 
Taking into account the dynamic and integrative nature of human knowing implies respecting 
the division of linguistic labor emanating from the diversity of areas of knowledge, but also 
recognizing that even at the individual level knowledge is polymorph. It integrates emotional 
(pathos), intellectual (logos), evaluative (ethos), and pragmatic (praxis) dimensions. It 
includes basically four operations, i.e. experiencing, understanding, judging, and acting as the 
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human mind operates at four levels of consciousness, namely the empirical, the intellectual, 
the reasonable, and the responsible. According to this dynamic and integrative model of 
epistemology, knowing is defined not in terms of formulating true justified beliefs, but in 
terms of accumulating insights by enriching the immediate data of experience with value and 
meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving. This definition of knowing 
replaces a well-entrenched conception of knowledge as representation by an alternative 
conception of knowledge as information processing. Knowing as information processing 
means that the knower is not a passive spectator of reality, but an actor, who is involved in 
various acts and processes of meaning generation and value creation, as the knower achieves 
various purposes linked with satisfying one’s needs and maximizing one’s abilities. This 
dynamic and integrative model of human knowing, therefore, requires a conceptual 
framework that takes into account the turbulent aspects of reality instead of trying to fix 
meaning and reference as a way of translating dynamic and integrative processes into a 
medium that led itself to univocal predication, mathematical operations, and logical 
inferences. This model, in my view, requires as a prerequisite a change of worldview from 
mechanics to cybernetics. Mechanics needs not to be eliminated, but it needs to be 
acknowledged that systems and processes that are as simple, ordered, and regular as 
mechanical systems and processes are rather special cases of cybernetic models, which are 
generated through fixing structure and purpose. It is fixing structure and purpose that allow 
the introduction of an invariant element in both natural processes and human behavior. This 
invariant element makes human behavior simple, ordered, and regular as fixing structure and 
purpose does not only involve stabilizing internal processes of change, but also isolating the 
system or the process from possible changes induced by the environment. In other words, by 
emphasizing invariant aspects as a way of looking for substance or universals, constraints are 
imposed on natural processes either by singling out invariant aspects or by fixing meaning or 
reference. There is no need to postulate a separate world of necessity made of Platonic forms, 
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mathematical symbols and rules, or predicates and the logical calculus, but a need to 
acknowledge the dynamic and integrative nature of human knowing based on the pathos of 
being thrown into experience and the accumulation of insights through our interaction with 
our human and non-human environment. Humans are not passive spectators of reality, but 
active generators of meaning and value as they integrate material, mechanical, logical, and 
symbolic aspects into dynamic and integrative processes of human knowing. These processes 
appeal to substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional dimensions of the human 
organism, which are the custodians of empirical, intellectual, rational, and pragmatic abilities. 
Nor is there a need to reject the achievement of modern science or to separate science and 
philosophy as a way of accommodating aesthetic values and religious beliefs. Science should 
be understood as what it is, i.e. a coded, formalized, systematized body of knowledge, which 
aims at defining reality in terms of invariant aspects (universals or substance) and formulating 
universal laws. The risk of a scientific approach is to reduce philosophy and knowledge to 
certainty while philosophy as love of wisdom includes non-scientific aspects of knowledge as 
well. Reality can still be tackled in its complexity and dynamism using appropriate methods 
such as “systems thinking”. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM THE ANALYSIS/SYNTHESIS DICHOTOMY 
TO SYSTEMS THINKING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The paradigm shift from normative epistemology based on mechanics to a dynamic and 
integrative epistemology based on cybernetics calls for other paradigm shifts. These shifts do 
not only affect the description of reality and the articulation of knowledge, but also the 
methods used in the process of knowing. A mechanical model describes reality in terms of 
matter and/in motion, while cybernetics upholds a four dimension paradigm that includes 
material, mechanical, logical, and symbolic aspects. Therefore, a mechanical model looks for 
immutable laws that are believed to be universal and objective while a cybernetic model looks 
for differential laws due to the interactive nature of cybernetic systems and processes. The 
immutable laws that mechanics seeks are linked to the nature of causality in mechanical 
systems. In mechanical systems and processes the same causes lead to the same effects. 
However, in cybernetic systems and processes there are no causes or effects proper, but inputs 
and outputs. On the one hand, the level of inputs influences the level of outputs, but on the 
other hand, the level of outputs influences the level of inputs as in cybernetic systems and 
processes, when the value of outputs reaches certain thresholds, the behavior of the system 
and process is reversed as the threshold values activate a feedback process. Therefore, in 
terms of the epistemological method, there is a need to shift from the analysis/synthesis 
dichotomy to systems thinking. This paradigm shift is based on the fact that we can only 
analyze systems and processes that are analyzable. Analycity does not depend solely on the 
prowess of the analyst, but also on the contents (substance), the structure, the behavior, and 
the function (goal) of the system/process being analyzed. Analycity depends on the level of 
interaction of the various components of the system/process being analyzed and on its pattern 
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of causality. Indeed, only systems and processes that follow a linear pattern of causality are 
analyzable because as the level of complexity of systems and processes increases through 
their integration with other systems and processes, they can only remain analyzable when 
their patterns of causality are additive; and these patterns can be additive only when they are 
linear, which is not the case for cybernetic systems that operate according to a differential 
pattern of causality. This is the case for natural cybernetic processes, such as homeostatic 
processes in animals or the functioning of endocrinal organs, or for non-natural cybernetic 
systems, such as thermostat. There have been sketches of this paradigm shift from various 
areas of academic interest. Whereas Drucker, for instance, suggests a shift from “analysis” to 
“perception”, Prigogine and Stengers point out that “today interest is shifting from substance 
to relation, to communication, to time”1. Cybernetics as a metaphysical framework is a 
metaphysics of “organized complexity”. Therefore, a worldview that has complexity at its 
heart implies devising means and methods that can handle complex processes and systems. 
The mechanical model is a special case of the cybernetic model, emanating from fixing not 
only inputs and outputs (the principle that the same causes generate the same effects), but also 
the rules of interaction. This chapter aims at suggesting a paradigm shift from the 
analysis/synthesis dichotomy to systems thinking. In the first section, it will present some 
salient aspects of the origin and the claims of the analytic method, i.e. “cutting complex 
systems and processes into pieces”, and anti-metaphysicalism. Then, it will assess the 
synthetic method, especially as it is used in artifacts. The limitations of the analytic method 
will be pointed out, not from the points of view of its practice, but of its universal pretensions. 
We can only analyze systems and processes that are analyzable, i.e. mechanical systems and 
processes. Systems thinking will be introduced from the points of view of complexity as a 
major characteristic of cybernetic systems and processes. Various aspects that affect the level 
of complexity of a system or a process, i.e. contents (substance), structure, behavior, and 
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goal/function will be pointed out, and salient aspects of systems thinking as a method suitable 
for a dynamic and integrative epistemology will be presented. 
B. ANALYTIC MODELS AND METHODS 
1. Cutting Systems and Processes into Pieces 
The basic characteristic of an analytic method amounts to understanding complex systems and 
processes in terms of their components. The analytic method implies that a whole is nothing 
but the sum of its parts. The assumption of the analytic method is that complex systems and 
processes are better understood when reduced to their simpler components, until one reaches a 
fundamental level of basic components, such as material atoms or simple propositions. For 
instance, complex phenomena and processes, such as floods and earthquakes, could be 
understood in terms of fundamental particles, such as atoms and their rules of interaction; and 
the whole of human knowledge could be understood in terms of simple propositions. 
Although the academic divide between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy would 
hardly associate Descartes with the analytic method, Descartes advocated an analytic 
approach to thought when he stipulated in Rule 5 of his “Rules for Conducting the Mind” 
that: 
The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects on 
which we must concentrate our mind’s eye if we are to discover some truth. We shall be 
following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions 
step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of 
all, try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the rest.2 
 
The analytic method is so well-entrenched in our culture, which is dominated by modern 
science, that very few contemporary philosophers or scientists question its assumptions. Very 
few even take the trouble to examine its origin and the philosophical questions the proponents 
of this method tried to solve. A universalistic pretension in philosophy would want to 
eliminate any reference to history, but the analytic method cannot be better understood unless 
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one puts its assumptions in a historical context. Not only can this method be linked to the 
Newtonian mechanical worldview, but also to the epistemological ambitions of modern 
science. Newton’s mechanical model defines reality in terms of simple, regular, and ordered 
material and mechanical processes. In other words, Newton’s world is a world of material 
bodies, be they particles or planets that move according to simple, regular, and ordered 
patterns. What guarantees this simplicity, regularity, and order is not an external divine 
power, but universal laws embedded in the universe itself. Therefore, according to mechanical 
models the laws that regulate the universe are as simple and as clear as the rules of 
mathematics. They do not only imply fixed quantities, but also qualities can be represented by 
univocal symbols that imply the fixation of meaning. The fixation of meaning renders 
symbols universal. On the one hand, the fixation of quantities has led to unprecedented 
inventions of measuring instruments, and on the other hand, the fixation of meaning has led to 
the elimination of ambiguity in the process of human knowing. In other words, Descartes’ 
predilection for “clear and distinct ideas” is the logical outcome of his methodological doubt, 
but it is also the consequence of the creation of a world of fixity where not only the meaning 
of symbols and propositions is fixed, but also the rules of inference. This world of fixity is 
well-represented by modern mathematical and logical systems. From an epistemological point 
of view, fixity, as a criterion for universality, implies fixing the outcome of the process of 
human knowing, i.e. knowledge itself. Knowledge defined as true justified beliefs implies that 
in order to qualify as knowledge, beliefs have to be infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible.3 
 
Reaching the level of accuracy required by the Cartesian search for “clear and distinct ideas”, 
i.e. infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible knowledge defined as true justified beliefs implies 
not only fixing meanings, rules of inference, and the outcomes of the processes of human 
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knowing, but also quantifying qualities. Christiaan Boudri has discussed this phenomenon 
extensively: 
Clearly, where the possibility and range of quantification are concerned, we cannot 
simply lump all the qualities together. We could define a complete quantification (based 
on Aristotle’s definition of quantity) as one in which the parts of the quantity bear the 
same relationship to the quality in question as the whole quantity. In those cases can one 
posit an absolute linear scale in which values can be added and subtracted without 
losing the relation to the original quality? Duration would then be a ‘completely 
quantified’ quality: a time scale can be divided into parts, each of which also represents 
a duration. The sum of two parts of the time scale is equal to the total of the 
corresponding durations. The success of this quantification explains why, in modern 
physics, the duration of time is identified with its quantification.4 
 
Another illustration of the practice of quantifying qualities, according to Boudri, is the 
measurement of temperature. For him: 
One example of a less far-reaching quantification is Celsius’ temperature scale. Heat 
and cold – or as we say now, ‘temperature’ – is converted into a linear scale by 
measuring the expansion of the volume of a material such as mercury. The freezing 
point and boiling point of water at the pressure of one atmosphere serve as the 
calibration points.5 
 
Quantifying qualities creates a possibility of handling qualities as spatial entities since 
quantified quantities can be represented graphically. This process of translating qualities into 
a medium that allows them to be apprehended according to geometrical rules and 
mathematical principles implies that geometry and mathematics can be considered as 
universal media. Moreover, in addition to their role as media, mathematical principles and 
geometrical rules are sometimes assigned a metaphysical role that would confer them a 
separate existence as essences. However, the possibility of quantifying qualities and 
representing quantities graphically leads to a process of mediation that allows apprehending 
qualities and quantities as spatial entities. This occurs as qualities that are essentially and 
substantially different can be handled through their quantities and the spatial representations. 
This aspect of scientific practice, both ancient and contemporary, reinforces logocentrism as 
by allowing the establishment of fixed points of calibration that allow the measurement of 
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qualities as linear functions of fixed quantities of qualities considered as units of 
measurement. Mathematical principles and geometrical rules are considered as expressions of 
the logos, a principle that, as the ancients believed, was at the core of the unity and the 
intelligibility of reality. The association of mathematical principles and geometrical rules with 
logocentrism is based on the fact that any inquiry of a scientific nature can, in principle, be 
put into a quantitative or geometrical medium as by fixing some quantities of qualities or their 
geometrical representations as units of measurement, any inquiry of a scientific nature can be 
expressed as an inquiry about quantity and space. Quantifying qualities and representing 
quantities graphically, therefore, provides a universal medium where qualities cannot be 
compared with each other as metaphysically different substances, but rather by their 
quantified and graphically represented aspects. In this context, the subject matter of scientific 
inquiry does not become the material objects or qualities themselves, but the quantified 
measurements and graphic representations of aspects that are under consideration. By 
following this double possibility, i.e. quantifying qualities and representing qualities 
graphically, ancient geometry and mechanics find themselves dealing with the same subject 
matter. Newton pointed to this fact when he noted that: 
The geometry of ancients was indeed concerned with magnitudes, but propositions 
concerning magnitudes were sometimes demonstrated by means of local motion, as 
when the equality of two triangles in prop. 4 of book 1 of Euclid’s Elements was 
demonstrated by transferring either triangle into the place of the other. But also the 
generation of magnitudes by continual motion was accepted in geometry, as when a 
straight line was multiplied by a straight line to generate an area, and an area is 
multiplied by a straight line to generate a solid. If a straight line which is multiplied by 
another one is of a given length, a parallelogram area will be generated. If its length is 
continually changed according to the same fixed law, a curvilinear area will be 
generated. If the magnitude of an area which is multiplied by a straight line is 
continually changed, a solid terminated by a curved surface will be generated. If the 
times, forces, motions and velocities of motions are represented by lines, areas, solids 
and angles, these quantities can also be dealt with in geometry.6 
 
The possibility of quantifying qualities and representing quantities geometrically implies that 
various quantities of matter or positions of bodies in motion can be apprehended as spatial 
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entities through their geometrical representations. It would, therefore, not be surprising that 
graphic representation is an important tool in both ancient and modern. Graphic representation 
allows the scientist or the natural philosopher to give spatial dimensions to qualities and 
phenomena such as matter and motion, which were previously understood in metaphysical 
terms. What its quantity is represented graphically, matter is no longer conceived as a 
metaphysical substance. Its metaphysical (ontological) dimension becomes less important for 
scientific inquiry than its extension in space. Hence, characteristics such as the quantity of 
matter itself (mass) or the size of the space it occupies (volume) became sufficient criteria for 
understanding the behavior of material, be they as huge as planets or as small as atoms or 
other elementary particles. Graphic representation confines intangible qualities and 
dimensions within the realm of physical space. In fact, representing these qualities and 
dimensions graphically provides them with one important characteristic of material objects, 
i.e. physical extension in space. In this way, graphical representation is not only a tool of 
analysis and calculation, but it also assists in quantifying qualities and naturalizing modality 
and duration. The capacity to represent natural processes and various aspects of human 
behavior graphically is very useful for the practice of modern science as it introduces an 
element of fixity into dynamic and integrative processes, which cannot lend themselves to 
analytic methods otherwise. 
 
In other words, the success in the quantification of qualities through graphic representation 
gives physical significance to some notions that remained elusive due to the fact that they 
evade direct observation. One such notion is the notion of force. There was agreement among 
physicists that the cause of motion was force. However, the nature of force remained elusive. 
In early modern times, some scientists returned to the idea of ether from alchemy while others 
still searched for religious causes. However, mechanical models of the universe understood 
the universe as constituted by material bodies in motion. These bodies could be as huge as 
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planets, or of the size of billiards balls, which were used for experimental purposes, or as 
small as particles. In the study of the notion of force, scientists have developed various 
methods, such as adding and subtracting forces, by using the rule of the parallelogram. The 
innovation at this stage is that, in addition to scalar quantities that are measured in one 
dimension, the qualification and quantification in terms of their point of application, their 
direction, their orientation, and their magnitude allows the representation of force or directs 
motion using vectors. Representation of force through vectors then allows measurement in 
two and three dimensions in a context where various dimensions of physical bodies are 
understood as quantities of qualities with fixed quantities of the same qualities used as 
standard units of measurement. 
 
In a context where reality is understood in terms of permanent characteristics (substance as 
opposed to accidents) and immutable laws of inference (for the sake of universality), graphic 
representation provides a second-order, level form of abstraction where relationships between 
material objects or mechanical processes can be analyzed by analyzing their respective 
representations. This is where Newton’s admiration for ancient geometry comes from. There 
is some (assumed) isomorphism between the relationships between the objects and processes 
themselves, on the one hand, and the relationships between their respective representations, 
on the other hand. This is the reason why representing material objects, natural processes, and 
some aspects of human behavior graphically translates these objects, processes, and aspects 
into a medium that renders them suitable for analysis. On the one hand, graphic representation 
eliminates ambiguity and, on the other hand, it fixes meaning, inputs, outputs, and rules of 
inference. This process of fixation leads to the paribus ceteribus (everything kept equal), 
which is a condition sine qua none for any scientific enterprise. However, in real situations, 
be they natural or man-made, there are very few occasions where everything is kept equal. 
Graphic representation, therefore, creates a situation where initial conditions, rules of 
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transformation, and results are fixed, as modern science assumes to operate in a wonderful 
world as simple, ordered, and regular as the one Newton assumed. These aspects of 
simplicity, order, and regularity are not confined to the structuring of the universe, but they 
can also be found, as Descartes assumed, in the structuring and the functioning of the human 
mind leading to a perfect form of knowledge (clear and distinct ideas) and clearly defined 
steps of conducting thought. 
 
Graphic representation, in other words, translates dynamic and integrative systems and 
processes into a medium that reduces them to their immutable characteristics and relations in 
a way that they become univocal, with the possibility of separating and reassembling their 
components at will, and hence, creating the possibility for linear patterns of causation. In 
brief, graphic representation renders complex systems and processes analyzable by fixing 
their components spatially, which allows the analyst to separate the components and put them 
together at will (as Euclid did with triangles). Moreover, graphic representation fits well the 
anti-metaphysical stance of modern science emanating from its rejection of scholasticism and 
reference to supernatural entities. Graphic representation does not present matter in terms of 
metaphysical essences, which are hidden behind the veil of appearance, but matter itself and 
other natural processes, such as motion, duration, force, and modality, are understood as 
characteristics of physical bodies within the boundaries of space and time.  
 
Graphic representation, thus, provides a medium to express immutable characteristics 
conceived not as metaphysical essences, but as permanent relations that attest to the universal 
character of natural processes and their rules of transformation. Graphic representation does 
not only succeed in quantifying qualities, but, in addition to fixing inputs, rules of inferences 
and outcomes, graphic representations also, paradoxically, fix motion itself. The success in 
the quantification of qualities through graphic representation confines notions that would have 
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otherwise remained elusive to the realm of time and space. One such notion is the notion of 
force. Force would have remained elusive due to the fact that it evades direct observation. 
However, by giving force fixed physical characteristics, such as its point of application, its 
direction, its sense, and its intensity (measured as the magnitude of a vector), force entirely 
becomes a physical notion, which does not lend itself to the idea of either so dear to alchemy 
or to its association with supernatural entities, such as the soul (anima in Latin), as it was 
done before the steam engine became a material proof that motion (a derivative of force) can 
be generated exclusively from purely material entities and processes. 
 
In metaphysical terms, graphic representation confines various qualities that would be 
considered as metaphysical essences in an Aristotelian framework to the realm of the physis. 
For instance, when modality and duration are represented graphically, their metaphysical 
aspects, i.e. their ontology, are not relevant any longer; they are not only considered as they 
are in themselves, but as they relate to other physical systems and processes spatially. Graphic 
representation contributes to the success of the mechanical model by showing that material 
objects and processes can be better understood when their representations and their spatial 
relations are understood. Graphic representation, in other words, renders natural processes 
analyzable, as Bertalanffy has pointed out: 
Application of the analytical procedure depends on two conditions. The first is that 
interactions between “parts” be non-existent or weak enough to be neglected for certain 
research purposes. Only under this condition, can parts be “worked out”, actually, 
logically, mathematically, and then be “put together”. The second condition is that the 
relations describing the behavior of parts be linear; only then is the condition of 
summativity given, i.e., an equation describing the behavior of the parts; partial 
processes can be superimposed to obtain the total process, etc.7 
 
Therefore, quantifying qualities through graphic representation does not only make fixing 
inputs, outputs, and rules of transformation possible, but also by providing a spatial dimension 
to qualities that naturally lacks tangible physical extension. Graphic representation as a 
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medium renders qualities such as duration and modality analyzable and maintains linear 
causal patterns since by fixing meaning, it maintains an invariant relation between initial 
conditions, rules of transformation, and outcomes. 
 
2. Anti-Metaphysicalism 
Quantifying qualities is not the only way of putting reality into an analyzable medium. 
Modern scientists, as natural philosophers, have adopted an anti-metaphysicalist attitude. 
They have avoided or simply rejected metaphysical (ontological) questions and focused on 
epistemological questions. The position that I will call anti-metaphysicalism implies that 
modern scientists, as natural philosophers, have eliminated any reference to supernatural 
entities in the description of reality and the articulation of knowledge. Moreover, they would 
not consider important aspects of the objective and universal knowledge they have intended to 
achieve as based on metaphysical essences, but as based on universal laws embedded in the 
structuring and the functioning of the universe itself. In other words, the type of universality 
sought by modern scientists is not ontological, but nomological. This understanding of 
universality assumes a certain isomorphism between the structuring and the functioning of the 
universe and the structuring and the functioning of the human mind. Therefore, the anti-
metaphysicalist position, paradoxically, is to some extent a metaphysical position in its own 
right. It postulates a materialistic, mechanistic, and deterministic universe, in which there is 
no other substance except for material substance. Natural processes and human behavior take 
place according to deterministic, mechanical laws that underlie all physical processes. This 
model is reductionist as it assumes that complex biological and behavioral processes can be 
reduced to their physical counterparts in terms of particles (atoms) in motion. This approach, 
according to Boudri, shifts the focus of scientists or natural philosophers from inquiring about 
the nature of material objects (things-in-themselves) to inquiring about their structure.8 
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Structure certainly lends itself to the analytic method as structure implies looking at the ways 
how various components fit together in order to form a complex whole. However, structure 
remains within the framework of fixity because as a subset of the mechanical model, focusing 
on structure suggests that components of complex systems, such as societies, languages, 
markets, floods, and earthquakes can be analyzed as results of material particles in motion. It 
is in this context that, for instance, societies are understood as the sum of individual actions, 
which are conceived as movements of limbs, languages, and movements of air between the 
lungs and the mouth following simple, regular, and ordered movements of the tongue in the 
mouth. Whereas markets as well as societies are mechanical as actions of economic agents are 
movements of limbs influenced by the mechanical laws of supply and demand (movements of 
goods and services), floods and other natural phenomena, in fact, fit the mechanical model 
better than the social counterparts. For instance, the movement called structuralism in social 
sciences is an attempt to apply the mechanical model to social phenomena. This school of 
thought has been identified with Lévi-Strauss. Moreover, many prominent French 
intellectuals, such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan have also been 
called structuralists. Structuralism has been applied to many areas of study, such as 
linguistics, mathematics, psychology, and biblical interpretation. As John Sturrock has 
pointed out, “[s]tructuralism holds to this vital assumption, that it studies relations between 
mutually conditioned elements of a system and not self-contained essences”9. Jean Piaget 
explains this shift from essences to structures when he contends that what is common to all 
the types of structuralism is: 
first, an ideal (perhaps a hope) of intrinsic intelligibility supported by the postulate that 
structures are self-sufficient and that, to grasp them, we do not have to make reference 
to all sorts of extraneous elements; second, certain insights to the extent that one has 
succeeded in actually making out certain structures, their theoretical employment has 
shown that structures in general have, despite their diversity, certain common and 
perhaps necessary properties.10 
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In addition to the understanding of structures as self-contained and autonomous, structuralism 
also ascertains that “a structure is a system of transformations”11. In other words: 
Inasmuch as it is a system and not a mere collection of elements and their properties, 
these transformations involve laws; the structure is preserved or enriched by the 
interplay of its transformation laws, which never yield results external to it. In short, the 
notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of 
transformation, and the idea of self-regulation.12 
 
The idea of structure yields characteristics of the universe understood as a self-contained, 
autonomous whole without any influence from a supernatural realm. Moreover, the 
understanding of reality in terms of structures and systems leads to the possibility of 
formalization of both the elements of the structure and their laws of their interaction. 
Formalization then leads to a type of knowledge that yields the coherence of Newton’s 
physics and the consistency of mathematics. Structuralism embodies the principles of the 
mechanical model as the characteristics that structuralists attempt to find in their object of 
study are similar to those that Weizenbaum finds in mechanical machines. Weizenbaum 
reminds us that although machines exemplify the way a complex system and process occur, 
machines of the modern times are mainly characterized by regular motion.13 This can be 
seen, for instance, in the back-and-forth movement of the needle of a sewing machine, or in 
the hustle of the gyrating, thrusting connecting rods that drive the locomotive’s wheels, or in 
the pulsating escapement mechanism of the most delicate watch.14 Mechanical machines, in 
other words, are characterized by “[r]egularity, complexity, motion, power”15. 
 
In other words, the mechanical model, by emphasizing the existence of an invariant order of 
nature, considers the universe as a machine. This universe operates in the context of fixity of 
inputs, outputs, and rules of transformation since this context of fixity yields analycity, which 
implies low or inexistent levels of interaction and requires linear causality. The same causes 
lead to the same effects and the immutable laws of transformation act as a black box where 
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inputs yield outputs without being affected by the process itself. Linear causality creates a 
symmetry of inputs and outputs in such a way that mechanical processes can be reversed 
materially or formally. On the one hand, knowing the inputs and the rules of transformation 
would render one capable of predicting the outcome. On the other hand, knowing the outcome 
and the rules of transformation would enable one to determine or calculate the inputs. 
Approaching reality mechanically and analytically also suggests that knowing the inputs and 
the outputs would make possible deducing the rules of transformation, which are believed to 
be simple mathematical relations emanating from the fact that mechanical laws are 
themselves simple, given the simplicity, the regularity, and the orderliness of mechanical 
processes. 
 
Mechanical instruments are based on implicit assumptions, such as the permanence of reality 
(material substance) and the immutability of rules of transformation. These assumptions have 
influenced the way mechanical machines have been designed. Mechanical machines are 
meant to embody the characteristics of simplicity, regularity, and orderliness, which Newton 
and his successors assumed to be embedded in the order of the universe. Very few 
philosophers and historians of modern sciences have realized the fact that the design and the 
construction of mechanical machines have imposed constraints to natural systems and 
processes. There is no mechanical system or process that does not embody an invariant 
element. These instruments have served to quantify qualities and fix the frame of reference. 
The quantification of qualities mainly implies a comparison between similar kinds following 
an arbitrary designation of a certain quantity as the unit of measurement. This is true for the 
Celsius temperature scale as it is applied to various measuring units of the metric system. In 
other words, in addition to the fact that the Scientific Revolution did not only bring new 
methods of scrutinizing nature, but also created new instruments for that purpose, instruments 
are also embodiments of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and principles. These 
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assumptions and principles determine why some instruments and techniques are used and 
others not. For instance, we would not expect a twenty-first century philosopher to consult the 
Oracle of Delphi to seek wisdom. Nor would we rely on revelation, tradition, and religious 
authority as warrants for knowledge and truth. The reason for this is that, as Wiener has 
pointed out, “[t]he thought of every age is reflected in its technique.” Techniques, methods, 
and instruments are not only embedded in a paradigm, but they are also embodiments of that 
paradigm. Domenico Bertoloni Meli has noted that: 
Several accounts of the so-called Scientific Revolution focus on instruments and their 
practitioners. Most of them emphasize the new instruments that emerged in the 
seventeenth century, such as the telescope, the microscope, the barometer, the 
thermometer, and the air pump. At the time these were called “philosophical” 
instruments, in contrast to “mathematical instruments” such as surveying equipment, 
quadrants, sectors, and other measuring tools.16 
 
This separation between mathematical tools and philosophical tools in the context of modern 
science is far-fetched. In addition to being embodiments of a paradigm, instruments are built 
to display the characteristics of the universe of their makers and users. Therefore, mechanical 
instruments are built on the model of Newton’s universe, and if they work properly, they 
display the characteristics of this universe, i.e. simplicity, regularity, and order. In other 
words, instruments are paradigm-bound. They embody processes and phenomena that are 
used to measure other phenomena. Measurement, as a comparison of similar kinds, implies 
that the simple phenomena in the measuring instruments would differ from the phenomena 
that are only measured with respect to their magnitude. This difference in magnitude suggests 
that the unit of measurement will also be a faction of the quantity that is measured as 
instruments are expected to play the role of “neutral” witnesses. They measure objects, 
processes, and phenomena as the latter are, without adding or subtracting parameters or 
qualities. Mechanical instruments, therefore, can only be designed according to the model of 
mechanics, i.e. matter in motion. Moreover, they must display characteristics of a mechanical 
universe, i.e simplicity, orderliness, and regularity. They cannot fulfill their roles thoroughly, 
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unless the invariant relation between inputs, outputs, and rules of transformation is maintained 
and checked regularly.  
 
Wiener maintains a strong connection between thought and technique as a paradigm is also 
reflected in the technique of the time. In fact, as Wiener has indicated, the civil engineers of 
the ancient times and those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries modeled their 
instruments after their own model of the universe. They considered the movements of the 
planets in, what they conceived as, “the heavens”17 as operating according to the mechanical 
model. Although detailed studies of Wiener’s assessment would require more time and space, 
Wiener states that “[i]f the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and 
the later eighteenth century the age of steam engines, the present age is the age of 
communication and control”18. In other words, instruments embody epistemological and 
metaphysical principles. It is important to know that the making and the use of these 
instruments have implicit epistemological assumptions that determine the way the instruments 
are made and used. At the actual level of the development of science, for instance, it is also 
important to know that not only the composition of the chemicals used in a laboratory, but 
also different tools of conservation, manipulation, measure, and record are able to reach a 
level of knowledge that meets the expectations and the standards established by the scientific 
community. The mastering of the instruments has both epistemological and social importance. 
On the epistemological level, correct manipulation of instruments helps to avoid errors that 
may falsify the results, and on the social level, wrong manipulation of instruments may lead to 
accidents that are detrimental to human health. Although the instruments of knowledge have 
not been considered as a domain of interest in epistemology before, one needs to be aware 
that these instruments are part of the technological developments that assist in testing new 
paradigms. They embed in themselves the principles and laws that allow the researcher to 
observe phenomena that escape human senses with more precision. Domenici notes that: 
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Despite their apparent simplicity and availability, objects were not always easy to 
handle, either conceptually or practically. They required training – for example, in 
dropping balls at the same time or in counting pendular oscillations over several hours – 
and ingenuity. At times they required intellectual tools developed only much later, but 
often it was not necessary to have a complete understanding to start dealing with them 
in a variety of ways.19 
 
However, instruments should not only be understood as material objects. They can be 
symbolic artifacts as well. For instance, whereas ancient geometry has been a great instrument 
for understanding spatial relationships, differential equations have provided a very useful 
mathematical model for studying change. Intellectual instruments, be they material objects or 
symbolic artefacts, play the role of intermediaries (media) between the objects that are studied 
and their representations. Therefore, humans can analyze relations between dimensions of 
material objects by computing relations between their representations. This isomorphism 
between the relations of dimensions of material objects and the relations between their 
representations spare the analyst from direct observation as an initial stage in the process of 
knowing. It takes the human mind from the first level of consciousness, which is empirical, to 
the second level, which is intellectual. Therefore, huge magnitudes, such as dimensions of the 
universe, do not need to be observed directly, but can be computed according to a mode of 
representation that brings these dimensions in a system of representation and rules of 
inference, which maintains the invariant relationship between initial conditions, rules of 
transformation, and outcomes. 
 
 
The reflection of thought in technique implies that there is no technical revolution that is not 
in itself a philosophical revolution. From an understanding of reality as matter in motion in a 
materialistic, mechanistic, and deterministic universe follows that everything can be 
understood and explained in mechanical terms. As qualities such as duration and modality are 
quantified and fixated through graphic representation, it becomes clear that there is no need to 
oppose time to eternity. Time, like other puzzles such as force, duration, and modality, 
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becomes either an absolute continuum, in which physical processes take place irreversibly, or 
an additional dimension of the physical universe. Instruments, as embodiments of 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and principles, have the effect of linking 
objects and their representations in such a way that one can deduce truth about the objects by 
acting on representations. As a matter of fact, this is what occurs in mathematics or formal 
logic. Mathematics and formal logic are systems of representations with an invariant relation 
between initial conditions, rules of transformation, and outcomes. This invariant relation 
attests to the fact that the systems and processes represented are subject to a linear pattern of 
causality. The consequence of a linear pattern of causality is a transparent universe. When one 
knows the initial conditions and the rules of transformation, one can infallibly compute the 
outcomes. Likewise, when one knows the outcomes and the rules of transformation, one can 
also compute the initial conditions. The rules of transformation themselves can be computed 
as a mathematical relation between the outcomes and the initial conditions. In a mechanical 
universe, this mathematical relation takes the form of a linear function. Abstraction, therefore, 
is the best way to render objects, systems, and processes analyzable. It does not suggest 
extracting university from the diversity of individual kinds, but finding a medium of 
representation that lends itself to a closed system of representations with an invariant relation 
between initial conditions, rules of transformation, and outcomes. For instance, the 
mechanical model, by reducing reality to matter and motion, automatically eliminates any 
reference to supernatural entities or vital entelechies. Moreover, the rules of transformation 
are universal laws (embedded in the universe itself) and not acts of the will of a divinity or a 
“homunculus”. The mechanical model implies then that natural processes and human 
behavior are material, mechanistic, and deterministic processes since they can be reduced to 
material particles in motion in the final analysis. The universality that the mechanical model 
implies is not inscribed in the order of things, but in the rules of transformation that the 
mechanical model assumes, i.e. universal laws. In other words, the universality that the 
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mechanical model targets and advocates is not ontological, but nomological. That is why, 
despite its efficacy in technological developments and the structuring of modern society, the 
mechanical model is not the only system of representation that assists humans in making 
sense of the complexity of the world.  
 
The mechanical model, therefore, by defining reality in terms of matter and motion, 
understands rules of transformations as changes of spatial location in a three-dimensional 
universe. One should keep in mind that the materialistic, mechanistic, and deterministic 
framework that the mechanical model upholds that spatial extension is the defining 
characteristic of material objects. There is no matter except for spatially extended matter. The 
contemporary confusion that leads to the concepts of materialism and physicalism being used 
interchangeably emanates from the radical assumption that physical objects are spatially 
extended while mental “facts” are not! However, motion, understood as change of position in 
a space with three dimensions, cannot be dissociated with duration. Duration implies 
temporality and the role of time in the mechanical model cannot only be understood as a 
rejection of eternity as a frame of reference, but also as the consequence of the extension of 
the physical realm beyond material objects. 
 
3. The Limits of Analytic Methods 
The limits of analytic methods do not lie in its inefficacy. The analytic method is very 
efficient and, therefore, capable of being understood by analysis. However, not all systems 
and processes in the universe are analyzable. Biological phenomena, for instance, are 
“wholes”.20 They are different from the parts of their parts.21 Analytic methods are, therefore, 
only applicable to mechanical systems/processes. Mechanical systems and processes fulfill 
the criteria of analycity on the one hand they operate according to assumingly immutable 
universal laws that can be formulated into simple mathematical relations. This simplicity 
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makes the relationships between parts of mechanical systems summative. Moreover, 
mechanical systems/processes follow a linear mode of causality, where the same causes lead 
to the same effects. However, a cybernetic model does not allow the philosopher or the 
natural scientist to operate in a framework or a metaphysics of substance that assumes or aims 
at fixity. Cybernetic systems and processes operate within the framework of a metaphysics of 
relations. Prigogine and Stengers repeatedly point out that “today interest is shifting from 
substance to relation, to communication, to time.”22  
 
Analytical philosophy was born from the belief that analysis is the only method that is 
adequate for philosophical inquiry. According to Thomas Baldwin: 
[p]hilosophical analysis is a method of inquiry in which one seeks to assess complex 
systems of thought by ‘analysing’ them into simpler elements whose relationships are 
thereby brought into focus.23  
 
The analytic method is not concerned with the nature (ontology) of its object of study, but 
with the way simpler components fit together to form a complex whole. Unlike the 
philosophical tradition known as “analytic philosophy”, the analytic method finds its ancestry 
in practices as old as Aristotle’s habit to dissect animals or his formulation of complex 
arguments into syllogistic formats, which are at the origin of contemporary formal logic. 
Whereas this aspect of dividing complex systems and processes into simpler components is a 
salient aspect of an analytic method, in recent philosophical traditions, analytic philosophy 
was vehemently anti-metaphysical. This anti-metaphysicalism helped in asserting the 
authority of modern science over previous conceptual frameworks, namely the divine-organic 
model that dominated the Middle Ages and the dualism inherent to scholasticism. However, 
there has been a metamorphosis of the dualism of the truth of substance (permanence) and the 
falsity of transience (change) to a dualism of the material and the mental. In other words, it is 
not accurate to characterize analytic philosophers as anti-metaphysical. Instead, one may 
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characterize their position as an ambiguous one since they uphold materialism as a 
metaphysical framework and, yet, fail to explain mental processes, rationality, and behavior. 
The anti-metaphysicalism that characterizes analytic philosophers is reductive as it reduces 
materialism to physicalism and physicalism to mechanics. Materialism and physicalism are 
often used interchangeably and the reduction of physicalism to mechanics is often simply 
ignored or eliminated. However, this double reduction generates philosophical impasses since 
by reducing all natural processes to physical processes and all physical processes to 
mechanical processes, two important aspects of the structuring and the behavior of natural 
systems and processes are eliminated, i.e. order and purpose. Mechanics, by reducing physical 
processes to matter and motion, provides a framework of simple, ordered, and regular 
processes and linear patterns of causation, which lend themselves to analysis. 
 
A critique of the analytic method, therefore, is not an advocacy for a return to an ontological 
dualism, but a quest for more rigor and precision in the articulation of the way natural 
processes and human behavior occur. This quest implies that looking at reality in terms of 
matter and motion is right, but it cannot account for all aspects of natural phenomena, human 
individuals and collective behavior. The analytic method requires to fix meaning by way of 
the design of methods that only cater for symbols that are univocal, or to reduce dynamic and 
integrative processes to their unchanging aspects that are conceived as embodiments of 
universality. However, the initial conditions of fundamental particles or univocal propositions 
that are prerequisite to any analytic endeavor are not found anywhere in nature. The first 
experience of reality that we have as humans is an experience of complex, dynamic, and 
integrative systems, aspects which we can analyze as the result of a higher level of our mental 
development. In other words, the type of universal knowledge that modern science intends to 
achieve is nomological and not ontological. It is not embedded in the order of things and in 
the natural functioning of the human mind. It is the fruit of a long process of development of 
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attaching fixed meanings to objects and processes and an ability to create a mediated world in 
which one can understand the relations between material objects and processes by analyzing 
the relations between their representations. This process of development may be attributed to 
evolutionary and ecological factors, but even within the life span of an individual human 
being, it is clear that analytic skills are acquired only at a later age in life and naturally 
assumed to improve through practice. In other words, in addition to the fact that all systems 
and processes that we come across are not analyzable, i.e. (1) are not made of components 
whose interactions are sufficiently weak or inexistent for us to separate them; (2) their modes 
of interaction do not always follow a linear pattern; analytic skills occur at a high level of 
human intellectual development. 
 
Without reverting to a pre-scientific metaphysical dualism, there is, on the one hand, a 
possibility of understanding natural processes without necessarily reducing them to the 
simple, regular, and ordered patterns that Newton postulated. On the other hand, there is also 
a possibility of putting logico-deductive knowledge (to which analytic skills belong) on a 
continuum of human mental development, where later stages build on previous stages without 
suppressing them. Jean Piaget shows in his classical book entitled Knowledge and Biology 
that Moreover, it should be acknowledged that human knowing is polymorph. As Piaget has 
pointed out: 
The essential starting point here is the fact that no form of knowledge, not even 
perceptual knowledge, constitutes a simple copy of reality, because it includes a process 
of assimilation of previous structures.24 
 
Piaget distinguishes between three stages in the process of the intellectual development of a 
child, namely a sensorimotor period, a period of preoperative representation, and a period of 
propositional operations. According to Piaget, the sensorimotor stage is: 
a period during which sensorimotor schemata ranging up to acts of practical intelligence 
by means of immediate comprehension (using a stick or a piece of string, etc.) are 
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established as well as practical substructures of future notions (permanent object 
schemata, spatial displacement “group,” sensorimotor causality, etc.)25 
 
The preoperative stage “begins with the semiotic function (language, game symbols, picture 
making) manifests itself”26 and ends with “the setting up of operations that are called 
“concrete” because they still have a bearing on objects (classifying things, putting them in 
series, noting connections, understanding numbers)”27. The whole process culminates in the 
period or stage of: 
propositional operations (implications, etc) with their combinatorial quality and their 
possible transformation made by relation to a quaternary group – a combination of two 
elementary reversibility forms (inversion or negation and reciprocity).28  
 
 
Although Piaget’s theory focuses on children and the stages he sets for the establishment of 
these stages have been challenged on empirical grounds, his theory shows that the 
assimilation of the previous stages in the process of intellectual development points to a 
dynamic and integrative pattern in adult life. This dynamic and integrative pattern allows the 
development of new patterns without suppressing the previous ones, and a possibility of using 
the skills of early stages when they are needed. Thus, as persons involved in the process of 
knowing we do not always do one and the same thing. We are subject to processes that take 
place at various levels of consciousness, namely the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, 
and the responsible. The process of human knowing includes operations such as experiencing, 
understanding, judging, choosing, deciding, and acting. It does not solely aim at describing 
reality, but at acting on it as well. Therefore, in addition to the search for objective and 
universal knowledge (episteme), the process of human knowing involves skills that help the 
knower not only to achieve accurate descriptions and to formulate “universal” laws, but also 
to make sound judgements, which lead to responsible decisions, and effective solutions to 
problems. These aspects of decision making and problem solving can involve the description 
of reality and its laws, but they also appeal to other forms of rationality that are evaluative 
(phronesis) and practical (praxis). In fact, as Bernstein has noted: 
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There is a deep irony in the tradition that Aristotle helped to initiate. Aristotle is at once 
one of the noblest defenders of the autonomy and integrity of praxis and phronesis and 
also the philosopher who sowed the seeds for the denigration of practical philosophy. 
The expression “practical philosophy” is virtually self-contradictory, because 
philosophy as the love of sophia is something higher and more divine than phronesis.29 
 
However: 
 
[i]t has become a dogma of modern thought that only after we resolve the “hard” issues 
of epistemology and come to grips with scientific knowledge can we turn to the “softer” 
and “fuzzier” concerns of moral, social, and political philosophy. This is a prejudice that 
is being questioned in the new conversation about human rationality.30 
 
Human rationality, like human knowing, is polymorph. Human rationality can lead to 
descriptions, formulations of laws, evaluations of situations with reference to idealisations, 
such as principles and values, and realisations of goals. Rationality, in other words, can be 
descriptive, normative, evaluative, or teleological, but also prescriptive and predictive. 
Analytic methods reduce human knowing and human rationality to logic. This reduction is 
due to the fact that the classic concept of the logos, a principle of unity and intelligibility of 
reality, has been adopted by modern scientific, academic disciplines as an epithet; hence, 
today there are sciences such as biology, sociology, psychology, etc. This concept, as adopted 
in modern science, assumes truth, objectivity, and universality embedded in scientific 
discourse. The logos in Greek philosophy is not only a principle of unity of diverse processes 
that render the universe as one, but it is also a principle of intelligibility. In other words, not 
only does the logos organize natural processes, but also human intellectual processes. The 
logos, translated – wrongly in my view – as ratio in Latin, accounts for specific aspects in the 
universe, such as order, simplicity, regularity, hierarchy, proportion, and symmetry, which are 
indeed characteristics of an intelligible universe. At the same time, the logos is associated 
with aspects of the human mind, such as the power of human reason itself, rationality, logic, 
objectivity, universality, quantification, inference, and formalization. In other words, the 
universe is intelligible since it is organized according to “logical” principles that are similar to 
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those of the organization of the human mind. This explains why an intelligible universe lends 
itself to the intelligent activities of an intelligent mind since there are two aspects of reality 
that are organized according to similar principles. Therefore, in human reasoning processes 
there is a superposition of the logical principles within the universe and the logical principles 
in the human mind. 
 
However, the first experience of reality we have as humans is rather a pathos and not a logos. 
A logical approach to reality is developed as we make generalizations from our early 
experiences in the sensori-motor, the pre-operative, and the operative stages. Before, we reach 
the analytic stage by which we can fix meanings, inputs, outputs, and rules of inferences, we 
first act on objects before we reach the stage by which we act on their representations. We do 
not operate in two worlds, one material and another mental, but we are involved in processes 
of dynamism and integration where matter is not only in motion (as Newton postulated), but 
where matter organizes itself following various patterns of order through which physical 
organisms achieve goals and solve problems. While Piaget is of the opinion that these 
dynamic and integrative processes operate according to a cybernetic model of information, 
control, and regulation through feedback, it is important to note that when a dynamic and 
complex process is represented graphically, it is not reproduced as it is. Only the salient 
aspects that are the subject of the analysis are taken out since abstraction, in this sense, does 
not mean abstracting universal (immutable) characteristics from individual kinds, but 
confining the process of analysis only to aspects and characteristics that are relevant to the 
object under study. On account of this, the mechanical model, despite its success in natural 
sciences and its unprecedented contribution to modern technological development, is 
essentially reductive. Not only does it reduce all natural processes to physical processes, but it 
also reduces all physical processes to mechanical processes. In other words, fixing inputs, 
outputs, rules of transformation, and quantifying qualities renders the world analyzable. 
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Computer programs (algorithms), as systems of representation, are analytical instruments par 
excellence. They operate in a world of fixed inputs, outputs, and rules of transformation.  
 
C. COMPLEXITY AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS 
1. Complexity and the Cybernetic Model 
Contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind use the terms naturalism, materialism, and 
physicalism interchangeably without making the effort of “unpacking” these concepts. They 
oppose the physical or the material to the mental without taking the facts that not all natural 
processes are physical processes and that not all physical processes are mechanical processes 
into account. This use of the material, the physical, and the natural as one and the same thing 
is linked with the influence of mechanical models. Mechanical models define reality in terms 
of matter and motion. Moreover, quantifying qualities and representing them graphically 
allow the analyst to apprehend complex systems and processes in a medium that only takes 
material and mechanistic aspects into consideration. The metaphysical implications of the 
reduction of all natural processes to physical processes, especially mechanical processes, 
originate in the Cartesian reductionism. Brian Cooney denounces Descartes’ reduction of a 
four-level model of the universe to two levels as a way of making it fit with the mechanical 
framework. By having rejected scholasticism, Descartes opposed an Aristotelian four-level, 
descriptive scheme for the only purpose of making it suitable for the mechanical model. As 
Cooney has pointed out: 
Most people then (as now) thought of our planet as populated by four categories of 
beings: 
1. inanimate bodies – objects, such as rocks, soil, and even liquids and gases 
2. plants- living bodies, such as vegetables and even mosses 
3. animals – sentient living bodies, including birds, fish, and land animals 
4. humans – sentient living bodies of a specific form with distinctive capabilities, 
such as reason and speech.31 
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The cumulative nature of this tetrad resides in the fact that “[e]ach higher level, from the first 
to the fourth, includes the lower with the addition of a further attribute”32. As a matter of fact, 
Descartes reduces the second and third levels of the tetrad to the first level on the grounds that 
“plants and animals were to be understood merely as machines, complex systems of movable 
parts that enable them to behave adaptively in their environment”33. Therefore: 
His (Descartes) reduction of life and sentience to the motion of material particles 
created an abyss between the human mind and body. It has the effect of suspending our 
consciousness in a world of bodies with which it has nothing in common. Each human 
mind became a ghost in its own machine.34 
 
However, there is a possibility of reaching a better understanding of the structuring and the 
functioning of the universe beyond mechanics and Cartesian dualism. This does not only 
suggest rejecting Cartesianism, but also the mechanical model in which it originates. It is 
crucial at this junction to understand the dynamic and integrative nature of natural processes. 
Cartesian dualism still overshadows philosophical debates as its assumptions often remain 
unchallenged. On the one hand, Descartes is presented as the “father” of modern philosophy, 
the champion of the modern search for objective and universal knowledge. Being Cartesian is 
a fairly prestigious title for those who have managed to put aside their sentiments and their 
prejudices in order to investigate the world as it is. However, Descartes’ own ambiguous 
situation remains unchallenged. On the one hand, Descartes maintains a dualism that opposes 
the material “substance” to the “mental” substance without providing any rational or 
empirical grounds for this distinction. Moreover, Descartes’ introspective method makes us 
assume that there is an ontological difference between external “objects” and their internal 
representations, but Descartes does not provide any tangible boundaries between the 
“external” and the “internal” arenas of the human person. This distinction is either based on 
common sense, or it is a disguised replication of the scholastic distinction between the body, 
which is external since it is available to direct observation, and the spirit, which can only be 
accessed through introspective processes, such as meditation. This distinction does not hold in 
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a world where air has been proved to be a physical element. There is a possibility of putting 
the material and the mental on a continuum where the structure and the functioning of the 
universe are not regarded in terms of matter and motion, but in terms of order and purpose. 
 
A cybernetic model, for instance, adds order and purpose to natural processes and systems 
instead of reducing natural processes to matter and motion. In other words, when we deal with 
natural processes and systems by using a cybernetic model, we are not dealing with “dead” 
matter, which is static and immutable. Even the concept of motion itself is not restricted to 
change in spatial location. It can portray, according to its original usage by Aristotle, any 
change including not only material objects and particles in motion, i.e. changing spatial 
location, but also different patterns and processes of organization that confer a certain level of 
order, or negative entropy, or a certain amount of information to natural and material complex 
systems and processes. Matter, as understood this way, implies that we do not only look at 
fundamental particles in motion or immutable mechanical laws, but also at the various ways 
by which material elements are set in motion (mechanical aspects) and the various ways by 
which material elements organize themselves into structures and processes that are capable of 
fulfilling natural or artificial purposes. In addition to looking at matter from the point of view 
of its nature (substance), a cybernetic model is open for the possibility of adding structure, 
behavior and function (purpose) as significant aspects of reality. Reality, therefore, is not 
reduced to its mechanical aspects, but as material elements organize themselves into 
structures, systems, and processes with a certain degree of order, i.e. negative entropy or an 
amount of information, they are both significant (yield some meaning) and useful (have some 
value) in a such way that they can serve various purposes pertaining to the intelligent life with 
which we associate the mind. 
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The concept of order does not have to be associated with an intelligent organizer or designer. 
Organized matter can acquire properties that its fundamental constituents, such as atoms or 
molecules, do not have when looked at in isolation. Although this aspect of order is part and 
parcel of reality, it is not often mentioned because mechanical models by assuming a simple, 
ordered, and regular universe, take order for granted and miss the role it plays in the 
intelligibility and analycity of natural processes and systems. Mechanical models of the 
universe, therefore, seek universal and immutable laws in an assumed ordered universe where 
the same causes do not only generate the same effects, but where both the causes and the 
effects following the causal closure of the physical are also confined within the realm of a 
mechanical model of the universe, which is understood as constituted by self-moving material 
bodies and processes. A cybernetic model by linking information with order introduces 
another model of the universe as a natural and physical process without necessarily reducing 
physical processes to mechanical processes, i.e. matter and motion. Moreover, this model 
does not reduce natural processes to physical processes as a cybernetic model also operates in 
biological and social processes. Like the way the Greeks linked the logos with order and 
intelligibility, a cybernetic model, as introduced by Wiener, defines information as the 
opposite of disorder, i.e. negative entropy. Following Wiener’s cybernetic model, any 
organized system or process is intelligible as it conveys a certain amount of information. In 
other words, the degree of organization of a natural system or process determines the amount 
of information it can convey, and hence its degree of analycity and intelligibility. 
 
We can study material bodies in their constitutive dimensions by identifying a certain scalar 
measurement of their characteristics, such as their weight or their dimensions in space (length, 
width, height). However, when these bodies are set in motion, they can no longer be studied 
solely as matter in a three-dimensional space. Setting a material body in motion brings a 
change in spatial location that introduces time as a fourth dimension. Studying a body in 
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motion does not only include studying the characteristics that lend themselves to scalar 
measurement, but also those that are best represented by vectors. Setting a material body in 
motion introduces other dimensions such as the direction and the sense of the motion, its 
intensity and its origin. In elementary physics, the study of the notion of force, for example, 
follows this pattern. The same pattern is applied when one introduces a criteria of order to the 
relationship between material bodies, be they stationary or in motion. Order is not an intrinsic 
characteristic of the bodies since it has to be characterized through the capacity to identify its 
criteria and to examine whether a given situation meets these criteria. There are many ways of 
proceeding, but checking whether a certain situation meets a certain criterion calls for an 
element of human judgment that goes beyond the impersonal nature of mechanical processes. 
Order then calls for principles of logic and rationality, which were once understood as 
organizing principles that amount to negative entropy and can take the form of information, 
structure, and/or pattern. Orderly processes, patterns, or structures can also be matched with 
human goals. While logic renders the processes, structures, and patterns meaningful through 
understanding, goals or purposes render the same processes valuable and, in addition to 
asking the “how question” normally linked with efficient causality, we are in a position to ask 
the “why question” linked with teleology and hence, with final causality. This theory of 
causality is due to the fact that organized processes convey information since organization by 
definition means order and negative entropy. Organized processes then, for the sake of being 
organized, do not occur randomly. They are purposeful. This idea of purpose implies that 
organized processes always have a goal. Therefore, it is important to take these goals into 
account when one studies an organized process. Reintroducing the idea of teleology in the 
study of causality implies that our goals play the role of an inviting final cause. This existence 
of inviting final causes upsets the assumption of normative epistemology that causality is 
linear and that the causes always precede the effects chronologically. In this context, the idea 
of a final cause should not be understood in an ultimate and absolute sense as it was 
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associated with the Aristotelian “unmoved mover” and God in the Middle Ages. It should be 
understood in a more mundane sense as a goal that is not out of human reach. This type of 
goal has to be SMART, i.e. Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realizable, and Timely.  
 
It is worth noting that the fact that information processing operates on symbols and symbol 
structures that can be represented functionally regardless of their underlying hardware does 
not imply that hardware should be abolished altogether. It is important to take the role of 
physical symbolic systems both in the structuring and the knowing of reality into account. As 
Simon has noted: 
A physical symbol is a pattern (of chalk, ink, neural connections, electromagnetic fields, 
or what not) that refers to or designates another pattern or a detectable external stimulus. 
Printed words on a page are symbols, so are pictures and diagrams, so are numbers. A 
physical symbol system is a system that is capable of inputting symbols, outputting 
them, storing them in memory, forming and modifying structures of symbols in 
memory, comparing pairs of symbols for identity or difference, and branching in its 
subsequent behavior of the outcomes of such tests.35  
 
In fact: 
A computer is obviously a physical symbol system. Its ability to perform these 
processes (and only these processes) can be verified easily from its physical properties 
and operation. A human brain is (less obviously) a physical symbol system. It can 
certainly carry out the processes specified in the definition of such as system, but 
perhaps other processes as well.36 
 
Furthermore, the cybernetic model does not reduce natural processes to material and 
mechanical processes as, in addition to matter and motion, it recognizes logic and symbolism 
as part of parcel of reality. Logic and symbolism emerge as dimensions of order and meaning 
as a system/process can only be intelligible and meaningful when it is ordered, i.e. organized 
into a structure and ordered to a purpose. It is this double sense of order, which defines 
intelligibility in terms of organization and meaning, that is embedded in the Greek concept of 
the logos, which is both a principle of unity and a principle of intelligibility. The intrinsic link 
between order and meaning and the crucial role they play in intelligibility is well conveyed by 
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the French word sense, which means both “meaning” and “direction”. In order to make sense, 
therefore, natural processes have to be both organized into structures and able to fulfill goals 
(function). The fulfillment of goals implies changes in the systems’/processes’ mechanisms as 
they adapt the constitutive characteristics of their internal environment to their ever changing 
external environment. Therefore, a full understanding of cybernetic systems/processes 
requires looking at their intrinsic qualities, such as the nature of their components, but also at 
their structure, their function(s), and their behavior because as originators of meaning the 
characteristics of cybernetic systems/processes are intrinsically structural, functional 
(teleological), and behavioral. On this account, cybernetic systems/processes should not be 
understood as aggregates of isolated and independent components. They are systems and 
processes since they are dynamically integrated in such a way that studying their components 
in isolation is, in fact, studying something else and not the systems and processes themselves. 
 
Therefore, a cybernetic model of the universe implies recognizing that there are complex 
systems and processes that are not analyzable. These systems and processes are constituted by 
subsystems and subprocesses that are inherently interactive in such a way that separating them 
means destroying the system or halting the process. Reducing these systems and processes to 
a lower level of complexity implies generating properties and characteristics that are different 
from the ones of the original system or process. These systems and processes that are 
characterized by a very high level of complexity are not defined in terms of permanent 
characteristics that are considered as their essence. Instead, they are defined by various 
criteria that include their contents (substance), structure, behavior, and function/goal. 
Moreover, in addition to these “internal” criteria, they are also defined in terms of their 
possible or actual interaction with their environment. Therefore, while mechanical systems 
and processes can be considered as special cases where the inputs, the outputs, and the rules 
of transformation are fixed, cybernetic systems, given their inherent complexity and 
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dynamism, are constantly subject to change in the levels of inputs and outputs; however, the 
rules of transformation also change according to the feedback they get from their 
environment. This model applies to natural systems with processes such as homeostatic 
systems or the functioning of endocrinal organs in human or in non-natural systems, such as 
the thermostat. 
 
 On the other hand, these interactive systems and processes operate by the use of patterns of 
information and control through feedback. Therefore, they do not follow a linear mode of 
causality with causes on one side and effects on the other. The world we live in measuring 
and analyzing are based on the assumption that the whole can be understood as a sum of its 
parts. However, the cybernetic model upholds that the world is inherently complex37 and 
sometimes chaotic.38 Whereas the analytic model has been very efficient in handling simple, 
regular, and ordered aspects, it is inadequate to handle complex systems and processes. The 
reason for this is that not all natural systems or processes fulfill the criterion of analycity. In a 
cybernetic system/process there are no causes or effects in the proper sense of these terms, but 
inputs and outputs. The inputs and the outputs inform each other as for the system to remain 
operational, both the inputs and the outputs have to remain within certain thresholds. These 
phenomena occur in biological systems, such as homeostasis or the functioning of endocrinal 
organs. In non-biological systems, devices such as the thermostat or the wheel controlling the 
balance of a ship illustrate systems and processes that function following a cybernetic model. 
Therefore, the assumption that all complex systems and processes can be reduced to simple, 
regular, and ordered subsystems that can be analyzed at a fundamental level is erroneous. 
However, mechanical and cybernetic systems should not be opposed to each other. Instead, 
mechanical systems should be considered as special cases of cybernetic systems where the 
inputs, the outputs as well as the rules of transformation are fixed. The passage from 
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cybernetic systems to mechanical systems implies that aspects of dynamism and integration 
are either neglected, or eliminated or, when quantitative analysis is involved, they are given a 
null value. In brief, the analytic method should be used on systems and processes that are 
analyzable, i.e. (1) whose components can be clearly distinguished form each other, and (2) 
whose interaction follows a linear pattern of causality. For complex systems, where inputs and 
outputs inform and control each other through feedback, system thinking should be applied. 
System thinking implies acknowledging that reality is inherently complex and that the simple, 
regular, and ordered processes that are observed in the universe are special cases. Moreover, 
systems thinking does not only imply looking at the way components fit together (structure), 
but also taking the behavior and the function/purpose of the systems and processes of study 
into account. Systems thinking, therefore, transcends the analytic method as the analytic 
method is mainly concerned with the way components fit together. However, systems 
thinking by taking structure, behavior, and function/purpose both in the description of reality 
and the articulation of knowledge into account provides a form of knowledge that is more 
complete than the analytic method. 
 
2. The System Idea 
The conditions for analycity are not fulfilled by “entities called systems, i.e. consisting of 
parts in ‘interaction’”39. Therefore, in my view, the analytic method can only be applied to 
systems and processes that are analyzable. Gestalt psychology has pointed to this fact by 
claiming that the whole is not merely an aggregate of the parts. Since most systems do not 
fulfill the conditions for “analycity”, they should be handled by methods other than analysis. 
As an alternative to analysis, I suggest an approach called “systems thinking”. Therefore, 
cybernetic systems/processes embody a certain level of complexity that renders their study 
difficult since as nature (substance) and structure fulfill purposes in dynamic and integrated 
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ways, it becomes obvious that mechanical systems/processes are special cases of cybernetic 
systems/processes. The complexity is not only at the level of interaction of various material 
bodies, but it is also constitutive of material bodies even at the fundamental level. Pandit has 
pointed to this fact when he notes that: 
From an information-theoretic perspective, every active element in the living nature can 
be seen interacting with other such elements in its capacity as a non-unitary complex 
structure or system. Even an element relatively as simple as a gene in the nucleus of the 
cell is in this sense a complex structure with a physical basis embodying or 
accompanied by information/instruction as to how exactly to interact with other 
elements in its environment.40 
 
In fact, although the idea of matter as active and able to carry information and instructions is 
associated with the emergence of the electronic computer age, connected to the possibility to 
store information and instruction on silicon chips, the phenomenon is much broader as the 
acclaim of the idea in the scientific community. Therefore, as Pandit notes again, “it is [...] 
true of every science that it seeks to understand the complexities of the natural processes in 
the world in terms of subject-specific laws of interaction at various levels of complexity”41. 
Therefore, complexity can be considered as an information inhibiting factor that would lead to 
the conclusion that the more complex systems and processes are, the less intelligible they 
become. Thus, as a model that understands reality in terms of information and control through 
feedback, the cybernetic model “is concerned with the possibility of the physical interactive 
ordering of nature itself, and the latter with the necessary restrictions on the interactions thus 
generated”42. The cybernetic model then does not assume a linear pattern of causality that 
leads to an infinite progress, but a pattern of information and control that maintains systems 
and processes within certain thresholds that trigger feedback processes and can reverse 
processes that tend to destroy the system by triggering a certain characteristic beyond or 
below the threshold of the system/process. Hence, instead of trying to determine how material 
bodies and mechanical processes lead to complex phenomena, such as life and the mind, the 
opposite should be done. Pandit suggests that: 
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A general interaction theory in the sense just considered must, however, address itself to 
other problems as well: e.g. (1) how are interactions in the living world generally 
different from those in the non-living world? And (2) how are human interactions 
generally different from non-human interactions (in the living world)?43 
 
For Pandit, “[t]hese questions assume considerable significance in the context of the problem 
of distinguishing knowledge (objective and subjective) from human interaction”44. There is no 
need to separate the two. Pandit considers knowing as a process at the level of the individual 
and posits an individual knower who tries to interact with others! On the contrary, the knower 
is, from the outset, an interactive being, who does not acquire most of his/her knowledge from 
the exercise of natural and individual rationality, but from learning not only the contents of 
knowledge (what to know), but also the skills of knowledge acquisition (how to know) from 
different communities of inquiry. Instead of assuming fundamental and simple particles as 
ultimate constituents of reality, one might begin by accepting that: 
all types of entities/active elements of interactions in the living world [are] so organised, 
in structure and function, as would warrant their characterization as information-
constrained elements in some scientifically relevant and intelligible sense of the term.45 
 
Moreover, 
These elements, from the most simple to the most complex, are not just unitary in 
character – just units of organisation of some kind – but complex organizations, each 
constrained as it were, an orienting field of information or instruction, embodying for 
that element alternative possibilities of interaction with other elements.46 
 
Therefore, the paradigm shift from a mechanical model to a cybernetic model implies a shift 
from a metaphysics of substance to a metaphysics of relation. On that account, a cybernetic 
model does not define reality by looking for permanent qualifies of material objects that are 
believed to be their essence or by abstracting kinds from individuals. The cybernetic model 
takes reality for what it is, i.e. complex, and then, looks at four different aspects of 
systems/processes, namely the nature (substance), the structure, the behavior, and the 
function/goal of a system/process. From this point of view, “[i]t should not be surprising that 
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this question employs the concept of information or instruction, besides a more general 
concept of organization”47. The concept of organization is central to the cybernetic model due 
to Wiener’s linking of information and order. Only organized systems/processes can convey 
information, the amount of information depending on its degree of organization. In fact: 
The concept of organization could perhaps be employed as a self-sufficient concept so 
long as a general interaction theory addresses itself to biologically neutral aspects of 
interaction across the worlds living and non-living entities/processes, besides those of 
an abstract nature. Thus, in a biologically neutral sense, significant interaction is 
definable as interaction between the active elements of different orders of 
organization.48 
 
Therefore, shifting from a metaphysics of substance to a metaphysics of relation does not 
imply defining reality in terms of principles of logic and mathematics, which are based on  
mechanical assumptions, such as the continuity of substance, the permanence of reality, and 
the possibility of regular and linear causality. The cybernetic model completes the mechanical 
model by acknowledging discontinuity (such as the succession of discrete signals in digital 
systems) and alternation (such as the regular succession of charges of opposite signs in 
alternative currents) as parts of reality. Therefore, reality can no longer be defined only in 
terms of substance (that imply permanence), but also in terms of patterns and relations. The 
cybernetic model does not reject the mechanical model. Instead, it completes it by 
incorporating elements of the electromagnetic model, such as discontinuity and alternation, 
although electromagnetic systems and processes can be reduced to the mechanical model on 
the grounds that electricity is the motion of electrons or ions. 
 
Shifting from the metaphysics of substance to the metaphysics of relation implies replacing 
the normative element that is at the origin of human scientific inquiry. Our world is not a 
world “out there” that passively renders itself to our inquiries, be they scientific or other. Our 
world is a turbulent world, which may or may not be, since, according to Wiener’s definition 
of “the amount of information” as what is transmitted as a single decision between equally 
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probable alternatives, we are introduced to a metaphysics of alternatives where the invariant 
element expressed in terms of an objective world and universal laws is replaced by a 
probabilistic element. This probabilistic element excludes that there are any essences to be 
discovered “out there”. However, there are patterns and relations to be discovered since: 
At the highest level of generality, therefore, we might speak of an organizational-
theoretic approach as regards the problem of characterizing the significant interactions 
across the living and the non-living nature.49 
 
However, we remain entangled within the mechanical model if we assume that mental 
states/processes are properties emerging from the complexification of matter. The theory of 
emergence still begins with non-living matter as the point of departure and looks for reasons 
such as the concentration of energy, or collusions that occur according to the laws of random 
probability. However, as a system of information, control, and feedback, the mind is not an 
entity, but a series of activities, which occur at different levels of complexity. Complexity can 
be linked with order and, hence, with information, but it does not lead to the emergence of 
metaphysically different kinds. Instead, “[t]he concept of information-constrained interaction 
seems to me, on the one hand, most relevant in distinguishing interaction in the living nature 
from those in non-living nature”50. For instance: 
The genetic code or the DNA molecule is indeed theoretically identified as spiral-like 
double helices wound around each other. Its very ability to trigger self-replication 
(transformation) and cellular control by a process of transcription/translation – the gene 
structure transforming itself into a structure of protein – points to its character as an 
‘innately’ informed system capable of informing other systems, if only as part of an 
endless developmental process.51 
 
In other words, the cybernetic model, by defining reality in terms of dynamically integrated 
systems/processes, locates complexity at the level of interaction of various interactive 
systems/processes that do not create the picture of a rigid world with immutable laws and 
eternal truths, which are only hidden and await to be unveiled by the mind. Instead, the 
cybernetic model deals with a turbulent world that is in a continuous flux of becoming. The 
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cybernetic model, therefore, does not aim at replacing the mechanical model as a way of 
substituting a physical model by a biological model. Its aim is to restate the terms of the 
debate of the mind-body problem not in the Cartesian metaphysical opposition of material and 
mental substances. This is a shortcut that was made by Descartes as his scholastic mode of 
questioning was confronted with the explanatory mode of mechanics. In addition to 
materialism, the cybernetic model deals with reality in terms of levels of apprehension. 
Therefore, one can clarify that materialism, as a theory that deals with material bodies, cannot 
be reduced to dealing with material bodies only when they are at rest. Material bodies, when 
set in motion, can generate properties that are not easy to identify when these bodies are at 
rest. When a material body is at rest, then it has no kinetic energy, which would be 
tantamount to ascribing a kinetic energy level with the value of “0” to the material body in 
question. Moreover, in addition to motion, material bodies that are organized according to 
ordered patterns are as intelligible as unified and yet, they are complex systems/processes.  
 
The merit of the cybernetic model is its recognition of the fact that some aspects of reality 
become obvious only when they are relevant to the system/process at hand. This is what 
abstraction means, namely not extracting qualities and essences from individuals, but looking 
at individuals in such a way that only aspects that are relevant to a given system and process 
are taken into account. On account of this, modern science seeks precise definitions and is 
prudent to state that it only operates in contexts where ceteribus paribus (everything is kept 
equal). The cybernetic model, which studies organized complexity in terms of information 
and control through feedback processes, and the mechanical model, which studies matter 
in/and motion, are not mutually exclusive. For this reason, it is not a wise suggestion to 
replace the mechanical model by the cybernetic model. As a matter of fact, the mechanical 
model has become difficult to supplant since it has been very efficient in its domain area, i.e. 
in mechanical systems/processes, namely systems/processes that can be studied in terms of 
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matter in/and motion. Mechanical systems/processes are considered as models of how a 
rational universe works since they follow simple, regular, and ordered patterns. In other 
words, they still fit in the cybernetic framework, except that dimensions that the cybernetic 
model adds to the mechanical model (logic and symbolism) are merely ignored or given a 
“null” value in mathematical formulations. 
 
The level of interaction of the components of mechanical systems/processes is so low that 
their formal structure can be identified clearly, their behavior can be fragmented into well-
defined steps (or programmed into algorithms), and their function is not difficult to pin down 
since mechanical systems/processes operate in a stable environment and have fixed goals. The 
fixation (the attribution of the “null” value) of goals and the characteristics of the 
environment, and the clear delimitation and ordering of structures eliminate any amount of 
disorder from mechanical systems/processes. With negligible entropy, mechanical 
systems/processes are at the information end on the information-entropy spectrum. 
Information defined as negative entropy implies that the amount of information that a 
system/process can convey increases when the entropy (disorder) of this system increases. 
Therefore, there is a positive correlation between the information a system/process can 
convey and its degree of organization. Mechanical systems/processes, with their simple, 
regular, and repetitive patterns, are of a very high level, if not a perfect level, of organisation. 
Hence, they are not to be opposed to their cybernetic counterparts, but to be acknowledged as 
special cases where the entropy has been reduced to negligible levels or has simply been 
eliminated. Mechanical systems/processes with a “null” value of entropy are fully organized 
and convey a maximum amount of information that fulfills the Cartesian dream of achieving 
infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible knowledge through “clear and distinct ideas”. 
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In practice, this type of knowledge cannot be achieved without imposing constraints on 
natural systems/processes. Therefore, knowledge defined in terms of “clear and distinct” ideas 
with its criteria of indubitability, infallibility, and incorrigibility does not emanate from the 
transparency of the mind and its special access to its contents, as Descartes assumed, but from 
a process of removing complexity and ambiguity from natural processes by submitting them 
to strict criteria of definition and identification. For this reason, indubitable, infallible, and 
incorrigible knowledge can only be propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge 
imposes constraints on natural processes through axiomisation, i.e. reducing complex 
processes of human knowing to observational propositions of the type “S is P”. This explains,  
at least partly, the predilection for mathematics and formal logic by philosophers who 
subscribe to the Cartesian tradition. In other words, the success of the mechanical model is 
linked with the fact that mechanical processes/systems can be subjected to quantification and 
formalization and are fully analyzable. On the one hand, the rules that mechanical 
systems/processes follow are simple, repetitive, and constant (universal laws) and can be fully 
formalized into algorithms. Mechanical systems, by following simple, repetitive, and constant 
laws, have a negligible level of entropy; hence, they can convey maximum amounts of 
information that can lead to certainty. In other words, Descartes’ predilection for “clear and 
distinct” ideas and his project of eliminating doubt by providing new foundations for 
scientific knowledge do not originate in the transparency of the mind and its privileged access 
to its contents. On the contrary, Descartes’ ideal of knowledge is only possible when reality is 
reduced to mechanical models with simple, repetitive, and regular patterns. Mechanical 
models, unlike their cybernetic counterparts, lend themselves to full analysis and 
formalization since mechanical systems/processes are fully analyzable. A dimension of 
complexity can be added to the dynamic and integrative model of human knowing as follows: 
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3. Systems Thinking 
The system idea as a possible successor of the analytic model has not emerged from a process 
of argument and counterargument as it is usually assumed to happen in philosophy. With the 
success of the scientific model both in academic circles and in mundane affairs, many 
independent scientific disciplines have emerged, with each having its area of concern, its 
method, and its jargon. Within established disciplines, the multiplicity and levels of 
specialization have generated abundant, but unrelated scientific knowledge. This situation has 
demolished the scientific aim of establishing a unified and universal model of knowledge. 
This failure has been attested by the fact that mathematics has more and more failed to cope 
with scientific complexity. However, what renders the system concept a possible successor to 
analysis is that it transcends specific academic disciplines and particular realms of inquiry. As 
Bertalanffy points out: 
System theory is a broad view which far transcends technological problems and 
demands, a reorientation that has become necessary in science in general and in the 
gamut of disciplines from physics to biology to the behavioral and social sciences and to 
Dimension 
of 
Complexity 
Operation/ 
Activity 
Greek 
Equivalent 
Level of 
Consciousness 
Achievement Proponent School 
of Thought 
Method 
Substance/ 
Nature 
Experiencing Pathos Empirical Representations 
(data) 
Empiricism Phenomenology 
Structure Understanding Logos Intellectual Meaning Rationalism Analytic 
Behavior Judging 
Evaluating 
Ethos Rational Value Critical Realism Critical 
Function/ 
Purpose 
Deciding 
Acting 
Praxis Responsible Purpose Pragmatism Experimental 
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philosophy. It is operative, with varying degrees of success and exactitude, in various 
realms, and heralds a new world view of considerable impact.52 
Linked to systems theory is the emergence of the study of entities that are different from the 
basic components that classical science was searching for. According to Bertalanffy: 
Entities of an essentially new sort are entering the sphere of scientific thought. Classical 
science in its diverse disciplines, be it chemistry, biology, psychology or the social 
sciences, tried to isolate the elements of the observed universe – chemical compounds 
and enzymes, cells, elementary sensations, freely competing individuals, what – 
expecting that, by putting them together again, conceptually and experimentally, the 
whole or system – cell, mind, society – would result and be intelligible. Now we have 
learned that for an understanding not only the elements but their interrelations as well 
are required: say, the interplay of enzymes in a cell, of many mental processes 
conscious and unconscious, the structure and dynamics of social systems and the like. 
This requires exploration of the many systems in our observed universe in their own 
right and specificities. It turns out that there are general aspects, correspondences and 
isomorphisms common to “systems”. This is the domain of general system theory; 
indeed, such parallelisms or isomorphies appear – sometimes surprisingly – in otherwise 
totally different systems.53 
 
Therefore: 
General system theory, then, is scientific exploration of “wholes” and “wholeness” 
which, not so long ago, were considered to be metaphysical notions transcending the 
boundaries of science. Novel conceptions, models and mathematical fields have 
developed to deal with them, such as dynamical system theory, cybernetics, automata 
theory, system analysis by set, net, graph theory and others.54 
 
In other words, the system idea has emerged from the fact that unrelated entities and 
processes have manifested similar patterns that render them better apprehensible as than 
systems, i.e. interrelated and interacting parts rather than merely superposed parts. Therefore, 
the focus has shifted from the study of the structure of the system (how the parts get together) 
to the study of its functioning and its history. In addition to this observed pattern in various 
scientific areas, the system idea has been made evident with the concurrent emerging of 
system technology. Bertalanffy has identified aspects such as the “hardware” of computers, 
automation, self-regulating machinery, and the “software” of new theoretical developments 
and disciplines.55 The realization of the overwhelming presence of systems and the 
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development of system technology has led to the formulation of a system approach or a 
system philosophy. According to Bertalanffy: 
There is system philosophy, i.e. the reorientation of thought and world view ensuing 
from the introduction of “system” as a new scientific paradigm (in contrast to the 
analytic, mechanistic, one-way causal paradigm of classical science). As every scientific 
theory of broader scope, general system theory has its “metascientific” or philosophical 
aspects. The concept of “system” constitutes a new “paradigm” in Thomas Kuhn’s 
phrase, [...] a “new philosophy of nature,” contrasting the “blind laws of nature” of the 
mechanistic world view and the world process as a Shakespearean tale told by an idiot, 
with an organismic outlook of the “world as a great organization”.56 
 
System philosophy leads to the consideration of the observed universe as a system with 
material, mechanical, logical, and symbolic components, but also to the observer of this 
universe as a system with emotional, intellectual, ethical and, pragmatic (behavioral) 
subsystems. In this context, the knower is involved in a dynamic and integrative process of 
experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting within a dynamic and integrative 
world of material entities, which can be stationary or in motion, but which are also enriched 
with value and meaning and subordinated to purposes through various insights accumulated 
by various communities of inquiry. System philosophy, in the first instance, implies “system 
ontology”. According to Bertalanffy, “[f]irst we must find “the nature of the beast”. This is 
system ontology – what is meant by “system” and how systems are realized at the various 
levels of the world of observation”.57 Therefore: 
What is to be defined and described as a system is not a question with an obvious or 
trivial answer. It will be readily agreed that a galaxy, a dog, a cell, and atom are real 
systems; that is entities perceived in or inferred from observation, and existing 
independently of an observer. On the other hand, there are conceptual systems such as 
logic, mathematics (but e.g. also including music) which essentially are symbolic 
constructs; with abstract systems (science) as a subclass of the latter, i.e. conceptual 
systems corresponding with reality.58 
 
System ontology, in other words, acknowledges the complexity inherent in the order of 
things. Material reality at the atomic and the subatomic level is complex since the atom 
although defined as indivisible, contemporary research technologies have demonstrated the 
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complexity of particles both at the atomic and subatomic levels. The same applies to living 
matter where a high degree of complexity has been observed. For instance, a cell is not 
merely a compound of its components, but also a milieu where complex physiological 
processes take place. Discoveries such as the DNA have demonstrated how complex patterns 
and messages can be embedded in organs that are very small in terms of physical size. The 
recognition of this complexity calls for a paradigm shift in metaphysics. Classical 
metaphysics is dominated by the concept of substance, which represents being and stability. It 
is a metaphysics that considers becoming and change as states of a lower ontological status. 
However, systems ontology creates a ground for a paradigm shift from a metaphysics of 
substance to a metaphysics of relation. This metaphysics of relation could include elements in 
spatial relations (patterns) and elements in temporal relations (successions, alternations, etc) 
in reality. This paradigm shift at the metaphysical level would consequently create an 
understanding of the world that accommodates a systems epistemology. According to 
Bertalanffy: 
This is profoundly different from the epistemology of logical positivism or empiricism 
even though it shares their scientific attitude. The epistemology (and metaphysics) of 
logical positivism was determined by the ideas of physicalism, atomism, and the 
“camera-theory” of knowledge. These, in view of present-day knowledge, are obsolete. 
As against physicalism and reductionism, the problems and modes of thought occurring 
in biological, behavioral and social sciences require equal consideration and simple 
“reduction” to elementary particles and conventional laws of physics does not appear 
feasible. Compared to the analytical procedure of classical science with resolution into 
component elements and one-way or linear causality as basic category, the investigation 
of organized wholes of many variables requires new categories of interaction, 
transaction, organization, teleology, etc., with many problems arising for epistemology, 
mathematical models and techniques.59 
 
Therefore, the dynamic and integrative model of human knowing is part and parcel of systems 
epistemology. It does not define knowing as the acquisition of true justified beliefs, but as the 
accumulation of insights through “organizing intelligence”. Organizing intelligence implies 
complex and multidimensional processes to the extent that the scientific study of aspects of 
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human knowing, which people take for granted, has shown a high degree of complexity. For 
instance: 
Perception is not a reflection of “real things” (whatever their metaphysical status), and 
knowledge not a simple approximation of the “truth” or “reality.” It is an interaction 
between knower and known, this dependent on a multiplicity of factors of a biological, 
psychological, cultural, linguistic, etc., nature.60 
 
For this reason, system epistemology acknowledges that theories of multiple intelligences are 
a great challenge to normative epistemology. Whereas these theories, especially as articulated 
by Gardner, show that intelligence is linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-
kinesthetic, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and naturalist, the Lonerganian model, which is, in 
my view, the most encompassing one, upholds that knowing implies experiencing, 
understanding, judging, choosing, deciding, and acting. In this model, knowing cannot be 
reduced to thinking as normative epistemology has claimed, but it has dimensions of feeling, 
judging, deciding, and doing. Moreover, in contradistinction to normative epistemology that 
reduces knowing to an activity of the mind, in my view, knowing is an activity (or rather a 
series of activities) of the whole organism. In fact: 
Physics itself tells that there are no ultimate entities like corpuscles or waves, existing 
independent of the observer. This leads to a “perspective” philosophy for which physics, 
fully acknowledging its achievements in its own and related fields, is not a monopolistic 
way of knowledge. Against reductionism and theories declaring that reality is “nothing 
but” (a heap of physical particles, genes, reflexes, drives, or whatever the case may be), 
we see science as one of the “perspectives” man with his biological, cultural, and 
linguistic endowment and bondage, has created to deal with the universe he is “thrown 
in,” or rather to which he is adapted owing to evolution and history.61 
 
 
This is a dynamic and integrative process where we create meaning and value to reach our 
purposes. Enriching the data of our immediate experience with meaning and value generates 
information that is used as input for decision making and problem solving. This approach 
cannot define the human by isolating minimal or essential qualities, such as reason, freedom, 
and will, or by separating “mental” from “physical” processes. It recognizes that human 
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physiological processes are part and parcel of an integrated, but differentiated pattern where a 
person integrates material and mechanical processes with logical and symbolic processes to 
live a purposeful and meaningful life. This idea of leading a purposeful and meaningful life 
can be summed up in the French word sense. In French, sense means both meaning and 
purpose. Sense is then created by enriching material objects with meaning and purpose by 
giving them a social significance. This dimension of meaning is important to humans as 
enriching material objects with value and meaning implies that natural objects are 
transformed into artifacts that humans use as intermediaries (media) in their own relations. It 
is this possibility of enriching material objects with meaning and value that makes human 
culture and communication possible. Human living is then essentially linked with the human 
person’s natural relatedness, which is attested by the fact that at the individual level, the 
human person integrates various physiological processes that constitute a substratum for 
emotional and intellectual processes. However, as a related being, the human person is 
characterized by ethical and behavioral processes that are integrated with the emotional and 
the intellectual processes in a way that the individual is capable of relating to his or her human 
and non human environment by the use of natural and cultural resources. We relate to our 
environment physically, emotionally, intellectually, and practically. By giving objects 
significance, we transform natural objects into cultural artifacts. From our capacity to create 
value and meaning, knowledge, technology, and culture as creations of the human mind find 
their importance and their uniqueness. Our relationship to the transcendent does not have to 
be associated with religious beliefs. Instead, this relationship consists in our capacity to 
transcend our temporal and physical limitations. Many of our contemporaries may not be 
aware that ordinary practices, such as writing time tables, booking appointments, preparing 
budgets, writing wills, are transcendent exercises since they help us to deal with the future 
while we are still in the present. Likewise, processes such as keeping records, building 
monuments, and learning, help us to deal with the past while we journey into the future. This 
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natural relatedness introduces “the relations of man and world or what is termed “values” in 
philosophical parlance”62 in systems epistemology. Therefore: 
If reality is a hierarchy of organized wholes, the image of man will be different from it 
is a world of physical particles governed by chance events as ultimate and only “true” 
reality. Rather, the world of symbols, values, social entities and cultures is something 
“real”; and its embeddedness in a cosmic order of hierarchies is apt to bridge the 
opposition of C.P. Snow’s “Two Cultures” of science and the humanities, technology 
and history, natural and social sciences, or in whatever way the antithesis is 
formulated.63 
 
Hence, there is a need to shift from the Cartesian scientific reductionism and the analytic 
model to systems thinking. Systems thinking is: 
any process of estimating or inferring how local policies, actions, or changes influences 
the state of the neighboring universe. It is an approach to problem solving that views 
"problems" as parts of an overall system, rather than reacting to present outcomes or 
events and potentially contributing to further development of the undesired issue or 
problem.64 
 
In other words: 
 
Systems thinking is a framework that is based on the belief that the component parts of 
a system can best be understood in the context of relationships with each other and with 
other systems, rather than in isolation. The only way to fully understand why a problem 
or element occurs and persists is to understand the part in relation to the whole.65 
 
In practice, systems thinking implies taking both hard and soft systems into account. Hard 
systems involve problems that can easily be quantified while soft systems involve problems 
that cannot be easily quantified. Whereas problems involved in hard systems call for a 
structured decision process, problems involved in soft systems mostly appeal to context, 
personal judgment, flexibility, and adaptability on the behalf of the decision maker. 
Technically, it is easy to write algorithms about solutions to problems involved in hard 
systems while it is difficult (and sometimes impossible) to program solutions to problems 
involved in soft systems. The reason for this is that soft systems call for an appreciative 
aspect, unlike hard systems, which can be strictly described. In fact: 
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In soft problems the designation of objectives is itself problematic. Not surprisingly, 
hard system thinking was not usable in these problems, which were always those of a 
kind to which the concept of human activity system was relevant. It was found 
impossible to start the studies by naming ‘the system’ and defining its objectives. 
Without this base, hard systems thinking collapses. During nine studies in 1969-1972 a 
different methodology was evolved and has been subsequently tested and modified in 
more than a hundred studies since then. Such work yields, beyond the action in specific 
situations, a cumulative account of the concept human activity system.66 
 
The concept of human activity systems accommodates well our contention that knowing is, 
first and most of all, an activity of the knower and that this activity is multidimensional. As 
Checkland notes: 
Regarded as a whole, the soft system methodology is a learning system which uses 
system ideas to formulate basic mental acts of four kinds: perceiving (state 1 and 2), 
predicating (stages 3 and 4), comparing (stage 5) and deciding (stage 6). The output of 
the methodology is thus very different from the output of hard system engineering: it is 
learning which leads to a decision to take certain actions, knowing that this will lead not 
to ‘the problem’ being ‘solved’ but to a changed situation and new learning.67 
 
In this process, “[w]e attribute meaning to human activity and our attributions are meaningful 
in terms of a particular image of the world, or Weltanschauung which in general we take for 
granted”68. Therefore, the shift from a mechanical weltanschauung, which defines reality in 
terms of energy that puts material particles in motion, to a cybernetic weltanschauung, which 
defines reality in terms of information that organizes complex systems through processes of 
control and feedback, implies an epistemology that integrates the analytical patterns of hard 
systems and the dynamic and integrative patterns of soft systems. This integration implies that 
instead of reducing knowing to thinking, one has to recognize that knowing is a fourfold 
process of experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing), and deciding (acting). In this 
perspective, knowing is not the activity of an isolated mind, but the activity of the whole 
human organism, which is not only dynamic and integrated, but also in relation with its 
environment through the integration of material, mechanical, logical, and symbolic elements. 
While the analytic model compels us to consider solely the structure of systems, the dynamic 
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and integrative model, which we called systems thinking, does not only imply considering the 
structure, but also the function, the evolution (history), and the purpose (finality, teleology) of 
a system under investigation.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The recognition of the fact that human knowing is a multifaceted and multilevel process calls 
for the integration of the phenomenological, the analytic, the critical, and the pragmatic 
models. One of the contemporary attempts to integrate all these approaches is “systems 
thinking”. This model is still developing and sometimes confused with its early phase that is 
interchangeably called “system’s analysis”. As Schultheis and Sumner have noted: 
The major objective of systems analysis is to understand the current system and to 
determine the importance, complexity, and scope of problems that exist. The scope 
and boundaries of the system, including its people and procedures, must be defined. 
Much of this phase involves collecting data about what is being done, why it is being 
done, how it is being done, who is doing it, and what major problems have 
developed.69 
 
Systems analysis leads to systems thinking as opposed to a linear pattern of thought that 
characterized the scientific age. The linear pattern of thinking was based on an attempt to 
establish simple patterns of efficient causality and relationships between cause and effect, 
means and ends, and inputs and outputs. Systems thinking goes beyond simple patterns. It is a 
major characteristic of what Drucker calls “the information based organization”70 and what 
Peter Senge calls “the learning organization”71. The learning organization is characterized by 
personal mastery, mental models, building a shared vision, team learning, and systems 
thinking”72. If we apply systems thinking, “we shift from seeing problems as caused by 
outside forces taking responsibility for our own actions and recognizing that these actions 
sometimes create the problems we experience”73. In other words: 
Systems thinking is a discipline of seeing wholes; it provides a framework for seeing 
interrelationships, rather than static events and snapshots. Systems thinking provides 
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an antidote for a sense of helplessness that prevails in complex situations. Systems 
thinking builds in a feedback loop that does not imply causality and does not establish 
blame. In systems thinking everyone shares responsibility for the problems, and 
everyone shares responsibility for overcoming these problems.74 
 
The concept of systems thinking was recently elaborated by Peter Checkland. He elaborated a 
system cycle that begins by showing how we pass from an area of reality that contains 
concerns, issues, problems, and aspirations. These aspects of the area of realty give rise to 
ideas from which theories can be formulated. These theories create problems within the 
discipline that may be analyzed by using models. These models may be manipulated using 
techniques that may be used in methodology. The methodology itself is to be used in action, 
(intervention, influence, observation) in documented records that support the criticism of the 
theories. In his own words: 
It [the systems model] assumes that the focus of interest is a set of concerns, issues or 
problems perceived in the real world about which we have aspirations. [...] Whatever 
the focus, it will lead to ideas from which we can formulate two kinds of theories, 
substantive theories about the subject matter (for instance a theory about catalysis in 
chemistry) and methodological theories concerning how to go about in investigating 
the subject matter. Once such theories exist, it is possible to state problems, not merely 
as problems existing in the world, but as problems within the discipline. All the 
resources of the discipline –previous results within it, its paradigms, models, and 
techniques – can then be used in an appropriate methodology to test that theory. The 
results from this test, which will itself involve action in the real world (intervention, 
influence, observation) will provide [...] ‘case records’, records of happenings under 
certain conditions. These provide the crucial source of criticism which enables better 
theories to be formulated, better models, techniques, and methodology to be 
developed.75 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE, WISDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of “the information society” is often associated with the development and the 
diffusion of electronic computers and related information and communication technologies 
(ICTs). According to C. S. French, for instance: 
Looking at the national and international community, and at the way organizations are 
run, highlights the fact that modern society is heavily dependent of the communication, 
processing and storage of information. It is claimed that we are moving towards an 
‘information society’ in which the majority of the labor force will be engaged in 
Information Processing and the use of ‘Information Technology’.1 
 
This approach can be misleading since it creates a situation where, when epistemology or 
philosophy of knowledge is linked to information, one is tempted to introduce a computer 
metaphor quickly. It would be easy, for instance, to claim that images such as Locke’s “tabula 
rasa” (borrowed from painting) or the contemporary “camera” generating “mental pictures” (a 
metaphor borrowed from photography) are outdated and that a computer metaphor that likens 
human mental processes to electronic computers, especially Turing machines and computer 
algorithms, provides a better model of description and an improved system of explanation. 
This fashionable temptation goes as far as to claim that the human mind – if not the whole 
universe - is a computer. This temptation has also been reinforced by findings from 
neurophysiology that indicate that brain processes at the cellular level are electrochemical, i.e. 
synapses send electrical signals rather than material particles. These findings seem to create a 
bridge between neurophysiology and electronics at the conceptual level and a bridge between 
biology and physics at a generalized level. Another factor that plays a role for this temptation 
is the sharing of terminology between neurophysiologists and Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
researchers, with concepts such as “neural networks” being used by these two groups of 
scientists.2 This linking of the “information society” with electronic computers is also shared 
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by the sociologist Anthony Giddens, who speaks of a “late modern age” where “[t]he media, 
printed and electronic, obviously play a central role”3. Despite the existence of mobile and 
wireless communication devices in the “information society”, James Dearnley and John 
Feather portray the information society as a “wired world”4. Building on Manuel Castells’ 
idea of a “network society”5, Anthony Giddens devotes a whole chapter to “organizations and 
networks” in the 6th edition of his masterpiece Sociology6, which is a step backwards, in my 
view, in comparison to his chapter “information as networks”7 in the 4th edition. According to 
Giddens, “[t]he inherent flexibility and adaptability of networks give them enormous 
advantages over older types of rational, hierarchical organizations”8. 
 
The reference to “rational and hierarchical organizations” by Giddens points to another way 
of describing the “information society”, namely, as a series of sociological transformations. 
The most sophisticated and pervasive description of the “information society” as a series of 
sociological transformations can be found in Daniel Bell’s characterization of the 
“information society” as a “post-industrial society”9. Bell’s assessment compares three types 
of societies, which he respectively characterizes as the pre-industrial, the industrial, and the 
post-industrial society. He compares these three types of societies following eleven criteria, 
namely (1) the mode of production, (2) the dominant economic sector, (3) the transforming 
resource, (4) the strategic resource, (5) technology, (6) the skill base, (7) the mode of work, 
(8) methodology, (9) time perspective, (10) design, and, (11) the axial principle.10 For Bell, 
while in the pre-industrial society, the mode of production was mainly extractive, privileging 
economic sectors, such as agriculture, mining, fishing, timber, oil, and gas, the mode of 
production in the industrial society was fabrication, privileging the production of goods in 
sectors such as manufacturing, both durable and non-durable products, and heavy 
construction. The industrial society is being supplanted, in Bell’s view, by the post-industrial 
society, which produces through processing information and focuses on the tertiary sector (i.e. 
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transportation, utilities), the quarternary sector (trade, finance, insurance, real estate), and the 
quintinary sector (health, education, research, government, recreation entertainment). These 
sectors also differ from the point of view of their transforming resource. On the one hand, the 
pre-industrial society mainly relied on natural power, i.e. wind, water, draft, animal and 
human muscle, while the industrial society depended on created energy, i.e. oil, gas, nuclear 
power. The post-industrial society, on the other hand, relies on information and knowledge, 
i.e. programming and algorithms, computer and data-transmission. According to Bell’s view, 
the strategic resource of the pre-industrial society was raw materials while for the industrial 
and the post-industrial societies, the strategic resources are respectively financial and human 
capital. The technology of the pre-industrial society was craft, the industrial society used 
machine technology while the post-industrial society uses intellectual technology. Bell 
indicates that, therefore, the skill base for the pre-industrial society was the artisan, the 
manual worker, or the farmer while in the industrial society, the skill base was embedded in 
the engineer and the semi-skilled worker. In the post-industrial society, the skill base lies in 
scientific, technical, and professional occupations. The mode of work in the pre-industrial 
society was physical labor, in the industrial society the division of labor, and in the post-
industrial society it is networking. The pre-industrial society relied on common sense, trial 
and error, and experience, while the industrial society’s methodology was empiricism and 
experimenting. The post-industrial society has devised various “new” methodologies, such as 
models, simulations, decision theory, and systems analysis. The temporal orientation of these 
three societies is also different since, according to Bell, the pre-industrial society was oriented 
to the past while the industrial society reacted to the present through ad-hoc adaptiveness and 
experimentation. The post-industrial society is future-oriented through forecasting and 
planning. The mode of design of the three societies is described by Bell as a series of games; 
the pre-industrial society played a game against nature, the industrial society played a game 
against fabricated nature while in the post-industrial society, persons play games against each 
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other. The respective axial principles of these three types of societies are traditionalism for the 
pre-industrial society, productivity for the industrial society, and codification of theoretical 
knowledge for the post-industrial society. A detailed schematization of Bell’s comparison of 
the pre-industrial, the industrial, and the post-industrial society can be found in the first 
appendix. 
 
Moreover, in addition to linking the information society with electronic computers and related 
information, communication technologies (ICTs), and outlining the social transformations 
that is brings with it, there is an intrinsic link between information and knowledge in the 
information society. Bell describes the information/post-industrial society with eye-catching 
concepts, such as “processing information”, and “information and knowledge”, which he 
associates with “programming and algorithms, computer and data-transmission”, “intellectual 
technology”, “networking”, “codification of theoretical knowledge”, and so forth. Other 
authors, such as Dale E. Zand, refer to knowledge explicitly by talking merely about “the 
knowledge society”11 rather than “the information society”. The prominent role of knowledge 
in the “information society” is outlined by Drucker. For him, the “knowledge worker”, an 
expert, is replacing the semi-skilled worker of the massive production of the industrial 
society. The semi-skilled worker is, in fact, the fruit of Cartesianism, i.e. the habit to “break 
apart problems, to fragment the world”12. The semi-skilled worker was precious in the 
industrial society since, at that time, the industrialist “analyzed tasks and broke them down 
into individual, unskilled tasks that could be learned quite quickly”13. It is this association of 
the information society and knowledge that catches the eye of an epistemologist with the 
possibility of undertaking an epistemological study of the information society. This 
undertaking is worthwhile as the information society, in addition to being a series of 
technological and sociological developments, is a paradigm, i.e. in Kuhn’s words, 
“universally recognized achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to 
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a community of practitioners”14. It is from the point of view of information as a paradigm that 
this philosophical study of the epistemological implications has been undertaken. Although 
there have been paradigm changes from a normative epistemology based on representation to 
a dynamic and integrative epistemology based on information processing, from a mechanical 
model of reality to a cybernetic model, and from the analysis synthesis dichotomy to systems 
thinking, one crucial question remains. What is philosophical about information? This chapter 
aims at answering this question by putting the notion of information in relation to two other 
important philosophical concepts, namely the concept of knowledge as this study has the aim 
of being a study in epistemology (philosophy of knowledge), and the concept of wisdom that 
etymologically defines philosophy. According to Luciano Floridi, one of the leading scholars 
in the area of philosophy and information [or philosophy of information, one may even say]: 
[P]hilosophy grows by impoverishing itself. This is only an apparent paradox: the more 
complex the world and its scientific descriptions turn out to be, the more essential the 
level of the philosophical discourse understood as philosophical prima must become, 
ridding itself of unwanted assumptions and misguided investigations that do not 
properly belong to the normative activity of conceptual modeling. The strength of the 
dialectic of reflection, and hence the crucial importance of one’s historical awareness of 
it, lies in this transcendental regress in search of increasingly abstract and more 
streamlined conditions of possibility of the available narratives, in view of their 
explanation but also of their modification and innovation. How has the regress 
developed? The scientific revolution made seventeenth-century philosophers redirect 
their attention from the nature of the knowable object [i.e. ontology] to the epistemic 
relation between it and the knowing subject, and hence metaphysics to epistemology. 
The subsequent growth of the information society and the appearance of the infosphere, 
the semantic environment in which millions of people spend their time nowadays, have 
led contemporary philosophy to privilege critical reflection first on the domain 
represented by the memory and languages of organized knowledge, the instruments 
whereby the infosphere is managed – thus moving from epistemology to philosophy of 
language and logic (Dummett 1993) – and then on the nature of its very fabric and 
essence, information itself. Information has thus arisen as a concept as fundamental 
and important as being, knowledge, life, intelligence, meaning, and good and evil – all 
pivotal concepts with which it is interdependent – and so equally worthy of autonomous 
investigation. It is also a more impoverished concept, in terms of which the others can 
be expressed and interrelated, when not defined.15 
 
This chapter will tackle this task in three steps. Firstly, it will detail the notion of information 
taking into account dimensions of order, behaviour and purpose as a way of describing the 
dynamism and integrative patterns embedded in the notion of information itself. This 
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description can be an alternative to the predilection for fixity that is embedded in mechanical 
descriptions which define reality in terms of matter, motion, and immutable universal laws 
that are based on assumptions of order, simplicity and regularity in the universe leading to a 
energy based model. Secondly, a parallelism will be established between the notion of 
information processing, i.e. enriching data with value and meaning and subjecting them to 
purposes such as decision-making and problem-solving, and Lonergan’s epistemological 
framework that defines knowing as accumulating insights through experiencing, 
understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), and acting. Thirdly, the notion of wisdom that 
defines philosophy etymologically will be examined in relation with knowledge (the object of 
epistemology) and information, the paradigm of our inquiry in this work. Last but not least, 
the way wisdom is applied in decision-making and problem-solving will be presented and a 
claim for integrating individual human rationality with institutional rationality will be 
established. 
 
B. THE NOTION OF INFORMATION 
1. Information as Patterns of (Self-)Organizing Matter and Energy 
In this thesis so far, the notion of information has been presented from two angles. On the one 
hand, information has been presented according to Norbert Wiener’s definition as “negative 
entropy”16, i.e. “negative disorder”, and hence, “positive order” or the measurement of a 
certain “degree of organization”. On the other hand, information processing has been 
presented as enriching immediate data of experience with meaning and value for the purpose 
of decision-making and problem-solving.17 Although these two notions of information seem 
to be remote from each other, they still conform to a cybernetic model that views “things 
social as interacting processing systems”18 and “appreciate[s] the importance of 
communication and control in all such systems”19. However, although our approach from the 
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onset has been historical by looking at the “information society” from the point of view of 
changing paradigms, 
history alone cannot explain why it is information that increasingly plays the crucial 
role in economy and society. The answer must be sought in the nature of all living 
systems – ultimately in the relationship between information and control.20 
 
Cybernetics is, in fact, a science of “Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine”21, as Wiener has subtitled his book. However, the concept of information itself 
remains multifarious as: 
All the philosophical and social problems associated with the new information and 
communication technologies can be directly and indirectly related to one scientific 
category. This category is information. It has emerged in biology as hereditary 
information and behavioural control; in psychology it is associated with the phenomena 
of cognition, thinking and memory, as well as the question of communication and sense 
in human behaviour; in economics, it gives rise to a key technology; and in informatics 
it serves as a basis for modelling human mental processes.22 
  
Information, as a scientific category, transcends disciplinary boundaries, on the one hand, and 
defies traditional definition of material objects in terms of physical extension or mental 
processes by opposing them to physical objects, on the other hand. However, this is not to say 
that information lacks spatial modes of existence. In fact, Wiener’s definition of information 
as “negative entropy” gives pertinence to the idea of information as patterns of (self-
)organizing matter and energy. This idea of information is linked with the fact that 
information appears in terms of spatial arrangements, be they arrangements of molecules and 
their parts (eg. DNA) at the macro-molecular level, arrangements of nerve cells and impulse 
patterns in the vertebrate nervous system, spatial arrangements of objects in the environment, 
spatial arrangement of signs in mediated reality, such as language (social form of language), 
or spatial arrangements of signs in meta-forms (personal forms of language or highly 
formalized languages, such as rules of logical inference, mathematical operations, and 
computer algorithms, which only apply to restricted domains).23 
 
 186 
These spatial arrangements lead to various forms of consciousness. At the macromolecular 
level, the totality of molecules, their parts and their connections, lead to the interaction of 
molecules and their parts on the basis of electrochemical signals.24 However, it is this totality 
of impulse patterns as an indivisible quality that controls behavior. These impulse patterns 
themselves are based on the spatial arrangements of nerve cells and impulse patterns in the 
brain. It is at this level that the brain’s function of control is located and some contemporary 
philosophers of mind do not hesitate to locate mental activity at this level. However, it is the 
third level of organization of material objects in the environment that leads to a consciousness 
of objects in the environment as the totality of these objects in situations is seen as indivisible 
qualities which lead to meaningful reactions, to impulse patterns and their causes in the 
environment.25 At this level, most normative epistemologists locate the point of departure of 
epistemology as a discipline by separating processes that occur at the macromolecular level 
and in the nervous systems (especially in the brain), i.e. “internal processes”, from processes 
that depend on spatial arrangements of objects in the environment, i.e. “external processes”. 
In standard normative epistemology, “internal processes” are considered as subjective, i.e. 
occurring within the knower, while “external processes” are considered as objective, i.e. 
constituting the reality or the object to be known. However, by going back to the 
macromolecular level in assessing information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and 
energy, the gap between the subject and the object can be bridged as instead of a top-down 
approach that assumes that mental processes are non-material processes that occur within 
non-material processors, there is a possibility of reversing the trends and suggesting a bottom-
up approach that does not only take our genetic heritage as a species into account, but also the 
physiological processes that the homo sapiens shares with other members of the animal 
kingdom. This bottom-up approach extends the boundaries of epistemology as a discipline 
since instead of focusing on the process of human knowing in the normal human adult, this 
approach looks at different time-frameworks that include how the genetic and physiological 
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processes sustaining the process of human knowing have been established through selection 
and adaptation, on the one hand, and how the patterns of spatial arrangements of material 
objects in the environment influence physiological processes that lead to different patterns of 
behavior at the levels of psychomotor activities. These bottom-up activities challenge 
arbitrary boundaries within the animal kingdom, such as those established between humans 
and animals, and those that separate rational and instinctive patterns of behavior. Moreover, 
this approach can provide a solution to the problem of other minds as it does not suggest to 
begin the apprehension of knowing processes from an individual isolated mind, as it is done 
in the Cartesian tradition, but it begins by acknowledging that different patterns of spatial 
arrangements constitute the material, mechanical, or physiological basis (hardware) of the 
process of human knowing and that these spatial arrangements are not restricted to the 
physical constitution of the knower (i.e. the body as opposed to the mind). There is a 
continuum between spatial arrangements at the macromolecular level and at the level of the 
nervous system, but the impulses at these levels do not activate themselves. They are set into 
activity as “[t]he totality of objects in situations” is considered as “indivisible qualities”26. In 
other words, the consciousness of the environment arises when objects in situations are 
processed as indivisible qualities leading to meaningful reactions, to impulse patterns and 
their causes in the environment. 
 
The level of consciousness of objects in the environment still corresponds to normative 
epistemology’s realm of inquiry that restricts knowing to invariant relationships between 
invariant characteristics of material objects (essences or universals) and invariant non-
physical processes “in” the human mind leading to universal and objective knowledge, which 
can easily be formulated into univocal propositions of the form S is P. However, this 
restriction of the domain of inquiry of epistemology is not only tributary to the attempts of 
modelling philosophy in general and epistemology in particular after the physical sciences, 
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with the search for immutable universal laws that can be formulated into simple mathematical 
relations, but it also misses the fact that spatial arrangements of material objects are not 
established once and for all. Therefore, changes of the spatial arrangements of material 
objects in the environment may lead to changes in the patterns of impulses at the 
macromolecular level or at the level of the nervous system and, subsequently, to changes of 
behavior. Moreover, changes in the spatial location of the organism, which embodies the 
macromolecular and neurophysiological processes at hand, may equally lead to changes of the 
patterns of impulses and connections in such a way that behavior is changed. What normative 
epistemology misses by reducing the relation between the subject and the object to an 
invariant representation process, which is objective and universal, is “[t]he principle of no 
immediate instructive interaction”27. According to this principle, as stated by Fuchs-
Kittowski, “[i]t is insufficient to view the generation and use of information only in terms of 
reception of available information from the outside world in order to obtain a direct 
representation”28. In fact: 
In studying the essence of information in living systems it becomes apparent that here 
information is not simply transmitted in one-sided, directed processes. Instead, the 
exchange takes place in a meaningful context allowing an evaluation and a creation 
anew.29 
 
Therefore, the spatial arrangements that constitute the basis for conceiving information as 
patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy are not limited to the spatial arrangements of 
material objects in the environment. Reducing reality to material objects leads to a 
mechanistic materialism that defines reality in terms of matter and motion and seeks 
immutable universal laws for an invariable relation of representations of the object by the 
subject. However, dynamic and integrative epistemology acknowledges the material and 
natural aspect of objects, but also their cultural value and symbolic significance. The 
symbolic significance of objects is at the origin of human culture and communication since 
humans can use these objects as intermediaries (media) for their own interaction. The fourth 
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level of consciousness is, therefore, according to Fuchs-Kittowski, the consciousness of 
society, which is achieved through the spatial arrangements of signs in language (social form 
of language) with the totality of established forms of language leading to the communication 
of meaning in social interaction.30 That is why a dynamic and integrative epistemology does 
not define the human person by isolating minimal or essential qualities, such as reason, 
freedom, and will, that are believed to constitute an immutable core, or by separating 
“mental” from “physical” processes. It recognizes that human physiological processes are an 
essential part of an integrated, but differentiated pattern, and this pattern makes human living 
possible by maintaining the human internal environment within certain limits through 
metabolism and homeostasis, but also by interacting with the human immediate and mediated 
environment. Human living is then essentially linked with the human person’s natural 
relatedness. At the individual level, the human person integrates various physiological 
processes that constitute a substratum for emotional and intellectual processes. As a related 
being, the human person is characterized by ethical and behavioral processes, which are 
integrated with the emotional and the intellectual ones in such a way that the individual is 
capable of relating to his or her human and non human environment through the use of natural 
and cultural resources. Natural and cultural resources are part of an information and 
communicative process since, as vehicles of meaning and value, they are intermediaries, i.e. 
media that allow human persons to live purposeful and meaningful lives. 
 
This unity of purpose and meaning is embedded in the French word sens. Therefore, human 
living makes sense through one’s partaking in a human history that goes beyond one’s limited 
life time. Through signs and symbols that are at the origin of purposeful and meaningful 
communicative processes, the human person transcends one’s temporal and spatial boundaries 
and reaches out to other persons on the one hand, and on the other hand, creates techniques 
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and technologies that allow the person to dig into the abyss of history and collective memory 
and, at the same time, to face challenges and seize opportunities of the present and to make 
plans for the future. Many of our contemporaries are not aware that usual practices, such as 
preparing budgets, making timetables, booking appointments with other people, are 
expressions of this self-transcendence since these are ways of handling the future while we 
are still in the present. The same applies to practices, such as keeping records and archives, 
that are ways of handling the past while our lives move forwards in the future. This explains 
the double sense of the French world sens, which means both meaning and purpose. Our lives 
make sense as we can look both forwards and backwards without losing the grip on the 
present. This is an essential quality of humans that allows them to partake in both natural and 
cultural resources. 
 
It is through transcending one’s temporal and spatial boundaries that one reaches the fifth 
level of organization, which is for Fuchs-Kittowski, the consciousness of Self and Values 
through the spatial arrangements of signs in meta-forms (personal form of language) where 
the totality of selected forms of language leads to the communication of meaning in personal 
interaction.31 It is this consciousness of Self and Values that justifies the dimension of human 
knowing as self-appropriation.32 Knowing as self-appropriation compels us to acknowledge 
that it is the knower and not the object of knowledge who is at the center of the process of 
human knowing. The knower is not solely a rational being in the intellectual sense, but a 
multidimensional unity with emotional, intellectual, ethical, and behavioral capabilities. The 
knower integrates the physical dimension made of material, mechanical, and electrochemical 
processes with logical and symbolic processes. Whereas the former renders the knower a 
natural being, the latter renders the knower a cultural being. As a cultural being, the knower is 
a creator of value and meaning as by enriching natural objects with value and meaning, the 
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knower turns natural objects into artifacts. Therefore, any process of information generation 
through enriching data with value and meaning is an artificial, or better, an artful process. It is 
at this level of artistic creation that human natural processes, such as material, mechanical, 
and electrochemical processes, are given a cultural significance that goes beyond their 
material value and utility. On this account, gestures, such as greeting, do not have any value 
in terms of material utility, but yet, they are very important for human interaction due to their 
symbolic significance. The same applies to other symbols of status or power, such as bank 
notes, academic certificates, and contracts, which in terms of their natural constitution 
(hardware) are simple and almost valueless pieces of paper, but in terms of their symbolic 
significance (software) they acquire a high value and importance. 
 
However, the notion of information as patterns of (self-) organizing matter and energy would 
remain unclear, unless one refers to the scientific milieu on which Wiener based his 
defininition of information as negative entropy. The concept of entropy was borrowed from 
thermodynamics because, as Beniger has pointed out: 
questions raised about the organization of non-living matter early in the nineteenth 
century culminated in thermodynamics, the science of heat and its relationship to other 
energy forms.33 
 
Thermodynamics, as a science, has emerged in a scientific paradigm dominated by 
mechanical models. Mechanical models, by defining reality in terms of matter and motion, 
consider energy as the underlying principle of all moving and self-moving systems and 
processes. With the demystification of air and the awareness that air is merely a material 
substance, the scientific principles which natural sources of motion followed are more and 
more better understood. Thermodynamics, in this context, has emerged with two apparently 
contradictory laws. The first law of thermodynamics, or the law of the conservation of energy, 
states that: 
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In closed systems defined by impermeable boundaries, energy must remain constant in 
keeping with the first law of thermodynamics, the so-called principle of the 
conservation of energy, that matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed.34 
 
However, the second law of thermodynamics points to a continuous disorganization of matter 
owing to the loss of energy by doing work, for instance. In other words, there is a relation 
between the conservation of energy and the organization of matter. Beniger has pointed out 
that: 
According to the second law of thermodynamics, the so-called principle of the 
degradation of energy, a system’s energy cannot be converted from one to another – 
including work – without decreasing its organization and hence abilities to do further 
work. A steam engine for example, can work only so long as it is organized into 
relatively more and less heated parts, the organization known as a heat gradient. 
Because this total energy must remain constant, the energy available to do work can 
only decrease.35 
 
The second law of thermodynamics, which is considered as one of the great discoveries in 
scientific history, points to the fact that energy is not a derivative of material bodies in 
motion, but that there is a possibility of converting matter into energy leading nevertheless to 
a disorganization of matter. From this point of view, systems and processes that lack 
continuous supplies of energy would be condemned to destruction owing to the fact that 
since: 
this total energy must remain constant, a closed system can only lose its ability to do 
work. Inevitably, by the second law, such systems must lapse into the state of totally 
unorganized, randomly distributed, inconvertible particles, the state of totally bound 
energy known – appropriately enough as heat death.36 
 
Therefore, according to the second law of thermodynamics, systems and processes that do any 
work are bound to convert matter into energy leading to their disorganization. However, 
living organisms seem to violate the second law of thermodynamics as they can do work and 
remain organized. This implies that their loss of conversion of matter into energy does not 
lead to their loss of structure. Beniger has noted this fact that living systems “sustain and even 
increase their organization, continuing to do work for many years in a apparent contradiction 
of the second law”37. This apparent contradiction is due to the fact that living organisms have 
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been, most of the time, considered as closed systems. They have been considered as 
individual units with individual bodies embodying individual minds. Understanding humans 
as individual units would imply limiting their definition within the physical boundaries of 
physical bodies, which would delineate the limits between “internal processes” and “external 
processes.” However, in epistemology, the words “internal” and “external” are used 
metaphorically as they do not refer to what happens inside and outside the skin, but to 
physical processes that are defined as res extensa and mental processes defined as res 
cogitans. However, looking at living organisms as violators of the second law of 
thermodynamics is due to the top-down approach that defines reality in terms of individual 
essences that are replicated in many copies of similar kinds. However, the bottom-up 
approach that looks at information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy would 
imply looking at individual organisms not in isolation, but in constant interaction with their 
environments. The scientific community has become aware of the fact that the second law of 
thermodynamics has not been violated: 
as living organisms came to be seen, like the steam engines whose coal smoke 
blackened the skies of nineteenth-century industrial towns, not as closed systems but as 
open ones, that is systems with continuous inputs and outputs of matter and energy.38 
 
Understanding living systems as open systems does not only explain how to solve the 
problem of the apparent violation of the second law of thermodynamics, but it also shifts the 
boundaries that are not only established between humans and other members of the animal 
kingdom on the one hand, but also between living organisms and inorganic matter on the 
other hand. Thermodynamics establishes a relation of symbiosis between inorganic matter and 
living organisms. On the one hand: 
Just as steam engines run off organic energy stored in wood and coal, vegetation also 
gets its energy from outside sources, usually actually directly from the sun through 
photosynthesis while animals steal energy from other organisms by eating them.39 
 
On the other hand: 
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Like steam engines, living things are open systems that continuously lose energy to 
their enviroinments – witness the heat of the cushion beneath the cat. Even wastes 
excreted by living systems retain some energy in their molecules and this, too, is lost.40 
 
The second law of thermodynamics, by linking conversion of matter into energy with the loss 
of structure, points to the intrinsic link between conversion of matter into energy and 
conversion of one form of energy into another with order or negative entropy. The only way 
to avoid “heat death” in living systems is control since: 
Thermodynamics thus explains what it is that all living systems must control, and why 
such control is essential to life itself. All open systems, if they are to postpone for a time 
their inevitable heat death, must control the extraction and processing of matter, its 
internal distribution and storage, continuous conversion into energy, and elimination as 
by-product wastes. Living organisms, for example, convert energy originally from the 
sun into forms more useful to the processes of life: body heat, chemical energy for 
metabolism, electric energy to fire nerve impulses, mechanical energy to contract 
muscles and move about (luminescent organisms can even convert the energy back into 
light).41 
 
Therefore, defining information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy implies 
linking the notion of information with structure. In fact, unstructured systems and processes 
are meaningless since the “amount of information” that systems and processes convey 
depends on their “degree of organization”. Information is intrinsically multifarious and can be 
located at various levels of spatial arrangements that range from the macromolecular level 
(DNA, for instance) and include spatial arrangements of nerves and their impulses in the 
nervous systems, arrangements of material objects in the physical environments, and at a 
more abstract level spatial arrangements of signs and symbols that elevate material objects 
beyond their materiality and render them bearers of value and meaning. Spatial arrangements 
of signs include (syntax in human languages), but abstract symbols can reach a level where 
meaning and reference are fixed as a way of rendering these signs universal. Cases of symbols 
with fixed meaning and reference include, for instance, rules of logical inference, 
mathematical operations, and computer algorithms. At the other end of the continuum, there 
are symbols that mediate between humans and their human and non-human environment. 
Humans can attach values and meanings to objects and situations in such a way that allows 
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them to attach various levels of importance to material objects and their attached meaning and 
value creating the possibility of solving ill-structured problems and pursuing complex and 
changing goals. 
 
2. Information and Control 
When defining information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy, one becomes 
aware of the role of control in maintaining living systems alive. For this reason, Wiener does 
not separate information and control in his description of a cybernetic model as a science of 
information and control in the animal and the machine.42 There are, in fact, striking 
similarities between Fuchs-Kittowski’s “levels of information”43 and Beniger’s “levels of 
control”44. Both Fuchs-Kittowski and Beniger locate the first level of information or/and 
control at the macromolecular level (DNA) where, for , life is generated through genetically 
based sociality (many animal species) following an intermediate stage where replicating 
molecules generates diversity according to their level of success in reproducing exact copies. 
The first level of control corresponds to the stage of organic life. At all stages of control, 
Beniger distinguishes processors, i.e. spatial arrangements and programming, i.e. the presence 
of instructions or programs that guide subsequent behavior. A program, according to Beniger, 
is “any prearranged information that guides subsequent behaviour”45. This information at the 
macromolecular level of the DNA is genetically programmed. Control, on the other hand, is 
“purposive influence towards a predetermined goal”46. By looking at the levels of control (or 
levels of information in Fuchs-Kittowski’s vocabulary) in terms of processors and 
programming, Beniger points to the fact that at the macromolecular level, molecules are not 
mere material entities, but, by bearing genetically inherited programs, they are geared for 
change, and not any kind of change, but a change that is predetermined by the genetic 
heritage. In other words, spatial arrangements of macromolecules enable these 
macromolecules to effect control, i.e. to fulfill predetermined goals. The dialectic of 
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information and control, therefore, implies that living organisms are both past- and future-
oriented. Genetically inherited programs tend to maintain some physiological and behavioral 
patterns that individual organisms have inherited from their species, but, at the same time, the 
ability to fulfill predetermined goals that imply that these behavioral patterns can change as 
goals change and that, in the long term, even the physiological patterns can change. 
Adaptation to changing goals, therefore, implies a possibility of change either at the structural 
(physiological) level or at the behavioral level. Hence, this potential for change calls for 
models that emphasize not only the fact that structures embody information but also the given 
the dynamic and integrative nature of the notion of information itself embodying information 
implies that information processing systems can not only change their structuring, but also 
their functioning following changes of goals or changes in the environment. Following this 
poing of view, the particularity of mechanical models resides in eliminating dynamic and 
integrative patterns through the fixing of goals, structure and function in a way that this triple 
level of fixation leads to invariant laws of transformation that are embedded not in the order 
of things but in systems of control that fixe one or the other aspects. This understanding of 
fixity as an exception rather than the rule leads to what Fuchs-Kittowski calls a “no-
substance-understanding”47. A no-substance understanding implies that: 
Information is not a non-physical substance, a ‘thing’ whose identity is independent of 
any physical body to which it may temporally be ‘attached’. Information must be 
understood as a specific effect and as a relationship.48 
 
Therefore, looking at information as a special effect and as a relationship implies giving up a 
top-down approach that postulates that reality is constituted at the highest abstract level by 
substances that are exemplified by individual kinds. These substances are often associated 
with similarities that members of a species share. These similarities are believed to be 
unchanging, or the more unchanging they are, the more substantial they are considered to be. 
This is a vestige of ancient philosophical approaches that associated reality with permanence 
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and change with appearance. However, a bottom-up approach that defines information as 
(self-)organizing matter and energy upholds that information is not an epiphany of essences, 
but the outcome of processes in the physical world where energy is not just a derivative of 
matter in motion, but a constituent of reality as a guarantor of change, growth, or decay. On 
that account, at the first level of control that Beniger associates with organic life, the 
macromolecules are not passive material entities, which would play the role of fundamental 
particles like those sought by physical chemistry, but integrated entities and processes, which 
embody their material constituents, the order in which these constituents determine the 
macromolecules structures, and the ways by which these macromolecules fulfill 
predetermined goals by following genetically inherited programs. A similar pattern can be 
observed at the second level of control, i.e. culture.49 At the cultural level, control is effected 
through culture-based social structures that reinforce learned behavioral programs, which are 
stored in the vertebrate brain.50 At this level, Beniger and Fuchs-Kittowski still agree on the 
role that spatial arrangments of neurons and their impulses play in determining levels of 
information and/or control. However, Beniger does not make provision for the spatial 
arrangements of objects in the environment. For Fuchs-Kittowski, it is the spatial 
arrangements of objects in the environment that are at the origin of the consciousness of 
objects. The consciousness of objects in the environment is at the origin of the traditional 
epistemological problem of distinguishing objects from subjects. Beniger, by skipping this 
aspect, locates control at the spatial arrangements of signs, in language for instance - the 
fourth level of information – without explaining how these signs have been formed in the first 
place. Beniger is right in stating that the vertebrate brain is the processor of learned behavioral 
programs that are themselves controlled by programming stored in memory.51 However, these 
learned behavioral patterns are not independent of genetically inherited programming, which 
could have emerged on a long time scale from the direct interaction of former members of the 
species with spatially arranged objects in their environment. This interaction can explain the 
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abilities of identifying useful and harmful substance in most animal societies, the 
development of the means of locomotion and communication that allow the access to useful 
objects and the avoidance of harmful objects, the organs and strategies of defence against 
harmful predators, the choice of habitats that are conducive to growth and reproduction, 
sedentarization or migration patterns that allow survival by remaining in useful habitats and 
leaving harmful habitats, the size of the populations in the same habitat, and the physical size 
and dexterity of individual kinds that allow either individual survival or survival in groups of 
different sizes. Beniger, therefore, locates culture from the point of view of how it is 
assimilated by individuals, unlike Fuchs-Kittowski, who places communication of meaning in 
social interaction before the consciousness of Self and Values, which leads to the 
communication of meaning and the creation of values in interpersonal interaction. 
 
In other words, Beniger locates culture at the level where individual members of a species 
have self-appropriated, learned behavioral programs, unlike Fuchs-Kittowski, who places 
self-appropriation at the highest level of information after the consciousness of society. This 
difference in the levels where culture is located implies a difference in priority for Fuchs-
Kittowski and Beniger. By omitting the consciousness of objects in the environment, Beniger 
takes the fact that sociality is always (or already) mediated for granted. However, Fuchs-
Kittowski, upholds a principle of “no immediate instructive interaction”52. According to this 
principle, “[it] is insufficient to view the generation and use of information only in terms of a 
reception of available information from the outside world in order to get a representation”53. 
The reason for this is that, at the first level of control, the vertebrate brain, as a processor, is 
not a black box through inherited genetic programs, on the other hand, it is influenced by the 
long-term history of the species to which it belongs since this history does not only determine 
its physiological constitution, but also its inborn behavioral patterns that every member of a 
species shares with other members. At the second level of control, the vertebrate brain on 
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learned behavioral programs that are acquired, in the case of humans, through early education 
and experience and that are developed and adjusted through adult life. The influence of the 
long-term past of a species and the short-term past (experience) of individuals on the 
constitution and the functioning of organs, such as the vertebrate brain, leads to a rejection of 
the definition of the human mind by categories that are borrowed from a metaphysical 
dualism that associates reality with permanence and change with appearance. Human minds 
do not only change as processors (vertebrate brains), but also in their programming. The 
latter, in humans for instance, changes due to genetic inheritance, experience, and education. 
 
The third level of control, which would correspond to Fuchs-Kittowski’s consciousness of 
society, is, for Beniger, bureaucracy. For him, bureaucratically controlled social systems 
imply formal organization of individuals through explicit rules and regulations.54 The 
bureaucratic levels of control include collective conscious planning and predetermination of 
goals and means to achieve them. Bureaucratic structures and processes, therefore, operate 
through a process that Weber and his interpreters called rationalization. According to his 
interpreters: 
Weber identified another related control technology, what he called rationalization. 
Although the term has a variety of meanings, both in Weber’s writings and in the 
elaborations of his work by others, most definitions are subsumed by one essential idea: 
control can be increased not only by increasing the capacity to process information but 
also by decreasing the amount of information to be processed.55 
 
Rationalization, in Weber’s context, implies standardization of systems and procedures so that 
similar data would lead to similar decisions and actions regardless of the personal judgment of 
the bureaucrat processing them. Understood in relation to a mechanical model of the universe, 
rationalization through bureaucracy implies automating behavior. In this way, bureaucracy 
can reduce favouritism as individuals in the same situation, i.e. provided with similar data, 
would be treated the same way. However, rendering bureaucracies efficient implies reducing 
the information to be processed to the strict minimum. In some situations, the information 
 200 
entered in bureaucratic systems is so standardized that it amounts to the reification of persons. 
From this point of view, therefore, rationalization implies a shift from “the government of 
men, to the administration of things”56. This is possible as: 
The reason why people can be governed more readily qua things is that the amount of 
information about them that needs to be processed is thereby greatly reduced and hence 
the degree of control – for any constant capacity to process information - is greatly 
enhanced.57 
 
Therefore, the process of “rationalization might be defined as the destruction or ignoring of 
information in order to facilitate its processing”58. This is what happens in the model of 
rationality supported by normative epistemology, by which reality is defined as matter in 
motion with the assumption that at the lowest level of hierarchy there are fundamental 
particles that cannot provide any other information except for their material constitution and, 
in case they are set in motion, their mechanistic characteristics. The same principle is applied 
to mental artifacts when human knowledge is reduced to univocal propositions that can be 
formalized into symbols with fixed meaning and reference. Beniger, therefore, by locating the 
second level of control at the level of culture without making any reference to the spatial 
arrangements of objects in the environment, focuses on the outcomes of situations where 
material objects have acquired social significance through their social role and the meaning 
and value that humans attach to them as the object of his inquiry. The principle of 
rationalization has been applied so pervasively in modern societies that it is now assumed 
that: 
By means of rationalization, therefore, it is possible to maintain large-scale, complex 
social systems that would be overwhelmed by a rising tide of information they could not 
process were it necessary to govern by particularistic considerations of family and kin 
that characterize preindustrial societies.59 
 
In other words, rationalization reduces the amount of information to be processed as a way of 
increasing the speed of processing. Rationalization conforms to the epistemological model of 
modern science since complexity is eliminated by idealizing physical bodies as points or, at 
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least, by postulating the existence of simple fundamental particles. The complexities and 
ambiguities embedded in the description of reality are reduced by strict definitions while 
usual aspects of human language, such as synonymy and polysemy, are avoided through the 
use of formal languages. Rationalization, therefore, implies the generation of “clear and 
distinct” ideas, not through the transparency of the mind, but through the fixation of meaning. 
Moreover, rationalization eliminates ambiguity and the peculiarities linked with individual 
personal judgments through clear definitions, hence, generating a closed system of meanings 
and representations that can sometimes make scientific disciplines look like esoteric societies 
where the initiated can only understand both the vocabulary and the symbolism. 
Rationalization, therefore, eliminates particularity in the quest of universal descriptions and 
universal rules of transformation through the fixation of meaning and reference. The objects 
of a totally rationalized process would imply “clear and distinct ideas” that are represented the 
same way every time and everywhere through the fixation of meaning and the elimination of 
individual personal value judgments so that these representations acquire universality. 
Although in normative epistemology and modern science it has been assumed that the two 
disciplines mainly deal with universals and not particulars, and that universals represented by 
universal symbols can be acted on through logico-deductive processes, the process of 
rationalization is an ad-hoc activity, which is only possible when immediate data of 
experience has been preprocessed as a way of preparing it to be processed by systems that act 
on unambiguous, context-free environments. These types of processors require preprocessing 
as a way of reducing immediate data of experience to universal symbols by eliminating 
aspects that are not relevant to the processing context. Therefore, in a bureaucracy, for 
instance, people are defined according to similar and objective criteria that are only relevant 
to artificial processing environment. For instance, one’s weight may be an important criterion 
to be taken into account in sports, such as boxing or health control; however, a university does 
not need to know the weight of a student registering for an exam (unless the exam takes place 
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in an artificial environment that can only support a limited amount of weight). In brief, 
although rationalization through bureaucratization increases controls, it reduces the amount of 
information. It is paradoxical “that the proliferation of paperwork is usually associated with a 
growth of information to be processed and not its reduction”60. However, whatever the 
common perception may be, the increase in paperwork decreases the amount of information. 
For instance: 
Imagine how much processing would be required [...] if each new case were recorded in 
an unstructured way, including every nuance and in full detail, rather than checking 
boxes, filling blanks, or in some other way reducing the burdens of the bureaucratic 
system to only the limited range of formal, objective and impersonal information 
required by standardized forms.61 
 
In other words, like bureaucracy, normative epistemology rationalizes by reducing human 
knowing to its formal, objective, and impersonal aspects. Processes of rationalization both in 
society, modern science, and epistemology aim at a form of knowledge that is described as 
“clear and distinct ideas” following the Cartesian ideal. However, this type of knowledge is 
reached at a high price, namely by reducing knowledge itself to unambiguous and univocal 
propositions of the type S is P, eliminating ambiguity and any possibility of individual 
personal judgment through “clear and distinct” definitions, especially those which lend 
themselves to universalization through the use of formal languages and symbols with fixed 
meaning and reference, and to the systematization of the field of knowledge by limiting 
knowing to logical-deductive processes applying rules of logical inference and mathematical 
operations and now computer algorithms that are perceived as expressions of the necessary 
relationships embedded in the order of the universe. 
 
However, this model of rationalization and rationality is at the origin of the fourth level of 
control, i.e. “the technocratic information society” that fulfills “purposefully designed 
functions and programs” through mechanical and electronic processors.62 As Beniger has 
pointed out: 
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Rationalization must therefore be seen, following Weber, as a complement to 
bureaucratization, on that served control in his day much as the processing of 
information prior to its processing by computer serves control today.63 
 
The process of rationalization as applied in bureaucracies and in computers implies increasing 
the amount of processing by reducing the information processed. In bureaucracies, it implies 
reducing information about people to minimal details shared by all humans, such as name, 
date of birth, place of residence, and so forth. In electronic computers, the process of 
rationalization is enhanced by the ability to create systems and it operates on in-stored 
programs. These programs are written by means of univocal symbols (binary digits) and fixed 
rules of transformation. Computer language is considered as the most abstract symbol system 
that has ever existed due to its attempt to express other symbols systems, i.e. text, sound, and 
image, for instance, through programming languages that are based on a combination of 
binary systems. The leading technology is manufacturing and the operation of electronic 
microprocessors is the ability to use highly abstract computer languages in order to store data 
and programs that an electronic computer can use to act of this data on a silicon chip. This 
process implies a high level of standardization, not only of the machine language, but also of 
the procedures of encoding. In other words, translating facts of life, natural systems and 
processes, patterns of human behavior, the structuring and functioning of artifacts in computer 
languages, and making computer models of these facts, systems, processes and patterns 
requires a process of fixing meaning and reference in such a way that computer programs act 
of univocal symbols that generate the same outputs from the same inputs following fixed rules 
of transformation. In this way, computerization is a process that is similar to normative 
epistemology’s search for a permanent foundation of knowledge by defining knowledge in 
terms of “clear and distinct” ideas and favoring a form of knowledge that is abstract, 
formalized, and systematized. Abstraction, formalization, and systematization are not only 
salient features of normative epistemology, but also of modern science. Abstraction is at the 
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origin of universalistic ideals that base human knowledge on clearly delineated definitions of 
basic concepts that are better expressed in formalized languages, which allow systematic 
assessments, combination, and recombination following fixed rules of transformation. 
Electronic microprocessors are the epitome of modern instrumental rationality that has aimed 
at unambiguous knowledge systems that would reach the accuracy of mathematics in the hope 
for a possible deductive knowledge system that would handle the whole of human knowing 
through logico-deductive processes, such as the ones applied in formal logic, mathematical 
operations, geometry, and now in computer algorithms. Such a system of human knowing 
would imply a world where objects of knowledge are arranged in invariant linear patterns in 
such a manner that the patterns in the objects of knowledge would be easily replicated by 
representation systems and their rules of transformation, given the assumed isomorphism in 
normative epistemology and modern science between the universal laws embedded in the 
structuring and functioning of the universe and the rational laws of the mind. 
 
However, understanding information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy 
implies looking at these patterns from various levels of spatial arrangements, be they of 
molecules, material objects, human individuals, or symbolic artifacts. These multilevel 
patterns of spatial arrangements can raise the complexity embedded in objects of knowledge 
to levels that are not easily tractable. These levels of complexity set limits to the 
computational capacities of the human mind so that the Cartesian idea of a transparent mind 
that apprehends a transparent universe and, thus, generates “clear and distinct ideas”, which 
can be represented by univocal symbols, does not prevail anymore. The alternative becomes 
an epistemology that contends with types of human knowledge within human reach and with 
possibilities of supplementing the limited human abilities with artifacts, such as bureaucracies 
and electronic computers, as in early modern times human vision was supplemented by the 
telescope and later by the microscope. Moreover, taking these levels of spatial arrangements 
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into account shows that some patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy do not only go 
beyond the spatial boundaries of individual organisms, but they also go beyond the life-span 
of individual human beings. Our ancestry as information processors go back to genetically 
programmed patterns of organizing matter that include certain physiological aspects and 
processing abilities that humans share with other members of the animal kingdom. For 
instance, humans share optical, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile abilities with other 
animals, especially mammals, and it is, in fact, claimed that some animals are better than 
humans in respect to some of these abilities. Cats, it seems, see better, and dogs smell better 
than humans. The awareness of the patterns of spatial organization that humans share with 
other members of the animal kingdom implies that looking at human knowing as information 
processing is not a top-down process that assumes non-material processors (the mind in 
particular) and looks at the way these non-material processors function within organic bodies, 
which are assumed to play vicarious roles as compared to their mental counterparts. Instead, 
knowing as information processing calls for a bottom-up approach that looks at patterns of 
(self-)organizing matter and energy beginning from the molecular level up to human societies 
and their artistic creations. This approach shows that higher processes of enriching data with 
meaning and value and subjecting it to specific purposes cannot be dissociated from the 
spatial arrangements at the molecular level and the constitution and functioning of the 
nervous system through the transmission of electrochemical signals. Likewise, interactions 
between individual humans cannot be dissociated from the genetic heritage that humans as a 
species share since this heritage leads to mutual recognition despite differences in gender, 
race, ethnicity, cultural and social backgrounds, but these differences also allow us to set 
boundaries between ourselves as humans and other members of the animal kingdom, 
members of the vegetal kingdom, and the inorganic universe. This relationship between our 
processing abilities and the way processing abilities have developed in other members of the 
animal kingdom with similar abilities, and the tributary nature of our processing abilities as 
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individuals to the evolution of processing abilities in the homo sapiens is a great challenge to 
normative epistemology, which limits its area of inquiry to the process of human knowing in 
average human adults. Human knowing considered from the perspective of genetic 
inheritance and long evolutionary processes that lead to the formation of the processing 
organs, such as the structuring and functioning of physiological processes that lead to a 
variety of interactions between humans and their immediate and mediated environment, calls 
for looking at the process of human knowing in such a way that substantive, structural, 
behavioral, and functional (teleological) aspects are integrated. This involves a consideration 
of various time spans that led to the process of human knowing as we know it in normal 
human adults in the 20th century. Otherwise, we remain with ideas of an ethereal mind that is 
both metaphysically and qualitatively different from the physiological processes that support 
i.e. a vestige of the medieval soul, which would survive physical decay at death as it is both 
separate and different from processes in the human body, on the one hand; and on the other 
hand, we remain entrapped in well-entrenched boundaries between the inorganic world and 
living systems, the humans and other members of the animal kingdom, and between rational 
processes that we attribute to humans and instinctive reactions that we relegate to non-human 
members of the animal kingdom. The boundaries go even far since even the individual human 
knower, the process of human knowing has often reduced the intellectual abilities to produce 
an objective and universal discourse on reality without realizing that in the long life of the 
philosophical enterprise there is no unanimity about what reality is and that paradigms and 
models that have been used to describe reality have been changing throughout the history of 
humanity.  
 
There is a possibility of reaching a better understanding of the mind and its functioning 
through overcoming the Cartesian dualism. Instead of understanding the mind by radically 
opposing it to the body, it is important to understand the cumulative nature of the human 
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processes that make the functioning of the mind possible. The Cartesian dualism has survived 
since the mind-body problem is often debated within the framework of the Cartesian dualism, 
but also philosophers limit themselves to human adults. However, even within naturalism a 
certain differentiation should be made. Given the wide range of techniques that psychiatric 
examination and treatment involve, a good and useful study of the mind should take both 
biological and psychosocial processes into account. Taking psychosocial factors into account 
indicates that the mind and the body are not irreconcilable entities that are unified at birth by 
divine authority or chance. They are human processes whose differences can be understood 
following the long history of human individual lives, but also the history of the human race as 
a whole. It is, therefore, possible to look at the mind from different time spans. On the one 
hand, there is a need to understand how the mind has emerged through various processes of 
selection and adaptation that have led to the current situation where humans display mental 
abilities that do not only allow them to claim dominion over animals and other non-human 
beings, but also to devise varied, complex, and complementary techniques that allow humans 
to control and coordinate natural processes and human actions. These techniques do not only 
include technological developments, i.e. the making of mechanical and electronic machines 
that humans use as tools, but also processes such as the domestication of animals and the 
design of various forms of institutions that allow social organization and regulation. Marvin 
Minsky laments that many scholars reduce the study of the mind to one time scale. For him: 
Good theories of the mind must span at least three scales of time: slow, for the billion 
years in which our brains have evolved; fast, for the fleeting weeks and months of 
infancy and childhood; and in between, the centuries of growth of our ideas throughout 
history.64 
 
In addition to these three time scales from Minsky, I would also suggest the inclusion of the 
new realm opened by nanotechnology where “humans are acquiring the capacity to build 
machines that have dimensions and working parts at the level of DNA, ribosomes, proteins, 
and other systems that do the work of life in cells”. In the realm of nanotechnology: 
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Much of the work consists of taking apart and putting together large molecules. We are 
already accustomed to hearing about feats of genetic engineering such as altering the 
genes of bacteria so that they produce chemicals that are useful to us. The cells that 
make up brain and other kinds of tissue are machines of the sort we will be able to 
build. There is no fundamental distinction between naturally occurring and artificial 
machines, between artificial and natural life.65 
 
Taking temporal dimensions, as Minsky suggests, into account shows that mind and 
consciousness as activities rather than entities are not the acts of some kind of disembodied 
rationality that is subsequent to the superiority of the mind over the body or to the qualitative 
superiority of reason over emotion, but a dynamic and integrative rationality that aims at 
achieving human goals within the limits of human physical, emotional, intellectual, ethical, 
and behavioral abilities. In other words, the process of human knowing is the predicament of 
real subjects that are involved in the drama of existence through satisfying their needs and 
exploiting their capabilities. This involvement in the drama of existence is not passive, it 
amounts to a series of activities and processes that require “conscious performance” as the 
subject interacts with his or her human and non-human environment. Conscious performance 
implies, on the one hand, that mind and consciousness are not entities, but activities. On the 
other hand, mind and consciousness cannot be located “inside” the subject as normative 
epistemology and the common parlance have assumed. Instead, they play the role of 
“interface” that Simon attributes to artifacts. On that account, Ryle has pointed out rightly 
that: 
The statement ‘the mind at its own place’, as theorists might construe it, is not true, for 
the mind is not even a metaphorical ‘place’. On the contrary, the chessboard, the 
platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the 
football field are among its places. These are where people work and play stupidly or 
intelligently. ‘Mind’ is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an 
impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games 
are played; it is not the name of another tool with which work is done, or another 
appliance with which games are played.66 
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Going through various levels of information and control creates the impression that 
traditionally established boundaries between inorganic matter and living systems vanish. 
However, this would be a great misunderstanding. It is true that “[i]nformation is an 
epiphenomenon of the physical world, one that even appears in inanimate matter and energy 
when they are ordered into comets or crystals”67. That is why the link between information 
and order is crucial. However: 
To reduce a living system to the level of information, therefore, would be to study the 
ordering of its matter and energy, that is, to analyze it in terms of chemistry and physics 
– a hardly new or inspiring idea. If we wish to exploit the higher order or derivative 
aspects of living systems, we must instead determine how they differ from inanimate 
matter studied by physical scientists; in this sense only will we eschew reductionism.68 
 
Therefore, the notion of information cannot be reduced to spatial arrangements, i.e. structure, 
although the notion of order that underlies processes of structuring is crucial to information. 
Any ordered or structured system/process conveys a certain amount of information. However, 
“[w]hen we compare even the simplest living system to the most complex inorganic materials, 
one difference stands out: the much greater organization found in things organic”69. Although 
we have considered the concept of information from Wiener’s association of information with 
order, there seems to be a difference between the type of complexity found in living 
organisms and the one found in organic matter. Beniger points out this difference by noting 
that “the complexity of crystals, [for instance], derives not from organization but from 
regularity and repetition, that is, from order”70. In other words, although some aspects of 
inorganic matter are well structured in such a way that they display negligible levels of 
entropy or no entropy at all, they are not organisms. This is the case for mechanical systems 
and processes that operate following invariable rules of transformation and linear patterns of 
causality so that when their initial conditions and the rules of transformation are known, it is 
possible to determine their outcomes using simple mathematical relations. However: 
Compared to organization, order contains relatively little information. A simple 
organism like the amoeba, for example, is not at all well ordered; it is a formless bag 
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full of sticky fluid in which irregularly shaped molecules float haphazardly. In stark 
contrast to even the most complex crystalline structure, however, the amoeba is highly 
organized, and indeed its description requires several hundreds large volumes, the 
information capacity of the DNA in which the structure is in fact recorded. That living 
material has greater complexity of organization holds even at the molecular level, which 
explains why students normally learn physical before organic chemistry.71 
 
What differentiates order and organization at the various levels of control is a certain idea of 
purpose. Order at the structural level would imply the explanation of complex systems and 
processes in terms of their components and the interrelations between these components. This 
implies that complex systems and processes that are looked at from the point of view of order 
are reduced to their structures and only considered from the point of view of their structure or 
a random succession of assembling and disassembling. However, an insight attributed to John 
von Neumann (1903-1957) is that the difference between order and organization is that the 
latter “always involves ‘purposive’ or end-directness”72. This insight that has originally aimed 
at introducing the idea of teleology within the life science would mean that “organization is 
more than mere order; order lacks end-directedness: organization is end-directled”73. In other 
words: 
What we recognize in the end-directedness or purpose of organization is the essential 
property of control, already defined as purposive influence toward a predetermined 
goal. Control accounts for the difference between even the most complex inorganic 
crystal and simple organisms like the amoeba: the amoeba controls both itself and its 
environment: the crystal does not.74 
 
The link between control and information resides in the fact that “every living [system] 
processes information to effect control”75. Therefore, there is no information processing that 
does not effect control. Control implies setting limits and these limits are established through 
predetermined goals. It is these predetermined goals that determine the threshold values that 
trigger feedback processes in cybernetic systems. Otherwise, our contention that any ordered 
system/process conveys a certain amount of information would be inaccurate, given the fact 
that without control some processes may go on ad infinitum to the point of becoming 
meaningless through defying the limited human computational abilities. These processes may 
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also become valueless through the lack of criteria of evaluation that are, most of the time, 
idealizations, such as principles and values. In the hypothetical case where some systems and 
processes would be able to process information without effecting control, these systems and 
processes may reach a degree of randomness that renders them unsuitable for our definition of 
information processing as enriching data with value and meaning for the purpose of decision-
making and problem-solving. There is, therefore, a link between information and control on 
the one hand, and information and life on the other hand. The reason for this is, as Beniger 
has noted, that “nothing that is not alive can do [process information to effect control] – 
nothing, that is, except certain artifacts of our own invention”76. The ability of artifacts to 
effect through information processing originates in the fact that the goals are predetermined 
by the inventor and embedded in the structuring and the functioning of the artifacts. In brief: 
Purposive organization and control, in other words, define the tangible discontinuity 
that distinguishes life from the inorganic universe. On one side, the exclusive province 
of the physical sciences, we find only matter, energy, and their ordering in the 
epiphenomenon we call information. On the other side, our own side in that we are 
ourselves living systems, we find structures purposefully organized (in von Neumann’s 
sense) for information processing, communication, and control, the special subject 
matter of the behavioral and life and life sciences.77 
 
Therefore, despite the descriptive advantages and the insights brought by comparing Fuchs-
Kittowski’s and Beniger’s levels of control reducing information to patterns of (self-
)organizing matter does not give the whole picture. The spatial arrangements that determine 
the patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy are important as they are at the origin of 
the physiological processes that make information processing in living systems possible. 
However, information itself is not only linked to control, but also to programming. 
Programming is important because: 
If purpose is to be explained in other than metaphysical terms, however, its goal must 
exist prior to the behavior that it influences in some material form, on the government 
rolls, for instance, that motivated the original Latin contrarotulare. All control is thus 
programmed: it depends on physically encoded information, which must include both 
the goals towards which a process is to be influenced and the procedures for processing 
additional information towards that end.78 
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The great achievement of microprocessors is that they can store both the programs and the 
instructions they act upon. In the early years of computing, this capacity created the 
impression that computers can perform all the functions that are traditionally ascribed to the 
human mind. Therefore, the strong AI (Artificial Intelligence) program aimed at elaborating 
computer versions of human minds. Looking at information from the point of view of a 
metaphysics of substance, which would imply that information is a “thing”, material or not, 
remains unproductive. It only perpetuates static models that set themselves the goals of 
establishing permanent foundations of knowledge in a substance model of reality that implies 
that the human minds produce infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible knowledge. However, 
the model of knowledge that we have suggested aims at elaborating a model of human 
knowing that does not strive for a “God’s eye view”. So, it does not set a process of human 
knowing that leads to truth, the whole truth, and nothing else except the truth. The 
informational model of knowledge looks at how actual processes of human knowing occur on 
the basis of the physiological processes that sustain them leading to epistemological processes 
of enriching immediate data of experience with value and meaning and subjecting it to 
purposes such as decision-making and problem-solving. Following this model, human 
knowing is not the activity of an isolated individual mind, but the triggering of processes of 
insight accumulation through enriching immediate data of experience with meaning and value 
and subjecting it to purposes in a process that implies a continuous flux where new data is 
integrated in a pre-existing explanatory framework that determines which decisions can be 
made or which actions can be undertaken. In other words, information processing means that 
processes are triggered by the constitution of the processors themselves, i.e. spatial 
arrangements, but these spatial arrangements on their own are not sufficient. They operate 
within the thresholds of control processes that determine critical values that trigger feedback 
processes. In most living systems and artifacts, these critical values are pre-established either 
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through genetic inheritance, learning, explicit rules, or programs on silicon chips, but these 
critical values also depend on predetermined goals that give information an intrinsic link with 
programming. Knowing as information processing implies that a “program must exist prior to 
the behavior that it influences”79. Programming, therefore, is a great challenge to linear 
patterns of causality and the metaphysical and epistemological models that support them. 
Traditionally, it is believed that causes and effects succeed each other chronologically, with 
the causes generating the effects. However, with programming the causes cannot be reduced 
to their structure or the processes that trigger and effect their behavior. Not only are causes 
and behaving systems structured, but also functional systems and processes. The function of 
any behaving system/process determines the system’s end or purpose. From this point of 
view, information does not only act as a structuring factor and a trigger of behavioral 
processes, but also as an inviting final cause.  
 
Information’s acting as an inviting final cause implies the possibility of removing mystery 
from teleology. Removing mystery from teleology creates a possibility of studying organized 
complexity by reevaluating spacio-temporal relations not in terms of material bodies colliding 
randomly, but in terms of organized processes that are oriented towards a goal in a changing 
environment. In fact, “[f]eedback control shows how a system can work towards goals and 
adapt to a changing environment,80 therefore removing mystery from teleology”81. Removing 
mystery from teleology implies the possibility of identifying mundane goal-oriented processes 
that fall within the limits of human capabilities and aspirations. Therefore, teleology in this 
context should not be confused with the ultimate and absolute requirements associated with 
the Aristotelian “unmovable mover” as the “final cause”. Teleology should be associated with 
the awareness that causality should not be apprehended solely in an instrumental sense 
reducing rationality to the search for means to an end. Teleology should be integrated into all 
goal-oriented processes that aim at reducing the gap between a desired and an existing 
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situation. These processes which include the defining of the goals themselves take place in a 
dynamic (changing) environment and within the limits of human cognitive abilities.  
Therefore, human knowing as a goal-oriented process should not be understood solely in 
terms of its mechanisms, but also in terms of its goals. Epistemology should then not be 
confined to asking questions about “what is knowledge” and “how it is acquired”, but, as 
philosophers (lovers of wisdom), epistemologists should ask the question of “why to know” 
as well. Taking all these questions into account leads to a model of human knowing that 
integrates issues of meaning, value, and purpose into a goal-oriented dynamic and integrative 
process. Therefore, problem-solving is part and parcel of the process of human knowing. As 
Simon has pointed out: 
What is required is the ability to recognize the goal, and to detect the differences 
between the current situation and the goal, and actions that can reduce such differences: 
precisely the capabilities embodied in a system like the General Problem Solver.82 
 
The intrinsic links between information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy, 
control as a “purposive influence towards a predetermined goal”83and programming as 
prearranging “information that guides subsequent behavior”84, puts information on a threefold 
time framework where information is related to its origin in genetic inheritance, learning, 
explicit rules, and mechanical and electronic programming, and, at the same time, is linked 
with its actual form of existence in macromolecules (DNA), human brains or nervous 
systems, bureaucracies and other social organizations, and human mechanical and electronic 
artifacts including symbolic and formalized artifacts, such as computer software. Information 
is also future-oriented since it acts as an inviting final cause that sets limits to structuring and 
behavioral processes that trigger feedback processes when critical values are reached. 
Information processors operate within thresholds of crucial values that determine their 
structure and behavior as these systems and processes fulfill predetermined goals. This 
threefold temporal framework creates a situation where information has structural, behavioral, 
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and functional (teleological) aspects, given its role in taking memories of the past into account 
(including at the species level through genetic inheritance, at the individual level through 
learning, at the social level through explicit rules that are effected through coercion, 
persuasion, and other means, at the technical level through goals and rules embedded in 
artifacts through design and manufacturing), but also challenges and opportunities of the 
present, and expectations of the future (goals). It is this future orientation of information 
processing that links the concept of information with control through programming, but also 
with decision. As Beniger has pointed out, “programs control by determining decisions”85. In 
fact: 
The process of control involves comparison of new information (inputs) to stored 
patterns of instructions (programming) to decide among a predetermined set of 
contingent behaviors (possible outputs).86 
 
In other words, “[t]o decide is to control, in short, and to control is to decide; information 
processing and programming make both possible”87. Therefore, knowing as information 
processing implies looking at the process of human knowing not as a mental process detached 
from its physical substrate, but as a series of interacting processes that include the various 
levels of spatial arrangements that lead to purposefully organized physiological and 
behavioral processes that lead to the generation, the storage, the use, the transformation, and 
the transmission of human knowing and its possible outcomes (knowledge). This calls for a 
dynamic and integrative epistemology that does not look at the outcomes of the process of 
human knowing, i.e. knowledge, but at the process itself. This change of focus has the 
advantage of showing that various approaches and schools of thought that are normally 
opposed in normative epistemology are stages in one continuum or that the radical separation, 
or even opposition of mental processes to physical processes, is an artificial boundary that 
separates and opposes processes that occur at different levels of control, but nevertheless 
contribute to all the possibilities of human knowing as a dynamic and integrative process. 
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3. The Three Facets of Information 
Inquiring about knowing as information processing does not exclude looking for immutable 
characteristics that one can associate with universal substances or metaphysical essences. In 
addition to taking the fact that information processing depends on processes and structures 
(spatial arrangements) that take place at various levels, i.e. the macromolecular, the 
neurophysiological, the social, and the artificial, into account, one also has to take the fact that 
information processing occurs according to a temporal framework into account. Fuchs-
Kittowski and his colleague Bodo Wenzlaff have elaborated, in addition to the framework that 
locates information at five levels of organization and is in many respects similar to Beniger’s 
levels of control, a horizontal approach that links information with three aspects, namely 
form, content, and effect. In Fuchs-Kittowski’s own words: 
We have come to distinguish five qualitatively different levels of organization which 
support one another. Each level is connected with three aspects – form, content, and 
effect – pertaining to three qualitatively different process stages – mapping, interpreting, 
and evaluating – in the generation and use of information.88 
 
 
Information, therefore, can not only be understood, from a hierarchical point of view that 
links information processing to various spatial and temporal processes at each level of 
organization from the molecular level to the personal and social level, but information can 
also be understood from the point of view of its three modes of existence, namely spatial, 
temporal, and spatial and temporal. From this perspective, information can be apprehended as 
stabilized by mapping resulting in structure as the relevant aspect. In case information is in a 
linguistic form, for instance, structure is equivalent to syntax. Information, therefore, looked 
at from the point of view of its spatial existence can be associated with various patterns of 
(self-)organizing matter and energy. However, information evolves over time, and this 
evolution amounts to a process of interpreting mapped information. Interpreting mapped 
information generates meaning, and, for the special case of linguistic information, it is 
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interpreting syntax that makes the passage from syntax to semantics possible. Except in 
highly formalized languages, such as those used in logical inference, mathematical operations, 
or computer algorithms, there is no necessary relation between syntax and semantics. In 
highly formalized languages, it becomes possible to link syntax and semantics since the 
symbols are assigned fixed meanings and references in their definitions. The effect of 
integrating the spatial and temporal existence of information amounts to evaluating the 
outcome of one’s interpretation of mapped information. This stage results in behavior after 
the structure and the meaning of information have been grasped. For linguistic information, 
evaluating and behavior are the special realms of pragmatics. 
 
This characterization of information according to three aspects, i.e. form, process/content, and 
effect, implies that information cannot be reduced to one or the other aspects. On the one 
hand, information cannot be reduced to its form as this would amount to reducing information 
to its spatial existence, i.e. various spatial arrangements allow mapping and create structure 
or, for linguistic information, syntax. Moreover, information cannot be reduced to generating 
meaning through interpreting or semantics as these processes are only possible given that 
information is first presented in form of certain temporary arrangements, i.e. mapping. 
Information cannot even be reduced to the effects of the two processes that would amount to 
evaluating behavior or pragmatics. Information should be understood from the point of view 
of a dynamic and integrative framework since, as Fuchs-Kittowski has noted, “none one of 
the levels of organization of living systems, can the phenomenon of information be reduced 
solely to the aspect of form”89. This is what Fuchs-Kittowski calls the principle of the 
irreducibility of information.90 
 
Understanding the notion of information within a dynamic and integrative process of 
mapping, interpreting, and evaluating points to the fact that information processing itself is 
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indeed a process that cannot be reduced to its final result. Not only does information 
processing occurs at many levels, but it also takes place in many steps. Fuchs-Kittowski 
focuses on mapping, interpreting, and evaluating as a process that results in structure, 
meaning, and behavior, but this process also depends on the spatial, the temporal, and the 
spatio-temporal (an integration of the spatial and temporal) existence of information. In the 
special case of linguistic information, this process amounts to syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics. Therefore, in addition to viewing information as a multilevel process, information 
can also be viewed as a multi-step process that combines a form (structure or spatial 
arrangement), a content, or a process that results in the evolution of informational processes 
over time, and an effect, or a goal. On an abstract level, one can characterize information not 
as a substance or a “thing”, but as a series of processes that integrate structure, behavior, and 
function (teleology). For the specific case of linguistic information, information integrates 
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects in a dynamic and integrative process that involves 
enriching the immediate data of experience with meaning and value for purposes such as 
decision-making and problem-solving. 
 
Not surprisingly, despite a difference in terminology, Beniger confirms the intrinsic relation 
between information processing and control by identifying three analytic dimensions of 
controls that result from (self)-organizing matter and energy.91 From the perspective of the 
intrinsic links between information and control, Beniger confirms this pattern by locating 
analytic dimensions of control systems to the levels of existence, experience, and evolution.92 
These levels imply that at each level of control there is a static and a dynamic dimension, 
which imply that the three aspects of information, i.e. mapping, interpreting, and evaluating, 
attest to a pattern of being, behaving, and becoming93 that is embedded in the notion of 
information itself. That is why information can only be understood from a dynamic and 
integrative point of view as static and dynamic aspects are intrinsically linked in such a way 
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that from the static point of view of being and in the absence of external change that counters 
entropy, living organisms fulfill the need of maintaining the processing of matter and energy 
through a control system that amounts to some fixed programming that runs throughout the 
system.94 Otherwise, the system itself loses its structure. The dynamic process that ensures the 
supply of energy in living organisms is a metabolism that transforms matter from external 
sources, food, for instance, into forms of energy usable by the living organisms themselves 
for their self-maintenance and for doing work. Behaving or experience implies from a static 
point of view responsiveness during the life of one system as the external environment 
changes. The dynamic aspect of behaving is adaptability. Behaving implies that organisms 
fulfill the need for goal-directed responses to changes in external conditions through feedback 
processes that control external inputs and outputs. These feedback processes operate through 
the ability to reweigh (change in the quantity of matter) or to reprogram (change in the 
predetermined course of behavior).95 Evolution or becoming implies preservation of 
programming with advantageous modification and this goal is achieved through the ability to 
replicate or otherwise to communicate programs to new generations with high fidelity, and 
sometimes with modifications linked with adaptation patterns within the species due to 
important changes in the environment. Changes are effected across generations of programs 
through differential selection of systems.96 In other words, information understood from the 
point of view of the different levels of spatial arrangements (processors) at processing occurs 
through patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy, on the one hand, and processes of 
being, behaving, and becoming, on the other hand, information itself cannot be understood 
following a static framework that would reduce it to structure. In addition to structure, there is 
behavior that determines the patterns of changes over time and function (or goal/end) which 
set boundaries at critical values in a way that when these critical values are reached feedback 
processes are triggered. Information, therefore, has structural, behavioral, and functional 
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(teleological) dimensions that make information a notion that can better be understood from 
the point of view of its dynamic and integrative patterns. 
 
All in all,”[i]n order to understand information, cybernetics has produced models such as the 
computer metaphor, by which it is possible to grasp some characteristics of information in a 
first step”97. Cybernetics, therefore, was considered as a great achievement as it provided a 
possibility of linking information with physics. In other words, cybernetics defined 
information as “a measurable magnitude whose transformation can be described by a physical 
formula”98, i.e. negative entropy. In this respect, cybernetics as a conceptual framework made 
a step forward as an alternative to mechanics, given the fact that mechanical models by 
reducing reality to matter, motion, and immutable mechanical laws have no place for aspects 
such as order and organization. Moreover, mechanical models remain entrapped in a 
metaphysics of substance that reduces reality to its permanent and immutable characteristics 
that are considered as features of reality itself, i.e. substances or essences as opposed to 
appearance or accidents. Applying a mechanical model to the notion of information would be 
counterproductive as according to a mechanical view: 
The nervous system works with representations of the outside world; information is a 
substance, and the mind like a vessel receiving and storing information. If we adopt this 
view, we forfeit the possibility of understanding the nervous system as an operationally 
closed system with ever possible new structures emerging from one moment to the 
next.99 
 
However, “[i]nformation is embedded in the interaction of natural physical forces, and it 
allows a new dimension for determining the way they act”100. Therefore: 
In examining how information is physically possible, the discussion of the essence of 
information is closely related to physics. In looking at what information brings about, it 
is related to biology and all the branches of science concerned with the investigation of 
organization.101 
 
In other words, “we need to recognize that information itself is a physical structure and, at the 
same time, a force dominating physical structure”102. From this point of view: 
 221 
the essence of information can only be grasped if we regard the structure and function if 
information as a basic relationship between the physical effects of natural forces and 
organization.103 
 
This approach does not only allow an understanding of the notion of information in its 
dynamism, but it also avoids the tendency of “reducing information to its sources and 
channels”104 as is done in classic information theory. 
 
B. THE DYNAMIC AND INTEGRATIVE NATURE OF HUMAN KNOWING 
Defining knowing as insights accumulation through information processing implies a change 
of perspective in epistemology. While normative epistemology begins its inquiries by asking 
the question “what is knowledge?” and then attempts to circumscribe the realm of knowledge 
by eliminating its possible conceptual competitors and confounders and examining its nature, 
possibilities, limits, and conditions, dynamic and integrative epistemology upholds that 
knowing is, first and most of all, an activity of the knower. As such, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology avoids reducing the process of human knowing to its end, i.e. knowledge itself. 
This would be similar to reducing one’s journey to one’s destination. Dynamic and integrative 
epistemology, therefore, does not begin by asking the question “what is knowledge?”. From 
the perspective that human knowing is an activity of the knower, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology instead asks the question “what am I doing when I am knowing?”105. 
 
This question that is at the beginning of Lonergan’s epistemology also implies a change of 
method. Instead of beginning by defining knowledge and then pinning down various aspects 
of the concept,  
First, we shall appeal to the successful sciences to form a preliminary notion of method. 
Secondly, we shall go behind the procedures of the natural sciences to something both 
more general and more fundamental, namely, the procedures of the human mind. 
Thirdly, in the procedures of the human mind we shall discern a transcendental method, 
that is, a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise. Fourthly, 
we shall indicate the relevance of transcendental method in the formulation of other, 
more special methods appropriate to particular fields.106 
 222 
 
Lonergan then points out that as humans when we are knowing we are not always doing one 
and the same thing. The process of human knowing includes activities such as seeing, 
hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, 
formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, 
deciding, speaking, writing [and reading].107 These activities can be classified into four 
operations, namely experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), and acting.108 
These operations correspond to four levels of consciousness, namely (1) the empirical, (2) the 
intellectual, (3) the rational, and (4) the responsible.109 The empirical level is the level of the 
sensual; the intellectual level is the level of inquiry, understanding, and expression; the 
rational level is the level of reflection and judgement of the truth or falsity of a proposition; 
while the responsible level is the level by which we apply what we know to ourselves and 
come to a decision of how we should act, given what we know.110 Lonergan’s method is 
described as transcendental because: 
any attempt to modify it will inescapably utilize the very method it speaks about. 
Anyone advancing a proposition will go through the process of attending to data; 
understanding the data by means of imagining what it can possibly mean; reflecting 
upon the resultant conceptions and theories in order to determine if it matches with the 
facts; and finally deciding what implications the resulting knowledge has for one's life 
and actions.111 
 
Lonergan’s epistemology, therefore, does not only focus on knowledge, but on the process of 
human knowing itself. It looks at the various operations that are involved in this process. 
Lonergan’s epistemology does not focus on “contents of consciousness”, but on the 
transcendental method as “a heightening of consciousness that brings to light our conscious 
and intentional operations and thereby leads to the answers to three basic questions”112. These 
questions are: “What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing so knowing? What do I 
know when I do it?”113. Answering these three questions brings together various areas of 
philosophy as: 
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The first answer is a cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is a 
metaphysics where, however, the metaphysics is transcendental, an integration of 
heuristic structures, and not some categorical speculation that reveals that all is water, or 
matter, or spirit, or spirit or what have you.114 
 
Therefore, Lonergan, by focusing on the operations themselves and not on their outcome, i.e. 
focusing on the process of human knowing itself and not on a fixed idea of knowledge 
thought of as a “thing”, Lonergan goes beyond normative epistemology’s attempts to define 
the contents of consciousness first, and then determine how these contents of consciousness 
are related to concrete objects in time and space. Instead, Lonergan suggests that: 
We must, then, enlarge our interest, recall that one and the same operation not only 
intends an object but also reveals an intending subject, discover in our own experience 
the concrete truth of that general statement. That discovery, of course, is not a matter of 
looking, inspecting, gazing upon. It is an awareness, not of what is intended, but of the 
intending.115 
 
This founding of the epistemological enterprises not on the objects of human intentionality 
and the contents of consciousness that are generated by their apprehension, but on the 
intending inquirer who is aware of various operations of inquiry implies that “[a]ll of these 
operations are directed towards, intend, an object”116 and that, in fact, “the operations are the 
operations of a subject”117. There is, therefore, no confusion between the subject and the 
object. What is important from the point of view of founding epistemology on knowing as an 
activity of the knower rather than separating the object and the subject and then attempting to 
establish invariant relationships between the contents of consciousness and the objects they 
refer to is that “[t]he subject is aware of these operations”118. If the word introspection is to be 
used to describe this awareness it must overcome its underlying conception of knowing as a 
process similar to the understanding of consciousness as a container where sensations and 
ideas are stored. Instead, introspection “must be understood to signify what the subject does 
when the contents of consciousness are objectified”119. It is this process by which the contents 
of consciousness are objectified that the subjects do not only become aware of the objects, but 
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also of their awareness of these objects. This awareness does not only lead to insights, but it 
also points to the fact that: 
Just as we move from the data of sense through inquiry, insight, reflection, judgment, to 
statements about sensible things, so too we move from the data of consciousness 
through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to statements about conscious 
subjects and their operations.120 
 
However, the link between Lonergan’s epistemology and the dynamic and integrative model 
of epistemology, which we have suggested, may remain obscure unless one takes the dynamic 
and integrative patterns that are embedded in the notion of information itself into account. 
When these patterns are taken into account, one becomes aware that Lonergan is aware of the 
dynamic and integrative nature of human knowing although he himself does not use the 
notion of information itself. Setting the problem of human knowing as a problem of 
information, i.e. “one depending on its solution on the interrelationships among programming, 
information processing, decision and control”121, implies that Lonergan’ epistemology can be 
linked to information by noting that as one attends data at the experiential stage of the process 
of human knowing, one tries to achieve accurate representations by paying attention. Whereas 
understanding achieves meaning through intelligence, judging creates value by comparing 
concrete situations with principles and values that are, in fact, idealizations. The resource 
needed at the level of judgment is reasonableness since the third level of consciousness is 
mainly evaluative; the level of deciding and acting achieves concrete goals and has 
responsibility as its resource. Therefore, the schematic representation of the dynamic and 
integrative model of epistemology that we have been building from the second chapter can be 
completed as follows: 
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This pattern is in many respects similar to Schultheis’ and Sumner’s definition of information 
as data enriched with meaning and value for the purpose of decision-making and problem-
solving122 and to Drucker’s definition of knowledge as information that transforms someone 
or something in order to make better decisions and carry better actions. Acting or deciding not 
to act achieves concrete practical goals.123 In other words, if we establish a parallelism 
between the three facets of information, i.e. mapping, interpreting, and evaluating, and the 
patterns described by Schultheis and Sumner, Lonergan, and Drucker, we realize that 
information processing has an intrinsically transforming ability linked to the notion of 
information itself. By defining knowing as accumulating insights through information 
processing, one enhances dynamism and integration by setting as one’s horizon an equally 
dynamic and integrative end, i.e. insight. Insight, as the result of an integration of new 
data/experiences into an existing explanatory framework, acts as a limiting factor or critical 
value that triggers feedback processes. One should keep in mind that feedback processes can 
either reserve the behavior of a system/process or start or influence other adaptive changes, 
such as the reduction or the increase of inputs, the change of structure, or the 
increase/decrease of outputs. 
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In the case of a process of human knowing, insight operates as a feedback trigger since (a) 
new insight does not only solve the puzzle(s) that is/are at the origin of the tension of inquiry, 
but it also assists in understanding some areas of the existing explanatory framework that 
were still misunderstood. Metaphorically, new insights shed light to obscure aspects of 
existing explanatory frameworks. For instance, defining knowing as information processing 
implies not focusing on the end of the process of human knowing, i.e. knowledge itself, but 
by tackling the whole process in its dynamic and integrative patterns. Reducing the process of 
human knowing to its outcome would be similar to reducing one’s journey to one’s 
destination, a practice that become prevalent in mechanics’ search for fixity and uniformity as 
characteristics of universal and objective knowledge. However, in mental processes, fixing is 
only achieved by fixing meaning, reference, and rules of transformation in such a way that the 
same causes lead to the same effects regardless of the context or the actor. This only happens 
in artificial environments or in constrained natural processes where uniformity is achieved 
through fixing structure, behavioral processes, and goals. The fixed models work well in 
symbolic systems, such as rules of logical inference, mathematical operations, and computer 
algorithms, as the symbols and the rules of transformation used in these systems acquire fixed 
meanings without having any specific reference. 
 
However, a dynamic and integrative epistemology that bases itself on cybernetic rather than 
mechanical models implies that human knowing is an ongoing process of insight 
accumulation which involves integration of new data/experiences in existing explanatory 
frameworks. These explanatory frameworks emanate from genetic inheritance, childhood 
experiences and upbringing, learning through conscious pratice and rules and procedures of 
verification embedded in scientific institutions and bureaucracies or testing by various 
mechanical and electronic artifacts which can indicate the occurring and the degree of other 
phenomena, given the fact that the designers and manufacturers of these instruments would 
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have calibrated this function in the structure and the functioning of these artifacts. Insight 
does not only play the role of integrating new data/experience in existing explanatory 
frameworks, but it can also challenge these frameworks by pointing at biases, oversights that 
have been taken for granted for a long time and foresights that have been neglected or simply 
ignored. Knowing, therefore, as a process of insight accumulation through information 
processing, is not an activity of isolated minds as normative epistemology would contend. 
Knowing is an activity of the whole organism. Even at the level of organism, individual 
organisms cannot be reduced to the physical dimensions of the body. These organisms are in 
continuous interactions with their human and non-human environments and they are tributary 
to the physiological structures and processes they share with other members of the animal 
kingdom through genetic inheritance. Moreover, individual organisms partake in cultural and 
social patterns acquired in early childhood and adult life through upbringing and conscious 
practice and follow various principles and rules established various institutions. Individual 
organisms integrate themselves in these institutions by self-appropriating these principles and 
rules through coercion, persuasion, and other means of securing compliance. Genetic 
inheritance, learned behavioral patterns, principles, and rules all act as programs that 
influence people’s behavior in various contexts. 
 
Dynamic and integrative epistemology, therefore, implies a knower who is an “open system” 
and who continuously accumulates insights by integrating new inputs, i.e. data/experiences, in 
existing explanatory frameworks, but who also discards outputs that do not enhance the 
process of human knowing, such as biases, oversights, and the negligence of foresights, and 
retains useful insights, such as solutions to problems and successful decisions. This implies 
that human knowing is an ongoing process that builds on the physiological and genetic 
resources of individual knowers, but also on the cultural, institutional, and technological 
heritage of humankind. That is why in the information society, for instance, electronic 
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computers enhance the process of human knowing by performing a number of tasks that are 
traditionally performed by humans, such as calculations, but also by providing new methods, 
such as computer simulations, or even paradigms, models and metaphors, such as computer 
models of the mind or of the whole universe. 
 
However, there is a difference between information processing, i.e. enriching data with value 
and meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving, and computing. 
Computing is a mechanical process that is often associated with Turing machines. There is an 
intrinsic link between computability and decidability. According to Beniger: 
Any decision tree of finite length can be duplicated by a finite automaton, thereby 
equating the question of decidability with that of computability, a connection that has 
brought considerable convergence of mathematics, logic, and computer science with 
traditionally humanistic disciplines like philosophy, linguistics and cognitive 
psychology.124 
 
This linking of computability and decidability does not only originate in the relation between 
decision and programming since etymologically, “ the origin of decision in the Latin verb 
decidere, to cut off”125 implies “purposefully to determine the ultimate function – to influence 
towards a desired goal”126. Computability and decidability are also linked from the 
perspective of information as a measurable magnitude. Wiener defines the unit amount of 
information as “a single decision between equally probable alternatives”127. However, 
Beniger is quick in pointing out that: 
As we have already seen with programming, such decision implies neither voluntarism 
nor free will; it carries no vitalist or other metaphysical implications. All decisions are 
determined in the sense that, for a given program, the same input will always result in 
the same decision or output.128 
 
Computing, therefore, radicalizes the assumptions, the procedures, and the methods of 
normative epistemology as computing does not only fulfill fixed goals by transforming fixed 
inputs (univocal propositions or abstract symbols) following fixed rules of transformation, 
such as mathematical operations, rules of logical inference, and computer algorithms. Those 
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who confuse computing and information processing miss the fact that computing requires 
preprocessing. Preprocessing is necessary for computing as “[a]ttention to symbols rich in 
meaning shifts the essence of control from communication to prior programming of its 
receiver”129. This implies that: 
For the engineer, communication involves a quantifiable amount of information that 
“flows” from A to B; for the semiotician, A communicates by “pointing” (by whatever 
means) to information already stored in B.130 
 
In practice: 
pointing must involve information flow (symbols must be sensed before they 
communicate, and the engineering model requires “decoding” of information by its 
receiver for communication to occur”131 
 
However, computing eliminates the interpreting processes associated with sensing symbols 
and decoding information as computing by relying on unambiguous “nominal definitions”132 
or abstract symbols in a way that members of a set and non-members are mutually exclusive. 
Unlike explanatory definitions that “include something further that, were it not in the 
definition, would have to be added as a postulate”133, nominal definitions play the role of 
fixing meaning and reference which eliminates any possibility for interpretation. Computing, 
therefore, amounts to a process of digitalization which creates a pattern of “all or nothing”. In 
fact, in information systems digital signals are distinguished from analog signals by the fact 
that analog signals are sent continuously while digital signals are discrete.134 This distinction 
can be used to describe the difference between information processing and computing. 
Whereas information processing is an ongoing process of encountering data/experiences that 
can be enriched with meaning and value for the purpose of making decisions and finding 
solutions to problems, digitalization is a form of packaging insights into compartments that 
are circumscribed by ridigity both in the definition of inputs and the formulation of the rules 
of transformation. There is, therefore, a certain continuity between modern science, normative 
epistemology, and computing since the three approaches operate on nominal definitions that 
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establish rigid boundaries between members and non-members of domains of inquiry and 
control processes by rigid, invariable rules of transformation. Computing, in other words, 
radicalizes the methods, procedures, and models of modern science and normative 
epistemology as it aims at levels of accuracy that are only possible in artificial or constrained 
natural environments. 
 
Information processing, in contradistinction to computing, is a continuous process of 
accumulating insights through enriching data with value and meaning for the purpose of 
decision-making and problem-solving. This process implies that as we come across new data, 
experience, or new events, we integrate them in existing explanatory frameworks. This 
process implies an awareness of the experiences themselves and the process of experiencing 
and achieving representations as accurate as our perceptive abilities allow. However, 
information processing does not end with perceiving, regardless of how accurate the 
perceptions are. Humans are not passive spectators of external stimuli, they also inquire, 
understand, and express themselves actively. Through the processes of inquiry and 
understanding perceptions become meaningful, adding to the process of human knowing 
semantic aspects. In other words, perceiving spatial arrangements, i.e. patterns of order or 
(self-)organizing matter and energy, is not sufficient to render data or new experiences 
meaningful. There is active involvement of the knower, which has a transformative effect. 
Piaget has pointed to this fact. For him: 
Knowing does not really imply making a copy of reality but, rather, reacting to it and 
transforming it (either apparently or effectively) in such a way as to include it 
functionally in the transformation systems with which these acts are linked.135 
 
Therefore, knowing cannot be reduced to a speculative enterprise that reduces reality to linear 
processes that can be univocally translated into the predication calculus as computing would 
require. Knowing implies enriching the immediate data of experience with value and meaning 
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as knowing culminates in acting or, at least, in deciding not to act. Piaget has added to the 
transformative nature of human knowing the fact that: 
The active nature of knowledge is manifest from the start in its most elementary forms. 
Sensorimotor intelligence consists in the direct coordination of actions without 
representation or thought. Perception is meaningless without some accompanying 
action.136 
 
In other words, “all knowledge at all levels is linked to action”137 because insights 
accumulation through enriching the immediate data of experience with value and meaning 
and subjecting it to purposes of decision-making and problem-solving. Information 
processing, therefore, is a dynamic and integrative process that is cumulative, iterative, 
recuurent, and open to correction and revision. Therefore, it is erroneous to reduce the process 
of human knowing to its successful outcomes, i.e. knowledge understood as clear and distinct 
ideas or true justified beliefs. The paradigm shifts that we have suggested imply looking at the 
process of human knowing in its complexity and dynamism since knowing as a process 
should not be confused with its product (knowledge). As Dretske has pointed out, “[a] process 
[...] is not simply a temporally extended entity, a mere succession of events. [...] Processes are 
something else. Or, something more.”138 According to Dretske: 
A process is the bringing out, the causing, of a terminal condition, state, or object – 
what I have so far called, and will continue to call, its product. The product is a part of 
the process, and therefore, the process isn’t complete until that product is produced.139 
 
Knowing as information processing is not merely representing the external world, but also 
creatively selecting meaningful and valuable perceptions and transforming them into useful 
knowledge as in every process of human knowing something new is learned, existing 
knowledge is confirmed, or past errors are corrected or either simply acknowledged. 
According to Putnam, “learning is not merely a matter of applying what one already knows to 
additional cases, but of making conceptual leaps, of projecting oneself imaginatively into new 
ways of thinking”140. The process of human knowing, therefore, implies an active 
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involvement of the knower, but it is also selective. Not all data we come across becomes 
meaningful or valuable so that we can subject it to purposes. In Lonergan’s terms: 
The intending of our senses is an attending; it normally is selective but not creative. The 
intending of our imaginations may be representative or creative. What is grasped in 
insight, is neither an actually given datum of sense nor a creation of the imagination but 
an intelligible organization that may or may not be relevant to data.141 
 
Defining knowing as accumulating insights through information processing implies setting 
insight as a dynamic limit that can trigger feedback processes, but also as a new experiential 
context that can be at the origin of new inquiries. The process of accumulating insights is not 
a linear process, but it goes on and on in a spiral pattern. Insight is, therefore, a determinant of 
wisdom as accumulating insights through information processing militates against the 
“fragmentation of reason”142, which is at the origin of the diversity and the lack of 
communication between certain academic disciplines. Not only are areas of inquiry 
fragmented in different areas of specialization that emanate from the traditional distinction 
between the natural and the social sciences, from established disciplines, such as biology, 
economics, medicine, sociology, and chemistry, but fragmentation also emanates from 
various combinations and re-combinations, such as “A History of Philosophy and 
Economics”, “A Philosophy of the History of Economics”, or “The Economics of 
Philosophizing about History”. In addition to this limitless possibility of creating areas of 
inquiry, methods can be retrospective, descriptive, and prospective and, in practice, methods 
can range from laboratory experiments, quantitative and qualitative analysis, or they can be 
descriptive, analytic, hermeneutic, or critical. However, following Lonergan’s 
“transcendental” method, we become aware that: 
As many operations are conjoined in a single compound knowing, so too the many 
levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the 
eros of the human spirit. To know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it 
must know the true, to know the true, it must know the intelligible, to know the 
intelligible, it must attend to data.143 
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This process implies that instead of considering each operation in isolation or being trapped in 
disciplinary and methodological boundaries, there is a possibility of identifying aspects of 
representation, meaning, value, and purpose that are embedded in various processes of human 
knowing, be they explicit or tacit. Human knowing dynamically integrates “knowing that” 
and “knowing how” with “knowing why” and “knowing when and where”. This approach 
does not only bridge the gaps between various academic disciplines, but also between 
philosophical disciplines themselves including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and other 
philosophical disciplines and their applications. This dynamic and integrative approach to 
epistemology also has the advantage that at the level of an individual knower it overcomes the 
traditional opposition of experiential and intellectual processes through opposing empiricism 
to rationalism, for instance, and the elimination of evaluation processes from the realm of 
rationality. It also militates against the contempt of practical action and the reduction of 
human rational processes to the intellectual dimension. Moreover, by linking information 
processing to genetic inheritance, physiological constitution, cultural and behavioral learning, 
conscious practice, allegiance to institutions, their rules and their principles, and to the use of 
mechanical and electronic processors, dynamic and integrative epistemology overcomes 
solipsism. It shows that knowing is not confined to individual isolated minds or individual 
organisms restricted to the physical boundaries of the body, which assumingly host non-
physical minds. Dynamic and integrative epistemology bridges the gap between processes of 
human knowing in individual subjects and knowing as embedded in groups of humans 
through the ability of creating and communicating meaning through the use of language and 
other artifacts. On the other hand, dynamic and integrative epistemology bridges the gap 
between humans and other members of the animal kingdom by acknowledging a number of 
possible common genetic inheritance that would explain similarities in physiological 
constitution and patterns of behavior, such as caring for the young. 
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This genetic closeness of the homo sapiens to other members of the animal kingdom is a 
challenge to the traditional reduction of human rational processes to slow processes, 
especially those that can be monitored consciously (following the Cartesian tradition), and to 
the relegation of fast, tacit processes to the instinctive level that are associated with animals. 
However, studies in biology and neurophysiology have pointed out that some neural 
processes take place at a speed of nanoseconds. In my view, a process does not lose its 
rationality due to its speed, which renders it untraceable by normal forms of human 
awareness. Furthermore, dynamic and integrative epistemology by defining knowing as 
accumulating insights through information processing and then defining information as 
patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy, bridges the gap between matter and mind so 
that it brings new perspectives on the mind-body problem. 
 
C. WISDOM TO AND FRO AND BACK  
1. The DIKW (Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom) Process 
Although wisdom etymologically defines philosophy, wisdom literature is scarce in today’s 
philosophical literature. Most of the time, wisdom is associated with ancient traditions or 
beliefs emanating from old Asian cultural setups. In popular imagination, wisdom is 
sometimes associated with religious esotericism delving in mystery and being practiced in 
secret societies. For instance, the concept of wisdom is absent from the glossary of Robbins’ 
textbooks on organizational behavior, which are considered to provide an interdisciplinary 
approach to human related issues. Even a well-furnished library, like the one at Heidelberg 
University, does not offer a lot of recent literature on wisdom, except for one book edited by 
the psychologist Robert Sternberg.144 However, the issues of wisdom have come to the fore in 
management sciences, given their association with “knowledge management” and the 
“information society”, which also defines itself as a “knowledge society”. Contemporary 
literature on wisdom is often associated with R. L. Ackoff’s article “From Data to 
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Wisdom”145. In this article, Ackoff puts data, information, knowledge, and wisdom in a 
hierarchical pattern, which implies a filtering process. This filtering process is often captured 
by commentators in the following verses from T. S. Elliot’s poem “The Rock”: 
Where is the Life we have lost in living? 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?146 
 
Some commentators add the line “Where is the knowledge we have lost in data.” This 
filtering pattern would imply, as Neil Fleming has pointed out that: 
A collection of data is not information. 
A collection of information is not knowledge.  
A collection of knowledge is not wisdom.  
A collection of wisdom is not truth.147 
 
Therefore, some commentators have, according to Ackoff’s original insight, presented the 
process from data to wisdom as a process of increase in understanding following increased 
context independence. According to this assessment of the process, information is 
understanding relations, knowledge is understanding patterns, and wisdom is understanding 
principles. For other authors, the process of data to wisdom implies a knowledge pyramid 
with a large base of data and wisdom at the top. However, the portrayal of this process suffers 
from a number of assumptions of normative epistemology that go unquestioned. For instance, 
it reduces knowing to understanding i.e. a practice that, in my view, that reduces human 
knowing and human rationality to the intellectual dimension. This would imply, in 
Lonergan’s terms, reducing the whole process of human knowing to its second level of 
consciousness. Moreover, portraying the process from data to wisdom as a hierarchical 
process, Ackoff’s portrayal of the passage from data to wisdom implies certain linear patterns 
and linear causal relationships that are not suitable for the dynamic and integrative nature of 
human knowing as described in this thesis. Following Ackoff’s model, data is defined as 
“symbols” by Bellinger, Castro, and Mills.148 However, they miss the fact that transforming 
data into symbols requires preprocessing or digitalization. Transforming the immediate data 
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of experience into symbols involves fixing meaning and reference, which renders these 
symbols univocal. This implies that the immediate data is translated into a medium that 
renders it suitable for computability. Preprocessing or digitalizatoin implies an increase of 
computability by reducing information. The immediate data of experience is then approached 
following only a limited number of characteristics (most of the time one) that are considered 
as a variable in the given process of inquiry, or in the case of continuous processes, spatial 
and temporary references are established, such as the study of the evolution of a continuous 
process over time, where values at given time units have to be established, or a population is 
classified according to regular and objective criteria, such as age groups, income, etc. This 
classification of data according to a fixed time unit or other criteria establishes a certain 
regularity in complex data, which then acquire discernible patterns and certain levels of 
simplicity. These discernable patterns bring order (i.e. negative entropy) into complex data so 
that this data can convey information. By defining data as symbols, Bellinger, Castro, and 
Mills, are one step ahead, namely, they avoid the preprocessing or digitalization that is 
involved in transforming immediate data of experience into symbols and the fixing of 
meaning and reference that is involved in the establishing of nominal definitions which 
depend on the paradigmatic nature of predication that we have pointed to in the first chapter. 
Preprocessing or digitalization is a crucial step that many proponents of the reduction of 
knowing to logico-deductive processes skip as they consider data as raw, when it is already 
represented by univocal symbols and described by nominal definitions. In fact, the elaboration 
of Bellinger, Castro, and Mills contradicts their initial reduction of data to symbols. They 
contend that: 
data is raw. It simply exists and has no significance beyond its existence (in and of 
itself). It can exist in any form, usable or not. It does not have meaning of itself. In 
computer parlance, a spreadsheet generally starts out by holding data.149 
 
If data “can exist in any form, usable or not”150, it cannot be reduced to its symbolic 
representation. However, they are right in pointing out that “data has no significance beyond 
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its existence”151. Data, therefore, occurs at the perceptual level, the first or the empirical level 
of consciousness in Lonergan’s terms. Its aim is to achieve accurate representations from the 
continuous flux of perceptive experience in such a way that is both selective and integrative. 
On the one hand, there is a lot of perceptive experience we come across, such as the various 
faces we see in a crowd, but that remain insignificant to us as we cannot integrate them into 
our patterns of knowing as they are neither significant nor meaningful to us. The same would 
apply, for instance, when we encounter a chain of letters (a secret code for instance) with no 
discernable patterns for us, unlike the order involved in the syntax of a language that we 
understand. Therefore, data, raw as it can be, in any form, emanates from immediate 
perceptual experience. Transforming data into symbols implies preprocessing or 
digitalization, which occurs through the establishing of nominal definitions or the 
representation of this data with univocal symbols through fixing meaning and reference. For 
this reason, the preprocessing or digitalization of data is always a selective process. 
 
However, Bellinger, Castro, and Mills point out rightly that “information is data that has been 
given meaning by way of relational connection”152. The human mind is not a tabula rasa. 
Insight is reached through integrating new perceptual experience into preexisting explanatory 
frameworks in such a way that perceptual experiences that are meaningful and valuable are 
the only ones that are preprocessed and integrated into the process of human knowing. It is 
through this integrative process that in the specific case of linguistic information we proceed 
from syntax (spatial arrangements of signs and symbols) to semantics, i.e. making sense of 
the arranged (preprocessed) signs and symbols. Bellinger, Castro, and Mills are right also in 
pointing out that “[t]his ‘meaning’ can be useful, but does not have to be.”153 The implication 
of the fact that meaning can be useful but does not have to be shows that at the level of 
information the aim is understanding through enriching data with meaning. Preprocessing as a 
way of putting order (negative entropy) or discernable patterns in immediate perceptual 
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experiences implies putting data into temporal and spatial arrangements that render data 
capable of conveying information. It is up to the human mind to make sense of these patterns 
in a way that when enriched with meaning, these patterns are understood. This is what occurs 
at the second level or the understanding level of consciousness by which ordered data conveys 
a certain amount of information and the human mind makes sense of them. However, 
grasping the meaning of data organized in regular and simple patterns is not sufficient to 
count for the whole process of human knowing. The distinction here is subtle as if we concur 
with normative epistemology’s reduction of the process of human knowing to its outcome, i.e. 
knowledge. We can accept that understanding is knowing, however, given our broad 
conception of knowledge as polymorph understanding leads only to intellectual insights and 
cannot count for the whole of human knowing in the broad sense that we conceive it as 
accumulating insight through information processing in a processes that integrates many 
operations i.e. experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), and acting and that 
occurs at four levels of consciousness, i.e. the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the 
responsible. 
 
Knowing, therefore, as accumulating insights through information processing is different 
from both information and knowledge, but it requires various processes that are dynamically 
integrated. Therefore, “knowledge is the appropriate collection of information, such that it's 
intent is to be useful”154. Knowledge’s intent to being useful confirms Piaget’s contention that 
“all knowledge at all levels is linked to action”155. Hence, the process of human knowing is 
better understood in its dynamism and integration instead of fragmenting it in its various 
possible components. Not only is its outcome, i.e. knowledge, multifarious, but the processes 
that generate knowledge themselves are also multifarious in addition to the fact that they 
occur at various levels of physiological structuring and functioning and various levels of 
interaction with the environment with various degrees of complexity. On this account, 
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knowing cannot be reduced to understanding since “understanding is an interpolative and 
probabilistic process”156. This probabilistic aspect of understanding links understanding to 
information since the unit of measurement of information is also a probabilistic occurrence 
between two equally probable alternatives.157 This probabilistic aspect contradicts normative 
epistemology’s predilection for success and reduction of knowledge to only successful 
processes of knowing in a way that following normative epistemology’s mechanical 
assumptions, knowing is considered as a deterministic process. Unfortunately, Bellinger, 
Castro, and Mills still hold this view158, maybe because they tackle the concepts of 
information and knowledge within the tenets of an implicit mechanical framework. Instead of 
overhauling the whole conceptual framework and defining knowing within a dynamic and 
integrative framework, which considers deterministic processes as special cases that emanate 
from artificially fixing inputs, outputs, and the rules of transformation, they try to cope with 
the integration of deterministic and probabilistic aspects of human knowing by distinguishing 
information that is “deterministic”159, understanding that is “an interpolative and probabilistic 
process”160, and introducing the concept of wisdom, which they describe as “an extrapolative 
and non-deterministic, non-probabilistic process”161. However, their description of wisdom 
shows striking similarities with the dynamic and integrative model of epistemology that  we 
have suggested so far. In their own words: 
wisdom is an extrapolative and non-deterministic, non-probabilistic process. It calls 
upon all the previous levels of consciousness, and specifically upon special types of 
human programming (moral, ethical codes, etc.). It beckons to give us understanding 
about which there has previously been no understanding, and in doing so, goes far 
beyond understanding itself. It is the essence of philosophical probing.162 
 
Furthermore, wisdom: 
asks questions to which there is no (easily-achievable) answer, and in some cases, to 
which there can be no humanly-known answer period. Wisdom is, therefore, the process 
by which we also discern, or judge, between right and wrong, good and bad.163 
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Therefore, by setting insights as a determinant of human knowing and wisdom, one is invited 
to broaden the scope of epistemological inquiry not by defining knowledge and pinning down 
its nature, possibility, conditions, and limits, but by pointing to the way real processes of 
human knowing occur. Returning to “love of wisdom”, as the etymological definition of 
philosophy suggests, therefore requires to take into account “extrapolative, non-deterministic, 
non-probabilistic” processes that are dynamically integrated in producing meaningful, 
valuable, and useful processes of human knowing. Returning to “love of wisdom” is not a 
retrospective process, but a challenge to the modeling of philosophy on the physical sciences 
– given their success during the last three hundred years – and an attempt to instigate of a 
series of reformulations and suggestions that are based on contemporary natural and social 
science. This reformulations and suggestions imply an epistemological enterprise that 
adequately reasonably Lonergan’s questions “What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is 
doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it. By answering these three questions, we set 
insight as a determinant of both knowing and wisdom as we have defined human knowing as 
accumulating insights through information processing. The sequence from data to wisdom, as 
established by Ackoff and his commentators, is informative, but it sometimes lacks the rigor 
we need for a philosophical description of a dynamic and integrative model of epistemology 
based on the notion of information. Sometimes, this sequence is caught up with mechanical 
assumptions that we have challenged in our description of a cybernetic model and our 
advocacy for systems thinking and the idea of a sequence itself or a hierarchy plays against 
the dynamic and integrative model of epistemology, which we are suggesting. Some 
clarifications need to be made. Some of them have, in fact, been made by Bellinger himself in 
a different publication. He has pointed out, for instance: 
That a collection of data is not information, as Neil indicated, implies that a collection 
of data for which there is no relation between the pieces of data is not information. The 
pieces of data may represent information, yet whether or not it is information depends 
on the understanding of the one perceiving the data.164 
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Therefore, the starting point of a dynamic and integrative epistemology that is based on the 
notion of information is not knowledge itself since this would imply a “substance” 
understanding that tends to portray knowledge as a fixed entity that transcends the 
circumstances and the dynamically integrated processes that lead to its production. A dynamic 
and integrative model of epistemology begins by acknowledging that knowing is, first and 
most of all, an activity of the knower. This does not imply an exaltation of subjectivism, but a 
recognition that objectivity as a result emanates from a strategy of detachment and external 
controls that allow the establishment of scientific knowledge, which “is concerned with things 
as related among themselves”165, unlike common sense, which “is concerned with things as 
related to us”166. Objectivity, therefore, is not attained by eliminating the knower from the 
process of human knowing, but by predefining the type of knowledge one wants to attain and 
putting in place strategies to attain this type of knowledge through external controls including 
artifacts, such as institutions, or mechanical and electronic devices. 
 
The entanglement of Bellinger in the tenets of “substance” thinking is shown by his 
description of information as static. According to Bellinger: 
While information entails an understanding of the relations between data, it generally 
does not provide a foundation for why the data is what it is, nor an indication as to how 
the data is likely to change over time. Information has a tendency to be relatively static 
in time and linear in nature. Information is a relationship between data and, quite 
simply, is what it is, with great dependence on context for its meaning and with little 
implication for the future.167 
 
This assessment of information is erroneous. In addition to the fact that it is based on a wrong 
idea of data, i.e. data reduced to symbols, i.e. after preprocessing or digitalization, this 
conception of information tends to render information a substance, a thing. This is only 
possible if one reduces information to its mapping, and eliminates the interpretive and 
evaluative aspects. Reducing information to its mapping would imply reducing information to 
the various spatial arrangements that constitute it, be they arrangements of macromolecules 
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(DNA for instance), arrangements of neurons and their pulses (the nervous system), 
arrangements of physical objects in the environment, which are, in normative epistemology, 
at the origin of delineation between the object and the subject, or arrangements of cultural, 
mechanical, and electronic artifacts, such as signs and symbols, institutions and machines. 
However, associating information with control and looking at information from its three 
facets of mapping, interpreting, and evaluating shows that the notion of information itself 
embodies aspects of behaving and becoming. Defining information in terms of structure 
remains incomplete. The notion of information is a complex notion that includes substantive, 
structural, behavioral, and functional (teleological or teleogenic) aspects. All these aspects are 
dynamically integrated in such way that the teleological or teleogenic aspects provide an 
antidote to the linear patterns of causality embedded in a substance metaphysics, a mechanical 
model of the universe, and a representational theory of human knowing. Substance 
metaphysics, mechanical models of the universe, and representational theories of human 
knowing aim at fixed by describing reality in terms of characteristics that transcend changes 
in time and space, i.e. substances, immutable mechanical laws that are embedded in the order 
of the universe, and representations that amount to eternal truth. On the contrary, teleological 
or teleogenic processes turn the patterns of linear causality upside down by goals or effects 
that determine means and causes in way that goals/effects constitute limits that either trigger 
feedback processes or end the processes themselves. This has a double advantage. On the one 
hand, the teleological or teleogenic aspects of information systems/processes set limits of 
behavioral processes in a way that avoids the potential limitlessness that is embedded in linear 
patterns of causality which may make them unintelligible, given the limited human 
computational abilities; and, on the other hand, this potential limitlessness that eliminates any 
possibility of feedback may reduce linear processes and their patterns of causality to mere 
randomness eliminating their capacity of conveying information. The way of the conundrum 
of unintelligibility that would emanate from a lack of limiting factors and, hence, of feedback 
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processes or sheer randomness (lack of discernable patterns, or order which would imply the 
highest levels of entropy and, therefore, the absence of information) would imply 
acknowledging that beyond the fixed aspects associated with substance, the notion of 
information embodies a possible metaphysics of relation that looks at spatial arrangements not 
as fixed, but as capable of behaving and becoming in a way that substantive, structural, 
behavioral, and teleological or teleogenic processes are continuously dynamically integrated, 
given the continuous interaction of information processors with an ever changing 
environment. This creates a situation where any change in the environment triggers responses 
in terms of change of structure, behavior or goal in a way that not only spatial arrangements, 
i.e. structures, are the only aspects taken into account, but also relationships and their 
changing patterns. Bellinger has pointed to this fact by noting that: 
Beyond relation there is pattern where pattern is more than simply a relation of 
relations. Pattern embodies both a consistency and completeness of relations which, to 
an extent, creates its own context.168 
 
Therefore: 
When a pattern relation exists amidst the data and information, the pattern has the 
potential to represent knowledge. It only becomes knowledge, however, when one is 
able to realize and understand the patterns and their implications. The patterns 
representing knowledge have a tendency to be more self-contextualizing. That is, the 
pattern tends, to a great extent, to create its own context rather than being context 
dependent to the same extent that information is. A pattern which represents knowledge 
also provides, when the pattern is understood, a high level of reliability or predictability 
as to how the pattern will evolve over time, for patterns are seldom static. Patterns 
which represent knowledge have a completeness to them that information simply does 
not contain.169 
 
Therefore, returning to philosophy as “love of wisdom” implies a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology that takes into account the dynamic and integrative nature of human knowing 
through dynamically integrated processes of experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, 
deciding), and acting in an ever changing environment. On this account, taking the facts that 
“[w]isdom arises when one understands the foundational principles responsible for the 
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patterns representing knowledge being what they are” and that “wisdom, even more so than 
knowledge, tends to create its own context” into account, one can conclude that: 
Information relates to description, definition, or perspective (what, who, when, where).  
Knowledge comprises strategy, practice, method, or approach (how).  
Wisdom embodies principle, insight, moral, or archetype (why).170 
 
However, these distinctions remain unclear unless one understands the process from data to 
wisdom following a pattern of understanding of how integrated patterns of knowing deal with 
differentiated contexts. The first assessment of data, information, knowledge, and wisdom by 
Bellinger, Castro, and Mills ranks these processes following a pattern of increased 
understanding and context independence. This ranking has objectivity and universality as its 
horizon and remains in the context of normative epistemology. It is when one adds to this 
ranking an aspect of complexity, complexity defined as “the degree to which something is 
simultaneously differentiated and integrated”171 that one realizes that dynamic and integrated 
human knowing original in the way dynamically integrated human processes interact with an 
ever changing environment. It is insight understood as the integration of new data or 
experiences into preexisting explanatory frameworks in a way that not only achieves meaning 
through understanding, but also creates value through evaluating existing matters of fact by 
comparing them to principles and values that are, most of the time, idealizations of actual 
objects, systems, and processes. In order to achieve a dynamic and integrative epistemology, a 
series of integrations are required, especially the integration of the formal and informal 
aspects of human knowing, the integration of the various levels of consciousness, and the 
integration of the various artifacts that enhance human processing abilities in the realm of the 
epistemological inquiry, such as institutions, and mechanical and electronic machines. 
 
2. Wisdom in Decision-making and Problem-solving 
It would be an omission to conclude this thesis without looking at the way wisdom is applied 
in decision-making and problem-solving. Not only are these concepts part of our definition of 
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knowing as information processing, i.e. enriching data with meaning and value for the 
purposes of decision-making and problem-solving, but they are also affected by overall 
epistemological assumptions and frameworks. For instance, in the context of normative 
epistemology, the rational choice model of decision-making and problem-solving has been 
put forward. This model depends on assumptions of modern science and normative 
epistemology, such as the idea of a transparent mind whose processes can be monitored. The 
rational choice model of decision-making and problem-solving follows a mechanical model 
that upholds that modern principles of rationality are essentially instrumental. These 
principles match means with goals, or vice-versa. For instance, the practice of budgeting in 
modern societies requires that either one matches one’s budget with what one desires to 
purchase or, when the financial resources available are not sufficient, one has to be contented 
with undertaking only what the financial means allow. According to the principle of 
instrumental rationality, “if you intend that a situation, X, occurs and you believe, in 
agreement with your evidence, that another situation, Y, is the most effective means to X, 
then you rationally should have Y occur”172. Therefore, instrumental rationality implies a 
linear pattern of causation where one cause leads to one effect. It also implies that “purposive 
human action requires deliberate calculation”173. From this assumption follows that human 
decisions and actions are deliberate rational choices, hence, the prominence of a rational 
choice model of rationality. Weizenbaum, for instance, denounces a certain “imperialism of 
instrumental reason” that leads to the replacement of judgment by calculation.174 The rational 
choice model assumes that human decisions and actions are deliberate acts of will emanating 
from the nature of humans as rational animals. In other words, decisions and actions, like 
minds, fall within the realm of an individual’s control. Therefore, it is upon one’s acts of will 
to control one’s rational processes in a “hardheaded”175 way in order to achieve not only 
certainty, but also success. From the point of view of rationality, Raymond Geuss, in 
reference to the purely instrumental conception of reason, states that: 
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This conception of reason denies that there can be any such thing as inherently rational 
ends or goals for human action and asserts that reason is concerned exclusively with 
the choise of effective instruments or means of attaining arbitrary ends.176 
 
The underlying problem is that despite ample evidence that human decision-making and 
problem-solving processes appeal to a multilevel form of rationality, decision theorists are 
reluctant to extend the concept of rationality to its experiential, evaluative, and pragmatic 
dimensions. Instead, they reproduce assumptions and techniques based on the mechanical 
model as a way of rendering decisions analyzable. Decision theorists, in fidelity to the 
Cartesian tradition, are of the view that: 
The basic idea of rational choice theory is that patterns of behavior in societies reflect 
the choices made by individuals as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize 
their costs. In other words, people make decisions about how they should act by 
comparing the costs and benefits of different courses of action. As a result, patterns of 
behavior will develop within the society that result from those choices.177 
 
In other words, “[r]ational decision-making entails choosing an action given one's 
preferences, the actions one could take, and expectations about the outcomes of those 
actions”178. Rational decisions and actions involve processes of identifying preferences, 
ranking, and fulfilling the decision/action at its best. This is made possible through a 
technique of fixing preferences by formalizing them. Formalization renders preferences 
objective and measurable since abstraction turns various preferences into similar kinds. 
Therefore, they can be manipulated as abstract entities. Formalization renders preferences 
quantifiable and suitable for mathematical models. In fact: 
it was originally taken for granted that people’s preferences correspond to abstract 
points to money. (originally the numbers in payoff matrices represented rank orders of 
preferences, but there was a tendency to interpret the numbers as having properties of 
“normal” numbers that can be added, divided, and so on.)179 
 
Quantification and formalization render preferences analyzable and suitable for the 
application of logico-deductive models. Although preferences are subjective and versatile 
even at the individual level, efforts are made to lend themselves objective, univocal, and 
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measurable. There are always attempts to translate preferences into clear and distinct ideas by 
defining them, quantifying them, and ranking them. Self-report questionnaires request 
subjects to give their preferences a numerical value or to rank their preferences on a scale of 
various ranges (from 1 to 5, for instance, 1 being the most preferred and 5 the least preferred 
or vice-versa). The assumption behind these ranking procedures is that human preferences 
cannot only be generalized from one person to another, but they vary from an invariant scale. 
The quantification and formalization of preferences allow the calculation of utility and the 
assignment to all decision-making and problem-solving processes of one goal, namely 
“maximizing utility”. As Messik again has pointed out: 
Rationality, theoretically, a type of choice coherence or consistency, meant expected 
utility maximization in the nonsocial context but something much more complex in 
competitive or mixed motives situations.180 
 
There is, therefore, a transposition of assumptions and methods of normative epistemology in 
the rational choice model of decision-making and problem-solving, especially the 
formalization and quantification of preferences as a way of translating them into univocal 
symbols to which rules of logical inference, mathematical operations, and computer 
algorithms can be applied. This transposition aims at giving the study of decision-making and 
problem-solving processes a scientific flavor by assigning them fixed values and subjecting 
them to linear patterns of causality. In this context, human rationality, reduced to its 
intellectual level, remains inherently instrumental and mathematical models of utility 
calculation and decision under uncertainty can be elaborated. Assuming that the rational 
choice model of decision-making and problem-solving can succeed, the model of rationality it 
presents implies that the rational processes involved in decision-making and problem-solving 
are explicit and can be monitored objectively. Moreover, these processes are autonomous, i.e. 
independent of non-rational processes within the human person, such as emotions and 
prejudices, and, at the same time, they are not subject to any external influence, be it changes 
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in the environment of the decision maker or the problem solver. The rational choice model 
implies that rationality is mainly instrumental and procedural so that one only needs to follow 
a series of predefined steps in order to achieve success. 
 
In other words, proponents of the rational choice model implicitly assume that as rational 
human beings we operate in a world of clear and distinct ideas or preferences. We can 
program our decisions and actions by giving our preferences a quantitative value. This 
quantification of preferences allows us then to rank our preferences in a decreasing or an 
increasing order since, as quantities, preferences become similar in kind and can be compared 
on one scale. By quantifying preferences, they are endowed with univocal meanings and 
made suitable for formalization. The process is indeed not different from the scientific process 
of quantifying qualities and providing them with a spatial dimension through graphic 
representation. The quantification of preferences, like the quantification of quality, puts 
preferences into a medium that renders them analyzable. Following the process of abstraction, 
the rational choice model creates a situation where we can act on preferences by acting on 
their representations. Hence, preferences, quantified and formalized, are suitable for 
normative epistemology as univocal meaning introduces them into a world of fixed symbols 
and rules of inference, which is simple, regular, orderly, and predictable. This world of 
univocal symbols allows individual rational beings to operate in clearly defined contexts 
where the relationships between causes and effects are necessary and where the rules of 
inference, like the rules of the mechanical universe, are immutable. This process of “fixation” 
of both meanings and rules of inference implies that a rational human being operates like a 
mechanical machine with fixed goals, procedures, facts, and values.  
 
Despite the diversity of preferences and values, the rational choice model, in fact, imposes 
one value to all rational human beings, namely maximizing utility. Not only does it imply a 
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fixation of inputs, outputs, meanings, and rules of inference, but it also fixes its goals. In other 
words, objective and universal rational processes, i.e. processes of enriching the immediate 
data of experience with value and meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-
solving, are processes where univocal meanings produce clear and distinct ideas through a 
mechanical process of transforming symbols. This process of transfoming univocal symbols 
following fixed rules of inference is not endless. It ends when certain requirements are 
fulfilled. Modern conceptions of rationality put forward one requirement, namely maximizing 
utility. Utility as a criteria of evaluation of rational processes of decision-making and 
problem-solving implies that, on the one hand, “all actions can be ranked in an order of 
preference (indifference between two or more is possible)”181 and, on the other hand, “if 
action a1 is preferred to a2, and action a2 is preferred to a3, then a1 is preferred to a3”182. The 
first principle is called the principle of “completeness”183 while the second one is the principle 
of “transitivity”184. Some theorists distinguish between situations of “strict preference”185, i.e. 
“when an individual prefers a1 to a2, but not a2 to a1”186 and situations of “weak 
preference”187, i.e. when “an individual has a preference for at least a1, similar to the 
mathematical operator ”188. Situations of indifference occur when “an individual does not 
prefer a1 to a2, or a2 to a1”.189  Other assumptions include that “[a]n individual has full or 
perfect information about exactly what will occur under any choice made [...] [since] decision 
aims at maximizing outcomes”190, and that “[a]n individual has the cognitive ability and time 
to weigh every choice against every other choice”191. 
 
However, the rational choice theory is only applicable in a mechanical universe since it 
assumes that natural systems/processes are linear and continuous causal chains whose 
immutable universal laws can be identified and formulated into simple mathematical 
relations. However, prior to the formulation of laws in mathematical relations, there is a 
criterion of clarity that has to be fulfilled since the type of causal relations that mechanical 
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systems/processes assume demands a certain kind of formalization that emanates from 
univocal representation. Univocal representation eliminates ambiguity, maximizes accuracy, 
and hence, offers a possibility for certainty and “clear and distinct” ideas. This reduction of 
rational processes to mechanical processes implies defining mental states/processes in terms 
of matter and motion, but also clearly delineating their components in clear-cut steps that can 
be formalized into step by step algorithms. Reducing rational processes to mechanical 
processes is tributary to reducing the whole process of human knowing to the empirical 
(experiencing) and the intellectual (understanding) levels of consciousness. 
 
This double reduction automatically excludes the third level of consciousness (judging), 
which is relegated to the level of subjectivity, and the fourth level (acting), which is 
considered as a byproduct of rational or irrational mental processes that it is believed the trail. 
However, in practice not only the process of human knowing is differentiated, but it is also 
integrated since it includes four types of operations, i.e. experiencing, understanding, judging, 
and acting, but as Lonergan has pointed out, the human mind also operates at four levels of 
consciousness, namely the empirical (experiencing), the intellectual (understanding), the 
rational (judging), and the responsible (acting) level. At each level, the human mind performs 
a qualitatively different operation; however, the four levels of consciousness can neither be 
reduced to one nor isolated from each other since they operate in synergetic patterns. Not only 
do they inform each other, but they also provide foundations for each other. What is worth 
noting is that the various levels of consciousness do not have the same telos. Whereas the 
empirical level aims at achieving accurate representations, the intellectual level aims at 
achieving universal and objective knowledge identifying the principles underlying the 
diversity of facts and events. The rational level is mainly evaluative since it compares existing 
facts and situations with desired facts and situations using principles and values that are, most 
of the time, idealizations. This difference in telos implies that the different levels of 
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consciousness do not use the same “mental” tools as each level involves the mind in a 
qualitatively specific activity that is different from others, but related to them in a dynamic 
and integrative way. Moreover, according to Simon: 
First, the [subjective expected utility] theory assumes that a decision maker has a well-
defined utility function, and hence that he can assign a cardinal number as a measure of 
his liking of any particular scenario of events over the future. Second, it assumes that 
the decision maker is confronted with a well-defined set of alternatives to choose from. 
These alternatives need not be one-time choices, but may involve sequences of choices 
or strategies in which each subchoice will be made only at a specified time using the 
information available at that time. Third, it assumes that the decision maker can assign a 
consistent joint probability distribution to all future sets of events. Finally, it assumes 
that the decision maker will (or should) choose the alternative, or strategy that will 
maximize the expected value, in terms of his utility function, of the set of events 
consequent on the strategy. With each strategy, then, is associated a probability 
distribution of future scenarios that can be used to weigh the utilities of those 
scenarios.192 
 
However, shifting from a normative epistemology that does not look for “clear and distinct 
ideas” or “infallible, indubitable, and incorrigible193 beliefs to a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology that accumulates insights through information processing, i.e. enriching data 
with value and meaning for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving, integrates a 
fourfold process of experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), and acting. 
This fourfold process implies a model of rationality that involves a process of searching 
through the maze of an “external” environment constituted by various material, mechanical, 
logical, and symbolic entities and processes and an “internal” environment constituted by 
genetic inheritance, physiological constitution, and other forms of programming, such as 
childhood experiences, upbringing, behavioral patterns learned through conscious practice, 
explicit rules from organizations and institutions to which one has pledged allegiance, and 
operational rules of mechanical and electronic microprocessors. At the individual level, this 
form of rationality integrates emotional, intellectual, evaluative, and pragmatic abilities while 
at the collective level, it takes substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional/teleological 
dimensions into account. The complexity involved in decision-making and problem-solving 
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processes themselves and in both the internal and the external environments implies that the 
human mind, which dynamically integrates four levels of consciousness, operates through 
heuristics (rules of thumb) rather than algorithms. As a matter of fact: 
In some very well structured problem domains, formal procedures, usually called 
algorithms, are available for finding systematically the solution that is best or maximal 
by some criterion. Elementary calculus provides an example of simple algorithm of this 
kind: to find the maximum of a function, take the first derivative, set it equal to zero, 
and solve the resulting equation.194 
 
“In most problem-solving domains of everyday life, however, and even in many formal ones, 
like chess, no such algorithm has been discovered.”195 Therefore, “[i]n most cases of interest, 
the selection of the paths to be searched is not governed by foolproof, systematic procedures, 
but by rules of thumb we call heuristics”196. 
 
By adopting heuristics rather than algorithms, one acknowledges that rationality is not a 
limitless resource that automatically leads to universal and objective knowledge. The 
rationality of heuristics is a tool for searching rather than a direct and infallible path to 
discovery. This type of rationality has been characterized by Simon as “bounded 
rationality”197. “Bounded rationality” is task-oriented, context-dependent, and operates within 
the limits of the computational capabilities of the subject. Instead of constituting itself into a 
limitless resource, the main role of “bounded rationality” is actually to set limits. In fact, 
Simon has pointed out that paradoxically: 
Rationality, then does not determine behavior. Within the area of rationality behavior is 
perfectly flexible and adaptable to abilities, goals, and knowledge. Instead behavior is 
determined by the irrational and nonrational elements that bound the area of 
rationality.198 
 
Therefore, Simon suggests that, for instance, “administrative theory must be concerned with 
the limits of rationality, and the manner in which organization affects these limits for the 
person making decisions”199. This focus on the limits of rationality rather than on rationality 
itself is based on the fact that “behavior is adapted to goals, hence it is artificial, hence reveals 
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only those characteristics of the behaving system that limit the adaptation”200. Therefore, for 
human knowing and human behavior as for any artificial process, “fulfilment of purpose or 
adaptation to a goal, involves a relation among three terms: the purpose or goal, the character 
of the artifact, and the environment”201. Moreover, “bounded rationality” introduces a 
criterion of “good enough” that brings an evaluative element into the process of human 
knowing. This evaluative element links rationality with reasonableness and implies that 
knowing cannot be reduced to thinking or understanding, but that judging, choosing, and 
deciding are part and parcel of the process of human knowing. This evaluative element 
confirms Lonergan’s view that knowing occurs at four levels of consciousness, namely the 
empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the practical. In fact, for Lonergan: 
What promotes the subject from experiential to intellectual consciousness is a fuller 
unfolding of the same intention: for the desire to understand, once understanding is 
reached, becomes the desire to understand correctly; in other words, the intention of 
intelligibility, once an intelligible is reached, becomes the intention of the right 
intelligible, of the true and, through truth, of reality. Finally, the intention of the 
intelligible, the true, the real becomes also the intention of the good, the question of 
value, or what is worthwhile, when the already acting subject confronts his world and 
adverts to his own acting in it.202 
 
A dynamic and integrative model of decision-making and problem-solving based on the 
dynamic and integrative model of epistemology, which we have suggested, would imply 
adopting a model of human knowing that integrates issues of meaning, value, and purpose 
into a goal-oriented dynamic and integrative process. This model would integrate decision-
making and problem-solving in the process of human knowing, unlike normative 
epistemology that separates the realm of thought from the realm of action. In practice, as 
Simon has pointed out: 
What is required is the ability to recognize the goal, and to detect the differences 
between the current situation and the goal, and actions that can reduce such differences: 
precisely the capabilities embodied in a system like the General Problem Solver.203 
 
In other words, whereas previously reality was apprehended in terms of material bodies in 
motion (mechanics), we suggest a paradigm shift from mechanics to a more encompassing 
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cybernetic model where “information theory explains organized complexity in terms of 
reduction of entropy (disorder) that is achieved when systems (organisms, for example) 
absorb energy from external sources and convert it to pattern or structure”204. In other words, 
“[i]n information theory, energy, information and pattern all correspond to negative 
entropy”205. The recognition that energy, information, and pattern correspond to negative 
entropy creates the possibility of studying organized complexity by reevaluating spacio-
temporal relations not in terms of material bodies colliding randomly, but in terms of 
organized processes that are oriented towards a goal in a changing environment. In fact, 
“[f]eedback control shows how a system can work towards goals and adapt to a changing 
environment206, therefore removing mystery from teleology”207. 
 
Removing mystery from teleology implies the possibility of identifying mundane goal-
oriented processes that fall within the limits of human capabilities and aspirations. Therefore, 
teleology in this context should not be confused with the ultimate and absolute requirements 
associated with the Aristotelian “unmovable mover” as “final” or “efficient” cause. Teleology 
should be associated with the awareness that causality should not be apprehended solely in an 
instrumental sense reducing rationality to the search of means to an end. Teleology should be 
integrated into all goal-oriented processes that aim at reducing the gap between a desired and 
an existing situation. These processes that include the defining of the goals themselves take 
place in a dynamic (changing) environment and within the limits of human cognitive abilities. 
Therefore, human knowing as a goal-oriented process should not be understood solely in 
terms of its mechanisms, but also in terms of its goals. Teleology, in other words, should be 
understood in a more mundane sense as a goal that is not out of human reach. This type of 
goal has to be SMART, i.e. Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realizable, and Timely. This 
implies that as we shift the goal post from absolute and universal requirements to human 
attainable boundaries, we are no longer interested in finding the best solutions, i.e. optimizing, 
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as the rational choice model suggests, but in finding solutions that are good enough. This shift 
in the level of goals has been called “satisficing” by Simon. According to Simon:  
In the face of even moderate uncertainty, it seems almost hopeless to strive for 
“optimal” courses of action. When conflicts in values exist, as they almost always do, it 
is not clear how “optimal” is to be defined. But all is not lost. Reconciling alternative 
point of view and different weightings of values becomes somewhat easier if we adopt a 
satisficing point of view: if we look for good enough solutions rather than insisting that 
only the best solutions will do. It may be possible – and it is often possible – to find 
courses of action that almost everyone in a society will tolerate, and that many people 
will even like, provided we aren’t perfectionists who demand an optimum.208 
 
A dynamic and integrative model of rationality implies that one acknowledges that the subject 
has limited information processing and cognitive abilities and yet, at the same time, that 
human knowing cannot be reduced solely to an activity of the mind. Hence, the aim of the 
process of knowing is not the ideal of acquiring true justified beliefs through an infallible 
process of instrumental rationality as defended by normative epistemology. The process of 
human knowing implies adapting one’s abilities to one’s goals following the limited and the 
limiting resources of Simon’s “bounded rationality”. “Bounded rationality” is, in addition to 
acknowledging that knowing includes experiencing, understanding, judging, choosing, 
deciding, and acting, at the origin of an information processing model of human knowing that 
is itself based on the view that: 
(1) a theory of human rationality “must be concerned with procedural rationality – the 
ways in which decisions are made – as with substantial rationality – the content of those 
decisions”; (2) In terms of procedural rationality, “the task is to replace the global 
rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the 
access to information and the computational capabilities that are actually possessed” by 
humans; (3) “human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the 
structure of the task environment and the computational capabilities of the actor”.209 
 
Therefore, the information processing model of human knowing acknowledges the 
impossibility of omniscience.210 Instead of aiming at a type of certainty that transcends all 
times and environments, it engages the subject into a process that is flexible, adaptive, and 
open to correction and learning. In other words, both in decision-making and in problem-
solving, the subject relies on heuristic rules rather than on normative principles embodied in 
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formal logic, probability calculus, or decision theory. In fact, “most problems of any 
importance are computationally intractable, that is, we do not know the optimal solution, nor 
a method for how to find it”211. Moreover: 
The same uncertainty holds for less well-structured problems, such as which job to 
accept, what stocks to invest in, and whom to marry. When optimal solutions are out of 
reach, we are not paralyzed to inaction or doomed to failure. We can use heuristics to 
discover good solutions.212 
 
This is possible as heuristics exploits both the evolving capacity213 of the subject and, at the 
same time, the evolving structures of environments214. As an instrument of “bounded 
rationality”, “a heuristic is a rule whose purpose is to describe the actual process – not merely 
the outcome – of problem-solving”215. In other words, “the rationality of heuristics is not 
simply a means to a given end; the heuristics itself can define what the end is”216. 
 
Simon has pointed out that “the criterion of ‘good enough’, which adjusts in this way [to the 
task, the environment, and abilities of subject] is called an aspiration level”217. However, 
normative epistemology and subsequently the rational choice model of decision-making and 
problem-solving remain silent on the way our aspiration levels are established. Simon points 
out rightly that “[a]t best, the model tells us how to reason about fact and value premises; it 
says nothing about where they come from”218. Moreover: 
When these assumptions are stated explicitly, it becomes obvious that SEU [subjective 
expected utility] theory has never been applied – with or without the largest computers 
– in the real world. Yet one encounters many purported applications in mathematical 
economics, statistics, and management science. Examined more closely, these 
applications retain the formal structure of SEU theory, but substitute for the incredible 
decision problem postulated in that theory either a highly abstracted problem in a world 
reduced to a few equations and variables, with the utility function and the joint 
probability distribution of events assumed to be already provided, or a microproblem 
referring to some tiny, carefully defined and bounded situation carved out of a larger 
real-world reality.219 
 
The key issue is that: 
 
It [the SEU model] is applied to highly simplified representations of a tiny fragment of 
the real world situation, and that the goodness of the decision it will produce depends 
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much more on the adequacy of the approximation assumptions and the data supporting 
them that it does on the computation of a maximizing value according to the prescribed 
SEU decision rule.220 
 
The previous remarks by Simon indicate that in addition to making wrong assumptions about 
the knower cum decision maker and problem solver, the rational choice theory also makes 
wrong assumptions about the world in which the process of human knowing takes place. The 
world in which the rational choice model operates is a simplified, ordered, and predictable 
version of the real world. In this emaciated world, one could be able to examine all the 
available alternatives and predict all the possible outcomes of one’s choices and actions 
accurately. However, the main trait of the real world is its complexity. Even in natural 
sciences, some entities, such as atoms and cells, that are considered as the simplest, 
fundamental, and indivisible units of non-organic and organic bodies, display unprecedented 
complexity both in their constitution, their functioning, and their interaction with other 
elements. Some authors even postulate that the orderly world of Newton’s physics is an 
abstraction that applies to a very small portion of the world. For these authors, deterministic 
chaos221 as well as complexity are essential features of the world. 222 Therefore, a realistic 
study of the process of human knowing and subsequently of decision-making and problem-
solving processes should face the challenge of the complexity of the real world. The challenge 
posed by the complexity of the real world is met by the fact that: 
One doesn’t have to make choices that are infinitely deep in time, that encompass the 
whole range of human values, and in which each problem is interconnected with all the 
other problems in the world. In actual fact, the environment in which we live, in which 
all creatures live, is an environment that is nearly factorable into separate problems. 
Sometimes you’re hungry, sometimes you’re sleepy, sometimes you’re cold. 
Fortunately, you’re not often all three at the same time. Or if you are, all but one of 
these needs can be postponed until the most pressing is taken care of. You have lots of 
other needs, too, but these also do not impinge on you at once.223 
 
In other words, when we make decisions and solve problems in the real world, we are neither 
dealing with the whole world nor are we taking all existing human conditions and values into 
account. We are capable of focusing on limited parts of the world and of using limited 
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abilities. The nature of our decisions does not require us to deal with all the problems at the 
same time. As human beings we are limited both in time and space. Our spatial and temporal 
bond is attested by the fact that we cannot be at two places at the same time. Kant was right to 
suggest that space and time are the a priori of our experience. Our decisions, like ourselves, 
are spatially and temporally bounded. Simon has pointed out that: 
Your decisions are not comprehensive choices over large areas of your life, but are 
generally concerned with rather specific matters, assumed, whether correctly or not, to 
be relatively independent of other, perhaps equally important dimensions of life.224 
 
Moreover: 
 
We live in what might be called a nearly empty world – one in which there are millions 
of variables that in principle could affect each other but that most of the time don’t. [...] 
Perhaps there is actually a very dense network of interconnections in the world, but in 
most of the situations we face we can detect only a modest number of variables or 
considerations that dominate.225 
 
Satisficing is intrinsically linked with “bounded rationality” as limiting our goals to “good 
enough” solutions instead of optimizing our goals implies adopting a modest approach to 
epistemology that is descriptive rather than normative.  
 
3. Institutional Rationality 
Overall processes of human knowing are not necessarily bound to physical and physiological 
processes of the human body. The body as the receptor of sensations and the location of 
immediate experience plays a great role in the process of human knowing and the 
organization of elementary processes. These processes include operations such as (1) 
comparing symbols to determine whether they are identical or not, (2) creating or copying 
symbols lists and associations, (3) finding information that is structured and stored in 
memory. However, processes of human knowing cannot be confined within the physical 
boundaries of individual organisms. As Simon has pointed out: 
provided with only the program output, and without information about the processing 
speed, one cannot determine what kind of physical devices accomplished the 
transformations: whether the program was executed by a solid-state computer, an 
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electro-tube device, an electrical relay machine, or a room full of clerks! Only the 
organization of the processes is determinate.226 
 
In other words, these processes cannot be limited to individual human beings, but they can be 
extended to other artificial systems. Simon has noted that there are several kinds of artificial 
systems, and in his The Sciences of the Artificial he has examined particularly “economic 
systems, the business firm, the human mind, sophisticated engineering designs, and social 
plans”227. In fact: 
Actors are persons, groups, organizations, or networks that are capable of making 
decisions and acting in a more or less coordinated way. The actors may have been 
newly formed, or they may have been newly transformed – but only by a finite set of 
forces. Among them are political struggles, shifts in cultural forms, the development of 
new technologies, and the emergence of opportunities to make economic gains.228 
 
Therefore, actors in their interactions that include cooperation, competition, conflict, and 
exercise of power229 are not totally bounded by rational principles as they engage in 
“purposeful behavior”230. On the contrary, “[s]ocial activity is determined by contextual 
factors, constitutes a fluid and dynamic force maintaining or changing games and their 
contexts”231. On this accout, it is not adequate, in my view, to reduce decision-making and 
problem-solving to thinking.232 This is a vestige of the normative epistemology’s reduction of 
knowing to thinking. Instead, it is important to recognize that: 
(a) the theoretical goal of CPS [complex problem-solving] research is to understand the 
interplay among cognitive, motivational, personal, and social factors when complex, 
novel, dynamic, non-transparent tasks are solved, and 
(b) the interplay among the various components can be understood within an information 
processing model.233 
 
This implies the elaboration of a model that includes “the problem solver, task and 
environment”234 in a situation where “information processing includes the task strategies that 
are selected and processes of task monitoring and progress evaluation”235. This model also 
recognizes the role of the environment, which potentially offers both barriers and 
opportunities. As Frensch and Funke have noted: 
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The environment includes the resources available for problem-solving, as well as 
feedback, expectations, cooperation, peer pressure, disturbances, etc. The environment 
affects both problem solvers and the task. It affects problem solvers by constraining the 
information process that can be used in influencing which knowledge is accessible. The 
environment affects the task by providing additional information, constraining which 
tools may be used, and so on. In addition, the environment can be changed actively by 
the problem solver but not by the task.236 
 
The challenge is rooted in the fact that problems are defined in terms of barriers or gaps 
between an existing and a desired situation and these barriers themselves “are assumed to be 
complex, dynamically changing, and non-transparent”237. This non-transparency of the real is 
due to the complexity of the real, on the one hand, and the limited human processing abilities 
on the other hand. Therefore, knowing defined as accumulating insights thought information 
processing does not aim at providing true answers once and for all; it points to a dynamic and 
integrative process that improves itself through its “ability to learn from success and 
failure”238. All in all, it is important to note that decision-making and problem-solving, as part 
and parcel of the process of human knowing, are embedded in the notion of information itself, 
but they are also generally confronted with limiting factors, such as “(1) the complexity of the 
situation, (2) the connectivity of the variables, (3) the dynamic development of the situation; 
(4) intransparency or opaqueness, (6) polytely (pursue of multiple goals)”239. Therefore, “this 
complex task demands the acquisition and integration of information, the elaboration and 
attainment of goals, action planning, decision-making, self-management”240. All these tasks 
cannot be accomplished by individual minds assumingly hosted by individual human beings. 
They require, in addition to the fact that individual human beings are tributary to their genetic 
inheritance, their early childhood experiences, upbringing, and conscious practice, they are 
also in constant interaction with other humans and their non-human environment. The process 
of human knowing is also, in fact, enhanced by artifacts created by humans themselves to 
enhance their limited computational abilities. These artifacts do not only include mechanical 
and electronic processors, but also organizations specially designed to accomplish specific 
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goals. These artifacts, in my view, found the notion of institutional rationality. Institutional 
rationality is based on the fact that: 
Our institutional environment, like our mental environment, surrounds us with a reliable 
and perceivable pattern of events. We do not have to understand the underlying causal 
mechanisms that produce these events, or the events themselves in all their detail, but 
only their pattern as it impinges on our life, on our needs and wants. The stabilities and 
predictabilities of our environment, social and natural, allow us to cope with the limits 
set by our knowledge and our computational capabilities.241 
 
It is in relation to “institutional rationality” that some popular concepts such as Peter Senge’s 
“learning organization” 242, or more generally, the characterization of the information society 
as “knowledge society”. As corollaries to “institutional rationality”, it is worth noting that in 
its framework there are “structural rationality”243, “substantive rationality”244, “procedural 
rationality”245, and “evaluative rationality”246. Structural rationality “guides the establishment 
of the structure of organizational decision-making”247, i.e. the establishment of both adaptive 
“internal controls”248 and adaptive “external controls”249. In other words: 
structural rationality is always involved with the organization of decision-making where 
structure of a system is defined by the set of relationships between subsystems (groups, 
departments: WHO decides?), between aspects systems (the issues, topics about which 
decisions are taken: WHAT is decided and HOW?) and phase systems (the phases: 
WHEN are decisions taken?).250 
 
Substantive rationality, on the other hand, “is concerned with questions of ‘content’, 
‘substance’, or ‘knowledge’ which guide the outcome of actions over a certain universe of 
discourse”251. Substantive rationality is illustrated by the fact that every universe of discourse 
has its ways and procedures to solve problems that are specific to that universe. For instance, 
economic theory is substantive rationality in solving economic problems252, but the same 
substantive rationality cannot be applied to other domains. For instance, while charity is a 
praiseworthy action in the context of religion or humanitarian action, charity would not be 
accepted following the substantial rationality of economics where it would amount to 
allocating resources to an area that is not productive. Another example of substantive 
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rationality is rules of law, such as statutes and legal substance when deciding legal matters,253 
or technical procedures in the operation of machinery, etiquette, language, and rituals in 
formal social interactions. 
 
Procedural rationality “is concerned with the choice of procedures by which decisions over 
the universe of discourse are taken” while: 
without entering into a discussion of the origin or the teleological orientation of 
organizations (that is whether goals ‘exist’ or are ‘attributed’ to decision makers), 
evaluative rationality refers either to goals towards which decision makers appear to 
strive and/or the criteria by which goal attainment is defined and evaluated.254 
 
In brief, “structural rationality is concerned with structure, evaluative rationality with ends, 
substantive rationality with content and procedural rationality with form”255. Institutional 
rationality is confronted with some problems that have to do with our limited attention, 
multiple values on which various individuals hold dear, and uncertainty. However, these 
limits that are intrinsic to our individual rationality can be superseded by institutional 
rationality. For instance: 
The routine and repetitive requirements of a society are handled in parallel by creating 
specialized groups and organizations, each of which deals with one set of issues while 
the others are dealing with the remainder. If it were not so obvious, we might label this 
the “fundamental theorem of organizational theory”.256 
 
Moreover: 
 
Over a wide range of matters, we can use markets and pricing to limit the amount of 
information each person must have about the decisions he is going to make. When I go 
to a supermarket, I can decide what to buy and what I am going to eat without knowing 
very much about how Wheaties and oatmeal are made, or what the manufacturer’s 
problems are. I need only to know the price at which he is offering these commodities to 
me. For this reason, markets and prices have proved to be extremely powerful 
mechanisms in modern societies for helping each of us to make decisions without 
having to learn a whole lot of detail about other people who may be involved. All 
relevant information is summed up in the price we have to pay in order to make the 
transaction.257 
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In addition to organizations and markets, experts have proved to be very reliable if not 
exclusive solution and advice providers in situations where we do not know which decision to 
make or how to solve a problem. In fact, “in matters of public policy as in matters of medicine 
or plumbing, we turn to experts. Sometimes we even take his advice without asking to have it 
fully explained”258. Experts are not only knowledgeable in their domains, but they also have 
devoted time, talent, and efforts to acquire levels of information and know-how that are 
unmatched by non-specialists. In this situation, it is important that “decentralization of 
decision-making has proved to be a solution to organizational and market boundaries”259. 
Moreover: 
When a domain reaches a point where the knowledge for skillful professional practice 
cannot be acquired in a decade, more or less, then several adaptive developments are 
likely to occur. Specialization will usually increase (as it has, for example, in medicine), 
and practitioners will make an increase use of books and other external reference aids in 
their work.260 
 
In situations where the domain is so vast that the opinion of one expert may not be enough or 
where a domain, such as an academic discipline or a problematic situation, has not yet 
reached the stability of “normal science”261, “adversary proceedings”262 that include experts 
with different views can provide unprecedented insights. According to Simon: 
Adversary proceedings are like markets and organizations in reducing the information 
that participants must have in order to behave rationally. Thus, they provide a highly 
useful mechanism for systems in which information is distributed widely and in which 
different system components have different goals. Each participant in an adversary 
proceeding is supposed to understand thoroughly his own interests and the factual 
considerations relating to them. He need not understand the interests or situations of the 
other participants. Each pleads his own cause, and in doing so, contributes to the general 
pool of knowledge and understanding.263 
 
In addition to human experts, there are non-human “experts” tools, such as maps, dictionaries, 
encyclopedia, reference books, codes of legal principles and proceedings, quality and standard 
control organizations. With the development and the wide diffusion of electronic computers, 
most of the non-human “expert” tools have both print and electronic versions. The most 
common are, for instance, the possibility of navigation through GPS [Global Positioning 
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Systems], which can be used instead of traditional paper based maps when one travels. There 
are also “expert systems” in various domains of specialization. According to Frank Puppe, 
“expert systems are [computer] programs for reconstructing the expertise and reasoning 
capabilities of qualified specialists within limited domains”264. Puppe points out that: 
The preliminary basic assumption is that experts construct their solutions from single 
pieces of knowledge which they select and apply in a suitable sequence. Hence expert 
systems require detailed information about the domain and the strategies for applying 
this information to problem-solving. In order to construct an expert system, the 
knowledge must therefore be formalized, represented in the computer and manipulated 
according to some problem-solving method.265 
 
Moreover, in the context of “bounded rationality”, complexity, uncertainty, and the limited 
computing capabilities of individual experts limit the scope of individuals in both decision-
making and problem-solving. In addition to human and non-human experts, there are 
technical tools for decision-making and problem-solving. According to Simon: 
These new tools are usually assigned to the disciplines of operations research and 
management science – and today to artificial intelligence as well. It is a special 
characteristic of these tools that they allow us to formulate, model, and solve problems 
with thousands of variables and thousands of constraints on the variables, and to take 
account of the interactions of all these variables and constraints in arriving at a 
solution.266 
 
However, some of these techniques pose the problem of applicability. For instance: 
 
One serious limitation on the applicability of operations research and management 
science techniques is that they require problems to be quantified in such a way that 
known mathematical techniques become applicable to them. For example, to employ 
linear programming for solving a problem, the problem first has to be translated (or 
folded, or beaten) into a form that expresses it in terms of linear equations, linear 
constraints, and a linear payoff function. If the world doesn’t have these properties, or 
can’t be approximated adequately in this way, linear programming won’t work.267 
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Defining human knowing as accumulating insights through information processing implies 
challenging in an unprecedented way assumptions that normative epistemology has inherited 
from modern science and its attempts to model human knowing on the physical sciences. It 
implies, therefore, an assessment of how the notion of information has emerged in relation to 
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the physical sciences and other successful sciences, such as biology, neurophysiology, the 
social sciences, computer science, and so forth. The last chapter was an attempt to achieve 
this task by linking the notion of information to Wiener’s definition of information as 
“negative entropy”. Hence, information defined as a certain degree of organization means that 
information can be understood as patterns of (self-)matter and energy. This conception of the 
notion of information links information with some spatial arrangements, be they at the 
macromolecular level, at the neural level, at the social level, or at the technological level. 
Understanding information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy only gives a 
static view of information that can be entrapped in a well-entrenched substance metaphysics, 
which would make a dynamic and integrative model of epistemology, like the one we have 
suggested, impossible. However, when one looks at information from the point of view of its 
capacity for behaving and becoming, one becomes aware that the predilection for fixity in 
both modern science and normative epistemology is unproductive as it limits human knowing 
to its formalized aspects that have emanated from modern science’s search for “clear and 
distinct” ideas, which can only be attained by acting on univocal symbols following invariable 
rules of transformation. These univocal symbols are reached through a process of fixing 
meaning and reference that occurs through preprocessing or digitalization of immediate 
experience. Preprocessing and digitalization imply fragmenting continuous processes into 
regular temporal and spatial parts by fixing temporal and spatial references, such as in the 
calibration of measuring instruments. 
 
By integrating information’s ability to behave and become, the perspective in epistemology is 
changed, which constitutes a dynamic and integrative model of human knowing that considers 
knowing, first and most of all, as an activity of the knower. This approach suggests that 
instead of asking the question “What is knowledge” and trying to clarify its nature, 
possibility, conditions, and limits, one can ask Lonergan’s questions “What am I doing when I 
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am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?”268. Answering 
these three question implies a dynamic and integrative model of epistemology that defines 
knowing as accumulating insights through information processing as the notion of 
information itself integrates spatial arrangements and processes that occur at various levels, 
i.e. at the macromolecular, neural, social, and cultural levels. These processes have static and 
dynamic aspects and are, thereore, not only embedded with the capacities of being, but also 
with the capacities of behaving and becoming. From this perspective, knowing is understood 
in a conceptual framework of complexity by considering substantive, structural, behavioral, 
and functional (teleological, or teleogenic) aspects, which requires taking account of one’s 
goals, changing patterns of behavior over time, structures that act as processors, and the 
“materials” that make the structuring and the functioning of the processors possible at the 
molecular level. 
 
The three facts of information, i.e. being, behaving, and becoming, show striking similarities 
with Lonergan’s process of human knowing as the definition of knowing as information 
processing suggests an assimilation of the two frameworks. The levels of spatial arrangements 
that define the notion of information do not invite epistemology to consider processing by 
individual, disembodied minds, as normative epistemology has often assumed, but to take 
account of the genetic inheritance that determines not only the physiological constitution and 
a number of behavioral patterns of humans and other members of the animal kingdom, but 
also early childhood experience, upbringing, conscious practice, and the assignment of 
explicit rules and other forms of “programming” that influence the process of human 
knowing. Beniger has identified four such types of programming, namely genetic, cultural, 
organizational, and mechanical/electronic programming.269 In Beniger’s view, “each program 
is a contributing cause”270. Taking these levels of spatial arrangements into account creates a 
link between information and organization on the one hand (confirming Wiener’s definition), 
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but also the link between information and predetermined goals (programming). Moreover, the 
notion of information is also linked with embedded processes that determine the way an 
organism’s behavioral processes achieve predetermined goals (control). Linking information 
with organization, control, and programming shows that knowing as information processing 
does not only involve achieving accurate representations, as normative epistemology has 
assumed, but it also involves enriching the immediate data of experience with meaning and 
value for the purpose of decision-making and problem-solving. This process relies on 
resources such as attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility in such a way that 
dynamic and integrative epistemology integrates metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical 
concerns. All in all, knowing as information processing implies that, as Simon has pointed 
out: 
in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something 
else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes 
is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently 
among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.271 
 
However, when knowing is regarded as a dynamic and integrative process that amounts to the 
accumulation of insights through experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), 
and acting, it also needs to be acknowledged that knowing occurs at different levels of 
consciousness. These levels of consciousness, the experiential, the intellectual, the ethical, 
and the practical, do not only correspond to the various operations that lead to them, but they 
also require specific skills that are dynamically integrated in order to enrich data with value 
and meaning in order to fulfill purposes. These skills are not isolated acts, but attitudes that 
shape the process of knowing despite its dynamic and integrative nature. Lonergan has called 
these skills transcendental precepts. For him: 
Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true selves by 
observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be Intelligent, Be reasonable, Be 
responsible. Being attentive includes attention to human affairs. Being intelligent 
includes a grasping of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities. Being reasonable 
includes rejection of what probably would not work but also acknowledgement of what 
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probably would. Being responsible includes basing one’s decisions and choices on an 
unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to oneself, to one’s 
groups, to other groups.272 
  
It is worth noting that: 
 
Progress, of course, is not some single improvement but a continuous flow of them. But 
the transcendental precepts are permanent. Attention, intelligence, reasonableness and 
responsibility are to be exercised not only with respect to the present situation but with 
respect to the subsequent, changed situation.273 
 
All in all, patterns of human knowing in the information society imply a dynamic and 
integrative epistemology that, following Lonergan’s framework, integrates processes of 
experiencing, understanding, judging (choosing, deciding), and acting.274 Information 
processing consists in integrating these processes since experiencing data alone is not 
knowing; the processing of human knowing means that the data that is experienced has to be 
understood through enriching it with meaning, but solely experiencing and understanding data 
do not complete the process of knowing as data that is experienced and understood has to be 
usable. From this point of view, there is an interaction between what happens inside the 
human organism, namely experiencing and understanding, and what happens outside the 
human organism. For this reason, as the knower interacts with his or her human and non-
human environment, the knower has to judge situations, determine whether to act or not, how 
experienced and understood data should be used or if it should be used at all, and how real 
situations stand in relation to principles and values that are, most of the time, idealizations 
used as yardsticks in assessing these real situations. This interactions with the environment 
imply that in addition to experiencing and understanding, human knowing involves processes 
of judging, evaluating, choosing, deciding, and acting, which militate for an epistemological 
model that goes beyond normative epistemology’s reduction of knowing to its intellectual 
dimensions. Dynamic and integrative epistemology does not find its foundation in the search 
for immutable universal laws that assumingly represent substances, but in a process that 
dynamically integrates the knower’s emotional (pathos), intellectual (logos), evaluative 
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(ethos), and pragmatic (praxis, phronesis) abilities. These abilities are not to be opposed to 
each other as some of them have been considered as enemies of rationality by normative 
epistemology and modern rationalism. They are part and parcel of the process of human 
knowing since knowing as information processing, i.e. enriching the immediate data of 
experience with value and meaning for the purposes of decision-making and problem-solving, 
means operating at four levels of consciousness, i.e. the empirical, the intellectual, the 
rational, and the responsible, as Lonergan has indicated.275 
 
Dynamic and integrative epistemology by describing knowing as information processing 
brings together Lonergan’s epistemology and Schultheis’ and Sumner’s distinction of 
information and data with Drucker’s definition of knowledge as information that changes 
something or someone for better decisions or actions.276 The impact of these changing 
paradigms are great, not only since dynamic and integrative epistemology solves traditional 
philosophical problems, such as opposing emotion to reason, and empiricism to rationalism, 
creating an epistemology of unsolved and assumingly unsolvable binary oppositions, instead 
of building an epistemology of successions that shows that empiricism, rationalism, critical 
theory, and pragmatism are steps in one dynamic and integrated continuum. From this 
integration of different schools of thought also follows an integration of different methods 
since each operation in the process of human knowing corresponds to a specific level of 
consciousness and a specific school of thought in philosophy. From this point of view, 
dynamic and integrative epistemology integrates empirical, analytic, critical, and 
experimental methods, with each method being used for its specific purpose, instead of using 
analytic methods as a master key that allows us to find out facts (data), grasp their meaning, 
appreciate their value, and assign them various purposes. Moreover, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology overcomes scientific reductionism as it does not look for fundamental particles 
or univocal propositions as foundations of knowing, but it tackles reality in its complexity and 
 270 
dynamism considering its substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional (teleological or 
teleonomic) dimensions. Not only are human mental abilities as reduced to intellectual 
abilities called in by normative epistemology, but there are also other knower’s resources, 
such as attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility that play a contributing role 
since knowing does not solely mean reasoning, but it also includes skill, connoisseurship, and 
commitment.277 Even in the case of scientific knowledge, from which normative 
epistemology draws assumptions and aspirations, skill, connoisseurship, and commitment are 
important as, for instance, the manipulation of scientific equipment is not a logico-deductive 
process. 
 
Last but not least, dynamic and integrative epistemology overcomes solipsism by founding 
itself on the notion of information, which implies, on the one hand, patterns of (self-
)organizing matter and energy, and patterns of being, behaving, and becoming, on the other 
hand. In this way, information and control are intrinsically linked, which leads to situations 
where the knower is not considered as an isolated and immutable entity with an equally 
isolated mind. Instead, the knower is a living human being, who shares with other human 
beings and some other members of the animal kingdom a physiological constitution that is 
tributary to a genetic inheritance that all humans as a species share. Moreover, the knower 
partakes in the cultural, institutional, and technological programming that influence both 
individual and institutional rationality. With the notion of information spatial patterns at the 
level of macromolecules (DNA for instance), the nervous system, culture, institution, and 
technology are taken into account, which creates a possibility of considering the human mind 
not as an immutable entity or an ethereal reality that eludes direct observation and scientific 
experimentation. The human mind can be considered as a control system that regulates the 
interaction of living human beings with their material, mechanical, logical, and symbolic 
environment. Moreover, the human mind as a control system would be an interesting further 
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research area. Further research then would involve a study of the human mind that is not 
based on a mechanical model, as it is usually done, but on the cybernetic model on which 
dynamic and integrative epistemology itself is based. When taking substantive, structural, 
behavioral, and functional (teleological or teleonomic) patterns into account, one tackles “the 
inherent complexity of the real”278. 
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CONCLUSION 
This philosophical study of the epistemological implications of the information 
revolution was a complex undertaking. On the one hand, it was historical in its focus 
attempting to establish relationships of continuity and/or discontinuity with previous 
conceptual frameworks, especially the medieval synthesis, modern science, and 
normative epistemology. The historical focus did not only point out that the information 
society is a sociological process, but also a conceptual framework. As a conceptual 
framework, the information society puts forward information in such a way as the 
information society itself can be studied philosophically as a paradigm that yields as 
much power as similar paradigms that, for instance, have fostered the passage from a 
medieval age, which was dominated by supernaturalism and based its epistemological 
assumptions on tradition, revelation, and reliance on (religious) authority. Looking at the 
information society from a historical point of view showed that there are intrinsic links 
between metaphysics and epistemology as both the description of reality and the 
articulation of knowledge depend on what is considered as real. These links between 
metaphysics and epistemology prompted us to assess the metaphysical changes that 
fostered the emergence of modern science, namely a pervasive shift from supernaturalism 
to naturalism, but also a shift from the reliance on revelation, tradition, and (religious) 
authority, as sources of knowledge, to observation, reasoning, and experimenting. In 
anticipation of the links between epistemological paradigms and sociological processes, 
the historical point of view accounted for a crisis of authority that questioned the 
assumptions of the practices of the medieval Christendom in an unprecedented way. 
These social transformations fostered a certain disintermediation of knowledge that 
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favored individual experience over mediation by authority so that an emerging urban elite 
would undertake knowledge functions without associating them with clerical status. 
Moreover, in this context, the Reformation and the invention of the printing press 
facilitated the access of the masses to devotional books that were previously reserved to 
the clergy. The abundance and the accessibility of knowledge, as compared to previous 
periods, led to a crisis of authority and diversity of opinion. Observations of scientists, 
such as Galileo, challenged the doctrines of the universe that were supported by church 
authorities and that approved of the prevailing social order. People who claimed to be 
enlightened by reason tried to spread their doctrines based on Galileo’s cosmological 
observations and Descartes’ spread of “methodological” doubt and promise of a “new” 
foundation of indubitable, infallible, and incorrigible knowledge. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that, given Descartes’ method based on doubt, normative epistemology aimed 
at establishing certainty, unlike ancient philosophers who defined philosophy as the love 
of wisdom. 
 
Modern science became the model of human knowing since it did not only expand the 
horizon of the human mind through unprecedented observations and precise calculations 
of the dimensions of the universe, but it also provided an alternative foundation of truth, 
given the prevailing Fideism and disputes that led to the religious wars that ravaged 
Europe. There was an urgent need to replace the authority of the Church by the authority 
of reason, and thereby avowing the arbitrary nature of supernatural beliefs and the 
tyranny of authority that led to recorded tragic actions, such as the execution of Galileo, 
and to coercive and repressive institutions, such as the inquisition. Modern science, by 
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founding knowledge on the authority of reason rather than on the authority of the Church, 
fostered the emergence of a new conceptual framework based on naturalism rather than 
supernaturalism, and based on observation, reasoning, and experimenting as sources of 
knowledge instead of revelation, tradition, and authority. Moreover, this new framework 
described the universe as a material, mechanistic, and deterministic system, which did not 
need any explanation and justification outside itself. This universe was regulated by 
universal laws, which could be identified and formulated into simple mathematical 
relations. This conception of the universe influenced normative epistemology in various 
ways as it defined reality in terms of material bodies in motion (the mechanical model) 
and set certainty as the aim of human knowing so that, unlike in ancient times when 
philosophy was the foundations of all the sciences, philosophy strived to be scientific by 
modeling all sciences and knowledge after the physical sciences. This modeling of all 
knowledge after the physical sciences led to the emergence of a normative epistemology 
that aims at certainty and defines knowledge as true justified belief, which reduces 
knowledge to univocal propositions of the form S is P, similar to mathematical 
formulations of universal laws as found in the physical sciences. The reduction of 
knowledge to univocal propositions of the form S is P has been called the Gettier 
problem in standard epistemology books, but there is no agreement on which form of 
justification leads to the certainty embedded in indubitable, infallible, and incorrigible 
knowledge. In other instances, justification has been replaced by warranty. What 
complicates the debate is that the historical origins of these debates are often eliminated 
from epistemological inquiry in an attempt to articulate an a-historical and universal 
epistemological discourse. 
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Nevertheless, normative epistemology, in its attempt to model all human knowledge after 
the physical sciences, contends that knowledge is true justified belief, which amounts to 
univocal propositions. This reduction of human knowledge to propositional knowledge 
does not only reduce the area of epistemological inquiry, but it also ignores the 
paradigmatic nature of predication. As such, normative epistemology sets normative 
criteria for human knowledge instead of describing how real knowledge processes occur. 
The dynamic and integrative model of human knowing, which we suggest as a possible 
alternative, does not only focus on knowledge as an end product, but also on the process 
of human knowing. It acknowledges that human knowing is a multilevel and multifarious 
process, which integrates emotional (pathos), intellectual (logos), evaluative (ethos), and 
practical (praxis) dimensions creating a diversity that is commensurate to various areas of 
human specialization and expertise. All forms of human knowing are insights since 
insight integrates new data or experiences in pre-existing explanatory frameworks in such 
a manner that new insights influence subsequent courses of action. From this point of 
view, knowing cannot be reduced to logico-deductive processes that easily lend 
themselves to formalization and mathematical models. Instead, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology requires to take both explicit and tacit forms of human knowing into 
account so as to integrate, for instance, scientific knowing, which deals with the way 
things relate to each other, with common sense, which deals with the way things relate to 
us. These two forms of human knowing do not have be put in a hierarchical relationship, 
which would imply that one form of human knowing is better than the other. It is more 
academically and practically enriching to realize that the two forms of knowing cannot be 
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expected to produce the same results as they are different both in their telos and  
procedures. Whereas scientific knowing aims at establishing a coded (nominal 
definitions), formalized, systematized, and controlled form of knowledge, which appeals 
to objectivity and universality, common sense appeals to less structured and highly 
context-dependent skills. Scientific forms of human knowing and common sense are at 
two different antipodes of a possible continuum, which would be established by using 
universality and context-dependence as criteria of demarcation. 
 
The conceptual framework of a dynamic and integrative epistemology is not a 
mechanical model, but a cybernetic model. Mechanical models of the universe are based 
on a number of assumptions of the physical sciences, such as the simplicity, the 
regularity, and the orderliness of the universe itself; hence, scientists or natural 
philosophers have the ability to formulate the laws that regulate the universe in simple 
mathematical relations. These assumptions are carried into other areas of human knowing 
that claim the status of a science in such a way that suitability for formalization and 
mathematical models becomes a criterion of evaluating whether a discipline is a science 
or not. However, dynamic and integrative epistemology builds on a cybernetic model that 
does not define reality in terms of matter in/and motion, but in terms of information and 
control through feedback processes. A cybernetic model is more general than a 
mechanical model since the latter can be understood as a special case of a cybernetic 
model where inputs, outputs, and rules of transformation have been fixed. Having the 
possibility of linking information with matter by defining information as patterns of (self-
)organizing matter and energy, a cybernetic model is broader than a mechanical model as 
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a cybernetic model defines reality in terms of matter, motion, logic, and symbolism. This 
way a cybernetic model includes aspects of order and teleology in the process of human 
knowing and these aspects are generally missing in mechanical models. A cybernetic 
model, therefore, goes beyond the linear patterns of causality that characterize 
mechanical models and defines reality in terms of behaving systems that do not operate 
according to linear patterns of causality, by which the same causes lead to the same facts, 
but according to differential laws, where there are no proper causal relations, but inputs 
and outputs that influence each other as when the system/process reaches certain critical 
values that trigger feedback processes. 
 
A cybernetic model of reality, therefore, allows the articulation a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology that does not focus on knowledge, but on the process of human knowing 
itself. Its approach is descriptive rather than normative. It describes how actual processes 
of human knowing occur instead of setting unattainable standards of accuracy, given the 
limited human processing abilities. Dynamic and integrative epistemology defines 
knowing as accumulating insights through information processing. This multilevel and 
multifarious process is rooted in the complexity of the real since complexity renders 
linear patterns of causation and analytic methods unsuitable for its apprehension and 
requires adequate methods for tackling complexity, such as systems thinking. Systems 
thinking does not only take material and mechanistic aspects into account, but also 
substantive, structural, behavioral, and functional (teleological/teleogenic) aspects. 
Taking these aspects into account creates a situation where predetermined goals play a 
limiting role: they trigger feedback processes or halt behaving systems. Predetermined 
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goals also establishes thresholds that a system or a process cannot go beyond without 
destroying itself. Predetermined goals restrict the apparent limitlessness of linear causal 
patterns and their possible randomness at high magnitudes. System thinking, by 
considering teleological/teleogenic processes, does not look for levels of accuracy that 
would solve all the problems once and for all, but it integrates new insights into existing 
explanatory frameworks in such a manner that enhances subsequent actions and solutions 
to problem.  
 
System thinking is, therefore, suitable for a dynamic and integrative epistemology as the 
latter sets insight as its goal and insight itself is multifarious. Insights can, not only be 
theoretical or practical, but they can also be associated with each step in Lonergan’s 
process of human knowing. In this process, specific insights can occur at the emotional, 
intellectual, evaluative, and pragmatic level, in such a way that new insights can not only 
be integrated into existing explanatory frameworks, but some insights are so profound 
that they challenge the explanatory frameworks themselves in a way that they create new 
experiential contexts that lead to new tensions of inquiry. System thinking, given its 
multilevel and multifarious approaches, is also suitable for an information-based, 
dynamic and integrative epistemology. Systems thinking can take into account various 
levels where patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy generate information. 
Moreover, systems thinking integrates various aspects of being, behaving, and becoming 
that are embedded in the notion of information itself. Systems thinking, in brief, is a 
method of handling complexity and can constitute a possible alternative to analytic 
methods, given its multifarious and multilevel approach. 
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Dynamic and integrative epistemology, therefore, derives its dynamic and integrative 
patterns from the notion of information itself. Information, defined by Wiener as negative 
entropy, implies a certain degree of order or organization so that information in living 
systems is associated with various patterns of spatial arrangement, be they at the 
molecular, neural, social, cultural, or technical levels. These patterns of spatial 
arrangements constitute various forms of programming as they convey physiological 
constitutions and patterns of behavior that humans share with other members of the 
animal kingdom through genetic inheritance. At the neural level of organization, the 
vertebrate brain and various neural connections convey information from early childhood 
experience, upbringing, and conscious practice in such a manner that these forms of 
programming influence subsequent behavior and action. Moreover, forms of 
programming can also be embedded in artifacts, such as bureaucracies, and mechanical 
and electronic microprocessors. Therefore, the notion of information embodies different 
forms of programming, but also different forms of control, which trigger feedback 
processes and stop the potential randomness of linear systems/processes. Moreover, the 
notion of information embodies aspects of being, behaving, and becoming, which are at 
the origin of the intrinsic dynamic and integrative patterns of information processing. 
Information, through its aspects of mapping, interpreting, and evaluating, integrates static 
and dynamic aspects so that information processing systems always adapt to their 
environment. Failure to adapt to the environment leads either to the transformation of 
information processing systems into something else or simply to their destruction. The 
interaction of information processing systems is characterized by adaptive patterns that 
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involve various possible changes, such as change of structure, change of behavior, and 
sometimes change of goals. However, sometimes these changes are difficult to isolate as 
they happen concomitantly or as they follow slow temporal patterns. Some adaptive 
changes even remain undetected as they occur in temporal frameworks that are beyond 
the life-time of individual knowers since they involve adaptive changes that occur at the 
species level as changes in the environment trigger changes in either physiological 
structure or patterns of behavior.  
 
All in all, dynamic and integrative epistemology, which is based on a definition of 
knowing as information processing through accumulating insights, responds to three 
shortcomings of normative epistemology, i.e. (1) the reduction of human knowledge to 
univocal propositions, (2) solipsism, and (3) the arbitrary boundaries between rationalism 
vs. empiricism, idealism vs. positivism, principles vs. facts, ideas (concepts) vs. objects, 
and theory vs. practice. Dynamic and integrative epistemology defines knowing in a 
broad way that does not only include true justified belief, i.e. knowing “what”, but it also 
includes “knowing how”, “knowing why”, and “knowing when and where”. The unifying 
aspect of all these forms of knowledge is insight, which implies integrating new 
data/experiences into existing explanatory frameworks or creating new experiential 
contexts that lead to new tensions of inquiry and subsequently new insights. Solipsism is 
overcome since knowing is no longer founded on introspective processes or on the 
assumption of a transparent mind to which each subject has a privileged access. Dynamic 
and integrative epistemology shows that knowing is not an introspective process, which 
involves monitoring one’s ideas, but a dynamic and integrating process, in which the 
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interplay of genetic inheritance, early childhood experience, conscious practice, explicit 
rules and principles with new situations leads to insights that influence subsequent action 
and processes of human knowing. Therefore, in the complex and dynamically integrated 
world we live in, human knowing does not always lead to certainty, but rather to a 
progressive process of insights accumulation that is open to revision, learning, and 
complementation. In such processes of insight accumulation, the human mind operates 
through heuristics in place of clearly defined algorithms and seeks “good enough” 
solutions instead of apprehending reality in an either/or or an all or nothing patterns. 
Seeking “good enough” solutions instead of permanent and absolute foundations is 
“satisficing”, as contrasted to optimizing. One resorts to “satisficing” instead of 
optimizing solutions since human rationality is not an unlimited resource. Our rationality 
is “bounded” by our goals, which remain within the scope of our horizon, our limited 
computational capabilities, and the complexity of the environments in which knowing 
processes take place. There are a number of remedies to the limitations imposed on 
individual knowing subjects by their bounded rationality, such as complementing 
individual rationality by institutional rationality. Satisficing through carrying on 
heuristics in the contenxt of bounded rationality creates the image of the human mind as 
dynamic and integrative process of information and control through feedback as a human 
organism interacts with its environment, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
maintains its defining characteristics within certain thresholds as a way of avoiding 
destruction or transformation into something else. 
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In this context, knowing does not occur in individual minds of individual knowers but in 
dynamic and integrated organisms that operate as wholes and that are related to their 
environments and to other organisms. Different forms of programming do not only 
influence how we know, but also why we know. Moreover, dynamic and integrative 
epistemology, by differentiating information and data, shows that knowing is, first and 
most of all, an activity of the knower with limited computational abilities and an 
increasingly complex world in such a way that individual human rationality has to be 
complemented with institutional rationality as a way of dividing computational labor. 
Thirdly, dynamic and integrative epistemology, by locating the process of human 
knowing at various levels and taking the aspects of being, behaving, and becoming that 
are embedded in the concept of information itself into consideration, militates in favor of 
an epistemology of succession rather than an epistemology of opposition. An 
epistemology of succession would imply that emotional, intellectual, evaluative, and 
pragmatic aspects of human knowing are various operations in one dynamic and 
integrative process, which leads to insight in its diversified forms and enhances 
subsequent actions and problem solving.  
 
In consideration of the core concern of this thesis, which was changing paradigms, a 
dynamic and integrative model of epistemology implies a shift from a classical to a 
historical consciousness. Bynum and Moor have recognized that: 
From time to time, major movements occur in philosophy. These movements begin 
with a few simple, very fertile ideas – ideas that provide philosophers with a new 
prism through which to view philosophical issues. Gradually, philosophical 
methods and problems are refined and understood in terms of these new notions. As 
novel and interesting philosophical results are obtained, the movement grows into 
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an intellectual wave that travels throughout the discipline. A new philosophical 
paradigm emerges. Like a phoenix, philosophy is transformed.1 
 
In our case, this historical consciousness would imply that we look at the world through 
the lenses of cybernetics and that, without rejecting the materiality of objects, we have 
extended our conceptual framework from a world of material atoms to a world of 
symbolic binary digits (1 and O), or BITS in short.2 Moreover, this shift would imply that 
as we recognize the world as a bundle of information, we recognize the emergence of a 
new metaphysics that is a fertile ground for a new epistemology. This new model has 
been conceptualized by Pagels when, with a pinch of Darwinism, he notes that 
information is part and parcel of reality both at the microscopic and at the macroscopic 
level. In his own words: 
Information, be it embodied in organisms, the mind, or the culture, is part of a 
larger selective system that determines through successful competition or 
cooperation what information survives. Information can be encoded in genes, nerve 
sets, or institutions, but the selective system that promotes survival remains 
similar.3 
  
The centrality of the concept of information both at the metaphysical and the 
epistemological level renders information an inviting final cause. This means that human 
knowing as information processing by enriching data with value and meaning for the 
purpose of decision making and problem solving reinstates the very aspects that 
normative epistemology has marginalized, namely purpose, value, and meaning in the 
process of knowing. If these aspects are reinstated, human actions and social 
organizations can no longer be reduced to mere material entities, which interact 
mechanically through the exchange or the transformation of energy. In addition to being 
systems and structures, they are embodiments of meaning and value and they serve 
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specific purposes. This dimension is manifested in the ability to create value and meaning 
by creating and transmitting signs and symbols. Therefore, various areas of human 
interactions and different social organizations are not merely subjected to mechanical, 
universal laws, but they integrate material and mechanic aspects with logical and 
symbolic aspects. If we maintain an informational nature of the meaning and value that 
humans attach to material reality and to the signs and symbols they create and 
communicate, human interaction is not merely a mechanical process where energy is 
exchanged or transformed, but also a flow of information. Paradoxically, many of our 
contemporaries are unaware of the symbolic aspect of our interactions, such as 
exchanging money (a symbol of value) for goods and services, appending signatures 
(symbols of our self-appropriation) to documents, respecting certain dress codes in 
certain circumstances (symbols of our role and status in society), referring to individuals 
by their titles, wearing wedding rings, and abiding by traffic rules. This informational 
aspect of human interaction is not a random process, but it is purposeful. In this respect, 
information is an inviting final cause.  
 
With the flow of information within and outside systems, the ordered and simple universe 
of classical science is more and more challenged. We are more and more aware that 
science is a specialized type of knowledge which is achieved through codification, 
formalization, and systematization. Hence, science cannot embody the whole of human 
knowledge. Therefore, the limitations that the scientific model and its subsequent 
normative epistemology face when applied to human affairs (including knowing) are real, 
 291
though dissimilar to those it faces when applied to natural phenomena. As Prigogine and 
Stengers have noted: 
Today we are beginning to see more clearly the limits of Newtonian rationality. A 
more consistent conception of science and nature seems to be emerging. This new 
conception paves the way for a new unity of knowledge and culture.4 
 
The special conditions in which scientific knowledge occurs are different from the 
ordinary conditions of our living. The standards of objectivity and universality it requires 
have been challenged by a number of scientists, given the complex and chaotic patterns 
of certain parameters when they are pushed beyond certain limits. Rescher recognizes 
that: 
Objectivity will have to take context into account, seeing that different individuals 
and groups confront very different objective situations. Rationality is universal, but it 
is circumstantially universal – and objectivity with it.5 
 
The recognition of the importance of the context and the knower challenges the scientific 
predilection for abstraction. Abstraction distorts reality and renders knowledge 
inaccessible and sometimes even useless. This view is emphasized by Prigogine and 
Stengers when they point out that: 
The progress of science has often been described in terms of rupture, as a shift from 
concrete experience towards a level of abstraction that is increasingly difficult to 
grasp. We believe that this kind of interpretation is only a reflection, at the 
epistemological level, of the historical situation in which classical science found 
itself, a consequence of its inability to include in its theoretical frame vast areas of the 
relationship between man and his environment.6 
 
Among these “vast areas of the relationship between man and his environment” is the 
informational component of reality. The cybernetics model that we have adopted has 
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proved that we live in a world where natural phenomena, human behavior, organizational 
methods, cultural values, social structures, and various living and non-living organisms 
can be considered as huge information processors, given the interaction of their 
components and their interaction with their environments. These objects and systems are 
capable of creating meaning and value through the production, storage and 
transformation of information. From this perspective, the universe can be conceived as a 
bundle of information rather than as an aggregate of atoms. In addition to the 
mechanistic, materialistic, and deterministic view promoted by classical science, there is 
room for the exploration of an information model that recognizes that atoms are not only 
material entities in motion, but that, owing to the electronic configuration that determines 
the way they assemble and disassemble, they do not only collide, but they also exchange 
information in terms of electrons. 
 
Likewise, small and big organisms can be understood as information systems by virtue of 
genetic information, which is inherited from generation to generation, and by virtue of 
various types of information that are stored in form of beliefs, memories, challenges, 
opportunities, expectations, fears, hopes, and illusions. In this way both the universe and 
the human person can be considered as information systems. The universe, for instance, 
can be portrayed as a huge analog (not digital) computer while the human person can, in 
addition to older metaphors such as “social animal” or “thinking substance” can be 
understood as “being [a] digital animal”.7 Not all the disciplines reduce information to the 
fundamental level of binary digits. However, across disciplines, information has been 
receiving unprecedented attention. For instance, in business schools, “Management 
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Information Systems” is a compulsory subject and in various companies the post of 
information technology manager is highly respected and brings significant financial and 
social benefits. In microbiology, genetic transmission has been considered as a 
transmission of fundamental particles – genes – that yield an invariable chemical 
composition. However, this area of human life is more and more understood as a 
transmission of information from one generation to another. In fact, one genetic 
“outlook” or “composition” is called a “genetic code”. As Rose has noted, “to continue 
the linguistic, information theory metaphor within which genetic theory was now to be 
formulated, the directed synthesis of RNA on DNA was termed transcription, and the 
synthesis of protein on the RNA was translation”8. Therefore, an info-computionalist 
model of reality, knowledge, mind, and consciousness is possible because as Bynum and 
Moor have noted: 
Computing provides philosophy with such a set of simple, but incredibly fertile, 
notions, new and evolving subject matters, methods, and models for philosophical 
inquiry. Computing brings new opportunities and challenges to traditional 
activities. As a result, computing is changing the professional activities of 
philosophers, including how they do research, how they cooperate with each other, 
and how they teach their courses. More importantly, computing is changing the 
way philosophers understand foundational concepts in philosophy, such as mind, 
consciousness, experience, reasoning, truth, ethics and creativity. This trend in 
philosophical inquiry that incorporates computing in terms of a subject matter, a 
method, or a model has been gaining momentum steadily.9 
 
In other words, by bringing new subject matters, methods, and models into philosophy, 
computing creates in philosophy, what Thomas Kuhn in his famous The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions10 calls, a paradigm shift.  
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Source: DanielBell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: Foreword 1999. New York: 
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